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CNS EventsCNS Forum: Experts Discuss China's ASAT Test
Event Date: February 2, 2007 Report by Erik Quam, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program Introduction On January 11, 2007 (UTC) China conducted a kinetic energy (KE) anti-satellite (ASAT) test, whereby China's military shot down the Fengyun-1C (FY-1C) weather satellite with a ballistic missile armed with a non-explosive warhead. According to U.S. intelligence reports, the test was the fourth known Chinese exercise involving a ballistic missile launch in what appears to be an ongoing program to develop China's ASAT capabilities; the January launch was the first resulting in the destruction of the target satellite. The impact of the missile's collision with the satellite caused a massive debris field in low-Earth orbit (LEO) and has the potential to endanger future space exploration and utilization, as well as threaten currently orbiting space objects such as the International Space Station (ISS). In light of this test, the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) held a panel discussion on February 2, 2007, that included three presentations by CNS researchers. Dr. Clay Moltz, CNS Deputy Director, opened the discussion by laying out the history of space weaponization and the international treaties and agreements that have thus far governed the weaponization and use of space. That was followed by a presentation by Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, Director of the CNS Education Program, on the Chinese space program. Finally, Stephanie Lieggi, Research Associate at Center's East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) discussed the details of the Chinese test, as well as the international ramifications and the potential political and economic fallout for China and its space program. Dr. Monte Bullard, who was also in attendance, provided some insight into China's military doctrine. History of ASAT Development Opening the discussion, Dr. Moltz gave an introduction and background to the history of international cooperation on space treaties. Dr. Moltz began by pointing out that while there have been instances of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and ASAT weapon tests, there has thus far never been an overtly hostile use of weapons in space by one state against the assets of another state. China's test was the first KE ASAT test in more than 22 years; the last test was in 1985 when the United States destroyed an obsolete weather satellite. This most recent test now begs the question of whether or not this practice will continue and whether or not it will encourage development of similar capabilities by other states. Several different ASAT systems have been developed and tested by the U.S. and former Soviet space programs. The United States first tested three small nuclear weapons in space in 1958. Then, in 1960, the United States conducted high-altitude nuclear tests as a part of the Hardtack series for ABM purposes. On July 9, 1962, the United States conducted a major test of a high-yield weapon in space--Starfish Prime--in which a Thor rocket was launched carrying a W49 thermonuclear warhead. The warhead exploded 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. The Starfish Prime test disabled six orbiting satellites, a large percentage of all the orbiting satellites at that time. Dr. Moltz noted that this sent a clear warning to the international community about the problems of nuclear detonations in the atmosphere because they could severely hinder the orbit and use of satellites. Another system that was in development in the United States at this time was the Nike-Zeus system, also known as Project 550. With a range of only 200 miles, this system was not considered useful and was scrapped. Program 437, also developed by the United States, began in the early 1960s and was officially discontinued on April 1, 1975. This program was based on the successes of a series of prior high-altitude nuclear tests and subsequent conventional proximity tests all carried out after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force. The program's facilities were located on Johnston Island. This program was ultimately deemed to be too expensive and difficult to use. U.S. researchers also realized that the system would cause the same damage to U.S. satellite systems that it would do to foreign systems. In the end, a hurricane swept through the islands and destroyed all of the facilities related to the program which were never rebuilt. The Soviet Union also tested nuclear devices for ABM purposes before 1963 and developed a conventional, co-orbital ASAT system between 1968 and 1982. Another ASAT technology that has been experimented with by several countries--including the United States, Russia, China, and India--is high-powered lasers. Laser systems can be deployed on the ground or on aircraft for anti-ballistic missile defenses. The lasers can be deployed against satellites from these platforms, where they "paint" the satellite by blinding them. More powerful lasers could also be used to destroy satellites by burning holes in, or otherwise disabling them. Although no state has admitted to testing these systems, both the United States and China have accused each other of using lasers to blind their satellites. In September 2006, U.S. officials accused China of using a laser to "paint" a U.S. reconnaissance satellite.[1] When asked whether or not there were ASAT systems that did not cause debris, Dr. Moltz pointed out that the ground signals can be attacked or lasers used to "paint" satellites without actually destroying space assets and causing debris. He noted that destroying a satellite was the bluntest of ASAT methods. Adding to the discussion about Chinese laser systems, Dr. Monte Bullard noted that over 20 years ago he was part of a group of U.S. officials given a tour a Chinese laser factory. Dr. Bullard commented that he was surprised it took them so long to test these capabilities as the use of asymmetric weapons has been in the PLA military doctrine for a long time. According to Dr. Bullard, the Chinese military does not have to come up with a perfect weapon--they just need to inflict enough damage on the U.S. Navy to hinder its capabilities in a Taiwan scenario. The Road Ahead Dr. Moltz went on to outline four possible steps for the international community to take in order to deal with the issue of ASAT systems and development. The first option is that the international community develops and ratifies a treaty to ban all destructive weapons in space. This treaty would not ban jammers or other non-lethal systems. The second option would be to strengthen existing treaties, including the Outer Space Treaty. That treaty states that a state must give notification if you are going to do anything that might be considered harmful to the space environment. Specifically, Article IX says that states must give prior notification before conducting any test in space that might prove harmful to the space environment. The third option would be a "rules of the road" agreement between all of the space faring states aimed at preventing debris generation, including in weapons tests. This agreement could also include an understanding that no state will interfere with the satellites or space assets of another state. A final option discussed was for the United States and other states to develop robust space weapons systems. This option was recently touted by U.S. Senator Jon Kyl.[2] Dr. Moltz went on to say that the Chinese test was not unprecedented, but did violate Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty by causing harm to the space environment, and doing so without notification to other space faring states. A big issue for the near term will be what affect the debris caused by the test will have on humans in space, especially the ISS and the now in development Virgin Galactic space vehicle. Dr. Moltz, responding to questions regarding whether or not this test would force the United States to the table to negotiate a treaty with the Chinese government, noted that the test clearly has forced the issue. He said that many U.S. Air Force officials do not want to move toward kinetic destruction systems, fearing its impact on other U.S. space assets. The road ahead is difficult to predict. To get support for an agreement on a new treaty is not impossible, but will be extremely difficult. In the near term a "rules of the road" agreement is both the most likely and most feasible potential option. Finally, Dr. Moltz warned of the necessity for all space faring states to avoid the temptation to become involved in a costly and dangerous arms race in outer space. The Chinese Space Program Dr. Yuan began his presentation with an overview of the Chinese space program. He noted that China's space program has a civilian sector with civilian leadership, while the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the PLA plays a critical role in shaping the space mission, as is the practice in most space faring countries such as the United States and former Soviet Union/Russia. The silence in Beijing after the successful completion of the test--possibly indicating that communications between the two sides were lacking--is a potential indication of the current tension between the civilian and military leadership. In theory, Hu Jintao is supposed to know and be aware of all military programs and tests; he therefore would have known the broader context of the tests. Most of the practical aspects however would be delegated to lower-level officers, possibly explaining a communication lapse with regard to this test. In addition, China's extended silence may have been an indication that the leadership did not correctly anticipate the level of the negative international response to the test. However, the delay that did occur between the test and the Chinese government's statements does indicate that there may have been a communication problem between the civilian leadership and the military. Dr Yuan also concurred with the view that China as a member state should have given advanced notice in compliance with Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. The Chinese space program was started in 1956 under the leadership of Dr. Qian Xuesen. Dr. Qian received his education in the United States, first at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and then at California Polytechnic State University (Caltech), where he later taught. After completing his doctorate, Dr. Qian and some other CalTech scientists started the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Near the end of World War II, Dr. Qian was commissioned a colonel in the U.S. Army and sent to Germany to study German V2 rockets in order to help develop the future U.S. missile program. In the 1950s, during the height of the McCarthy era, Dr. Qian was investigated and ultimately put in custody for five years. He was deported back to China in 1955 and upon his return there was quickly put in command of the Chinese missile and space programs. China conducted its first ballistic missile test in 1960. Although in the early years China worked closely with the Soviet Union, by 1960 Beijing was longer receiving support from Moscow due to the Sino-Soviet split that occurred in the late 1950s. In 1966 Chinese engineers were able to conduct their first test of the Chang Zheng (CZ, or Long March) missile series. Development continued and China launched its first satellite into space in 1970. This satellite had little practical applicability, simply orbiting the Earth transmitting the patriotic song "The East is Red" for twenty or thirty days. In March 1986 a group of Chinese scientists submitted a paper to the country's leadership stressing several areas of specific importance that China needed to improve upon, including further development of national space capabilities. This letter ultimately helped to refine the Chinese leadership's attention to its space program. The 1986 plan was followed by a much more detailed one in September 1992. This new plan, called Project 921, detailed the development of China's manned space program, later called Shenzhou, or "Divine Vessel". The Shenzhou program launched its first unmanned spacecraft in 1999. This mission showed that China had the capability to send a craft into space and return it to earth successfully and safely. In 2003, Shenzhou V, China's first manned mission, was a complete success. In 2005 China launched and retrieved Shenzhou VI, the first space craft to send two Chinese astronauts into space. The successes of the Shenzhou program made China only the third state in the world to successfully put people into orbit. These were important successes for China's civilian space program, but they no doubt had significant impact on the Chinese military space program as well. The PLA has played an important role in the development of the Chinese space program, especially regarding launch missions. Command and control, as well as management of the launch sites for the space program, typically fall under the purviews of the PLA. Additionally, the command of the Shenzhou program is under the PLA General Armaments Department. On top of this, there has been much written about in terms of the growing autonomy of the PLA. This has been evidenced in the past several years by the EP-3 spy plane incident as well as the 2004 incursion of a Chinese submarine into Japanese waters.[3] Both incidents caused serious political problems for the Chinese government and seem counter to the recent Chinese efforts to not upset the international system or bring negative attention to China. The PLA Turns to Space Dr. Yuan went on to discuss how the U.S. military campaigns of the 1990s became a primary driver of the PLA's mission towards developing its own space capabilities. The first Gulf War brought the utility of space in modern warfare front and center in the perceptions of China's military leadership. The American use of satellites for communications, reconnaissance, as well as guided-munitions that relied on Global Positioning System (GPS) systems all demonstrated to China the nature of the future of warfare, as well as the vulnerability of Chinese weapons systems, as much of Iraq's military hardware had come from China in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War. The Kosovo campaign, the second Gulf War, and the Afghanistan campaigns showed how far the United States had already moved ahead in terms of the latest Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The PLA saw in these examples how space could be used to incorporate real time intelligence and communications on the battlefield. It also made it clear to Chinese military leaders that space control is critically important to China. However, the concept of comprehensive space control was still recognized as a luxury for China's military. Instead, limited deployment of space weapons would provide what Chinese military writers would refer to as a potential "assassin's mace"--a weapon which would allow China to level the playing field in one fell swoop, despite the differences in overall conventional military capabilities between the United States and China. Chinese government official policy has consistently called for international treaties to prohibit weapons in space. Dr. Yuan pointed out however that China's most recent National Defense White Paper, published in December 2006, omitted the call for international treaties to prohibit space weapons for the first time. Other Chinese writings, both civilian and military, that have discussed these issues in depth focus significant attention on U.S. systems, including U.S. ASAT and jamming capabilities, as well as laser systems. According to Chinese writings on the issue, the U.S. decision to move forward with missile defense has greatly undermined China's capabilities in space. Dr. Yuan did note that it is difficult to ascertain the authoritativeness of many Chinese writings on this subject, as well as what connection many of the authors have with official Chinese policy. He went on to say that the United States defines five "spaces" for potential conflict: land, sea, air, cyber space, and outer space; China has been identified as a potential adversary in outer space. A number of military exercises and simulations that the United States has conducted in recent years have been based on scenarios that appear to make China the primary adversary. Dr. Yuan concluded by saying that there are some analysts who believe that if there is a future conflict between the United States and China, the first shots will very likely be fired in space. The Chinese ASAT Test and its Implications Ms. Lieggi began her discussion with the specifics of the test itself. According Lieggi, on January 12, at six in the morning local time, a missile was launched from the Xichang Launch Center in Sichuan Province. Most speculation indicated that the missile fired was a DF-21 medium-range, solid fueled ballistic missile. The missile has a range of 1800-2000 kilometers with a CEP of roughly 300-400 meters. The CEP of this system has been greatly improved in the past several years, which is very important when conducting ASAT tests with kinetic energy kill systems. If you have a large CEP and are using a nuclear weapon, or another explosive device, it is not that necessary to get too close to the target, however conducting a kinetic energy kill, the CEP must be much more accurate. The mobility of the DF-21 could potentially give the Chinese a road-mobile ASAT capability, although the system's mobility for use as an ASAT is still unclear. The satellite destroyed in the test--the Fengyun-1C--had been lauded by China in the past decade as a significant achievement for the domestic satellite program. Launched in 1999 with what was supposed to be a two year mission, it became the first Chinese satellite to outlast its scheduled life span. The FY-1C had been out of service for sometime; however it continued to send signals back to Chinese space command. Because of those signals Chinese engineers were able to both track the satellite and know exactly where it would be when they did choose to conduct tests. From there, Ms. Lieggi focused on the test itself. As a KE ASAT test, the exercise did not include an explosive warhead; the satellite destruction was instead the result of one large object simply slamming into another at a very high speed. The test took place in a very controlled environment because those involved knew the exact flight path of the satellite. The test also resulted in a very large debris field. Initial analysis indicated that the debris field has a polar orbit, meaning that nearly every satellite in LEO will have to pass through it. The field covers an altitude range of 200-3,500 km, and might affect many satellites that will pass through it. This ironically also includes Chinese satellites like the FY-1C's big brother, the FY-1B, which first passed through the field sometime in the week of February 5, 2007.[4] Ms. Lieggi pointed out that before any U.S. government official confirmed the test, rumors that a test (or something big) had occurred, because amateur space observers around the world noticed the debris field immediately. Ms. Lieggi pointed out that this was not the first test conducted by the Chinese--just the first to result in the destruction of a satellite. China already had conducted three tests, which were not made public until after the January test. Because none of those earlier tests resulted in a collision, no debris field was created. The first three tests may have taken place in October 2005, and April and November 2006. It is not known if these tests were "failures" in the sense that they "missed" the target or if they were just conducted for tracking and other purposes in the initial phases of a more long term test program. Audience members asked whether or not the United States had tested weapons with "near misses" like the three earlier tests by the Chinese that led up to the successful test. Dr. Moltz noted that the United States did do proximity tests during their ASAT programs. If the detonation came within an 8 kilometer window, U.S. officials figured the nuclear warhead would destroy it; however in some cases the missile did hit the satellite directly. From a general view, the timing was a surprise. U.S.-China cooperation has been on the rise in the last few years. Tensions over Taiwan have been minimal and there was cooperation between Washington and Beijing on nonproliferation issues, including on the DPRK and Iranian nuclear programs. Because of those factors it was surprising that China would take provocative action to upset that atmosphere. Ms. Lieggi noted however that it was not a surprise from a technical standpoint, as China has had the technical capability to carry out this type of exercise for some time. From a technical standpoint, it was not a very difficult test for China to achieve. Ms. Lieggi also pointed out that, as Dr. Yuan had mentioned, there have been hints in the Chinese media that China's military was beginning to consider pursuing space weapons and ASAT systems. Recent reports of Chinese laser tests should have been an indicator that China was beginning to move in this direction and that they were seriously pursuing these capabilities. Some outside analysts have argued that the test was a not so gentle push to get the United States to come to the table on these issues. The test can also be seen as a result of China's threat perceptions--perceptions that have been discussed significantly in the Chinese media in the months leading up to the test. Ms. Lieggi pointed out that the international ramifications over the test for China may be severe. Domestically, there may have been damage to the civil-political relationship, especially in respect to the perceived communication gap between some sectors of the military and civilian leadership. Economically, international cooperation is very important to the Chinese program. The Chinese space program has cooperated on projects with numerous space powers, including the Europe Union and Russia, and most recently was in discussions with the United States over potential cooperation. This test however may very well chase cooperative opportunities away from Beijing. Ms. Lieggi also noted that China's own investment in its program may become an issue as the costs for protecting and insuring space assets may increase if the business community fears a space race or if space debris causes damage to any satellites. Ms. Lieggi posed a number of questions. Firstly, can Beijing afford the space race that it may have just started? China's space weapon program is being looked at critically by other space faring nations, including regional powers such as Japan, India, and South Korea. If this test starts a space race China will be forced to keep up--something it may not be able to do if it also wants to develop economically. India may very well be the biggest challenge for China. India has indicated that it is considering a military space program as a reaction to China's, a fact that has a real potential to create a regional space race. Secondly, what should be expected from China in the future in regards to its space program and further testing? The answer remains unclear. China's space program still has a number of limitations, but Beijing is working hard to move past these deficiencies. Chinese launch capabilities are still relatively limited and immobile infrastructure is still very vulnerable. The next move could be for China to develop parasitic systems, as their micro-satellite development is relatively advanced with help from a program that has been developed in cooperation with a UK research center. That cooperation may now end as a result of this test. The Chinese may not feel the need to conduct another KE test in the near future. The forum ended with the presenters showing the audience a video from the website CelesTrak which showed the spread and extent of the debris cloud caused by the ASAT test. It was noted that U.S. tracking systems at that point were tracking 10,000 pieces of debris moving at 18,000 mph.
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