The views expressed in this talk were the personal observations of the speaker.

Let me first address a broad agenda against which Russian security strategy at home and abroad is evolving. At the threshold of present decay, there happened a profound change in Russian domestic politics with serious implications for foreign policy. If I were to list the principle reasons for this change, they would be: the prolonged economic crisis of the 1990's, which devastated everything from social programs to law enforcement; the trend toward disintegration of the USSR and the increase in organized crime and corruption in Russia itself; the policy of the West, which includes the double shock in 1999 of NATO expansion to former Soviet allies and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. Western intervention in Yugoslavia was largely connected to the second war in Chechnya. NATO actions removed the taboo that had previously constrained Russian forces deployed for peacekeeping purposes from using military force.

These three circumstances contributed to the profound shift in Russian public mood and provided the environment for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's landslide victory in 2000. Our country has survived two coup d'etat attempts and two wars in the last decade. Accordingly, the people are inclined to support a leader who brings the promise of law and order and a strong state. Putin's grand strategy consists of three main elements: 1) Strengthening the state-- Putin wants a centralized executive bureaucracy and a strong state supported by strong armed forces. Though at times this may curtail personal freedoms of the mass media and/ or individuals, Russians are willing to let these things slide in order to gain stability. 2) Liberal economy—Measures taken on tax code, labor code, deregulation, and money laundering laws all fall in line with a market economy. 3) Pro-Western but pragmatic foreign policy—In an effort to enhance Russian maneuverability and take the country away from a policy of subservience to the West, Putin has broadened relations with countries like China, India and Iran, and has reopened relations with countries like Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Countries of “proliferation concern” to the West provide Russian defense industries with profits equal to those they receive from the state, and that in itself is incentive to continue cooperation. Additionally, embracing rogues states shows the West that if Russian interests are not taken into account in important areas, Russia will act in self-interest rather than the interests of the international community.

Russia and the West
Yeltsin's policy of subservience to the West in the 1990's proved to be counterproductive. In order for Russia to regain international respect, it has to be open to alternative avenues of Foreign Policy. However, good relations with the West are also a priority for Putin because they are an economic necessity. Thirty per cent of Russian foreign trade is with Western Europe. If new applicants to the European Union are included in the count, then that number jumps to sixty per cent. Good relations with the United States are important to Putin because they lead to improved trade relations with Western Europe and Japan.

In a recent address to the nation, Putin indicated several times that Russian integration into Western Europe is his highest priority. He hinted that he would like to begin consultations on the possibility of Russian accession to NATO. Putin has demonstrated that strategic parity with the United States is not something to which he is ready to dedicate huge resources. He also attempted to smooth relations with the West by proposing a joint Russian/NATO Theatre Missile Defense system. The idea was perceived by the West as an attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States on the question of ABM/NMD. However, there is more to this proposal than meets the eye. If taken seriously by the West, a cooperative defense stance would have driven Russia into the alliance, thereby preventing Russian cooperation with China and rogue states. It would be impossible for Russia to work with NATO while still providing dual-purpose technology to countries that are targets of collective security measures. Finally, Putin's TMD proposal signified Russian acknowledgement that deterrence and nonproliferation may not be enough to cope with the emerging threats of ballistic missiles from rogue states.

This is not to imply that Putin's grand strategy is well organized and coordinated. On the contrary, in both tactical and strategic levels, it is full of contradictions. One of them is that a liberal economy may not be compatible with a strong state and bureaucratic struggles between branches of power in government are common at the federal and regional levels. The liberal economy will eventually conflict with the build-up of a strong authoritarian state. A strong state that curtails individual freedoms would not be compatible with Western policy in the long run. Already it is possible to see friction over dealings with Chechnya and the subjugation of free TV and news media. Unlike some Latin American countries, an authoritarian state, a liberal market economy and good relations with the West are not compatible in Russia. This is one of the internal contradictions I see in Putin's grand strategy. Sooner or later one of the three elements will take precedent. Which one depends on factors such as Russian economic development, oil prices and relations with the West. The question then becomes, “is the West conducting policy in the best possible way to induce positive choices?” I believe the West's current policy may push Russia toward poor choices.

Ballistic Missile Defense
The Bush Administration continues to tell Russia that mutual nuclear deterrence is no longer relevant in bi-lateral relations. The United States must pursue deployment of ballistic missiles, which will not be designed to counter threats from Russia, but from rogue nations. This explanation seems unbelievable to Russians. First, why is nuclear deterrence no longer relevant? When Russia proposed that each side reduce to 1500 deployed nuclear weapons, the United States did not respond except to say that it was reviewing its nuclear policy. This response fueled the perception that the United States still bases its policy on deterrence and is for some reason trying to deceive Russia. Since the United States is not willing to negotiate, Russia will consider deterrence the basis for the security relationship until the two countries are formal allies. Contrary to popular belief, deterrence is compatible with defense and always has been. We can retain deterrence, and build limited defenses against rogue nations and China—but in order to achieve that goal, negotiations must take place. The main problem in Russian-American relations today is not American willingness to dismantle the ABM, but American rejection of the notion of negotiations with Russia.

Nonproliferation
Right now the Russian security agenda is outdated. It should be revised to include nonproliferation as one of its first priorities. Nonproliferation is currently low on the list of priorities because resources are allocated to address traditional priorities such as strategic arms control, NATO, and local conflicts. The problem is compounded by the fact that Russians think American insistence on nonproliferation is an attempt to push Russia out of the world market for nuclear technology and materials. The KEDO example in North Korean reactors in 1994 left an enormous imprint on the strategic and political elite, including MINATOM. American objections to Russian sales to Iran are perceived as America trying to stifle Russia in the world market the same way it did in North Korea. Nonproliferation is the name of the game today. Neither ballistic missile defense nor NATO expansion is as important for the security of the United States and the world as strengthening nonproliferation and devising new counterproliferation methods. However, Western policy today sacrifices nonproliferation to the short-term goals of missile defense and NATO expansion.

NATO Expansion
Another sticking point in the strategic relationship is NATO expansion. I understand why the West is contemplating further expansion into former Soviet allies and territories, but I cannot understand why Putin's repeated hints and almost direct appeals have been rebuffed. What harm would it do for the West to consider expansion while at the same time inviting Russia to start negotiations about the possibility of and/or timeframe for its accession to NATO. This action would not commit the West to anything because the negotiations could take years and Russia may find that the terms of its joining are not acceptable. Perhaps some form of cooperation short of membership could be established between Russia and the West.

Foreign Debt Problem
Finally, let me say a few words about the Russian foreign debt problem. Presently, Russia pays the interest on its foreign debt using revenues from high oil prices. However, in a few years, oil prices will stabilize and growth will flatten. When this happens, Russian debt payments will constitute a much larger portion of the federal budget. Payment of foreign debt already constitutes the largest portion of the Russian federal budget. In a few years, it may become too large for Russia to digest. Many of Putin's social service and military reforms will be sacrificed and the population will be disenchanted. New leadership will not want to accept the blame for this development. Therefore, the scapegoat will undoubtedly be the United States, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Russians will blame Western organizations for using the debt to stifle economic growth in Russia.

Conclusion
I understand that I have suggested some fundamental changes in U.S. policy towards Russia, and that it may seem like a tall order. However, if you consider what's at stake, then it is not such a tall order after all. Negotiations with Russia on amendments to the ABM and strategic force cuts are imperative. European expert Therese Delpeche says, “the lesson of the twentieth century should be that Democracy is not only about human values, Democracy is about security as well.” Russian democracy and world security, particularly issues of nonproliferation, are inseparable.

Questions:
Q: Given Moscow's historic position as the “third Rome” and the fact that Russia's closest allies in the region are Orthodox Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia, how important is the Orthodox Church in Russian politics and Foreign Policy?
A: Not very. When Russian politicians mention Orthodoxy, it is for justification, not for formulating goals.

Q: The Bush Administration has said that the United States should withdraw from the ABM, while Russia has stressed that we should agree to amendments. What amendments could be made that would satisfy the Russian side?
A: There have been several indications of what Russia might be willing to negotiate regarding the ABM Treaty. As it stands today, Russian leaders hint that they might go for amendments, but have not described concessions they would be willing to make. If serious discussions of the issues start, possibilities for amendments include alleviating limits on developments and testing in the ABM so the United States can test all kinds of ballistic missile defenses (except space-based systems). This would allow the United States to learn more about promising technology while waiting to see how the threat evolves. In return, Russia would ask for reductions in offensive forces so that it does not have to spend money to preserve the nuclear balance. The first provision of the ABM Treaty, banning defense of territory, may be subject to a broader interpretation. This provision could be interpreted to prohibit only defenses directed at each other.

Q: To what extent, in the medium or long range, do you foresee increased military involvement on behalf of South and Central Asian Russian allies? To what extent do you think threats from extreme Islamic forces in Central Asia are real? You were one of the original voices cautioning against military transfers to Iran. How do you view that threat now?
A: Because of its geostrategic position, Russia may well be dragged into conflict with Islamic fundamentalists in the South or Central Asian region. However, Russia is also wary of Islamic fundamentalists inside its borders. After all, more than 20% of the country is Muslim and if situations like those in Chechnya escalate horizontally, it could create a real national catastrophe. One reason Russia curtailed its strategic force was to reallocate resources to conventional forces designed to control conflict in Central Asia. Finally, Russia has concerns about the proximity of the Taliban regime and views it as a serious threat the stability in the region. Russia should do what it can to build local centers of power to combat Muslim extremism.

Q: Many Western analysts have noticed an emphasis in Russian military writings on the use of small nuclear weapons to enhance military capabilities. How do you view their role in restructuring Russian defense forces in South and Central Asia?
A: Unfortunately, this idea has been discussed in Russia, and to some extent it has been bolstered by American rejection of the CTBT and discussion of the need to resume testing. From strategic and political points of view it is unthinkable. Using nuclear weapons on guerilla groups is no use militarily and would be counterproductive politically. Some officials and experts in MINATOM have been exposed only to closed circles for decades and do not realize that these issues have already been discussed and are already subject to international consensus.

Q: Are you optimistic that Russia and the US will be able to reach an agreement on offensive/ defensive weapons systems?
A: I am optimistic in the long run, but in the short run I think American reluctance to hold negotiations is a problem. Technical problems regarding NMD could be resolved, especially since our two countries are no longer afraid of each other and do not pay as much attention to each others force structures. One solution would be to revise limits on testing all systems (except space-based interceptors) so the United States could test and learn what kind of defense it wants in response to what kinds of threats. Revisions on limitations of deployment could be resolved if Russia is reassured that American defenses do not undercut its deterrent capability. In my opinion, it was a mistake for Russia to cut and restructure its forces without negotiations because it lessened its bargaining position. That decision should be revised and Russia should pursue a larger deployment strategy with land based mobile ICBM's that may be MIRVed. That would result in a more tangible bargaining chip with the United States. Currently, the United States is not really concerned with Russian response to US defenses because Russia has few choices. Russia needs to do something to change the environment for negotiations and the United States has to change its attitude.

Q: I was encouraged to hear you say nonproliferation should be a higher priority for your government. How far is Russia prepared to go to stamp out technology and materials transfers?
A: If two criteria are met then Russia could go very far in coordinating nonproliferation policy. First, Russia must be persuaded that nonproliferation policy is not a tool employed by the United States to stem commercial competition in the market. Second, Russia must be shown that its role in nonproliferation is that of a superpower. Going for a full-scale joint technical program for safe nuclear energy is the wave of the future. It could occupy MINATOM and nuclear experts with intellectually challenging work that is more materially rewarding than cooperating with Iran.

Q: The Duma recently approved a proposal to allow the import of nuclear spent fuel from foreign countries for long-term storage and reprocessing. Has your party taken a position on the idea of Russia becoming a resource center for international spent-fuel?
A: It was a heated debate within our party. Ninety per cent of public opinion is against the idea because people do not believe that the funds earned from this dangerous enterprise would be used properly for the purposes described in the laws—radioactive clean-up, dismantlement of nuclear submarines, etc. My party proposed several amendments to make usage of the income transparent and under public control. The amendments were not accepted. Although the Yabloko Party is not attracted to the idea in principle, we realize it is one way to store nuclear waster, clean up radioactive waste and safely dismantle nuclear powered submarines. However, we wanted assurances that public safety and finances would be protected and we did not receive them. Therefore, we voted against the measure. The proposal was adopted anyway, because right now the Duma is very loyal to the executive branch.

Prepared by Kristin Thompson

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