MIIS Student Negotiators Also Sign New U.S.-Russian Arms Control Treaty

On February 5, 2011, the Russian Federation and the United States will exchange the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) ratification documents, signaling the treaty's entry into force. Throughout the negotiations and ratification process, the Obama administration emphasized that New START is only a first step in resetting U.S.-Russian relations and paving the way for a more ambitious nuclear arms pact that would encompass all categories of nuclear weapons. While both countries will have seven years to meet the limits imposed by New START, discussion on the potential framework of a new agreement may commence shortly.

Last fall at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 22 students from nine countries (including junior diplomats and government officials from Belarus, China, Indonesia, and Ukraine participating in their personal capacity) participated in a semester-long nuclear arms control simulation involving the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to New START.

Under the guidance of Professor William Potter, with the assistance of CNS experts Dr. Nikolai Sokov and Mr. Nikita Perfilyev, the students negotiated and signed an agreement entitled the "Treaty on Nuclear Arms Reduction and Cooperation on Missile Defense" (NARACOM). The treaty included unprecedented collaboration on missile defense, a significant reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, including both strategic and non-strategic arms), and a comprehensive verification regime.

Ambassador James Goodby speaks.

The negotiations during the simulation were contentious and at times led to heated debate. The Russian delegation was adamant about placing further limitation on the number of deployed strategic launchers, due to a significant number of their launchers soon reaching their end of service. By reducing the ceiling limit to a figure more in-line with its projected capabilities over the next decade, the Russian Federation would be able to maintain parity with the United States and efficiently modernize its nuclear forces. While the U.S. delegation was open to reducing the ceiling limits on these weapon systems, it was unwilling to accept its counterpart's proposed ceiling limit of 400 for deployed strategic launchers. However, relying on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review as guidance, the U.S. delegation determined that it was possible to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear triad while reducing its constituent parts. They therefore proposed to reduce the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet to twelve submarines carrying 20 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each, maintaining a total of 60 heavy bombers, and deploy 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at each of the three launch sites. Their view was that a limit of 580 strategic launchers would not only be feasible, but it would assist in the reallocation of resources to develop and build a new class of SSBNs and heavy bombers. The delegations further agreed that the total limit on deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers will stand at 680 and that the number of deployed strategic warheads would be reduced to 1250.

A significant concession on the part of the United States was repatriation of all nuclear weapons outside their national territory within two years, which would be subsequently verified through inspections by the Russian Federation. This concession opened up an opportunity to include non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in the overall reductions. Since the Russian delegation was hesitant to include any language that would directly designate NSNW, it was decided not to specify the type of reduction, but to allow each country the flexibility to reduce its nuclear arsenals as it deemed appropriate by no less than 20 percent from the levels established by verifiable baseline declarations. Moreover, within two years after the entry into force of the treaty, the delegations agreed to establish a ceiling limit of 3,000 warheads of any type located on military bases, which are defined in the treaty as being deployed or operational. For the Russian delegation, this was a vital provision that would effectively limit the U.S. upload potential. Additionally, both countries consented to signing a memorandum of understanding not to deploy NSNW on surface ships, submarines, and land-based naval aircraft.

Ambassador Linton Brooks speaks.

From the onset of negotiations, the delegations understood that cooperation on missile defense would be an essential element of the treaty. Both sides believed that a cooperative effort in this arena would further their mutual interests by providing increased defensive capabilities, enhanced transparency, and a new platform for U.S.-Russian security partnership. The negotiations focused on creating a missile defense framework for the European theater in which both countries would actively participate. To achieve this goal, the parties agreed to establish a system for sharing early warning radar data that would include the establishment of two Forward Based X-Band radar sites located in Plovdiv, Bulgaria and Gabala, Azerbaijan. These two sites would be jointly operated and would transfer data to two Joint Data Exchange Centers (JDEC) located in Moscow, Russia and Brussels, Belgium. These JDECs would also incorporate data collected from the Russian radar site in Armavir and the U.S. radar sites in Fylingdales, United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland. Additionally, the delegations agreed to participate in several joint missile defense exercises and training programs as well as collaboration on future missile defense research and development.

With a focus on establishing a new era of strategic partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation, the delegation members negotiated an unprecedented verification regime. This regime would not only provide for the verification of the 20 percent reduction of nuclear arsenals, but would also increase the transparency of nuclear stockpiles by identifying the location, number, type, and movement of all nuclear warheads.

Arms control negotiation simulation class.

The Monterey Institute students participating in the simulation class believed that the signing of an agreement such as the NARACOM Treaty in reality—and not just in a simulation—would provide a solid framework for a New START Follow-on Treaty, and that the provisions of negotiated for NARACOM would represent a significant step forward in building a stable, cooperative relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. The simulation participants also regarded the treaty they negotiated to be an appropriate follow-on measure that addresses many of the issues omitted in previous U.S.-Russian arms negotiations. In addition, the student negotiators believe that their treaty would enhance transparency and predictability, while enabling each side to retain adequate flexibility. Both the U.S. and Russian delegations perceived the new treaty as a substantial step towards fulfilling the obligations of their states under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby strengthening the nonproliferation regime and encouraging other governments to take similar arms reduction steps.

Notes

*During the simulation, Daniel Painter and Leo Naboyshchikov were chairs of the U.S. and Russian delegations, respectively.