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On January 17, 2002, the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies hosted one of a series of conference calls with U.S. and European experts to review the impacts of the events of September 11 on arms control and nonproliferation.

An edited transcript of this roundtable discussion appears below. The principal speakers, in order of their comments, are:

Conference Moderator: Leonard Spector, Director, Washington, D.C., Office, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Therese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, French Atomic Energy Commission
Terence Taylor, Assistant Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies
Jonathan B. Tucker, Director CBW Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Patrick Clawson, Director for Research, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Paul Schulte, Director, Proliferation and Arms Control, U.K. Ministry of Defense
William Potter, Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Amin Tarzi, Senior Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Gaurav Kampani, Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Christine Wing, Program Officer, Human Rights and International Cooperation, The Ford Foundation

LEONARD SPECTOR: Therese, why don't you lead off, if you would be kind enough, and provide some thoughts on how all of these events are resonating in Europe.

THERESE DELPECH: Let me first say that we have now passed the four-month anniversary of the attacks. What I find important to recall is how impressive the emotion and the display of solidarity were here in Europe. It came both from sheer pain, and from the discovery that most of the hijackers had lived at some point in Europe. This attack was very soon qualified as an attack on all NATO members and on the countries of the European Union. Not only the member states, but also the candidate states, declared total solidarity with America. They backed U.S. retaliation and declared that their countries were prepared to undertake actions according to their means. Here I would like to stress that the transatlantic cooperation is much less uneven as far as police and intelligence is concerned, than on military matters. The events have not only renewed the debate on common transatlantic threats--Europe is very much aware that it is also vulnerable to catastrophic terrorism--but it has also generated some debate on European defense. Europe is in the process of acquiring a common projection force, which is supposed to deal mainly with peacemaking operations, such as in the Balkans. We now ask whether this is an adequate and sufficient objective.

I want also to address the issue of arms control and nonproliferation in terms of practical consequences. The attacks have first affected the areas of immigration, asylum rights, protection of religious groups, and dirty money rules. Second, they have affected the way we cooperate in Europe in dealing with criminal or terrorist activities. In particular, we have adopted a European arrest warrant recently. Concerning arms control and nonproliferation, the attacks have shown the importance of widely shared objectives around the world. This is a situation that needs a lot of international cooperation in order not only to fully recognize what is at stake, but also to fight in an effective manner. In my view, nonproliferation, even if it is only part of the response, is probably more not less important now.

Third, whatever the origin of the anthrax attacks, there should be a new stress on BW [biological weapons]. After the failure of the [Biological Weapons Convention] verification Protocol last year and the suspension of the Review Conference, progress should be made before November 2002, when the Conference resumes. Here, probably, some added emphasis on safety and security of biosamples and agents is very much needed.

Fourth, it seems to me that cruise missiles and defenses against them have acquired a renewed importance as well. This subject was very much on the backseat on both sides of the Atlantic, but will now probably have more salience now.

Fourth, the considerable importance of Russian cooperation should be underlined. We should encourage Putin's move to the Euro-Atlantic space, taking advantage of his cooperation in the war against global terrorism.

Finally, there should be a greater European contribution as well to Russian disarmament. A sort of European Nunn-Lugar program should be adopted.

SPECTOR: Why don't we take a question or two? When you say progress should be made on the biological weapons front, what did you have in mind? Do you mean regarding the Convention or regarding some of the new American initiatives?

DELPECH: I mean both. This Conference has been interrupted to avoid the feeling and the image that it was a failure. When it resumes, it should address some major multilateral issues without coming back to the original idea of a verification Protocol, which in my view is dead. A number of measures might also supplement what the Conference, itself, will address, because some of the issues need to be addressed in a different way. For instance in dealing with the pharmaceutical industry, some needed measures are not necessarily within an international convention.

TAYLOR: I just wanted to pick up on Therese's last extremely important point, as there is a tendency to focus on action within the treaty as we get nearer to a Review Conference and successes or failures directly associated with the treaty or part of the treaty. Handling this very difficult area of action outside the treaty could, in effect, be more important. By this I mean steps taken by the biotechnology industry itself, or, some very significant strengthening of a global epidemiological surveillance system. Both of these will probably work best outside a treaty framework. I would like to ask Therese to say a little bit more about that, and what she believes are the most important steps outside the treaty framework.

DELPECH: One example is related to the trade in biological samples and the way it is currently implemented throughout the world. This includes looking at practices in major developed countries, where the procedures, in some cases - or lack of them -, are highly questionable. Additional monitoring should be provided in order to solve this. In September 2001, we adopted some regulations in this area, which we are now discussing at the European level.

TAYLOR: Therese, in your view, is pursuing the verification protocol really dead as far as Europeans are concerned?

DELPECH: The Europeans tried during the Review Conference to save the Protocol with a compromise. We came to the regrettable conclusion that it was almost impossible to have this Protocol live because of fierce U.S. opposition to it. I am not speaking for my government, but my own view is that we have to start a new process with new initiatives to rebuild some consensus around a number of initiatives concerning, for instance, safety and security of biosamples and agents.

TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

SPECTOR: Why doesn't Jonathan just comment and then we will move to the Iraq issue before Patrick Clawson has to leave.

JONATHAN TUCKER: Therese, on the Protocol issue, first is there any possibility that the European Union might consider negotiating its own Protocol of a prototype or a model of what might be done on a broader multilateral basis? Second, the U.S. alternative package includes a recommendation that countries pass domestic legislation restricting access to dangerous pathogens, but there is no model legislation or uniform standards involved.

Would it be possible, perhaps as an alternative to the BWC Protocol, to negotiate a multilateral regime, which would provide uniform standards for safety, security and regulating access?

DELPECH: On a personal basis, I would find these alternatives worth looking at, because it will be difficult for the Europeans to go their own way. They are more likely to try to find some agreement with the United States. This issue is too important to be dealt with in a divisive fashion. The alternative you suggest is something I would personally consider worth looking at carefully. Up to now, the American alternatives, which have been presented, have been considered rather weak here. There is probably some progress to make there, but we still have some months ahead and we (the U.K., Germany, and France) will work with Canada and Australia on the subject. There is also some work done at the level of the 15 in the EU.

SPECTOR: Very good. Therese, we'll try to work back to this issue in a little bit. Let us turn, if we may, to taking a look at Iraq while we have Patrick Clawson, who is going to start our discussion, and then we will turn to some of the others including you. Patrick?

PATRICK CLAWSON: It is no secret that there's been a strong disagreement in policy circles in Washington about Iraq policy. But, I think that those disagreements are narrowing and that there is in fact more in consensus that it might appear from the outside. That consensus is that something has to be done about Iraq's WMD ambitions and its programs. I don't think that anything is likely to happen soon, there is still an awful lot that the U.S. has to do in Afghanistan and places like Somalia, Yemen, and the Philippines. Mr. Rumsfeld strongly feels that we have not finished wars well recently. So the concentration in the early part of this year is going to be on those kinds of issues. But, Iraq is going to come on the agenda I suspect sometime during the year 2002.

If we have a discussion about Iraq policy, the difficulty that we are going to face is that the approaches that we have used toward Iraq in the past don't seem to have been terribly successful. There is a lot of skepticism in this town about the prospects if the UN arms control inspections were to re-start, what they might be able to find, and how useful that process would be. Similarly, the smart sanctions proposals that Secretary Powell made earlier in the administration may have been very effective at defusing some of the criticisms of the United States for not taking into consideration the suffering of the Iraqi people. However, I think there is also a lot of skepticism about how effective the controls on the exports to Iraq of dual-use equipments would be at preventing progress in Iraqi WMD programs.

If we are going to have a new discussion about Iraq policy, it is going to be a real challenge to come up with effective alternatives to the alternative that everyone knows is on the table, namely the use of U.S. military force to achieve the replacement of Saddam's regime. I don't think that that's the first choice of most policy-makers. The challenge is going to be in the debate to discuss what are the alternatives to that if we feel that something must be done about Iraq.

SPECTOR: Do we know if Saddam is thinking about employing some of the terrorist organizations that he is supporting? Have we seen any evidence to suggest that he has used these to advance Iraqi interests?

CLAWSON: Not really. Iraq was never particularly effective in the terrorism game, and the concern about Iraq is much more because of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for another mass casualty attack on the United States. This was, of course, heightened by the anthrax episode.

I don't think that what is driving this process is principally an Iraqi track record of working with terrorist groups. It is more the concern about the Iraqi WMD programs and that Saddam might begin to use them or might begin to cooperate more actively with terrorist groups in the future.

SPECTOR: I guess I was raising the issue of whether the terrorist groups might not be the vector for getting at us.

CLAWSON: That is of course the great concern. Just let me say that there is not a track record to this point of a great deal of Iraqi cooperation with such groups. On the side of the terrorist groups themselves, to date they have not been able to link up with a state that had biological, chemical or radiological weapons. Perhaps they have been trying. It would appear to be the case, although it is not clear how much effort they really devoted to that.

TAYLOR: I think Patrick is absolutely right about that. We must be careful about the connection between the campaign against terrorism, I am using the word campaign deliberately instead of war, and dealing with Iraq. I think that trying to deal with them together as connected efforts does damage to both causes. Also, the connection is tenuous.

CLAWSON: I think that you are going to find that a lot of U.S. policy-makers are going to tell you that our concern is preempting future terrorism. The focus on preempting future terrorism leads us to think about who are the people who have capabilities that they should not have, to whether there is an international consensus that they shouldn't have these capabilities, and if they have also clearly expressed antipathy towards the United States. The focus on preemption is the high priority being given in this town to the activities of the intelligence and law enforcement communities, rather than on just simply finding out those who have actually done things in the past.

SPECTOR: Paul, perhaps you might introduce us to the question of whether or not we're going to see inspectors returning to Iraq anytime soon, and whether or not there are pressures mounting for this that might prove effective?

PAUL SCHULTE: It is not a question of whether pressure is mounting, but rather that pressure is continuing. Iraq must realize that it is not going to wriggle out of the sanctions regime unless it goes through the stages the U.S. has laid down. It is, as it has always been for the last few years, a question of whether or not Iraq is prepared to try to ignore the sanctions regime or whether it thinks its interests are best served by trying to persuade the U.S. that is has seriously discarded prohibited programs. On balance, I think the probability is that it will decide to try and persuade them, but I don't know any methodology of judging when it will decide that is the best strategy open to it. I am modestly optimistic in the long term that the Iraqis will at least attempt to engage with the UN, but I do not know when.

SPECTOR: So you don't have a sense then that there might be a crisis building as the United States starts saber rattling and tries to bring a coalition together at the UN security council on this issue?

SCHULTE: That is a scenario which I do not see happening yet. I don't exclude that that could happen, that the Iraqis under that kind of pressure, if it were to build, might react that way. But I don't see the signs of that beginning at this stage.

DELPECH: I've been following Iraq's activity in different capacities for 10 years now. It seems to me that we are today in a period of transition that may still last some months, but probably not for years. This is a period of trial. It is a chance for Iraq to change its position and to accept international inspectors without conditions.

If I were to judge by Iraq's statement at the beginning of this month, reiterating its refusal, the prospect is not encouraging. But that might change, in particular because the only country within the Security Council presenting a new policy that has to be adopted is probably reaching the end of its efforts and other members are also tired of Iraq's stubbornness. Even the Arab countries in the region are tired.

The new policy presented by the Bush administration, the so-called smart sanctions, was acceptable to all the members of the Security Council but one. In November, at a time when it was absolutely essential to preserve international cooperation for other reasons, and in particular Russia's cooperation, the Security Council decided to accept a new period of six months for the old oil-for-food mechanism. At the end of this period, the Security Council will meet again with a plan to adopt the new regime.

In my view, this period is one of trial. The consultations with Russia currently on the new list of dual-use items are moving forward. The main problem on Russia's side is probably less the content of the list than a number of economic considerations. We might have Russian support at some point. Then pressure on Iraq will grow and its resistance will have a greater price.

Whatever the future holds, it seems to me wise to insist--and this is what Washington and the U.S. president are doing right now, hopefully not only rhetorically--on the return of international inspectors. We all know that no bombardment has been as effective, so far, as inspectors in eliminating WMD programs. Even if force were eventually used at some point, it would be important for this to be done with the maximum amount of legitimacy.

BILL POTTER: I have a brief follow-on to Therese's comments. I share her analysis. I think the real question mark is the likelihood, or better, the possibility, that the Russian-U.S. relationship deteriorates rather than progresses. I think the key here is the impact of the broader set of relations with Russia in the arms control sphere. While I am hopeful that there will be more progress made, I don't think we should assume that that is a given. If, in fact, we find greater difficulties in nailing down some kind of offense-defense bargain that is acceptable to both parties. If Putin is not successful in getting something from the United States in the economic sector, I think that it is inevitable that this will also impact the Russian stance on Iraq and a variety of other issues that could pose difficulties for the United States.

DELPECH: You are absolutely right, Bill. I believe that not only on the issue of Iraq, but also on many other issues. One of the major questions ahead, and very important here in Europe, is the sustainability of the new U.S.-Russia relationship. Is this a slogan without much substance? Or, is it a policy that will be sustained? Taking into account the decision on ABM Treaty, the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] with the huge nuclear reserve, and the NATO situation (by this I mean NATO enlargement, plus the difficulty to come to an agreement on new rights for Russia within NATO on issues other than collective defense), there is not much for Vladimir Putin to show his own people in support of his Western policy. This policy might therefore collapse. One of the unfortunate consequences might be a disagreement on Iraq. So I completely agree with you.

SCHULTE: Can I just make a slight counter observation on that? The Russian position, as I understand it at the moment, is very much that they wish to be accepted as a power, which will be integrated in the "Euro-Atlantic space." That is, they want to be understood fundamentally and irrevocably as realigning their security interests with those of Europe and North America. Now, if that is the Russian position--and there is considerable willingness on the part of Europe and the U.S. to accommodate that move and to see if it is genuine--then one of the tests of that move towards the West will be their attitude on rather important long-term Western goals, like nonproliferation and serious disarmament.

It is difficult to say that a country is trying to realign itself in a Western direction with Western goals, if at the same time, over a long-term unavoidable crunch test issue like Iraq, its diplomatic posture seems to be that of, on the whole, assisting Saddam's position rather than that of all the Western countries.

DELPECH: You assume that in Moscow, the Western choice is the Russian choice, that is, the choice of Russia as a whole. This is not true at all. It is Putin's choice. It may be the only sensible choice for Russia, but this is only Putin's choice for the time being. A large part of the military and a large part of the intelligence community is not supporting this policy at all. So if it does not get any results, and in particular in the economic sphere, you will have Vladimir Putin increasingly isolated at some point. This is politics.

SCHULTE: Well, it is politics, but at the moment my impression is that he is very much in control and has a strong personal ability to try to push through this redefinition of Russia's interests and role in the world.

POTTER: I think that Therese is absolutely correct. At some point Putin has to deliver the goods. The policy is wise, if it, in fact, enables him show some economic benefits, which are first and foremost what he's after. That will require some give on the Western side as well. I think it is quite possible that we will see a kind of progress, which serves both Western interests and Russian interests; but it is not a foregone conclusion. It is not clear to me at the moment that he will in fact get what he wants in a timeframe, which will allow him to carry on. As Therese notes, this is first and foremost his policy, which is supported at the moment. But that does not mean that he will be able to carry on indefinitely.

AMIN TARZI: First of all, on this whole issue of Iraq, I tend to agree with Therese and Bill that Russia is the key. At the same time, Russia is not looking at the Atlantic and Europe as the only choice.

Right now it appears as if the troops in Afghanistan are staying there for good. With this and with U.S. policy in the Middle East being quite unilateral, I don't think Russia is in a position to be part of the Atlantic and Europe because its whole economic and social situation is at a much different stage. If it accepts that Central Asia is now under U.S. domination, or may be coming under such domination, I don't think Russia will control everything. Central Asian oil and gas, and Middle Eastern gas and oil are, I hope, part of the alliance with the U.S., With that said, I want to talk about Iraq and this issue of U.S. policy in the long run. Right now we have the British with us, and the French are with us on the smart sanctions, but with regard to the Arab countries, there are many disturbing signs. We are hearing in Congress that people, like Senator Levin, are calling for the closure of the only major base we have in Saudi Arabia. We know that without the Saudis' support and other Arab support, the campaign in Iraq, the political campaign at least, will be futile. Then if we go in militarily, it may be disastrous. So I think the Iraq policy is not only how we look within the UN, but also how we look within the coalition, within the Arab countries. That is very important.

Now, in regards to one question that Therese brought up, in passing she talked about cruise missiles. When I used to work with the United Arab Emirates, I was concerned about the issue of the sale of cruise missiles to certain countries, specifically the United Arab Emirates. I am talking about the [French] Apache, which is also called the Black Shahin. At that time I talked to some colleagues with the French Defense Ministry, and they said that there was nothing to worry about, it was only an American worry.

In regards to your comment that cruise missiles are now coming back on the agenda, do you mean that there will be more restraint in selling weapons such as the Apache or other American weapons in the Middle East or elsewhere? Or what do you mean by more emphasis on cruise missiles?

DELPECH: What I mean by more emphasis on cruise missiles is the necessity to think, in the missile defense program, not only about short- and mid-range ballistic missiles. This was more or less the focus of what the Europeans wanted to do. We should think about defenses against these kinds of missiles because our troops in military operations abroad could very well face them. It seems to me that we now have to add the problem posed by cruise missiles. Hopefully, this will lead all countries having this level of awareness to be more careful in some of their deals.

TARZI: OK, relate the question to UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. I agree with you on cruise missiles, but another thing that has caught my attention is that a terrorist or a state could easily disseminate biological or chemical weapons with something that is very easy. But these are not even listed as items to be restricted under the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime]. Indeed, a number of countries in the Middle East now openly make these systems.

Do you think that there may be an international convention that might start restricting sales of these systems in some way or some way to bring them under the MTCR?

SPECTOR: They are included under the MTCR. Certainly, if they have a range of 300 kilometers and 500 kilograms of payload. [Note: The MTCR also extends to any unmanned system intended for delivery of weapons of mass destruction regardless of range and payload capabilities.]

TARZI: But what if they are lower than that? In regards to the potential terrorism aspect, they may not need that kind. They may use the shorter-range missiles, up closer to the target, and they may use one of the ones that are not categorized. I was wondering if you see any new agreements, at least within the supplier countries, for reducing the payload and the range, and for making more restrictions than currently exist?

DELPECH: I haven't heard anything of this kind but it might be useful. What I was pointing at is that this whole issue is now subject to closer scrutiny than it was before. Concerning cruise missiles, there are about 70,000 anti-ship cruise missiles around the world, which could easily be converted for land attack purposes. Let me come back to another point you've made concerning the cooperation of the countries of the Middle East region on Iraq. This point is essential. When the proposals on smart sanctions were put on the table, not only was the support of one member of the Security Council lacking (Russia), but cooperation of countries of the region was also lacking because they were unwilling to tighten control on all illicit trafficking.

In the Middle East, there are also some other specific problems to address. If the situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians continues to deteriorate, the support for Baghdad in Arab countries will only grow. Baghdad should comply with UNSC [UN Security Council] resolutions whatever happens in other parts of the region, but one cannot forget the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Arab public opinion.

TARZI: I agree with you. It has to be a package that must include the Security Council, as well as the regional states. At the moment, however, it is not clear where our regional allies may stand. You have countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, for example, which is a good ally of ours, but they are number one in allowing Iraqi ships to pass through. You also have Turkey, which is permitting smuggling, because it needs money. While the U.S. understands that, we are not pressuring Turkey, but it does leave questions as to where Turkey stands on forcing out Saddam.

But if we want to press Iraq, we will need a package that makes everybody responsible. I don't see that happening right now, at least not in my reading of the open sources.

SPECTOR: Let me raise a question which would be, if we get the inspectors back in, will they be able to really do the job when it comes to biological weapons? They were having so much difficulty even under UNSCOM.

TUCKER: As I understand it, the inspection regime really had three goals. First, to uncover the historical program. Second, ongoing monitoring and verification of dual-use facilities that could be diverted for biological weapons production, and finally, identifying clandestine facilities through short-notice challenge-type inspections.

I think that the most successful of these three objectives was the OMV, ongoing monitoring and verification. As long as there were inspectors on the ground and closed circuit television cameras at these identified dual-use facilities, it was possible to monitor them quite effectively to prevent the Iraqis from diverting these facilities for illicit production.

As soon as the inspectors were expelled in December of '98, the Iraqis were able to use these facilities for biological weapons production and also to rebuild some of their vaccine plants that had been dismantled.

So, even though a return of inspectors to Iraq would not by any means be a panacea for the problem, it could keep it under at least some kind of contained status. There is always the possibility of another Hussein Kamal, a senior defector who could provide information, which could then be exploited effectively if we hadn't been able to identify a clandestine facility, such as Al-Hakam, which Kamal brought to our attention. While not a panacea, it would be very useful to have inspectors back and would put some kind of constraints on the program.

SPECTOR: Let me just wrap up by asking Paul Schulte or Therese what is going to be the next milestone that we can expect to see in the UN or maybe external to the UN?

SCHULTE: Well, it seems to me that there will be various milestones in the organization and preparation of UNMOVIC. There will be milestones over the evolution of the sanctions regime, and in particular, the achievement of some kind of improved smarter sanctions arrangement, which will depend very heavily on Russian cooperation. But the key milestone that everyone will be looking for will be a change in Iraqi intentions towards the UN. And the bigger milestone after that, will be evidence that that intention is genuine. The critical question will be if the Iraqis are or are not really serious about cooperation if they invite the UN back.

I don't know when that will occur. I think we ought to assume that the Iraqis might change their minds, but not be gullible in case what they are doing falls short of that.

So, it is a kind of vista of small changes with one big question mark-shaped milestone, rather than any one imminent, immediate big memorial on the horizon.

DELPECH: June will be an important date because UN Security Council Resolution 1382 will come to an end at the end of May, and there will be a new discussion within the Security Council on the situation. At that time, the bilateral discussion between the United States and Russia on the goods-review list will have taken place, and I am confident that there will be an agreement.

We should not dismiss the work done by UNMOVIC itself. UNMOVIC's chairman is cautious and serious, and UNMOVIC, though not on the ground, is working intensively on a number of issues, making the best possible use, for instance, of the huge archives available. We can expect that they will be able to learn more from these archives once they take advantage of all the information they contain. We know that UNSCOM has been able to use only part of them. UNMOVIC is also dealing with what can be learned about Iraqi activities without inspectors, through the use of overhead imagery, intelligence from various sources, and also open sources. The next six months will be very important. As I said before, we are now in a period of transition. In my view, this is something Iraq should very much understand.

POTTER: I found Jonathan's kind of testament of the successes of UNSCOM compelling. If in fact he's correct, then it seems to me that Saddam Hussein has a very strong incentive to keep the inspectors out, if one assumes that his motivation is to try to further develop weapons of mass destruction.

So, absent the real prospect of U.S. military action, what is it that is likely to bring Iraq to the table to in fact allow the inspectors back? Yes, Russia might come on board because they may lose some financial benefits that they would otherwise acquire by joining the U.S., but short of the real threat of U.S. military action, what in June is likely to lead to a change in the readiness of Iraq to accept UNMOVIC inspectors?

TAYLOR: I think I share a certain amount of optimism that Russia is likely to come around. I share Paul's view on this. I would like to get Therese and Paul to look forward and imagine we reach a point where there is an acceptance by Iraq that the UNMOVIC inspectors should go back. I think the key issue will be if Russia swings around, and I think the Iraqis will accept them.

Then we are into a whole new sphere about the assessment of what UNMOVIC can achieve. This is a really important point. Let me put my view forward. I think UNMOVIC will be an extremely important vehicle to test whether or not Iraq is serious. The kind of information they collect and the assessment they make will be vital. I am very pessimistic about what UNMOVIC could possibly find that Iraq wanted to hide. I don't think they will be very successful at that. But, that does not mean we shouldn't want the inspectors to go back.

The other point is if we entered into a protracted negotiating process with Iraq, would it not then seize this as an opportunity for keeping military action further at arms length? They could engage in play with the inspection process and draw it out. What would be Paul's and Therese's views of that?

DELPECH: I am not going to elaborate on a possible negotiating process because I believe the return should be unconditional. If the inspectors are allowed to come back, and in my view this remains the main goal, three things are essential. The first is to have very competent inspectors. With the time they have had to prepare themselves, they certainly are competent. The second thing is for them to know where to go, and intelligence is necessary for that. The third is to maintain high standards for compliance. There should be no lowering of the standards for compliance, and Hans Blix is firm on that.

Will we encounter problems? Yes, we will. We will in any situation, but we will have to deal with them, at least, in an environment that is entirely legitimate. I believe that this will be extraordinary support for success, if any problems occur--and there will be problems.

SCHULTE: I'd agree with much of that. I think, without saying that UNSCOM was not legitimate, that there is undoubtedly very strong emphasis on neutrality and high professional levels in UNMOVIC.

DELPECH: I never said UNSCOM was illegitimate. This is a misunderstanding. I said international inspections in Iraq were entirely legitimate.

SCHULTE: To answer Terry's two questions. First of all, what might change the government of Iraq's views? Well, it would presumably be a recalculation that it is not going to achieve its goals by its present approach. That it is not going to be able to wriggle out of the cage that the UN has put around Iraq, that it is not going to get assistance in doing that by enough states, and that, therefore, it is better off doing what it said that it would do under 687.

On the question of how one prevents UNMOVIC's engagement from just being an excuse for delay and of obfuscation, I think that challenge has to be met by very precise reporting and review on what exactly the Iraqis are doing, rather than being drawn into an Iraqi game of a kind of pretense of involvement and their kind of deceptive engagement with the UN. I think that precise reporting on what's happening, and a kind of moderate, but determined approach, can achieve that.

TAYLOR: That would only work, presumably, if the Security Council's aim is to stand together throughout this process, and if they have the resilience to stand together.

SCHULTE: That has always been an important background precondition hasn't it? This again returns us to the importance of Russia's position. The position the Russians take will be a test case of how far they're being Euro-Atlantic about all this.

GAURAV KAMPANI: I just wanted to say that even if the inspectors are drawn into an Iraqi game, it is important for the United States to try and go through the motions of withdrawing inspectors in Iraq so at least it can show to the international community that an attempt was made to exhaust the diplomatic option before raising the preemptive war.

TARZI: To answer Bill's question of what would change. I think that Saddam Hussein's calculations are that as long as he has members of the P-5, right now he has at least one, or countries within the region supporting his game(either openly or secretly), he will continue to play it .

The second thing he knows is that if the United States does not have countries around Iraq to launch an attack, then executing the attack will be pretty hard. As I mentioned earlier in regards to Saudi Arabia, there is a possibility that we may actually lose the base there because of a Congressional problem. Hussein will calculate that. Furthermore, he also knows that there is no opposition to help the U.S., and the U.S. knows that there is no opposition. We do not have a Northern Alliance, so to speak. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) is basically a defunct organization and everybody knows that. Saddam knows this more than anybody else.

In regards to thinking in Iraq, if you read Iraqi papers as of late, you will notice that Saddam Hussein is portraying himself as somebody who was not the militarist, ever. Yes he fought a war, but at one point there was actually a commentary, which I saw, that said that the people that the United States is saving are the people who actually attacked the U.S. on September 11. Basically, this was talking about Kuwaitis and Saudis. What Saddam might like, and I am speculating, is for the U.S. to one day come and legitimize him.

For Saddam Hussein, one of the most important aspects is not so much the UN, but rather the whole issue of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA). As long as that is there, Saddam Hussein does not see the UN, or specifically the U.S., as only wanting to end the sanctions. ILA specifically states that it is the policy of the United States of America to remove Saddam Hussein from office, period. It has nothing to do with arms inspections and other related issues. If the United States were to legitimize him, he may actually change.

There are a lot of calculations. I agree with everyone that there is a period of calculation, but please read Iraqi papers to see where he is coming from. He says that he has never done any terrorist attacks. He is still saying bad things about the U.S., but he is branding himself as a non-radical Islamic. And, don't forget he belongs to a party that is Socialist. His party and its leaders are non-radical, and he attacked a radical state, and now the U.S. is paying for it.

DELPECH: In my view, it is much more important to focus on what we want to achieve than to focus on what might be in Saddam's mind. What I would whole heartily support is to take time, and to use this time to build consensus. Whatever we do afterwards will be greatly helped by these two elements--time and consensus building. This has been an excellent recipe in Afghanistan, in a very different situation. I also believe that there should be no linkages between a war on terrorism and Iraq, because Iraq poses a different problem. But this problem is a serious one, which should be addressed.

CHRIS WING: Building on what Therese just said, I wanted to go back and ask if anybody has a different view than Patrick Clawson did on the stage of this discussion in Washington.

SPECTOR: I was just going to raise that because I think there is a bit of a shift going on here in terms of the relationship between Powell and Rumsfeld, with the Pentagon getting more status and more influence. Even within the State Department, we are now observing some folks who really are not enthusiastic about inspection regimes and, indeed, are very hard-line in their skepticism. I am thinking specifically of John Bolton and a comment that he made at a meeting we had last Friday, where he said that the answer to Iraq is a "regime change." He was very explicit and did not pull his punches. He did not say that we are going to sneak up on it through getting a consensus with the Russians and getting the inspectors back in. He really felt that the answer was a more radical approach.

DELPECH: Well, Sandy, he was ahead of the U.S. president. The president of the United States doesn't say that.

SPECTOR: I understand. I am just saying that as this country pulls its vision together of which way it's going to go, I think that there are going to be many different pressures internally. I don't know that the outcome is so clear as of yet.

TARZI: We have a law in regards to this U.S. policy of a change to a regime. It was signed by Clinton in October of '98, and it is still the law of this land.

SPECTOR: It may well be that we'll see a saber rattling whose purpose in the end is to get the inspectors back in. However, I do observe that this camp that wants a more radical solution does still have some influence. Maybe we should wrap it up there for the day.

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