James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, left, talks with William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies on Tuesday. [Src: The Monterey Herald] See also: Streaming video of the event [Src: AMPMedia.org] Transcript of the event The Monterey Herald story

Mohamed ElBaradei Calls for a New Global Security Landscape

Jean du Preez and Insook Kim

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and 2005 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, spoke in Monterey on May 30, 2006, at an event sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the City of Monterey and the Monterey County Herald newspaper. During his conversation with Dr. William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Dr. ElBaradei highlighted many key issues and challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime today. A general theme in his candid responses to questions about the current nuclear proliferation threats was the need for a new global security landscape, one in which some states could not argue that nuclear weapons are essential for their security while denying others the same right. Dr. ElBaradei emphasized that national security concerns lie at the heart of many nonproliferation challenges. It is imperative not only to ameliorate the symptoms but to address the root causes of nuclear proliferation, and in this regard he argued for the need to closely examine the driving factors behind a state's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Until this bigger question can be answered, ElBaradei warned that "Kennedy's prediction is still alive," referring to President Kennedy's 1963 prediction that the world would have 20 nuclear weapons states by 1975.

The Iranian nuclear quagmire
Dr. ElBaradei was optimistic that a diplomatically negotiated settlement could be reached to defuse the current tensions building around Iran's suspect nuclear program and that the crisis can be averted. In this regard he cautioned that lessons should be drawn from the Iraqi case and states should avoid "jumping the gun" when dealing with Iran. He reiterated the importance of exhausting all diplomatic means, and downplayed the value and effectiveness of enforcement measures, such as economic sanctions. He argued that any efforts to isolate Iran, including by means of sanctions would only serve to harden already hard-line positions in Tehran, possibly resulting in an active, but clandestine nuclear weapons program. In this regard, he drew parallels between the Iranian situation and that of North Korea, where Pyongyang kicked out the IAEA inspectors after announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. (North Korea also announced that any sanctions imposed by the Security Council would be considered a "declaration of war." Pyongyang continued to clandestinely reprocess plutonium and on February 10, 2005 declared that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons.)

Dr. ElBaradei noted that Iran needed to halt its enrichment activities as a means of restoring the international community's confidence in its stated intention not to develop nuclear weapons. While acknowledging that there are gaps in understanding and verifying the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program, he emphasized that the IAEA has not found conclusive evidence that Iran is developing a parallel military program. Since Iran has only experimented with small quantities of uranium and has not moved to "industrial size" production, the Director-General emphasized that while it is clear that Iran has developed the knowledge of the fuel cycle, this is not "synonymous to having a nuclear weapons program." He said there is "no clear and present danger, and there is still lots of time to investigate and negotiate."

Dr. ElBaradei downplayed suggestions that Iran might be contemplating withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to pursue an active nuclear weapons program. But he emphasized that given Iran's influence in the Middle East, any punitive measure aimed at Tehran, including sanctions and military action, could lead to a "total mess" in the region. He stressed the need for a "rational approach" with regard to the situation with Iran. He suggested that the parties most involved with negotiating with Iran--that is China, France, Russian, the United Kingdom and the United States--should present Iran with a comprehensive incentive package to convince Tehran to halt all enrichment related activities and accept robust safeguards. He suggested security guarantees and normalization of ties with the United States should be on the table. Dr. ElBaradei also emphasized that direct engagement between Iran and the "principal" party concerned-- i.e. the United States--is essential in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. The Director-General noted his view that since Iran, as in the case with all countries, is principally concerned about its own security, only direct talks with Washington would address these concerns.

Implications of the US-India deal
Responding to a question on why he welcomed the controversial US-India nuclear cooperation deal, describing it as a "win-win situation," the Director-General noted that the deal would help make India an important partner in nonproliferation. Dr. ElBaradei emphasized the need to engage the three nuclear weapons possessor states that lie outside of the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) and to devise practical means to embrace them into the international nonproliferation regime. He pointed out that whether recognized within the NPT or not, India is a nuclear weapon state, and further noted that "India is never going to join the NPT." He emphasized that India would only give up its nuclear weapons under a global nuclear arms control agreement that would include all other nuclear weapons states, especially China--India's main security concern. He asked the question "how can one treat [a country with] one sixth of the world's population as a pariah" and argued that it is vital to bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream. He emphasized that the world community has recognized, especially since 9/11, that the nuclear nonproliferation regime needs a new framework, one in which India would have to play an important role. ElBaradei questioned the concern of some skeptics that despite measures put forth in the US-India nuclear deal, it would not be possible for the IAEA to verify the proposed separation of India's civilian and military programs. He noted that the Agency currently inspects nuclear facilities in other nuclear weapon states in a similar fashion as that proposed by the pending deal.

Nuclear disarmament: leading by example
With respect to the importance of nuclear disarmament and the lack of historical progress in this area, Dr. ElBaradei reminded the audience that there were still "27,000 nuclear weapons 15 years after the end of the Cold War," and that the United States and Russia still target each other and have their weapons on hair-trigger alert status. Dr. ElBaradei emphasized the necessity of all nuclear weapon states to set a positive example by taking concrete steps to demonstrate that they are serious about fulfilling their disarmament commitment under Article VI of the NPT. He further questioned the effectiveness of efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability, when the country leading the charge against Iran--the United States--does not have the moral authority owing to its lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament.

He cited the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as important means to jump-start the disarmament process. On the FMCT, the Director-General strongly advocated the need for a verifiable treaty "and stated that the Agency is already verifying production in Japan." Conceding that no treaty is perfectly verifiable, as argued by the Bush administration, Dr. ElBaradei said "it is still better to have a verification mechanism which makes it more difficult to cheat." Responding to a question if the NPT would look different if it were to be drafted today, Dr. Elbaradei stated that in his view a "new NPT" should "totally abolish nuclear weapons" within a set timeframe, much like the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) did for chemical weapons.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
In addressing the importance of ensuring that nuclear energy only be used for peaceful purposes, Dr. ElBaradei pointed out that most, if not all, initiatives in this regard resulted from a "major shock" in response to major issues of concern--such as in the way the Chernobyl accident raised awareness of the need for international standards for nuclear plants. He argued that a state's ability to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes does not necessarily mean that it intends to develop nuclear weapons, and pointed out that all states that have developed nuclear weapons have done so through the use of research reactors and not through nuclear power reactors.

Addressing the dangers involved in the continued use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian sector, he emphasized that no technical reasons remain for reliance on HEU. However, he pointed out that since most of the HEU research reactors and stockpiles are located in the nuclear weapon states, the same principles should be applied to all states. "What is good for the goose should be good for the gander" he said.

Dr. ElBaradei also touched upon the important role that civil society should play in promoting awareness and applying pressure on national governments in the nonproliferation and disarmament arena. The Director-General noted that historically civil society has not played a large role in the security field, but it has great potential to make significant contributions and bring about much required changes. He pointed also to the need to recruit a new generation of nuclear nonproliferation specialists with a different vision of what is possible and the ability to paint a new security landscape that would remove the perception that nuclear weapons were essential for a country's security. This, he said, would require a "change of mindset" especially in those states with nuclear weapons.

See also:

• Streaming video of the event. [Src: AMPMedia.org]
• Transcript of the event.
• The Monterey Herald story.

Go to the Press page.