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First U.S.-Japan Track II Meeting on on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Implications of Chinese Military Modernization for the U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Security

• Many Japanese participants consider that opportunities exist for the United States and Japan to influence and shape Chinese thinking on its future course of action in arms control, nonproliferation, and security. While there are slightly different views within the Japanese team on the current and future trends of military modernization in China, Japanese participants generally hold the view that a combination of American and Japanese pressure on Chinese counterparts, through the arms control and other dialogues, might influence China's strategic thinking in a positive way. There was wide agreement that the two countries should use this process to explore ways to affect China's military capabilities, and to urge it to be accountable for its military modernization program. However, not all were sanguine about the prospect for U.S.-Japan-based initiatives to constrain Chinese military capabilities. Among the reasons for this cautiousness is that Chinese military authority has a strong say in government decision-making and in the past China has been reluctant to take measures not consistent with military interests.

• Japanese participants are still uncertain about the full extent of the U.S. missile defense program and wonder about the implications of missile defense for Japan's national security. Japanese participants are interested in knowing more about the current phase and future plan of the development of U.S. missile defense programs. They also wonder how missile defense may affect U.S. nuclear deterrence as well as China's military modernization, and eventually, Japan's attitude toward missile defense. Additionally, since Japan's cooperation with U.S. missile defense has been oriented toward the Navy's "theater-wide" system, the U.S. conceptual elimination of the distinction between theater and national missile defense has caused some confusion among Japanese participants. They are interested in discussing with the United States the future of missile defense programs, Japan's requirements, and their implication for relations with China.

Non-Proliferation Verification and Compliance: Nuclear Weapons and Materials

• Japanese participants have expressed their hope that the U.S. ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). There are clear differences between the United States and Japan on this issue. Japanese participants believe that the CTBT would institutionalize and secure U.S. primacy of nuclear weapons' capability, and seem to take the view that reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence would not be necessarily undermined. They are worried about the absence of the U.S. ratification of the CTBT because without entry into force of the CTBT, China, and perhaps, India and Pakistan, might eventually resume testing and threaten the capability of U.S. deterrent. They are also concerned that it could undermine the NPT regime. Additionally, Japanese participants are skeptical of the argument that the United States might need more testing to maintain the reliability and safety of its existing nuclear weapons. They have expressed concern that the United States might develop new nuclear weapon designs in the future. Japanese participants sent the message that they hoped that steps to achieve the objectives of ensuring safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile embraced in the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program would be steadily pursued.

• The Japanese participants contend that strengthening multilateral institutions and norms are important, and that there is a need for the United States and Japan to create a seamless web of control over nuclear materials, including diversion safeguards, physical protection of nuclear material, and control over illicit trafficking of nuclear material. The two countries should support and promote a number of measures to strengthen the IAEA, including: completion by all NPT parties of the required safeguards agreements with the IAEA; adherence by all states, including the nuclear-weapon states, to INFCIRC/540; encouraging United Nations Security Council action to take its compliance/enforcement-related 1992 assertions on proliferation and safeguards a step further; urging non-NPT parties to support international safeguards; sustaining and strengthening safeguards financing; and reviewing appropriate resource allocation.

Non-Proliferation Verification and Compliance: Chemical and Biological Weapons

• Many Japanese participants view that the United States and Japan should seek a more appropriate balance on the international agenda between negotiations of accords and their implementation. There is a consensus that the international nonproliferation regime has been ill-served partly because the signatory states and the international institutions allocated more resources to negotiation than to implementation. More efforts should be given to augmenting the verification and compliance capabilities of the regimes. However, Japanese participants stress that the negotiation over legally binding documents on the BTWC verification may still have some value. They share American views that the two countries should continue close consultation to develop approaches to compliance and to strengthen the role of preventive measures.

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