Panel 1: The Nature and Implications of a Possible European Missile Defense System (Speakers: Ian Kenyon, John Simpson, Mark Smith, Michael Rance, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Dieter Dettke)

Introduction
(Ian Kenyon)
Ian Kenyon introduced the paper, “Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System,” and spoke about the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies' Missile Forum. MCIS has cooperated with non-profit peace institutes in France, Germany, Japan, and elsewhere, and has also collaborated with European governments on the issue. To date, MCIS has held one seminar and produced two occasional papers on the topic of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

(John Simpson)
John Simpson began by stating, “Europeans see missile defense not as a solution to a problem, but increasingly, as a problem in and of itself.” Regarding missile defense for its European allies, the current U.S. discussions differ from previous U.S. discussions of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which, in theory, would have involved greater cooperation with and protection of Europe. In the absence of a space-based defense system, any U.S.-European missile defense cooperation will necessarily involve two separate systems.

This situation would pose two related challenges for Europe: assuring that the system does not harm relations with Russia, and at the same time keeping NATO intact. Furthermore, Europe will face both security and political concerns from the requisite technological collaboration. This system would rely on an integrated and centralized command and control center, an organization which, in its trans-national purview, would test the unity of the European nations and force either the EU or NATO to assume control of the entire European Ballistic Missile Defense (EBMD). Though potentially problematic from national intelligence perspectives, collaboration is essential to a system capable of covering Europe. The impact of an EBMD system would be deep for EU states and for NATO. It seems sensible, then, if there is to be shared technology, for NATO to run feasibility studies on EBMD.

(Mark Smith)
Mark Smith first stressed the fact that unlike the United States, Europe is not one nation; it is a collection of independent states that have chosen to collaborate on some decisions. He continued, saying that beyond theater missile defense (TMD), the current European debate on missile defense occupies itself with the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) plans, and does not grant much attention to Europe-centered ballistic missile defense. Why is the European constituency for EBMD weak, while concern over missile technology proliferation is rather strong? What factors would need to change in order to generate a constituency for EBMD in Western Europe?

Government reports from the U.K., France, Germany, and the Netherlands indicate that proliferation has moved up as a concern—indeed, much proliferation has occurred near the borders of Southeastern Europe. However, it seems that neither proximity to states of concern, nor obligations to the United States have been able to shift European discussion from theater missile defense to the broader EBMD. European nations differentiate between a rogue state's capability to threaten the United States and Western Europe and its intent to do so. European countries have repeatedly demonstrated that, at this point, they are interested only in protecting deployed forces with TMD, not in changing international strategic constructs.

Since Europe is Russia's geographical neighbor, the reconfiguration of European defenses ultimately depends on the outcome of U.S.-Russian debates over missile defense. Additionally, any European attempts at deployment must balance the strategic interests of the non-U.S. nuclear weapon states and U.S. plans.

System Architecture and Command/Control
(Michael Rance)
In his discussion of the various options for deployment and development of an EBMD, Mr. Rance presupposed that a multilateral agreement had been achieved. Of course, he noted such an agreement seems a dim, if not altogether unlikely, future prospect. Even if European states reached such a politically difficult consensus, any European missile defense system would encounter a host of practical and technological challenges. Mr. Rance enumerated several potential plans for responding to this situation, should it ever arise.

First, Europe would have to decide which countries required which types of defenses. A country must weigh its own security concerns, and choose either a comprehensive missile defense I.E.,--one that could protect its cities, -- OR a more localized, theater-oriented defense that would cover its military bases and installations. These questions would be crucial in formulating the criteria for the system.

Similarly, nations would have to come to a basic agreement about the threats posed to Europe. Currently, no such agreement exists. That the U.K. perceives a greater threat from Iraq than does France, for example, illustrates the subjective reality of national security, and suggests the troubles inherent in the very first steps of development of any EBMD. Furthermore, nations would have to come to a collective understanding of how current threats may develop. The system, Mr. Rance noted, would have to be evolvable, so as to avoid the fate of becoming a costly relic incapable of protecting against newly emerging threats.

Naturally, cost itself would be a central point in any EBMD plan. Each nation would have to decide how much to budget for development and deployment of the system. Currently, there is no funding for an EBMD. Establishing the political foundation for such funding, and for agreeing on the immediate threats and the type of defenses necessary would have to come before deployment. Again, this question raised political issues inherent in the lack of a centralized European government. In addition to command and control and intelligence-sharing problems, a mechanism would need to be devised to ensure that all protected countries contributed to the funding of an EBMD. This could present a problem for nations with small military budgets.

Assuming these points are resolved, Mr. Rance suggested that development would need to occur in stages, beginning with a TMD-style system to cope with threats to South and Southeastern Europe. The developing architecture would draw on available technology. Extant NATO networks could provide the basic infrastructure for a command and control system. Later, plans could build off NATO's TMD system.

“I believe European protection should be in European hands,” stated Mr. Rance. “Separate national command controls would be chaotic,” he continued, adding the caveat that it is, of course, a big decision for nations to share the sensitive data necessary to operate a trans-national command and control center. Despite a strong EU, diverse national security interests mean that Europe faces a greater number of obstacles in BMD development than does the U.S.

European Views of Missile Defense
(Paolo Cotta-Ramusino)
Mr. Cotta-Ramusino opened by echoing a now commonly heard question: With missile defense, are we heading toward the end of deterrence as we know it? Persistently high nuclear arsenals, and their continued high-level alert status, suggest that we are not. Since European countries have a long history of sensitivity toward outside threats, they have developed a greater sense of vulnerability. The assumption underpinning U.S. ballistic missile defense plans¾that traditional deterrence no longer works¾seems a specious claim when applied to the reality of European security.

A general disapproval of U.S. unilateralism stems not only from U.S. posturing on BMD, but also from recent actions in the U.S. Senate, namely the failure to ratify some sixty signed treaties, including, most conspicuously, the CTBT and the Kyoto Protocol. Mr. Cotta-Ramusino addressed the European resentment of perceived American indifference toward these treaties. This resentment underscores European unease, voiced by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac, that an EBMD or U.S. NMD would adversely affect arms control regimes. Furthermore, he noted, the foreign relations of the United States cannot be taken as a reflection of the foreign relations of Europe, which has taken a policy of engagement with countries¾Iran, Iraq and North Korea¾that the U.S. does not deal with so openly.

The NMD debate has highlighted the need to strengthen missile technology export controls in Europe, Mr. Cotta-Ramusino noted, adding that Europe has not taken an active enough role in restricting exports.

The U.S. abandonment of the ABM Treaty faces critical objection in Europe, where general thinking supports changes or modifications within the treaty, but not abrogation. Diplomatic tradeoffs are, of course, the currency of international relations; Europe might be more willing to accept a strong U.S. position against the ABM Treaty, if the United States. would ratify the CTBT.

German Views on the Missile Defense Question
(Dieter Dettke)
Germany and France have been the strongest opponents of missile defense. U.S. NMD exposed a divergence in strategic thinking between the U.S. and Europe, and caused a rift in relations, for if the U.S. carried through with its plans to build a national defense, it could render Europe more vulnerable without a shield of its own. Mr. Dettke conceded that President Bush is probably correct in assuming greater multilateral understanding of U.S. BMD plans after his trip to Europe, but noted that a sharp lack of unified support remains.

Thus far, Europe does not see rogue states as a credible threat to U.S. security. The costs to a small state of attacking the U.S. and being destroyed in response are just too great. “I've always thought,” Mr. Dettke said, “that the true motive [for NMD] has been in U.S. relations with Taiwan and with concerns over possible future conflict there.”

If the United States abrogates the ABM Treaty unilaterally, then the U.S. must face retaliatory Russian consequences. Such a downward spiral would weaken the nonproliferation regime and endanger not only the security of the U.S. and Russia, but that of Europe and the rest of the world as well. Ballistic missile defense could also jeopardize the unity of the NATO alliance by driving a wedge between pro and anti-U.S. system member states. Ultimately, Mr. Dettke concluded, the U.S-NATO alliance can be preserved, but we must allow time for thorough discussion of BMD and all its attendant complications.

Questions and Answers
Q: Recognizing that there is no unified view in Europe, what might Europe do if the U.S. wants to amend the ABM Treaty, and Russia refuses? Will Europe attempt to persuade Russia to amend?
A: (Dettke) There is a European responsibility to bring Russia along.
A:(Cotta-Ramusino) U.S. proposals must be full enough to be convincing in their own right.

Q: What kind of political capital is Europe willing to expend on non-defensive aspects of missile proliferation? Do Europeans support the argument that missile defenses are necessary in the event that deterrence fails? Could you comment, also, on European thinking vis-à-vis protection against accidental missile launches?
A: (Smith) Faith in deterrence is resilient. Europeans do not believe in non-deterable states. We are supportive of accidental launch defense, but skeptical of the ability to discriminate between this and full missile defense. Also, states like the U.K. or France with small nuclear arsenals would face new dangers in a world where missile defense technology itself is proliferating.
A: (Cotta-Ramusino) It is important to differentiate between possible and likely threats. There is still room for dialogue with countries like North Korea.
A: (Dettke) There is a common concern in Europe over Iran.
A: (Simpson) European understanding exists, but there is a clear difference between European priorities and vague U.S. proposals.

Q: What specific steps are Europeans taking to deal with the threat of missile proliferation through technology sales? What happens in Europe the next time that Russia sells missile parts to country X, Y, or Z?
A: (Smith) This is indeed a problem in Europe, but one of export policy, not of missile defense.
A: (Kenyon) It is crucial to remember that export control can only serve as a stop-gap measure. Other measures, that circumvent the desire for the exported products, are necessary to get past the short-term solutions.

Q: In order for the idea of missile defense to be effective, Europe must be defended, otherwise vulnerability will simply shift from the United States to Europe.
A: (Smith) Missile defenses should protect forces, not cities. It is far more likely that Iraq would want to prevent the build-up of troops in the Mid-East than overtly threaten a strategic attack against the United States. Therefore, Europe favors a lower/upper tier TMD system that can be moved and won't be a set target as a central command center in Europe would be.
A: (Dettke) Another approach would be to use incentives to alleviate some of the threats posed by states of concern. By opening up political or economic opportunities for Iran, we might forge a less adversarial relationship.

Q: What are the differences between the EU and NATO in regards to missile defense? If the ABM is a relic of the Cold War era, is NATO also?
A: (Simpson) The EU is slowly starting to develop mechanisms for dealing with nonproliferation and security issues, though these mechanisms are often consultative. The EU does not effectively adapt to changing situations. As for EU/NATO differences, the EU includes countries like Austria, Sweden, and Ireland, while NATO does not. So, these non-NATO states prefer the route of negotiation, as they don't rely on NATO defenses. Along these lines, the problem of ceding national sovereignty to NATO is greater than that of ceding it to the EU.

Q: Is there a precedent in NATO to deal with command and control issues?
A: (Kenyon) NATO isn't just Europe.
A: (Dettke) The EU would make sense if the structure of an EBMD were different from the U.S. NMD system.
A: (Rance) NATO makes more sense if all the allies have the same system. NATO currently has a command center and it could be carried forward quickly. The difference is the timeline.

Q: I'm curious about the supposed infallibility of the ABM Treaty. The argument is that it restricts proliferation. However when the treaty was signed in 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union each had about 2,000 missiles, whereas at the height of the Cold War, each side had about 10,000. Perhaps missile defense will prevent future proliferation by taking away the incentive for poor countries to invest scarce resources in missiles that could easily be intercepted.
A: (Kenyon) I hadn't heard the direct relationship between missile proliferation and abrogating the ABM treaty before. The question is: Does deterrence work in an asymmetric, multi-polar world? It is not something we want to discover the answer to before we have a strategic replacement concept.

Panel 2: Alternative Conceptions of the Missile Threat and Defenses
(Speakers: Aaron Karp, Victor Mizin)

Threat Assessments and the Future of Deterrence: Competing Views
(Aaron Karp)
Mr. Karp commented that the EU represents, as a collection of the United States' closest allies, the symbolic center of the debate. If the U.S. cannot bring the EU along, it will be isolated. China and Russia pose the moral question: What right does the U.S. have to act unilaterally? One must remember that no one side in the debate is homogenous; differences exist within nations.

America is responding to a change in the security environment by “abandoning the shibboleths” of the past, said Mr. Karp. The 1991 discovery of the Iraqi nuclear program and the 1998 North Korean test-launch of the Taepodong missile raised doubts about the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime. Before this new era, the ABM had intrinsic importance. The current shift in the debate seeks to evaluate the ABM more critically. Concurrently, there has been a shift in BMD thought, from “what to do when it doesn't work?” to “how well will it work?”

The overwhelming support in the Senate for the National Missile Defense Act of 1999¾it passed on a margin of 97-3¾was the result not only of increased interest in BMD, but also of the recognition of the need to reevaluate U.S. strategic priorities. In contrast, Europe, opined Mr. Karp, has lost its ability to think strategically. European nations now make decisions based on collective deliberation, not on examination of national interests. Missile defense has become the “eight-hundred pound guerilla that doesn't fit into the rest of the zoo,” said Mr. Karp, who went on to note that there has been nothing like the Rumsfeld Report to build European public opinion in support of BMD.

Among European nations, the U.K. has positioned itself to be the key ally to influence how the U.S. deploys any missile defense system. The French remain committed to the idea of deterrence. Germans accept the legitimacy of a threat, and value NATO, but believe that if the U.S. abandons the ABM, then it must replace it with “something” else. Germany does not have a strong opinion on the substance of this “something” else, just that the formal strategic requirement is filled. This lack of interest in substance, commented Mr. Karp, is troubling.

Cooperative Russian Proposals for Missile Defense with NATO (Victor Mizin)
Mr. Mizin began by stating that Russia has won the “propaganda war” on BMD. However, he questioned whether the Russian concept of a European-based missile defense system is not simply a diplomatic ploy.

Since [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's NBC interview and statements in Italy, Russia hasn't mentioned anything about deployment of such a system. Militarily, it is uncertain who would be in control. If Europe were to carry out a joint venture with Russia, it would be tantamount to Russian accession to NATO.

It is very important for Putin to show that Russia is open to negotiation. Therefore, the United States and NATO must develop an ambitious plan. Compromise will be possible if Russia is given a stake in a Europe/Russia-protective system. This could perhaps be a groundbreaking development that would help us get out of the Cold War mentality.

It is also important to consider ways of thinking outside of the ABM's purported strategic deterrence. President Bush mentioned this, but backed off. It is deplorable, since we need that type of creative thinking. Do we, after all, seriously believe what supporters of the ABM have told us, that, for instance, the ABM Treaty will keep China from increasing its nuclear force?

The U.S. should think of security guarantees with Russia and China, and further enhance trans-Atlantic ties. “I think it's time to stop treating Bush as the grinch who stole stability,” Mr. Mizin concluded.

Questions and Answers
Q: Russia's proposal for missile defense last June included NATO, so it's not clear that it would not include the United States. Russia has been pressed to clarify its meaning, but hasn't spoken in detail on the subject since the winter. What are your thoughts on this matter?
A: (Mizin) Russia now is saying that it's a system for all who want to participate.

Q: Were references to boost-phase intercepts mistaken, or reconsidered in the Russian proposal?
A: (Mizin) Putin never mentioned boost-phase, but it was taken as such since he seemed to allude to it. Someone in the Russian military corrected him. The proposal is still vague, yet to be fully discussed.
A: (Karp) I would caution against evaluating Russian proposals scientifically. The key point is that Russia has expressed a willingness to go beyond the ABM.

Q: Given everything that's been said, how can we move forward? A U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement to tie together the ABM and missile defense? A multilateral regime constraining deterrence? What should be the basis of security for Europe? Do they need a strategic agreement linking missile defense with conventional force agreements?
A: (Karp) I am skeptical of any grand agenda. Russia is looking to sustain claim to its super-power status. Anyway, in the long run, the United States will withdraw from the ABM. Currently, we are in a period of transition, since any post-ABM framework will come later than U.S. deployment of missile defense.
A: (Mizin) In order to move forward, we must think outside the traditional frameworks, and stop repeating the same schemes. Peter the Great made Russia a power by Westernizing it and Europeanizing it. We must look for new solutions, replacements of deterrence. Speaking only of military aspects of the Russia-European-U.S. triangle, Russia is still being treated as the enemy. We must address the question of why Russia is still regarded as “the threat.” Along these lines, we must also remember why the ABM was devised in the first place.

Concluding Discussion: U.S. Missile Defenses and the Allies
(Speaker: Edward Warner)

U.S. Missile Defenses and the Allies
(Edward Warner)

Mr. Warner spoke about the two major military reviews that have been mandated by Congress: the National Security Strategy Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, which are due before the end of the year. Bush's well-covered speech to the National Defense College on May 1st, Mr. Warner continued, touched on a broad agenda. This administration has seen fits and starts in the nonproliferation area; the United States is again, after a three-month hiatus, considering talks with North Korea. The administration recognizes the diplomatic necessity of readjusting the Agreed Framework.

There is a notable preference within the Bush administration for non-legal, unilateral maneuvers in nonproliferation, as evidenced by its talk about unilateral cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In such an environment, second track dialogue between the U.S. and Russia could play an important role. Russia prefers legal arrangements, and is now willing to go lower than before; financial exigency mandates that it do so.

The key question, according to Mr. Warner, is why the United States must continue to worry about an adversarial Russia that no longer exists. The Bush administration has a general commitment to move ahead with missile defense. It wants to obliterate the distinctions between TMD and NMD, to forge what Rumsfeld originally termed “Global Missile Defense.” Discussions are still ongoing on the final architecture of the system, but plans for a terminal intercept would be the easiest to deploy soon. There is also, now, a new focus on the possibility of boost-phase intercept systems.

Questions and Answers
Q: Given the technical difficulty of hit-to-kill and boost-phase systems, does anyone advocate nuke-tipped interceptors?
A: (Warner) No. The surrounding problems and dangers are too great.

Q: If adversarial relations between the United States and Russia are over, why don't the U.S.-Russian strategic arms cuts reflect this?
A: (Warner) Neither side has made the effort it should.

Q: Are you aware of any probabilistic studies of political and technical aspects and challenges of missile defense? It seems that the debate exists outside of such thought.
A: In his report, [Department of Defense senior ballistic missile defense official] Coyle made clear that the mid-phase system hadn't tested well.

Q: If the administration wants to abrogate the ABM, what actions will it take?
A: (Warner) Since land-based testing is permitted, they would test to cross that restriction; tests would involve sea-based firing.

Prepared by Kristin Thompson and Andrew Monahan

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