

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Mutual Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 2009

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties [or Contracting States],

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability and the continuity of the arms reduction process,

Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; and the Moscow Summit Joint Statement of July 8, 2009,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memoranda of Understanding.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty do not exceed

- a. 1675 for warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers,
- b. 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers,

2. Each Party shall reduce the aggregate number of its deployed and reserve nuclear warheads associated with ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number does not exceed 2,931.

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the reserve portion of the limits provided for in subparagraph 2 of Article II of this Treaty, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and associated nuclear warheads shall not be restored to active service without advance notification, in accordance with the Reserve Protocol.
2. For the purposes of being identified as disabled, ICBMs, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers and associated nuclear warheads shall not be restored to active service without advance notification, and shall be physically modified so as to be prevented from rapid restoration to active service without observable steps. This shall be implemented in accordance with the Conversion and Disablement Protocol.
3. ICBMs, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers and associated nuclear warheads not reserved, converted, or disabled in accordance with subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, including those in transit, shall count toward the maximum aggregate deployed limit provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of this Treaty.
 - a. Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit.
 - b. Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit.
4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:
 - a. For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
 - b. For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
 - c. For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.
 - d. Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canisters shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.
5. Each Party shall have the option to use an attributive warhead counting rule in order to reduce the verification burden on a certain type of launcher. For accounting purposes the maximum number of warheads is defined as the maximum number of warheads a ballistic missile has been tested with. If a SSBN, ICBM silo field, ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and heavy bombers bases are declared to deploy the maximum possible number of warheads, SSBNs, ICBM silo fields, ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and heavy bomber bases so declared shall be exempt from deployed warhead inspections.

6. Newly constructed ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows, except when verified to be carrying conventional warheads, or in reserve in accordance with the with the Conversion, Disablement, and Elimination Protocol:

- a. an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
- b. a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
- c. a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;
- d. for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
- e. an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched; ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
- f. an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
- g. an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
- h. for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
- i. a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes.

7. The conversion of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers to deliver munitions of a different type, including conventional munitions, shall be conducted in accordance with the Conversion, Disablement and Dismantlement Protocol.

8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

- a. Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:
 - i. For the United States of America, the types of missiles designated as Minuteman III, and Trident II.
 - ii. For the Russian Federation, the types of missiles designated as RS-20, RS-18, RS-12M, RS-12M2, RSM-50, RSM-54, and RSM-56; which are known to the United States of America as SS-18, SS-19, SS-25, SS-27, SS-N-18, SS-N-23, and SS-NX-30, respectively;
- b. Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are:
 - i. For the Russian Federation, the types of missiles designated as RS-12M and RS-12M2, RS-24 which are known to the United States of America as SS-25, SS-27, and SS-28 respectively.
- c. Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:
 - i. For the United States of America, the types of missiles designated as Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Polaris A-3, Peacekeeper, Trident I.
- d. Existing types of heavy bombers are:
 - i. For the United States of America, the types of bombers designated as B-2 and B-52.
 - ii. For the Russian Federation, the types of bombers designated as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively.
- e. Former types of heavy bombers are:
 - i. For the United States of America, the type of bomber designated as B-1.
- f. Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs:
 - i. For the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated as AGM-86B and AGM-129.
 - ii. For the Russian Federation, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively.

ARTICLE IV

1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:
 - a. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of reserve ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250.
 - b. Each Party shall limit the number of reserve ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Reserve ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from reserve mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.
 - c. Each Party shall limit the number of reserve ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:
 - i. two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or

- ii. four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
 - d. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 25.
- 2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:
 - a. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of reserve mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110.
 - b. Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
 - c. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 40.
 - d. Training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.
- 3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 80.

Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 25.
- 4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:
 - a. Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.
 - b. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed 12, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten.
 - c. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.
- 5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.
7. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 10.
8. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:
 - a. Each Party shall locate reserve ICBMs and reserve SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion, disablement, or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; space launch facilities; or ICBM bases reserve nuclear warheads. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Reserve ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Reserve SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.
 - b. Each Party shall locate reserve mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
 - c. Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges.
 - d. A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(c) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.
 - e. Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
 - f. Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and

at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

9. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities:

a. Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of

ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

b. Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

c. Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area.

d. Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range.

e. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

ARTICLE V

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;
- (b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;
- (c) produce test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- (d) produce, test, or deploy silo launchers of ICBMs in excess of the limits set in Article II.1.b
- (e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- (f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

5. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

6. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities.

9. Each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed; [III.10(c)]
- (b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

10. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. [Silo LCC Letters]

11. Each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;
- (b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;
- (c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads tested with;

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

13. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

14. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

15. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

- (a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices;
- (b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such

- missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;
- (c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit;
 - (d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);
 - (e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.
17. Each Party undertakes not to:
- (a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments;
 - (b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments;
 - (c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.
18. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.
19. The Russian Federation undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.
20. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.
21. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.
22. Each Party undertakes not to convert:
- (a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;
 - (b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;
 - (c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;
 - (d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.
23. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

24. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

25. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

26. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarines for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

27. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for:

(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages;

(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and

(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

Article VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed ten square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than fifteen deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area.

3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment

area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

Article VII

1. Conversion, disablement, and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Remote Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion, Disablement or Elimination Protocol.

3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs.

4. The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol.

ARTICLE VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding Data, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.

3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

- (a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;
- (b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty;
- (c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;
- (d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty;
- (e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification;
- (f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information;
- (g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;
- (h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;
- (i) notifications concerning inspections; and
- (j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.

4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt.

5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of December 22, 2012, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding Data, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. The Parties

shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X

1. After any new ballistic missile has been tested 7 times, or two years after the date of the first flight test, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.

2. After any new ballistic missile has been tested 7 times, or two years after the date of the first flight test, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including:

- (a) the use of encryption;
- (b) the use of jamming;
- (c) broadcasting telemetric information from a ballistic missile using narrow directional beaming; and

- (d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles.
3. After any new ballistic missile has been tested 7 times, or two years after the date of the first flight test, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicles. telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ballistic missile.
 4. After any new ballistic missile has been tested 7 times, or two years after the date of the first flight test, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.
 5. After any new ballistic missile has been tested 7 times, or two years after the date of the first flight test, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.
 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eight flight tests of ballistic missile each year. Of these eight flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBM and SLBM, of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol.
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with

paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring.

6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. Each re-entry vehicle deployed on the ballistic missile is considered to be one deployed warhead for accounting purposes.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.

8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed.

10. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.

12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;

(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a

type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and

(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion, Disablement, or Elimination Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

ARTICLE XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile

launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures;

(b) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-

mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.

(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.

(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.

(g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.

(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:

(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;

(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;

(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or

(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection.

(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.

- (j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:
- (a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
 - (b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
 - (c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.
 - (d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
 - (e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections.
 - (f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
 - (g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party

shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below:

- (a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.
- (b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:

- (a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol;
- (b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
- (c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
- (d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.

4. When an operational dispersal is completed:

- (a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations .
- (b) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. The Parties recognize that the deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs involves certain risks that might affect strategic stability.

2. The Parties desire to minimize misinterpretation of the deployment or launch of a conventionally armed ICBM or SLBM as one that is armed with a nuclear warhead.

(a). The Parties agree to establish a functionally related observable difference from the same systems in nuclear mode, through the measures identified in the Memorandum of Understanding on ICBM's/SLBM's Armed with Conventional Warheads.

3. The Parties agree that future bilateral arms control treaties will include additional discussions on reducing the negative effects of conventional ICBM's and SLBM's on strategic stability.

(a). If the responsible budgeting authorities and domestic parliamentary institutions approve funds for the development and deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs/SLBMs, the negotiations mentioned above will also include all additional measures agreed between the Parties, as defined in item number six of the Memorandum of Understanding on ICBM's/SLBM's Armed with Conventional Warheads.

4. To address the risks posed to strategic stability by conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs, both parties have agreed to measures to foster the spirit of cooperation and trust outlined in the Protocol on ICBMs and SLBMs Armed with Conventional Warheads.

Article XVI

1. The Parties recognize the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. Deployment of strategic defensive systems will pressure the other party to increase its strategic offensive capabilities because defensive systems paired with offensive systems may negate guaranteed retaliatory capability.

2. The Parties recognize that the unilateral deployment of strategic defensive systems may impact strategic stability and encourage cooperation and transparency to minimize

these concerns.

(a) In order to address this issue the parties agree to foster cooperation and transparency through the measures outlined in the following documents:

1. Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Future Threat Posed by Ballistic Missile Proliferation
2. Joint Statement on the Cooperation on Missile Defense Systems
3. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Expansion of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches
4. Joint Statement on Missile Defense Coordination
5. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America to Establish a Joint Missile Defense Strategic Planning Commission

ARTICLE XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the State Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall meet annually to:

- (a) promote the objectives and the implementation of the Treaty.
- (b) resolve questions relating to the implementation and compliance with the Treaty
- (c) agree upon additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty
- (d) inform or update the other State Party on efforts made to implement the Treaty

2. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission according to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

ARTICLE XVIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall commit not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

ARTICLE XIX

1. The articles pertaining to measures of Verification and Article XV on Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission shall be provisionally effective after the signature of this treaty.
2. The provisional application of this article of the Treaty with respect to a State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States of its intention not to become a party to the Treaty.

Article XX

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, [Memoranda of Understanding] and Joint Statements, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years after entry into force, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 10-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. These discussions shall be independent of those concerning future arms reduction efforts, which will begin immediately after entry into force of this treaty. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XXI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XXII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

START Plus Arms Control Simulation Class
Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
12/05/2009

http://cns.miis.edu/activities/091208_smart_treaty/

Done at Monterey, CA on the 5th of December, 2009, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION