

Reducing and Regulating Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Russian Dimension

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December 11, 2009



Tochka-U short-range (120 km) missile

Views on employment of NSNW

Mid-1990s: proposals about enhanced reliance on TNW in response to NATO enlargement. Proposals not implemented into policy and strategy.

Military Doctrine (2000-2003): concept of de-escalation in response to U.S. and NATO conventional superiority:

- *Nuclear weapons can be used in response to a large-scale conventional attack on Russia;*
- *Russia will use long-range (strategic and medium-range air-based) assets to strike at command centers, airbases, aircraft carriers, control and communications centers involved in the attack, including outside the immediate theater of operations.*

Short-range assets do not have a defined role.



Military Doctrine of 2009 (?)

Information still contradictory.

Possible further expansion of nuclear missions to local conflicts.

Types of wars:

- armed conflict
- local conflict
- regional conflict
- global conflict

← Allow for nuclear use



Preventive use of nuclear weapons in “certain situations” (as opposed to first use?)

Subsequent statements/interviews repeated the 2000 language.

Bottom Line

1. Short-range weapons do not have a defined mission
2. Tu-22M3 medium bombers have a nuclear role. When they are phased out, their mission might be passed to strategic bombers or to Su-34. The latter seems unlikely.
3. Nuclear SLCMs are kept “in reserve” and might have a role. That mission could be picked by aircraft, however (Tu-95, Tu-22M3, perhaps Su-34).



Question:

Why Russia continues to hold on to its NSNW?

Politics of NSNW



“No more unilateral or asymmetric concessions”

No more “concessions to common sense” *perestroika*-style, including INF model (Soviet Union eliminated several times more missiles than the United States). This means, for NSNW:

- *Russia must not give up advantages, or trust promises. Good-will gestures will be pocketed by the West. Only capability and legally binding agreements are acceptable;*
- *Western insistence that Russia reduces its NSNW or accepts transparency are attempts to deny Russia one of its few advantages;*
- *If American NSNW capability cannot be logically explained, it must be intended against Russia.*



Politics of NSW

Inertia

The longer a position is maintained, the more difficult to change it. Change of position without justification is a unilateral concession (see above for “no more concessions to common sense”).

Change of a “stale” position possible in two situations:


- *New leadership (like the ascension of Gorbachev) – not likely in the near future (not until 2012, probably later);*
- *Change of external circumstances.*



Politics of NSNW

Capabilities-based planning


- Keep any existing capability to guard against uncertainty and new threats that might emerge in the future
- “Others have ‘em” – same justification as for withdrawal from INF in 2005-07: other countries have and/or develop intermediate-range missiles



Politics of NSNW

Parochial group politics

- Russian Navy interested in keeping NSNW option available in case it needs to face U.S. Navy
- Everyone else is less interested or not interested at all
- No one has a motive to invest resources into changing Russian position; consequently broad psychological variables (“no unilateral concessions”) and Navy’s interest obtain.



Project 885



Project 971

Politics of NSNW

Arms control challenges

Agreements on NSNW must address warhead stockpiles. Involves new categories of facilities: warhead storage sites and production and dismantlement plants.

Developing new position will take time and effort.

Overcoming opposition or at least skepticism (RosAtom, 12th GUMO, FSB, etc.) will require investment of political resources.



Bottom Line

Russian position appears very stable, represents consensus of interested parties. It could be changed:

- Russia does not need short-range weapons;
- SLCM warheads potentially have a role;
- Warheads for long-range aircraft have a role in the foreseeable future.

Yet there is no reason for the government to engage in a politically risky and costly revision of the present stance.

Two options:

- Wait until the domestic situation (political and/or economic) changes,
- Remove the main argument for Moscow's refusal to deal with NSNW – American NSNW in Europe, or
- Find another trade-off.

Reducing and Regulating Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Options for Action

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Current intentions – include NSNW into next START

Will likely generate more problems than will solve:

- (1) Russia will not accept unequal reductions; U.S. will not accept equal ceilings.
- (2) U.S. unlikely to trade off all SLCM warheads
- (3) Russia will want significant concessions on *both* NSNW and strategic weapons.
- (4) Verification of stockpiles will be a challenge, controversial in both states.

Better option – get movement on NSNW separately, only then include into START process

“Transparency first”

- None or very modest reductions.
- Provides basic data on the state of NSNW arsenals, dynamic of their change, breakdown by basing method (air, sea, other), possibly geographical distribution.
- As a result, reasonable degree of predictability, some idea of possible employment, few unpleasant surprises.
- Reduce concern among NATO countries, especially in Eastern Europe.
- Appears acceptable to Russia in principle because NSNW have little or no military role (at least, the short-range variety).



Difficult to launch



Trigger:

- (1) unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNW from Europe
- or
- (2) NSNW-CFE deal

Purpose: Change domestic alignments in Russia



Methods:

- (1) Undermine the cornerstone element in Russian position or
- (2) Offer an overwhelming incentive.



Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNW from Europe

U.S. statement – unilateral or on behalf of NATO:

- Unilateral withdrawal
- Basic information about total NSNW stocks (including in the U.S.)
- Invitation to Russia to do the same and possibly move NSNW storage sites deeper into Russia.



Legally binding agreement is attractive, but might be counterproductive because Russia is likely to ask for additional concessions

NSNW-CFE deal

Exchange of concerns: NATO's concern over Russian NSNW to Russia's on NATO's conventional forces.



Challenge – Russian expectations for CFE will be difficult to swallow:

- Bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- Moldova
- flank limitations, etc.

Maybe explore Medvedev's new format.

Next stage - Full-Scale Treaty

Link subsequent action on NSNW to subsequent action on strategic weapons (beyond START I replacement currently under negotiation):

- Timeframe – 2010 (to get NSNW action underway prior to new START)
- Focus on warhead stockpile reductions instead of delivery vehicles (next stage of START will likely do it anyway to address uploading capability, which is a major concern for Russia);
- Significant NSNW reductions will concentrate on short-range assets; longer (intermediate) range will be subject to some reduction and verification;
- Procedures for verification of storage and dismantlement facilities will apply to both strategic and tactical warheads;
- At first, forego limits on non-deployed warheads (to account for bigger Russian NSNW stocks), later – aggregate limit on all nuclear stockpiles (strategic and non-strategic). Russia will likely sacrifice the latter.

Advisable to begin discussion as early as possible at Track II and Track 1^{1/2} level to explore possible solutions and lay down political foundation.

