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Challenges Facing Chemical Weapons Destruction in Russia

Summary of CBW Breakfast Seminar
June 28, 2006
Paul Boren, Chief, Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Joseph Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Congress

This seminar examined the challenges facing U.S. efforts to assist chemical weapons (CW) destruction in Russia, with an emphasis on the CW destruction facility (CWDF) that the United States is helping to build in Shchuch'ye, a town in south-central Russia, east of the Ural Mountains and north of the border with Kazakhstan. Delays in completing the Shchuch'ye CWDF recently led the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to issue a critical report on the construction effort (Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Needs More Reliable Data to Better Estimate the Cost and Schedule of the Shchuch'ye Facility, May 2006, GAO-06-692, online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06692.pdf).
Mr. Boren opened the seminar by describing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). This program supports chemical demilitarization in Russia by:

• Improving security for portable CW munitions awaiting destruction (mostly at Shchuch'ye and Kizner, where 27 percent of the Russian arsenal is located);
• Dismantling former CW production facilities (at Nukus, Uzbekistan; Volgograd, Russia; and Novocheboksark, Russia); and
• Building a CWDF at Shchuch'ye.

Russia inherited 40,000 metric tons of nerve and blister agents from the former Soviet Union. As a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia is obligated to destroy its entire CW stockpile by April 2012. (This deadline includes a one-time, five-year extension beyond the original treaty deadline of April 2007.) As of March 2006, however, Russia had destroyed only 3 percent of its CW stockpile, putting it far behind schedule. Russia will also require extensive foreign assistance to meet its CWC obligations.

Construction of the Shchuch'ye facility is the largest U.S. industrial project ever undertaken in Russia, costing the U.S. $1.039 billion. The United States has committed to build the entire CWDF except for one of the destruction buildings, which is Russia's responsibility. Russia is also responsible for industrial infrastructure to support the plant (e.g., water and gas lines) and social infrastructure projects for the community, including two new schools and a new hospital. Several other countries are participating in the infrastructure projects.

Mr. Boren presented a diagram of the Shchuch'ye facility, a huge complex containing several process buildings, an administration building, and a firehouse. The weapons destruction process will involve several steps. First, train cars will arrive with munitions from the storage depot at Planovy, 11 miles away, and be unloaded onto a conveyor system. A robotic disassembly line will drill a hole in each munition and drain the chemical fill. The agent will then be neutralized chemically and the waste product mixed with bitumen (similar to asphalt) to form large blocks, which will be stored permanently in concrete bunkers.

Mr. Christoff, the head of the GAO team that audited the Shchuch'ye project, said their main task was to determine if the CWDF was on track for completion by December 2009. GAO found that as of February 2006, only 40 percent of the CWDF had been finished, compared with the 52 percent scheduled for completion at that time. Several key buildings are behind schedule, including the main destruction building (101), the second destruction building for which Russia is responsible (101A), and the administration building. GAO found that DOD was a year late in issuing contracts to finish construction of Building 101 because of conflicts with Russian subcontractors. Completion of supporting infrastructure has also been delayed: only one of three power lines is operational and the gas lines have yet to be connected.

The GAO report criticized the management of the Shchuch'ye CWDF project by the U.S. prime contractor, Parsons Global Services, Inc. In particular, GAO found problems with the Earned Value Management (EVM) system, a DOD-required tool that monitors performance and provides warning of cost overruns and schedule delays. Parsons' use of flawed and unreliable data created problems in staying on schedule and within budget.

Although DOD concurred with GAO's conclusions, Mr. Boren noted that Parsons faces unique challenges in Russia, including a remote site with harsh weather conditions, delays in the delivery of equipment, and difficulties working with Russian subcontractors and government agencies. For example, a newly created regulatory authority, the Agency for Technological and Ecological Oversight, arrived at the site unannounced and levied additional safety and administrative requirements that caused further delays. Russia has also placed a higher priority on destroying CW stored at depots other than Shchuch'ye in order to meet the intermediate destruction deadlines specified in the CWC. Given these problems, GAO has concluded that the Shchuch'ye facility will not be ready for operation in 2009 as planned.

The GAO team also discussed whether Russia will be able to eliminate its entire CW stockpile by the extended treaty deadline of 2012. This goal now appears unlikely, given that only two of seven planned Russian CWDFs have begun operation. Moscow also claims it will need $5.6 billion to destroy its entire stockpile, yet it has received only $2 billion from international donors. The United States, for its part, is also behind schedule in destroying its CW stockpile and projects that it will be able to eliminate only about 66 percent by 2012.

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