

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE FUTURE THREAT POSED BY BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Both states acknowledge that there is a need to establish a common understanding of current threats to their own national security interests as well as those that challenge the peace and security of the global community.

In this regard, the following can be viewed as framework for determining mutual ballistic missile threats and ways to address those threats. It has been reached through open and transparent discussion that aptly demonstrates the dynamic nature of an uncertain international world. It is also the joint sentiment that international security is vital to maintain a predictable global order.

Therefore, the understanding was reached that a joint threat assessment should be two-tiered. The first tier examines current threats and the second addresses future emerging threats.

First level: Current Threats

Present threats for both states have a multi-faceted scope. The primary concern of ballistic missile threat emanates from States that have advanced their missile programmes outside of international control regimes and that have also expressed an interest in advancing their weapons of mass destruction programme. Although the parties may feel differently about these states, it has been understood that they present a challenge to international stability. The United States and Russian Federation have vital and enduring roles in addressing these threats.

Both parties strongly support current efforts to prevent the proliferant activities of non-state actors and encourage ongoing efforts to address this matter. Both states pledge their continued support to co-operate in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.

Second level: Future and Potential Threats

Emerging threats are of great concern for both states and the international realm. Predicting what those threats may be is challenging and has important international political implications that must be carefully considered. Thus, improved accuracy and diplomatic relations necessitate a venue where both states are able to discuss threats that may or may not be mutual. This can be accomplished in the Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission. This commission will enable both parties to conduct better threat analyses through cooperative communication and intelligence sharing.

As the most militarily advanced states in the world, the parties recognize they share a responsibility to promote global peace. Increased co-operation and regular bilateral consultation are important cornerstones for a strong U.S.-Russia relationship and the continued peace and prosperity of both nations.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE COOPERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Taking into account the continuing worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles and of missile technologies and the need to protect the population of both countries and their allies, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation have reached agreement on a cooperative initiative to explore opportunities for joint cooperation on missile defenses. The objective of the initiative is to collaborate on the plans for developing missile defense, including joint missile defense training and exercises and to study the feasibility of integrating components of the respective missile defense systems.

As part of this initiative, the United States and Russia will also examine the future possibility of establishing a joint center to train Russian and US personnel for a joint missile defense battalion in which other states could voluntarily participate.

The Presidents have directed their experts to develop as quickly as possible for approval in their respective countries a plan for advancing this initiative toward implementation as soon as practicable.

DONE at Monterey, California, USA on December 5, 2009 in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PROTOCOL ON ICBMS AND SLBMS ARMED WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have come to an understanding on a number of principles for the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs armed with conventional warheads. These principles have been established to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misinterpretations associated with these systems and to foster the spirit of cooperation and trust between the parties.

1. The Parties acknowledge that the deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs involves certain risks that might affect strategic stability.
2. The Parties recognize the need for a rapid response capability in light of existing and emerging threats to global security.
3. The Parties determine that conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs launched by one party will not overfly the other party's national territory.
4. The Parties agree to provide timely launch notification.
5. The Parties agree to alter the flight characteristics and trajectories of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs in order to make them clearly distinguishable from nuclear-armed ICBMs/SLBMs.

The Parties support designing functionally related observable differences between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles. The functional difference will be assessed upon the establishment of a conventional missile program.

6. The Parties commit to having further discussions about this matter if the responsible budgeting authorities and domestic parliamentary institutions approve funds for the development and deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs/SLBMs.

DONE at Monterey, California, USA this fifth day of December, 2009, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON THE EXPANSION OF A JOINT CENTER FOR THE EXCHANGE
OF DATA FROM EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND
NOTIFICATIONS OF MISSILE LAUNCHES**

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Recognizing the commitment to the mutual security needs of the Russian Federation and the United States in terms of missile defense and missile proliferation

Guided by the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches of June 4, 2000, hereinafter referred to as the June 4, 2000, MOA

Considering the Joint Statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, on Missile Defense Issues of July 6, 2009

Committing with the SMART Negotiations process

Sharing the concern about the presence of multiple international threats and the need to address them through cooperation and confidence building measures

Declaring the Parties' commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code Of Conduct, and other multilateral or bilateral initiatives on non-proliferation

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

1. To expand the mandate of the JDEC as defined in the June 4, 2000, MOA to include data sharing on launches of ballistic missile or space launch vehicles of third states.
2. The expanded mandate of the JDEC shall provide for the implementation of exchanges of information on all launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles detected by the warning systems of the Parties, including those belonging to the Parties.

ARTICLE 2

1. The Parties intend that the JDEC Joint Commission, created and defined in the June 4, 2000, MOA, meet to discuss implementation details of the expanded role of the JDEC. The Parties may determine the number of representatives and their selection outside of this agreement.
2. Further modifications and new provisions concerning the expansion of the JDEC will be discussed at the - JDEC Joint Commission level.
3. The Parties declare their support for the Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning

Commission.

4. The parties declare that the JDEC Commission can coordinate its work with the Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission. This relationship will be established by a standing rules defined by both parties.

ARTICLE 3

A ballistic missile or space launch vehicle shall be considered as "belonging to" a Party if it is owned, possessed or controlled by the Party or by any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association or other legal or natural person (either government or private, including international organizations) organized or existing under the laws of the Party, as defined in the June 4, 2000, MOA.

Any missile or space launch vehicle not meeting the above definition will be considered to be that of a third state.

ARTICLE 4

1. Information shall be exchanged on the following types of objects detected by the warning systems of the Parties:

- a. launches of any ballistic missiles that could pose a national security threat to the United States or the Russian Federation, including launches that threaten Parties' interests outside their national territories.

2. Information shared may be used for the joint missile defense needs of the Parties.

The sources for obtaining information exchanged pursuant to this Memorandum shall be the equipment of the space and ground based warning systems of the Parties.

ARTICLE 5

All information exchanged by the Parties shall remain confidential and not shared with third states, unless necessary to the national security of that country. The decision to share information with a third state must be agreed to by the Parties in near real time.

ARTICLE 6

1. Any changes must be agreed to by the Parties before becoming a part of this Memorandum.
2. Either Party, upon six months written notice to the other Party, may terminate this Memorandum.

DONE at Monterey, California, USA on December 5, 2009 in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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12/05/2009

http://cns.miis.edu/activities/091208_smart_treaty/

JOINT STATEMENT ON MISSILE DEFENSE COORDINATION

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided to implement confidence building measures and coordinate mutually beneficial endeavors in missile defense by including the following elements:

1. Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission. This bilateral body will coordinate missile defense plans between the two parties. It will involve bi-annual meetings among high-ranking officials involved in missile defense planning, including the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Russian Defense Minister, and the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister.
2. Representative Exchange. The United States and Russian Federation agree to each establish a representative, assigned to the defense attaché staff, to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and the Russian Space Forces. These representatives will facilitate communications and implementation of missile defense strategic planning. Governments are obliged to honestly declare the position of their representative for accreditation purposes.
3. Revitalize the NATO-Russia Council. The parties will work together to make efforts towards revitalizing the NATO-Russia Council.
4. The U.S. and the Russian Federation agree to grant predefined access to relevant components of missile defense systems deployed outside of the parties' national territories. Both sides commit to establishing agreements with respective host countries to coordinate visa and custom procedures. The definition of predefined access will include:
 - A. Predefined access to relevant base facilities, where relevant base facilities are defined as radar systems and interceptor-related systems;
 - B. Explanation of the mission of that particular base;
 - C. Discussion of the role that base plays in joint U.S.-Russia missile defense efforts; and
 - D. The further definition of a predefined access will be determined by the Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission.
5. The Presidents instruct the Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission to determine further details, including agendas and schedule.

DONE at Monterey, California, USA this fifth day of December, 2009, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO ESTABLISH A JOINT MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING
COMMISSION**

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Recognizing the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms

Considering the recent talks on the new Strategic Mutual Arms Reduction Treaty

Desiring to promote transparency in strategic defense arms

Sharing the common desire for the promotion and encouragement of missile defense cooperation

Recognizing the mutual benefit of improved procedures for strengthening trust through mutually beneficial cooperation and confidence building

Convinced that effective proposals would be facilitated by systematic studies at the technical level and closer cooperation in missile defense;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

**ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT PERMANENT COMMISSION ON CONSULTATION
AND COOPERACION OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENSES FORCES**

The Parties agree to establish the " Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission," hereinafter in this Agreement referred to as the "Joint Commission."

ARTICLE II

COMPOSITION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

1. The Joint Commission shall consist of representatives of both Parties, including the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Russian Defense Minister, and the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister.
2. In connection with the work of the Joint Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Department of State of the United States shall perform administrative, technical and coordination functions on behalf of the respective Parties.
3. The Joint Commission may establish subsidiary bodies with such functions as may be entrusted to them by the Joint Commission.

ARTICLE III OBJECTIVES

1. The objectives of the Joint Commission shall be to promote and develop bilateral cooperation in specific issues and areas concerning missile defense and missile proliferation.
2. The Joint Commission will identify ballistic missile threat perceptions and concerns for both parties and means to coordinate efforts to address those concerns. Joint threat assessment efforts will include information sharing between the two parties and utilization of other appropriate third-party sources.
3. The Joint Commission will propose further recommendations to facilitate further implementation of confidence building measures on missile defense, such as personnel exchanges, exchange of information, and others measures defined by the Joint Commission.
4. The Joint Commission will further define the nature of and coordinate the implementation of entrance to relevant components of missile defense systems.
5. The Joint Commission will determine the further details, including agendas and schedule about confidence building measures on missile defense.
6. The Joint Commission shall have particular responsibility for the analysis and follow up of specific cooperation agreements concluded between the Parties.

ARTICLE IV JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER

The Joint Commission will help coordinate JDEC activities.

1. The Joint Commission will meet to discuss implementation details of the expanded role of the JDEC and will coordinate these discussions with the JDEC Joint Commission.
2. Further modifications and new provisions concerning the expansion of the JDEC will be discussed at the Joint Commission and JDEC Joint Commission levels.

ARTICLE V MEETINGS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

1. The Joint Commission shall meet at least twice annually at such date or dates as may be agreed between the Parties. The Parties shall endeavor to synchronize the dates of the meeting of the Joint Commission with those of the Management Committees to be established for each Agreement concluded on specific areas of cooperation between the Parties.
2. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held alternately in United States and Russia or in such other place as may be agreed to between the Parties.

3. The agenda for each meeting of the Joint Commission shall be settled by both Parties at least two months before the meeting.

4. The decisions of the Joint Commission shall have the status of recommendations to the Parties to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the last notification of one Contracting Party to the other that the necessary legal requirements for its entry into force have been complied with.

ARTICLE VII DENUNCIATION

1. Either Party may denounce the Agreement upon written notice of its decision, addressed to the other Party. The termination of the Agreement shall become effective on the expiration of six months after the date on which the notification of denunciation is received by the other Party.

2. In case of denunciation of the present Agreement, the programmes and projects in progress shall not be affected thereby and shall continue until their completion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the duly undersigned Plenipotentiaries being duly authorized thereunto, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE at Monterey, California, USA on the Fifth day of December two thousand nine, in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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