The views expressed in this talk were the personal observations of the speaker.

Now is an appropriate time to start collecting ideas for the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which will take place in May 2003. The Review Conference as a mechanism is not specific to the CWC. However, this is the first treaty with its own complete implementing mechanism. Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) covers only part of the obligations of the States Parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is in charge of the implementation of the CWC without excluding any Article.

Review Conferences for other treaties have had preparatory committees. These committees theoretically have the task of developing agendas and draft documents. The question is whether the CWC needs a separate group in addition to the Executive Council. The speaker believes that such a group should be under the umbrella of the Executive Council.

Traditional processes of Review Conferences involve reading through the treaty article-by-article and making comments. The CWC is too long to proceed in a similar manner. It might be better to approach it by trying to identify the main objectives of the CWC at the time it entered into force, to compare these objectives with reality, and to see what the problems are and how to address them.

Some objectives:
1. The first objective is not stated in the CWC, yet the speaker thinks that many people had it in mind when the Convention entered into force. This objective is to identify, highlight, and put existing chemical weapons (CW) potentials under international supervision.

This objective has been achieved to some degree. About a dozen countries have confessed to having had a CW program. Before the entry into force of the CWC there were only three confirmed CW possessors: Russia, the U.S., and Iraq, but now two additional states have declared stockpiles. Finally, eleven countries have declared CW production facilities in various forms and degrees of destruction.

Although some countries of proliferation concern have joined the Treaty, there is still a problem of achieving universality. Another part of the problem is that some degree of dissatisfaction and suspicion remains concerning the effectiveness of verification and the degree that various states are prepared to use the existing mechanisms of the OPCW.

2. The second objective is the destruction of CW agents and production facilities. There has been some progress on this objective, as more than 5,000 tons of agents have been destroyed. Three out of the four CW possessors have met the first intermediate deadline by destroying 1% of their stocks by April 2000. There is still a problem with Russia, which will not be able to catch up with the destruction deadlines by the Review Conference. That may have serious implications for the Convention. It also depends on the attitude of other major players to this problem.

The rate of destruction and prospects for completion of destruction in ten years will constitute a major issue for the First Review Conference. One idea for addressing these problems is to extend the deadline for complete destruction. The speaker thinks that we should be cautious about taking this approach, as it may take pressure off those countries that have to destroy their stockpiles.

Another possible question to discuss at the Review Conference is whether we are satisfied with what the Convention describes as destruction. The Convention is very specific about what constitutes destruction - it has to be 100% complete. Maybe we should make life somewhat easier and satisfy ourselves with the partial degradation of chemical warfare agents. Another question deals with assistance by the international community for destruction.

3. A third objective is the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. It includes a number of elements: universality, trade restrictions on non-States Parties, industry inspections, and exchange of import-export data.

There are problems with several elements. First, regarding the problem of export-import data, there are wide discrepancies in the data submitted by various actors. Regarding the effectiveness of trade restrictions on non-States Parties, the restriction on selling Schedule 2 chemicals did not produce the desired effect. We need to address the question of restrictions on Schedule 3 chemicals, and whether the lack of success with this element results from political considerations.

Regarding Article XI on access to chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes, there is continuing controversy over the existence of the Australia Group (AG). On the one hand, after four years, the Convention still does not provide sufficient reassurance for member-countries in the Australia Group. We need to ask ourselves whether there is something wrong with the Convention, and if so, how to improve the effectiveness of implementation. On the other hand, we should think how the CWC can promote economic growth. So far there is no clear consensus on how to address this issue.

Verification
After the establishment of the OPCW, it seemed that the inspection and verification mechanism was functioning well because the organization conducted many inspections in numerous countries. The inspections made sense in the beginning because it was necessary to prove that the system was capable of functioning efficiently. Gradually the question of how to measure the effectiveness of the verification regime arose. The current situation is that two-thirds of the time of the verification division is devoted to monitoring destruction facilities. The OPCW needs to reevaluate whether this allocation of effort make sense.

Challenge inspections
How are member-states using Article IX, which deals with fact-finding and challenge inspections? So far, no State Party has been unhappy with another state's compliance to the degree that it has forgone political considerations and asked for a challenge inspection. Is this good or bad for the regime?

Collateral verification/implementation
It is important to ensure that member-states prepare themselves well enough to compile their declarations, receive inspections, and pass implementing legislation. The current situation regarding these issues is not encouraging. In particular, many countries have not passed the domestic implementing legislation required by the treaty.

Scientific developments
The Review Conference needs to address several issues related to scientific developments. First, what is new on the scientific horizon that could make CW more attractive? Second, is there anything that would make it easier to use CW covertly? Third, what is happening with the chemical industry? Are companies trying to move away from the use of scheduled chemicals? If so, what are the implications for the regime? Finally, what is new in terms of verification technologies?
The Review Conference should also address various programs of the OPCW and conduct a study to learn how well they work, and how much time is spent by the Executive Council on various subjects.

Q & A
Q. Can you speak about the financial problems that the OPCW faces?
A. There is a financial problem right now, but it should not necessarily be on the agenda of the Review Conference. There is a problem of growth in two respects. One respect is that the number of States Parties almost doubled since the entry into force of the CWC. The second respect is that certain approaches to budgeting that appeared to be working well initially now require some correction.

Q. Are CW-possessor states meeting their obligations to pay for the OPCW inspections?
A. The U.S. and Russia have not met their financial obligations yet.

Q. It is becoming apparent that the U.S. and Russia will not meet the 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapon stockpiles. Is a five-year extension being discussed? Should a request for an extension be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral?
A. We should draw a line between recognizing the inevitable and invoking a provision for an extension. The obligation is still to finalize destruction by 2007, but the Secretariat has already recognized the inevitable. We are working under the assumption that Russia's CW will not be destroyed by 2007. The actual request for an extension should come from the countries that are concerned about not meeting the deadline. From a legal point of view, this issue does not need to be addressed in 2003; it can be done much later.

Q. Has the Secretariat given any thought to getting the chemical industries involved in a more formal process in its activities?
A. The speaker would not feel comfortable about getting chemical industry more formally involved in the Secretariat's activities. There is, however, a discussion about having more interaction with the industry, and bringing more fundamental issues for their consideration.

Q. To what extent do the current budget problems threaten the verification activity?
A. So far the financial problems have not posed a very serious risk. The Organization still has some cash at its disposal. In the longer run, it can become a serious threat.

Q. Out of 30 or 40 countries that produce Schedule 2 chemicals, a high percentage have implementing legislation. Is this correct? If so, why is it important to resolve this issue?
A. This statistic exists in the 2000 report of the OPCW, the draft of which is about to go to the Executive Council. This report will become public. Basically, the problem is more with countries with a smaller declarable industry. The original purpose was that those who have more inspectable facilities should have implementing legislation. In addition, even when countries have legislation, there is different treatment in terms of the requirements of other obligations of the Convention.

Q. There was a recent statement made by OPCW Director-General Bustani regarding Iran's compliance with the CWC. What was it based on?
A. Iran was inspected by the OPCW and there are no grounds to suspect that it is in non-compliance with the Convention. The Secretariat receives declarations, asks questions, and either confirms them through inspections or discovers something else. However, the OPCW works on the "clean field" that the government of the inspected country declares. Regarding countries with past CW programs, for example, there are questions about whether everything was destroyed as they claim. But if any government suspects that another country is in non-compliance, it should use Article IX, Part 1, which allows for consultation and cooperation. It can also ask the Executive Council to clarify something. So far, no country has gone this route. Therefore, despite public statements regarding Iranian non-compliance, no country has brought its suspicions to the OPCW.

Regarding challenge inspections, when a government considers whether to go ahead with a challenge inspection, it takes political aspects into consideration. Nevertheless, the speaker did not agree with the proposition that there would never be a challenge inspection. There is a view that says that the lack of challenge inspections is not a good thing because the mechanism will become rusty. The speaker did not necessarily agree. He said that the OPCW should receive assistance from various member-states to help with exercising challenge inspections.

Q. Are there any prospects of moving Iraq's status from the U.N. inspection regime to the OPCW?
A. Whereas Iraq is a party to the NPT and the BWC, it is not a party to the CWC. Accordingly, it has no treaty obligations not to have chemical weapons. The U.S. policy on Iraq is in flux. This is a wider political question. Iraq started to link the return of any inspections with the Israeli nuclear program, a position similar to that of several Arab states.

Q. The U.S. has been having consultation with some State Parties under Article IX of the CWC. Issues have been resolved during those consultations and therefore the issue of challenge inspections has never been brought up. To what extent do other countries also engage in consultations with other parties?
A. We hear about the U.S. consulting other countries, mainly with regard to their initial declarations. We do not hear much about bilateral consultations between other countries. We know they are occurring, but not in the way the U.S. is conducting them. The OPCW does not observe those consultations.

Q. What is your conception of the role of challenge inspections? Are they meant for verifying non-compliance, confirming the absence of illicit activity, or any other purpose?
A. By the end of the negotiations on the CWC, there was an acceptance that challenge inspections should not necessarily find a smoking gun. In the meantime, changes in governmental departments responsible for the CWC restarted the debate on the role of challenge inspections. Several states believe that if challenge inspections do not find a smoking gun, they are either a failure or abusive. The speaker personally thinks that this view is incorrect and that there is a place for challenge inspections even if they do not find a violation and simply result in eliminating a compliance concern.

Prepared by Merav Zafary

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