The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) conducted 70 biological weapons (BW)-dedicated missions in Iraq, and overall approximately 100 inspections related to BW. It also performed hundreds of hours of interviews with senior Iraqi officials. But since much of the information was collected from the Iraqis themselves, it was not always accurate. This talk reflects the speaker's own assessment and views.

Chronology of Development
The origins of Iraq's BW program were in the early 1970s, when Iraq had a policy to acquire BW. The rationale of the program, and of the decision to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in general, is not clear. Iraq claimed it was to counter its enemies--Iran and Israel. Another possible interest in WMD could be that they saw it as a credential to be a major player in the Middle East.

In 1974-1975, Iraq started to build the Al Hazan Ibn Al Haithem Institute, which is located 30 km south of Baghdad. It is also the location of chemical weapons (CW) research and electronics. Ostensibly it was under the Ministry of Higher Education, but actually it was under the control of the intelligence apparatus. One possible explanation for this is that perhaps Iraq thought that they would use the facility on a small scale. The work at the Institute was directed from above and the objectives of the work were not known to the workers. According to the Iraqis, in 1978-1979 the workers, including the director of the Institute, were arrested and served time in prison for about 10 years. The reason that was given was financial fraud. The failure of the Institute was a setback to the BW program. UNSCOM believes that there was still small-scale activity after the Iraqis claim it was closed.

In the early 1980s, Iraq had a renewed interest in BW. The Iraqis told UNSCOM that the director-general of the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) assumed that his mandate covered both CW and BW, and that, in general, decisions were made by the scientists or their immediate superiors. UNSCOM thinks that it is unlikely that this was the case. It suspects that the decision was made at a higher level, but was not able to confirm it.

The MSE had the right infrastructure and all the required credentials to start a BW program. It had five large laboratories, a few small ones, and an animal house. In February 1985, Dr. Taha was recruited for the MSE and was asked to restart the BW program. In interviews with UNSCOM, she said that she knew little about BW when she first arrived. Upon her arrival she researched BW literature for a few months. Initially the program did not have a well-defined objective. They told UNSCOM that they thought that they could produce weapons in 5 years.

The initial agents Iraq produced were botulinum toxin and anthrax. Iraqi officials said that the reason they chose these agents was that they were weaponized before by other countries, and Dr. Taha felt that she could handle this technology. In mid-1985, she started working in one of the laboratories on those agents. The pace of the work was slower than the authorities wanted.

The program was relocated in May 1987 to Salman Pak (aka Al Salman), which was heavily bombed in the Gulf War. At first the morale was low at the new facility, but later the pace picked up and the program flourished when small-scale production of agents began. At Salman Pak, Iraq conducted experiments on animals with agents in liquid and dry form. The experiments had no controls, and served more as a demonstration of ability.

In 1988 another bacterial agent was added--gas gangrene. The reason for this choice was that during the Iran-Iraq War the authorities noticed that the soldiers' wounds were infected with gas gangrene bacteria. They investigated the cases in the hospitals as they thought that maybe the Iranian military had used it as a weapon. Although they found that this was not the case, it stimulated interest in the agent.

By the end of 1987 the Iraqis thought that they could go into production. In 1988 Hussein Kamal took over the program. He had a profound effect on the program. Kamal wanted to strengthen his position within the Iraqi government and according to General Saadi, this was one way to do so. Kamal had a carrot-and-stick approach to management. He rewarded and punished people who were involved in the program according to their achievements.

Iraq looked initially at mobile production facilities. In 1988 Iraq started to build a production facility in Al Hakam. It was called Project 324, since March 24, 1988, was the date they decided to start building the new facility. According to the Iraqis, the site was selected because it was remote. They said that they could not produce at Salman Pak because it was too close to Baghdad. Another reason could also be that it would be more secret.

Construction of Al Hakam had high priority. At the end of 1988 they had the first building in place. Staff were transferred from Al Salman. In 1988 the Iraqis also expanded the BW program and added viral, fungal, and plant agents. The Iraqis told UNSCOM that the director-general discussed the expansion with Dr. Taha at Al Salman in 1987, but UNSCOM thinks that the decision to expand was made at a high level.

In 1987 or 1988, a small team of mycologists was recruited. Initially they investigated trichothecene mycotoxins, the type allegedly used in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. They had a difficulty working with them. They also worked with aflatoxin. The choice of aflatoxin is curious due to its small acute toxicity effects. The speaker thinks that it was a decision of the mycologist who was recruited, Dr. Emad. He had worked on aflatoxin before and he knew that he had to achieve something. There was also no review of his work due to continuing conflicts between him and Dr. Taha. Dr. Emad started at Salman Pak and when Taha's team moved to Al Hakam he was supposed to go there as well. But he wanted to work somewhere else, thus he was sent to Fudaliyah. There are indications that he was rewarded for this achievement.

In 1988-1989 ricin was added to the program. Ricin is isolated from castor beans. This was a separate initiative from Taha's project. The Iraqis conducted a weapon test using an artillery shell but the trials were not successful and they told UNSCOM that this project was abandoned.

The Iraqis also researched a plant pathogen--wheat cover smut. They started the research in 1984 and in 1987 started to produce quantities. They thought they could use it as an economic weapon against Iran.

In August 1990 the Iraqis looked at three viral agents: hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, human rotavirus, and camel pox. Camel pox is not a disease of humans, and usually does not affect humans. The Iraqis told UNSCOM that the Iraqi population lived with camels all their lives and were immune to this disease, but coalition forces were not. UNSCOM wondered whether they selected camel pox because it can be manipulated using genetic engineering. The Iraqis denied it.

Iraq investigated a whole range of delivery systems including bombs, rockets, and artillery shells, using liquid agents. In general, their weapon types were developed by MSE and not by the biologists. They used reverse-engineering to build the R-400 bomb, which is a curious choice because it was originally a conventional penetrating bomb and it has thick casing. They said it was demanded by the Iraqi Air Force. The bombs were filled at Al Muthanna. They were destroyed by UNSCOM in 1992. At the time of the destruction, UNSCOM was not aware that the bombs were to be filled with BW, although the Iraqis marked them with a black stripe. Another delivery system that they used was 122mm rockets. This is also a curious choice for BW because they have a range of 14-15 km.

After the invasion of Kuwait Hussein Kamal ordered the production of as much agent as possible and at an accelerated pace. The BW program took over a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccine plant for production. By the Gulf War Iraq produced 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of anthrax, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin.

In August 1990, the Iraqis started to produce Scud warheads. They filled 25 warheads with various types of BW. Iraq claims that it never tested the warheads with BW, just with CW. The warheads were stored in two locations.

In November-December 1990, Iraq developed a new weapon -- a spray device. In November 1990, Iraqi officials read in an Israeli newspaper that 90% of the population of Israel could be wiped out if sprayed over with anthrax. Hussein Kamal wanted to make it happen. They decided on an aircraft that would spray anthrax from a modified fuel tank. They used a Mig-21 aircraft and a Mirage fuel tank. They conducted trials with the Mirage using a few simulants. The Mig aircraft was developed as a remotely operated aircraft with a 2,000 liter tank. They planned to develop 12 spray devices but said they modified only 4 fuel tanks. They also said they abandoned the project in March 1991 when the aircraft were bombed and the tanks destroyed.

There is no evidence that BW was used by Iraq in the Gulf War. After the War, Iraq claimed it had unilaterally destroyed all BW agents and weapons. UNSCOM later destroyed Al Hakam.

Remaining Capabilities
UNSCOM believed that Iraq still had BW capabilities even when it left the country. They possibly have the following remaining capabilities: