John Parachini: Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Recent allegations that terrorist groups have used or attempted to obtain chemical and radiological weapons has been closely monitored by the CBW (chemical and biological weapons) Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Many of the cases involving the alleged acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by non-state actors appear to be apocryphal. Nevertheless, they deserve close examination to shed some light on what broad lessons can be drawn from the motivations and patterns of behavior associated with WMD (weapons of mass destruction) terrorism. The assessment of the terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons in Jonathan Tucker's Toxic Terror book have drawn special attention in identifying characteristic motivations and patterns of behavior associated with CBW terrorism. Toxic Terror provides in-depth case studies of terrorist groups and individuals who, from 1946 to 1998, allegedly acquired or employed CBW agents. Today, as a continuation of this effort, three case study authors are joining us to discuss recent allegations related to the use of such weapons by terrorist organizations.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna is Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews. He was formerly Hesburgh Scholar at the Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame; Foreign Policy Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies , University of Maryland, and Visiting Scholar, Office of Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois. Dr. Gunaratna has conducted extensive field research on Asian groups, focusing on terrorist support networks.

Mr. Roger Davies is a former special projects officer in the Scientific and Technical Division of the Defense Intelligence Staff of the British Army. Mr. Davies commanded the Northern Ireland Bomb Disposal Unit and worked as an operations and intelligence officer for the National Bomb Disposal Operations Center.

Mr. Jeremy Mc Dermott is the Latin America correspondent for The Daily Telegraph in London. He is also the Colombia correspondent for the BBC and worked as deputy director editor for Emirate News in the United Arab Emirates. Mr. Mc Dermott has covered the Bosnia - Herzegovina conflict and Israel's 1996 ' Operation Grapes of Wrath' in Lebanon.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna will begin our presentation on the Khalistan Separatists and cyanide poisonings in Punjab. The author's presentations would be followed by a question and answer session.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna: Good afternoon. The alleged use of potassium cyanide by the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) in Punjab between 1997-98 was the aim considered in the study of the allegations of WMD use by Khalistan separatists. The history of conducting mass casualties in their attacks is a distinctive feature of this terrorist organization. The Babbar Khalsa International was formed in 1978 after clashes with a rival sect, with the precise objective of punishing those responsible for the death of Sikhs and to establish an independent Sikh state. Its leadership fled to Canada after Indian security forces attacked the Golden Temple in 1984. The use of tear gas during operation "Blue Star" was misinterpreted as a chemical weapons attack by the Indian authorities against the Sikhs. In response to the perception that the Indian government was planning to employ chemical and biological weapons, Sikhs leaders called for the development of a chemical and biological 'offensive' and 'defensive' capability. However, such plans where delayed, as the violence declined in 1992 due to an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the BKI leadership.

The perception that BKI had been suppressed only lasted until 1997, when Indian authorities recovered one kilogram of potasium cyanide in Punjab from a BKI courier. The recovery revealed the idea that the BKI were trying to use chemical and biological agents in a poison campaign that included targets such as devotees in holy temples, water supplies and army mess halls. However, Indian intelligence assessments revealed that the cyanide was to be used in a jail-break operation to rescue a BKI member. Glass cyanide capsules were to be taken by the terrorists in the event of their capture during the operation.

The facilitators that could have influenced the choice of unconventional weapons material by BKI include the group's revengeful nature, a tradition of denying their actions, its small support base, and possible access to chemical and biological technologies through its vast networks. The restraints for the use of such weapons include BKI's well established ties with the government of Pakistan and the severe disruptions within the group's domestic and operational support network. Nonetheless, international and cross border support from the Sikh diaspora contribute to sustain a low-level violence campaign.

To summarize, the BKI evades harsh India response domestically by operating overseas. However, BKI politicizes, radicalizes, and mobilizes the disapora despite the fact that the domestic population wants the violence to end. Thus, it is believed that the diaspora has lost touch with ground realities, making the organization critically dependant on external support. Thank you.

Roger Davies: Good afternoon. In May 1996 reports emanating from Russia revealed a possible sale or attempted sale of nuclear material by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The story was published in a British tabloid, The Mail on Sunday describing how the MI5 were using a Russian to investigate the IRA buying weapons and nuclear material. A close examination of this claim revealed that the story was not followed up by either The Mail on Sunday or by any other paper or media. The original story was found short on specifics and contradictory. This might have been motivated by the political context surrounding the story, in relation to the Yeltsin re-election campaign. A spate of similar reports were released by the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) over a two-week period coincident with this story, which included accusations that Estonia was assisting with terrorism. The individual mentioned in the story, Platon Obhukov a minor servant of the North America department of the Russian Embassy, was found mentally unstable and convicted. The story was discredited by FSB senior officers in October 1996.

A brief historical background on the IRA reveals that during the 1960's and 1970's the Republican strategy lacked a clear political context. However, the circumstances surrounding such context provided an adequate environment for the promotion of IRA violence guided by the importance of a community to serve. During the late 1970's some signs of a coherent political strategy started to emerged from influential leaders such as Adams and McGuiness, and the rise of Sinn Fein as a political party.

The Republican strategy and its history of mass casualties dates back from a 19th century poison plot against the British Army and a couple of incidents during the 1920's and 1970's respectively. The facilitators that could have influenced the choice of unconventional weapons by the IRA could be related to an incomplete support of the peace process; individual actions by Real IRA (RIRA) or Continuity IRA (CIRA); the group's ability to forget adverse incidents; the perception of violence as an end to itself in Republican thought; or a probable collapse of the peace process. The restraints for the probable use of such weapons by the IRA are influenced by the sectarian nature of the conflict; the group's 'catholic defender' tradition; the tribalism of the communities; and the success of traditional explosives. In addition, the use of such weapons would inflict potential damage to their cause in consideration of the mass casualties that would result.

The Mail on Sunday story is unconvincing and the allegations of a probable use of nuclear material appears to have been considered by Irish terrorists, informally, not as a part of a coherent strategy. The leaders are now politically astute, even if their control is sometimes tenuous.

Jeremy McDermott: In June 1999, the Commander of Colombian's National Police, Luis Alberto Gillibert, publicly denounced the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for using chemical weapons against the security forces. During FARC's national offensive in mid-1999 the army and police reported that cooking gas cylinders were used as mortars to destroy police stations. Subsequent investigations conducted by the Army and the Fiscalia General de la Nacion revealed some autopsy reports in which the bodies of some soldiers revealed burns that might have been caused by sulfuric acid. The probable use of chemical weapons by FARC was feared, considering the fact that the group holds an effective military presence in almost half of Colombian territory.

A closer look into FARC's background reveals that they are not terrorist or revolutionary in the traditional sense. Their roots can be found in the Liberal guerrillas of La Violencia between the late 1940's and early 1950's. In the 1960's they adopted Marxist ideology and emerged as the FARC-EP, headed by Manuel Marulanda. Most recently they have become active in the drug trafficking and blackmailing business by taxing traffickers and controlling large areas of coca crops, which provides them substantial profits for their ongoing war effort.

Looking further into the alleged use of chemical weapons by FARC, one might notice a lack of understanding on behalf of the Colombian military on the peculiarities and technical properties common to this kind of weapon. The devices used in the attacks are simple cooking gas cylinders, common in extensive areas of the country, which are modified by the rebels to be used as rudimentary mortars. Colombian military intelligence reports claim that such devices are packed with sulfuric acid and other chemicals by several guerrilla fronts. However, further technical assessments reveal that the acid might have been used more as an oxidizer rather than as a chemical weapon with the purpose of improving the mortars' incendiary power.

Members of the FARC Secretariat denied the use of chemical warfare by their guerrilla fronts, by explicitly undermining the effect that such weapons could inflict for their battleground requirements. However, gas cylinder bombs were identified as a legitimate and easily available material that must be utilized in the war against the government security forces. Nonetheless, the restraints for the probable use of chemical weapons by FARC are few, due to their lack of support by the civilian population and the group's lack of interest or vulnerability towards national or international condemnation. Furthermore, it could be argued that FARC would consider unconventional weapons use if such weapons were consistent with their own aims. Thus, the current perception that the United States is already lined up against FARC could eventually influence the rebels' battleground response.

Questions and Answers

Q: Has anyone looked at the agricultural chemical agents mentioned in the FARC case?
McDermott: There are some allegations of how the rebels are protecting the coca crops with substances that can make them immune to the chemicals sprayed. However, there has been more discussion over the kind of chemicals and the collateral damage to the eco- system and inhabitants in the coca growing regions that are being sprayed by the government with glyphosate agent.

Q: Is there an increase in interest in the use of this kind of weapons by non-state actors?
Parachini: As we looked into all our cases studies we observed different uses of CBW material. Many evidenced a visceral ethnic hatred which non-state actors may have propensity to use CBW, but choose not to. In most of the cases, with the exception of the Aum Shinrikyo, the use of such weapons have proven to be most crude and technologically unsophisticated.
Roger Davies: In terms of response, there is the need to define more clearly the threat and vulnerability.

Transcript prepared by Andres Saenz

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