SMART Negotiations Result in a Smart Treaty

During the past three months, and in tandem with U.S.-Russian START Replacement negotiations in Geneva, two dozen Monterey Institute graduate students from both the United States and Russia (including junior diplomats from China, South Africa, and Chile) negotiated their own START follow-on treaty. Unlike their "real world" counterparts, the negotiators in Monterey signed an accord on December 5, 2009.

SMART treaty negotiation simulation participants.

The students in Dr. William Potter and Dr. Nikolai Sokov's arms control simulation course had an advantage over their "real world" counterparts because they were relatively unconstrained by the bureaucratic political considerations that typically dominate decision-making in Moscow and Washington. Nevertheless, the students took their responsibilities extremely seriously and did not compromise the national security of the country's they represented. The new Treaty, known as SMART (Strategic Mutual Arms Reduction Treaty) not only provides for significantly lower limits on delivery vehicles and deployed warheads, but includes a number of innovative verification measures.

As in the actual negotiations, the July Joint Understanding put forth by President Barack and Dmitry Medvedev framed the opening positions of each of the Monterey negotiating teams. It quickly became apparent that the most controversial issues were: (1) limits on delivery vehicles; (2) limits on strategic nuclear warheads; (3) the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive systems; and (4) the impact of non-nuclear submarine launched ballistic missiles and inter-continental ballistic missiles on strategic stability.

The students agreed to set a limit for strategic nuclear and conventional delivery vehicles at 700. The Russian opening position was a 500 limit on strategic delivery systems. Russia arrived at this number based on it plans to optimize and downsize its current strategic nuclear forces by retiring aging Cold War era ballistic missiles and replacing them with a smaller and more flexible missile force. The U.S. opening position was 1100 in order to ensure flexibility for U.S. missile forces. Going lower became possible because the two delegations changed the START accounting rules to exclude strategic submarines modified to carry conventional submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The Russian and U.S. negotiators also agreed to keep the same conversion rules for heavy bombers contained in the original START treaty.

Nikita Perfiliev (l) and Aaron Stein (r) sign the accord.

The United States was able to reach the 700 number by agreeing to cut 25 ICBM launchers from each U.S. ICBM base and converting a number of nuclear capable B-52s and B-1s for conventional missions. While Russia does not plan to match the United States' DV numbers, the Russian delegation believes that the gap between the strategic forces of the two countries will not affect strategic stability.

The student negotiators at the onset of negotiations agreed to do away with START era maximum attribution accounting rules. An agreement was reached to count the actual number of deployed warheads. There was a consensus that both countries future nuclear force structures will not require the maximum upload of warheads. With this in mind, the students reached an agreement to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at 1,675.

Aaron Stein and the American delegation.

However the change in accounting rules raised a number of verification issues. The existing START attribution rule would count each ICBM and SLBM as carrying the maximum number of warheads the systems was flight tested with. As such, inspections only had to verify that the ballistic missile did not carry the maximum number of warheads attributed to the missile. The students working on verification sought to devise innovative methods to inspect each other's weapons systems. Both delegations wanted to ensure that the inspection regime would allow each country to confirm that the actual number of deployed warheads matched the country's declarations.

The delegations understood from the outset that counting each deployed warhead would be cumbersome, intrusive, and very expensive. The objective of the inspections for deployed warheads was to detect any militarily significant violation, which was defined as more than 15% above the declared number of, deployed nuclear warheads on strategic submarine, heavy bomber base, and ICBM bases. The verification-working group devised a method (based upon a U.S. National Academy of Sciences' report) to ensure with at least 95% confidence detecting a deviation in the number of declared deployed strategic warheads.

Nikita Perfiliev and the Russian delegation.

The agreements in this simulation went beyond the mandate laid out in the July Joint Statement. The negotiators agreed to limit the aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads to 2,930. The negotiators concluded that the warheads in reserve should not exceed 75% of the maximum number of deployed warheads. Everything in excess of the aggregate warhead limit was to be dismantled or disabled. While the Russian delegation sought to limit maximum upload capability, the United States agreed to this limit in exchange for the substantial consolidation of Russian warhead storage sites and the separation of tactical and strategic warheads.

The two sides agreed not to count as deployed at strategic nuclear warheads those that were stored at least 100 kilometers away from any strategic submarine, heavy bomber, or ICBM base. The parties further agreed that warheads in transit would count towards the overall deployed warhead limit. However, in order to facilitate consolidation of warhead storage sites, the parties agreed that up to 70 strategic nuclear warheads would not be counted towards the number of deployed nuclear warhead limit. In the interests of verification, the parties also agreed to install remote monitoring systems at missile production facilities and warhead storage sites.

Dr. Alexander Pikayev, Amb. James Goodby and Dr. Potter at the simulation class.

Unlike START, the two delegations tackled the issue of American missile defense systems and its impact on strategic stability. At the outset of these negotiations the American delegation sought to stall on this issue while the Russian team emphasized the two parties' mutual interests and the need for cooperation. The dynamics of the negotiations changed when the Russian delegation presented a position paper that did not place a numerical limit on the deployment of American missile defense systems. This development and the recognition that both parties had overlapping security interests made possible the negotiation of a number of Memoranda of Understanding and strongly worded provisions in the Treaty – something that neither delegation thought would be possible at the beginning of the negotiations.

As a result of intense negotiations Article XVI of SMART recognizes that the deployment of strategic defensive systems will prompt the other party to increase its strategic offensive capabilities because defensive systems paired with offensive systems may negate guaranteed retaliatory capability. To avoid this, the parties encourage cooperation and transparency in a Memoranda of Understanding. Inter alia measures include moving forward with the final establishment and expansion of the Joint Data Exchange Center, personnel exchange and visits to relevant missile defense facilities, and consideration of a possible joint missile defense system in the future. The United States wanted to ensure that nothing in the SMART Treaty would place any limits on the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems. The Russian delegation entered the negotiations with the view that it was unnecessary to achieve specific limits on U.S. missile defense in the SMART Treaty. These perspectives made it possible for the two sides to agree on cooperative measures to increase transparency and explore opportunities for further engagement.

With regards to the deployment of conventionally armed SLBMs and ICBMs, both sides agreed to include a provision in the treaty indicating that the deployment of these systems might affect strategic stability. At the outset of the negotiations, the Russian delegation wanted to introduce as many obstacles to this program as possible. The Americans wanted to ensure that the there were no numerical limits on the deployment of these systems. As a compromise the Treaty requires conventional systems to have functionally related observable differences and timely notification of launches with no over flight of national territories.

The U.S. and Russian delegations believed that it was in their best interests to ensure the continuity of their discussions with an eye to further arms reductions. The delegations assigned a Working Group to tackle the post-SMART agenda. The agenda lays out a broad framework that addresses not only further reductions in strategic systems but also the linkage between conventional forces and nuclear weapons. The agenda also establishes a bilateral consultative mechanism that will meet on a regular basis to discuss future arms control agreements between the United States and Russian Federation.

Throughout the negotiations there were instances in which there were break-downs in communication and misperceptions between the two delegations as well as within each delegation. This led both parties occasionally to discount or disregard concessions offered by the other side. Too frequently, there was a tendency to use one side's proposal as a baseline from which to extract more concessions. Although this tendency stemmed in part from a desire to appear strong, it worked against the interests of both delegations.

Individual personalities also proved to be critical in the negotiations. It did not matter what kind of instructions the negotiator might have received from his/her delegation. Success depended upon working with members of the opposite delegation. Our experiences have taught us that while only one person could derail negotiations, it took both delegations to reach an agreement and conclude the SMART treaty.

As one might expect the Monterey treaty represents a hard compromise in which both delegations had to make significant concessions on important issues. As Ambassador James Goodby, who twice met in person with the students observed, after closely reading the final documents: "Congratulations to the class on a really professional job. I was thinking of telling them that when I considered the American position, I thought the Russians had taken them to the cleaners. And then when I studied the Russian position, I thought they had been fleeced by the Americans. So I think this indicates that the outcome was pretty balanced."

We share that perspective.