CNS Programs: EANP

• About the Conference
  • Aims and Salience
  • Participants and Agenda
• Executive Summary
• Summary of Conference Proceedings
  • Lessons from Past Experiences
  • Current Interactions
  • Key Debates, Trends and Institutions
  • Future Bilateral Agenda
• Appendices
  • China and Proliferation: Encouraging Developments and Continuing Concerns
  • Table: Chinese Participation and Positions Regarding Various Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, Organizations, and Regimes

AIMS AND SALIENCE

Within the United States, too few resources have been devoted to developing adequate information, expertise, and policy recommendations with regard to China, nonproliferation, and arms control. In particular, little is known about the roles, influence, policy trends, and debates of key persons and institutions concerned with nonproliferation and arms control in China. Moreover, those initiatives which have been taken in the past by U.S. nongovernment and government institutions to understand and engage China on these issues have thus far been mostly ad hoc and fragmented, reducing their contribution to effective policy development.

As a result, U.S.-based institutions are often frustrated in their aims to resolve outstanding nonproliferation and arms control issues related to China. While the U.S.-China summit of October 1997 resulted in a number of encouraging developments for the relationship on certain contentious proliferation issues, numerous differences remain unresolved and more difficult problems for the bilateral relationship related to nonproliferation and arms control matters lie ahead.

By becoming more familiar with the role, influence, and policy debates of persons and institutions in China, policy-makers, policy analysts, and concerned citizens in the United States will be in a better position to work toward effective resolution of differences.

To assist in this important process, the conference on Individuals, Institutions, and Policies in the Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Community proposed to meet three principal goals:

• Foster the interactions of U.S. nongovernment and government specialists focusing specifically on China, nonproliferation, and arms control issues in order to exchange insights and information, coordinate activities, and open new lines of communication.

• Identify and assess key persons, institutions, policy debates, and policy positions within the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community.

• Develop and disseminate recommendations for use by U.S. policy-makers, policy analysts, and concerned specialists involved in discussions with the Chinese on issues related to nonproliferation and arms control.

First, in November 1997, the conference itself was convened. It brought together 35 leading U.S. experts on China, nonproliferation, and arms control from government and nongovernment organizations. Second, the proceedings and the principal findings and recommendations of the conference have been summarized in this report. Third, the organizers have presented the results of the conference in the form of briefings to relevant government and nongovernment institutions in the United States.

Finally, the conference has also contributed to facilitating informative cross-links between government and nongovernment counterparts. The conference initiated a process that can be sustained in the future through follow-on meetings, the establishment of an e-mail discussion group, the commissioning of further studies, the solidifying of professional ties, and other cooperative activities.

PARTICIPANTS AND AGENDA

The conference involved more than 35 leading U.S. specialists from government agencies, nongovernment policy research organizations, universities, and the private sector. Nearly all the participants focus much of their professional energies and insights on China, nonproliferation, and arms control, and have devoted considerable time to engaging the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community over the past five to ten years in both official and unofficial capacities.

Other meetings and conferences in the United States have held broader discussions of Chinese security-related issues or have convened a single panel on nonproliferation and arms control issues as part of a larger meeting. However, this conference was the first gathering of such U.S.-based analysts to focus exclusively on Chinese nonproliferation and arms control issues and actors, and to generate and sustain cooperative synergies among the U.S. participants. In particular, the conference presentations and discussions centered on analyzing key persons, institutions, policy debates, and policy positions within the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community.

The conference lasted two full days and consisted of four main sessions: (1) to analyze the comparative development of nonproliferation and arms control communities in the Soviet Union/post-Soviet republics and China; (2) to assess current U.S. contacts with the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community; (3) to identify and analyze key persons, institutions, debates, and trends within that community; and (4) to address the future U.S.-China bilateral nonproliferation and arms control agenda.

On each panel, three to four specialists presented their remarks and discussion papers, followed by a lengthy open discussion period. Receptions, keynote speakers, and other functions provided ample opportunity to gain additional insights and hold off-line discussions. This report is drawn from the papers and discussions of the conference, but it will not attribute comments or opinions to specific individuals. The conference agenda and list of participants are appended to this report. The report will be widely distributed to individuals and institutions throughout the U.S. government and nongovernment community.

• The insights and experiences gained from past and current interactions with the Soviet Union and post-Soviet republics on nonproliferation and arms control may have some value in engaging China and evaluating certain aspects of its nonproliferation and arms control community. However, overall, these lessons should be applied with some caution. More work needs to be done to understand the Chinese case separately and to educate the concerned policy community and broader public about these differences.

• The Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community is undergoing a critical period of growth and transition. It is marked by greater openness to change and outside opinion, less ideological rhetoric, the establishment and strengthening of agencies concerned with nonproliferation and arms control, and more sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies.

• Indications are that politics, economics, concerns with international prestige and image, and acceptance of relative, rather than absolute, gains in military capability – rather than strictly technological and military realities and concerns – increasingly influence Chinese decisions in the fields of nonproliferation and arms control. If true, this suggests new paths toward constructive dialogue with China on these issues.

• Numerous factors help explain this important shift in Chinese policy. They can be summed up in the understanding that China has increasingly become a greater stakeholder in the international economic and security system and its leaders seek to shape the terms of participation in those systems, including with relation to nonproliferation and arms control. China may now find itself on a "slippery slope" regarding nonproliferation and arms control, but the question remains as to how steep the incline is now and will be in the future. A "window of opportunity" exists to encourage a constructive Chinese approach toward nonproliferation and arms control.

• This "window of opportunity" has allowed a greater degree of interaction and engagement between U.S. and Chinese counterparts. An active U.S. government and nongovernment agenda of engagement with the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community has made a fundamental contribution to understanding Chinese positions and policy-making, introducing U.S. and international norms and policies, fostering debate and more independent centers of thinking within China on issues of nonproliferation and arms control, and promoting China’s acceptance of widely-held international norms in nonproliferation and arms control. It is important to expand and deepen engagement on nonproliferation and arms control now, as this window may be less open in the future.

• This general sense of optimism and opportunity must be tempered by a realistic understanding of three key points. First, while we know far more today about the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community, we still know far less than we ought to. Second, there remain a significant number of concerns for U.S.-China relations on proliferation and arms control issues. Third, in attempting to assess a "moving target", it is too early to focus narrowly on certain individuals and institutions in China; it is unclear what results will accrue from this period of opening and transition.

• U.S.-based specialists should seek a strong relationship with the newly-established Department of Arms Control and Disarmament within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, greater contact with relevant bodies associated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the defense-industrial sector, including the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) is needed. Greater research and focus on military-related bodies and their interests and influence in China’s nonproliferation and arms control decision-making and implementation are crucial.

• Analysts and policy-makers in the United States concerned with these issues must expect that problems related to nonproliferation and arms control will inevitably arise, disrupting U.S.-China relations. Anticipating these potential problem areas is a key task. Perhaps most importantly, the two sides should work to assure that these disruptions do not cause larger rifts in the overall bilateral relationship. This can be accomplished in part through more regularized Track 1, Track 2 and "Track 1-1/2" (government-nongovernment expert groups) meetings with Chinese counterparts.

• U.S. policy should seek to expand the many areas of common ground which already exist with China on these issues, while continuing dialogue to resolve problems. The record with regard to nuclear-related issues offers some room for encouragement that continued engagement and dialogue can pay off. Constructive and cooperative dialogue with China can be expected to follow from U.S. positions which: reflect a widely-accepted international norm or consensus; coincide with Chinese interests to enhance its international prestige and standing; and offer relative gains for Chinese economic and security goals.

• Nongovernment organizations and policy research institutions can make important contributions to the process of engaging China more constructively on nonproliferation and arms control issues. Such contributions include offering visiting fellowships, facilitating interaction of U.S. and Chinese specialists in nonproliferation and arms control, exchanging information and analyses with Chinese counterparts, and working to clarify nonproliferation and arms control concepts, terms, and goals. U.S.-based specialists should improve government-nongovernment coordination on issues related to China, nonproliferation, and arms control.

• Gaining a more constructive relationship with China on nonproliferation and arms control issues will take time. One should be encouraged by the degree of change that has occurred in China on these issues in just the past eight to ten years, but there remains a long road ahead. Persistent commitment on the part of the U.S. policy community will be needed to effect continued progress.

Findings and recommendations are categorized according to the four principal areas of focus at the conference: (1) relevance and lessons of past experiences; (2) current engagement with the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community; (3) key institutions and debates in that community; and (4) the future U.S.-China nonproliferation and arms control agenda.

I. LESSONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

Comparisons

Conference participants discussed the relevance and lessons of past experiences in working with nascent nonproliferation and arms control communities, with a special focus on past experience in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet republics. The United States government as well as numerous nongovernment organizations and policy research institutions have actively engaged individuals and institutions related to the Soviet and post-Soviet arms control and nonproliferation communities. These interactions have included not only intensive arms control negotiations, but also efforts to work closely with persons and institutions involved with the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons complex, as well as with scholars and policy-makers concerned with arms control and nonproliferation issues. In the post-Soviet era, these interactions have expanded and intensified to embrace persons and organizations throughout the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union.

Conferees agreed that insights and experiences gained from these interactions may have some value in understanding China on these issues. For example, the "Soviet model" may help in understanding some of the organizational hierarchies and closely-held decision-making structures in China. Other similarities include the paucity of independent sources of information, a relatively small number of arms control and nonproliferation specialists (especially true for China and the non-Russian republics), and the long-range goal of many in the United States to help foster more independent organizations and individuals on these issues in both China and in the former Soviet republics.

Contrasts

However, overall, the lessons learned in working with the Soviet and post-Soviet nonproliferation and arms control community may have only limited applicability in the case of China. This is true for several important reasons. First, the bilateral experience in arms control and nonproliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and former Soviet republics now dates back some 40-plus years; the United States and China are just beginning a more focused dialogue in these areas.

Second, the nature of the dialogue in the two cases is far different. As the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have focused largely on arms control and disarmament to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war; bilateral arms control has been largely absent in U.S.-China discussions, where the focus has rather been on nonproliferation and, more recently, cooperation in multilateral arms control efforts. Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent massive U.S. investment in nonproliferation and arms control in the former Soviet Union has no parallel in the case of China.

On the other hand, the U.S.-China relationship, lacking the fierce animosity and strategic struggle which characterized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, offers more opportunities for constructive interaction and influence at an earlier stage in the bilateral dialogue on arms control and nonproliferation than was possible in the U.S.-Soviet case. In short, more work needs to be done to understand the Chinese case separately, to consider it unique from the Soviet and post-Soviet case.

II. CURRENT INTERACTIONS

Participants discussed and assessed the range of government and nongovernment activities that are taking place between the United States and China on issues related to nonproliferation and arms control. It was stressed that this active agenda of engagement with the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community has made a fundamental contribution to understanding Chinese positions and policy-making, introducing U.S. and international norms and policies, fostering debate and more independent centers of thinking within China on issues of nonproliferation and arms control, and promoting China’s acceptance of widely-held international norms in nonproliferation and arms control. At the same time, this process remains in its nascent stages. Participants agreed that while we know far more today about the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community, we still know far less than we ought to.

Areas of activity

The discussions focused on three areas of activity in particular: U.S. nongovernment engagement with Chinese counterparts on nonproliferation and arms control issues; activities conducted by U.S. national laboratories with Chinese counterparts; and official, bilateral negotiations on nonproliferation and arms control.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, U.S. nongovernment entities and policy research institutions -- such as think tanks, universities, foundations, businesses, and private citizens -- have gained ever-increasing access to counterparts in China whose professional focus is on nonproliferation and arms control issues. In general, the goals of these organizations have been to assist in stemming the proliferation of weapons through a range of programs and activities in cooperation with Chinese individuals and institutions. These programs include research and training opportunities, conferences and other "Track 2" activities, capacity-building initiatives, and foundation support.

Participants widely agreed that such unofficial programs have made an important contribution to the official government-to-government agenda on nonproliferation and arms control, and to the broader U.S.-China relationship. The praise was cautionary however, with one observer noting: "While it is true that nongovernment organizations have more influence than governments think, they have less influence than nongovernment organizations think." Moreover, nongovernment entities must be wary of the "mirroring effect": too readily claiming that an apparently receptive Chinese audience has validated our prior assumptions and prejudices. Participants largely supported a call to expand "Track 1-1/2" activities which would foster greater interaction and coordination between nongovernment and government organizations.

Another effort to engage China on these issues involves a small but active program of interactions between U.S. scientists at certain national laboratories -- Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory -- and counterparts in China. These interactions have been largely with the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, formerly known as the Ninth Academy, which houses the Chinese nuclear weapons R&D complex. The participants on both sides stress that these interactions are entirely unofficial in nature.

These interactions began in fiscal year 1996, and at present fall under two categories: voluntary efforts for effective nuclear materials management, and collaboration related to specific arms control and nonproliferation commitments. Individual projects include demonstrations of nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) procedures, discussions and technical demonstrations related to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification, and on the role of scientists in developing and implementing nuclear export controls. Conference participants agreed that these activities, while formally unofficial, mark some of the most encouraging advances yet in terms of regularized, low-key, non-antagonistic interactions between persons and entities closely associated with their respective governments on issues of nonproliferation and arms control.

At the official level of bilateral negotiation and dialogue, U.S. engagement with China on nonproliferation and arms control has been a protracted and often controversial process. Lacking common ground and shared principles on many issues, the gap between U.S. and Chinese commitments to international nonproliferation and arms control goals has been significant. Moreover, some conferees expressed concern over the fact that Chinese commitments often come in the form of secret, unverifiable assurances which are not publicly affirmed by the Chinese and are left to the United States to explain. Also, past experience raises questions whether Chinese interlocutors in official discussions have the authority, expertise, and experience to negotiate binding commitments and agreements.

Nevertheless, the situation today in U.S.-China relations vis-à-vis proliferation issues is far better than it was just five years ago. U.S.-China dialogue on these issues greatly intensified over the period 1995-97, particularly in the run-up to the October 1997 U.S.-China summit, where a number of encouraging agreements and joint statements were made on nonproliferation and arms control. While Chinese activities continue to raise concern, U.S. policy toward China on nonproliferation and arms control issues has contributed to a more positive trend for change on the part of China. The establishment of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hopefully a step toward a more centralized and authoritative locus for official U.S.-China interaction on nonproliferation, arms control, and related concerns. Making these issues a more regularized aspect of discussions between the two countries will likely push these positive trends further, and should be an important long-term priority for Washington.

At the official level in the United States, the Pentagon has made the greatest inroads toward engaging and understanding the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). On issues related to military-technical proliferation and – looking ahead – on strategic arms control, U.S. officials and concerned specialists must engage the PLA and COSTIND for discussions to be authoritative and result-oriented.

An important result of the Pentagon’s efforts to encourage greater transparency on the part of the Chinese military establishment was the publication in November 1995 of the country’s first "white paper" on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. The publication disappointed many for not going far enough in providing adequate and useful information. But it was an important step forward that came in part as a result of U.S. engagement with Chinese counterparts on nonproliferation and arms control issues.

Conference discussions touched upon the U.S. use of sanctions as part of its engagement with China on these issues. Unilateral imposition of U.S. sanctions has had a limited degree of influence on Chinese nonproliferation and arms control activities. Chinese arms control and nonproliferation decisions favorable to U.S. interests appear to have been most influenced by positive inducements (technology transfers, regime memberships) and when U.S. goals are presented not unilaterally, but as a widely held international norm (nuclear nonproliferation, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).

This is not to say that sanctions have no place -- they can be a useful tool. But, by themselves they cannot be expected to contribute to the longer-term interests of the United States and the international community in nonproliferation and arms control. They should be considered as one of many foreign policy instruments that can be utilized when appropriate in conjunction with other methods shown to influence Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policies.

Expanding and deepening interactions

As described in more detail below, a greater degree of growth, openness, and flux characterizes the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community at present and for the foreseeable near-term future. This period of creative germination and development offers promising opportunities to engage this community more constructively. Participants generally agreed that U.S.-based individuals and institutions should seek to engage as many counterparts in China as possible, while maintaining a healthy skepticism about the near-term prospects for full-fledged disclosure and breakthroughs. It is probably too early to focus narrowly on certain individuals and institutions in China as it remains unclear what results will accrue from this period of opening and transition. The term "moving target" was commonly employed by participants to characterize the challenges of understanding and engaging the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community.

Nevertheless, it was widely agreed that U.S.-based specialists should work to strengthen the clout and expertise of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while at the same time seeking greater contact with relevant bodies associated with the PLA, including COSTIND.

To the greatest degree possible, more unofficial interactions should take place in China, where a greater number of Chinese participants can be reached and included in discussions, conferences, and other forms of dialogue. Until now, contacts in China on issues of nonproliferation and arms control have largely been limited to persons and institutions in Beijing and Shanghai; conference participants agreed that efforts should be initiated to engage persons and institutions outside of these key cities, with Hong Kong noted as an important possible locus.

It is important that activities be sustained over time – so they are not simple "one-off" activities – through follow-up interactions and continued contact over the long-term. Establishing longer-term relationships is especially important owing to generational factors. First and second generation specialists in China – those aged 45 to 50 and above – are likely to be more reticent about interacting with foreigners, especially on topics such as nonproliferation and arms control which have traditionally been seen as highly sensitive and military-related issues.

Younger persons of the third generation, who will not reach positions of greater influence for at least 10 to 15 more years, typically have greater exposure to and experience with the outside world, often speak one or more foreign languages, and are more willing than their elders to consider new concepts and exchange views. In addition, because of the ill effects of the Cultural Revolution on persons now aged from their early-40s to their mid- to late-50s – the so-called "Lost Generation" – younger persons may lack active and forward-looking mentors. Taken together, these points underline the importance of seeking to engage younger specialists, and to maintain ties with them over the long-term.

Persons and institutions in the United States should also be prepared to make a longer-term commitment with Chinese counterparts owing to the relatively small number of individuals and organizations in China who are professionally engaged in nonproliferation and arms control work. This factor alone suggests it will be some time before there might be a significantly large and more independent nonproliferation and arms control constituency in China. Sustaining and expanding the scope of bilateral and multilateral interactions with this nascent community will likely further its growth and development.

Several participants stressed that in working with Chinese partners – especially in unofficial interactions – it is important to be watchful for potential practical difficulties. These include financial misunderstandings, immigration difficulties, and professional jealousies among individuals and institutions in China.

Discussants also cautioned those in the nongovernment realm to recall that their activity with Chinese counterparts on nonproliferation and arms control issues is often not a "neutral" exercise, but can be value-laden. In any event, Chinese interlocutors will often perceive U.S. nongovernment organizations as simply the mouthpieces of U.S. official interests and values. To counter this perception, activities with Chinese counterparts need to promote nonproliferation and arms control as fields of study, rather than as a collection of predetermined ideologies or sets of national interests.

III. KEY DEBATES, TRENDS AND INSTITUTIONS

Period of greater openness and change

More than at any other time in the history of the People’s Republic, bureaucratic entities, scientific institutions, and strategic research organizations are intensively engaged in nonproliferation and arms control policy research and implementation. These internal developments are marked by greater openness to change and outside opinion, less ideological rhetoric, the establishment and strengthening of agencies concerned with nonproliferation and arms control, and more sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies.

Several prominent manifestations of this more open atmosphere are evident: a more obvious degree of intra- and inter-agency bargaining taking place on issues related to nonproliferation and arms control; the nascent formation of like-minded cohorts which cut across organizational lines; and an increased willingness to solicit advice from outside institutional structures, including advice from foreigners. But in spite of this somewhat more open and flexible environment, there remains a continued careful modulation of the public voice by Chinese specialists in open fora and far less disclosure and transparency than most U.S.-based observers would prefer.

Indications are that politics and economics – rather than strictly technological and military realities and concerns – are more influential in China today in the fields of nonproliferation and arms control, as China becomes increasingly enmeshed in a growing set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral commitments (see "China and Proliferation: Encouraging Developments and Continuing Concerns" and "Chinese participation and positions regarding various arms control and nonproliferation agreements, organizations, and regimes" in the appendix to this report). As such, many conferees suggested that China now finds itself on a "slippery slope" regarding nonproliferation and arms control, leading to a steady closure in the gap between Chinese declaratory policy and actual practice in these issues. The question remains as to how steep the "slippery slope" may be at this point, and whether the incline will be more or less precipitous in the future.

Even though the entry fees to the "club" of international nonproliferation and arms control regimes have become increasingly costly – witness China’s decisions to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – the costs for exit are becoming even more higher for a China concerned with international stature, improved international relations, and greater access to the international financial and trading system. One participant suggested we are witnessing the "bourgeoisification" of Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policy.

Also notable are developments in the area of export controls. Under pressure from the United States in relation to the certification of the 1985 U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and owing to its membership in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Zangger Committee, China has taken a number of important steps to strengthen public accountability and awareness, licensing procedures, and enforcement of its export controls, especially related to nuclear, chemical, and conventional military products (see "China and Proliferation: Encouraging Developments and Continuing Concerns" in the appendix to this report).

According to the conferees, numerous factors help explain this important shift in Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policies. In general, these factors can be summed up in the understanding that China has increasingly become a greater stakeholder in the international economic and security system. Therefore, its leaders seek to shape and institutionalize the terms of Chinese participation in that system.

First, there is a growing, cumulative recognition among China’s leaders that the country’s interests in achieving stable and friendly relations with leading members of the international system can be assisted through constructive engagement in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes. Second, is the understanding that past policies which ignored or undermined international arms control and nonproliferation initiatives must be radically reordered to contribute to the management of the rapid diffusion and advance of weapons and military technology worldwide (and often on China’s doorstep). Third, as arms control and nonproliferation initiatives advance, the Chinese leadership recognizes the need to be involved in the process to seek the greatest limitations on military capabilities of other countries, while limiting the potential constraints on Chinese capabilities.

Institutions

The participants in the conference noted the development of many new and potentially influential bodies of expertise and political authority within the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community. Bodies which were previously in place have concurrently raised their profile and become more active in a range of technical and policy-related activities in the fields of nonproliferation and arms control.

Some conferees noted that this far greater activism and institution-building related to arms control and nonproliferation can be traced to mid-1996. During this period, China was outmaneuvered and eventually came to reluctantly support and sign on to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an arms control treaty which will have a direct and significant impact on the country’s military capabilities. Also, it was during this period, and increasingly over the course of 1997, that the United States pressed a full nonproliferation and arms control agenda on the Chinese in bilateral negotiations. In addition, the cumulative current and likely future nonproliferation and arms control commitments for the Chinese – related to such agreements as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the proposed fissile materials production cut-off treaty – became increasingly apparent. Chinese leaders and institutions apparently responded to these challenges by increasing and improving their resources devoted to nonproliferation and arms control policies.

Most prominent among these is the newly-established Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, led by Ambassador Sha Zukang, within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It remains too early to know the degree of influence this organization will have. Based on a reading of publicly available Chinese export control regulations and on the organizational structure of the new department, this new organization is likely to have more clout in the area of internationally-negotiated treaties and regimes, rather than on the implementation of domestic export controls. Some participants noted that the MFA’s lack of information about sensitive exports, its lack of authority toward military and defense-industrial exporters, and the status of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament as a bureaucratic newcomer will limit its influence. Others noted the professionalism, experience, and trust which Ambassador Sha has built within the Chinese decision-making structure will lend him and his new department greater political leverage.

On the other hand, the PLA and COSTIND remain highly influential in both the arms control and nonproliferation decision-making processes in China. But the scope and process of that influence is not well understood in the United States. The military is formally headed by the Central Military Commission which is in turn formally responsible to the Chinese Communist Party, not to the civilian leadership under the State Council. Traditionally, the PLA has performed a dual function as the nation’s military but also as an important political force. At present, formal civilian and party authority over the military is embodied in the person of Jiang Zemin, who is at once the Chinese president (head of state), head of the armed forces (chairman of the Central Military Commission), and head of the party (chairman of the Chinese Communist Party). Taken together, this situation allows the PLA a certain independence and significant authority with relation to nonproliferation and arms control decision-making.

A significant number of organizations within the PLA or with close ties to it – such as the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, the Institute for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, the PLA General Staff Department, and COSTIND – conduct research and provide technical and policy advice to the civilian nonproliferation and arms control decision-making establishment. Greater resources should be devoted to understanding the role of the PLA, COSTIND, and other military-related organizations in nonproliferation and arms control decision-making.

Discussions at the conference also speculated on the role of individuals and institutions in two specific instances – China’s accession to the CWC and the CTBT – in which China for the first time agreed through arms control discussions to close off important strategic options under potentially intrusive verification conditions. In the absence of public debate on the treaties in China, and given continued Chinese reticence to disclose details of internal discussions on sensitive issues, it is very difficult to identify clearly the key persons and institutions influencing decisions in these areas.

As a starting point, it would appear that on the CTBT and CWC decisions, concerns with China’s prestige and international standing took precedence over strictly military and technical issues. These concerns were not limited to these treaties alone, and the overall positive trend in Chinese nonproliferation and arms control activities are just a part of the ambitious post-Tiananmen diplomatic offensive to improve the country’s international image. Presumably, it would be the task of the MFA to argue this case, but concerns over national prestige and international standing are certainly not within the purview of the MFA alone.

That these decisions directly affect Chinese military capabilities points to the involvement of the PLA- and COSTIND-related bodies, and their presence at the CWC and CTBT negotiations only confirms this. But their agreement to constrain China’s military potential also suggests certain trade-offs: that the political and military benefits of accession in the post-Cold War world – including avoiding international isolation, improving China’s great power stature, and gaining limits on the arsenals of other powers – ultimately outweighed the potential risks in the minds of military strategists. Anecdotal evidence suggests that high-level advocates in the PLA as well as in the military research and development community, opposed China’s accession to the CTBT and possibly the CWC, but in the end it appears that political decisions took precedence.

However, we need to be cautious not to frame this debate too simplistically as the "military establishment versus the political establishment." If, on the other hand, it is true that concerns over prestige, image and relative rather than absolute gains in security prevailed over narrow military and technical considerations, then this suggests new paths toward constructive dialogue with China on nonproliferation and arms control.

In sum, the current period of openness in the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community offers a glimpse into institutions and decision-making processes, but there is far more to learn. During a period of gestational change and growth, an even greater predisposition toward personalism, ad hoc arrangements, and case-by-case decisions may be the prevailing norm until the trend toward institutionalization is more firmly established. As a preliminary assessment, a number of institutions and their respective responsibilities were discussed during the conference (see Table 1).

IV. FUTURE BILATERAL AGENDA

Continuing concerns

In spite of the significant progress that the United States and China have accomplished in narrowing their differences on nonproliferation, arms control, and security issues, large gaps remain on a number of critical issues. Analysts and policy-makers concerned with these issues must expect that nonproliferation and arms control problems will arise. A key task will be to anticipate these potential problem areas and work with China to alleviate them. Perhaps most importantly, the two sides should work to ensure that these inevitable disruptions do not cause larger rifts in the overall bilateral relationship.

First and foremost, doubts remain as to the extent the United States and China share a set of common principles related to nonproliferation and arms control, the linkages between nonproliferation, arms control, and security, and the appropriate means and ends of nonproliferation and arms control. A good example: even as China and the United States have moved closer to mutual understandings about nuclear proliferation, the two sides remain rather far apart on other issues, including chemical-related exports and – particularly – missile-related exports. These differences and similar differences on fundamental principles and concepts will test the willingness of the two sides to move their bilateral agenda forward in the months and years ahead.

As such, greater official and unofficial dialogue and interaction devoted to shaping common principles, definitions, and goals is in order. This can only be achieved when the two sides are prepared to engage in forward-looking discussions in an atmosphere of greater trust and confidence. More regularized sets of meetings are necessary to address basic understandings at the Track 1, Track 2, and "Track 1 1/2" (government-nongovernment interaction, or "expert meeting") levels.

Second, where some common principles can be established, the United States and China continue to differ on how these principles should be interpreted and implemented. Several conference participants noted that "secret" and unspecified assurances between the United States and China on nonproliferation issues have tended to hurt the relationship more than help. It should not be up to the United States to explain and justify the pledges which China will not acknowledge publicly. Often the two sides have differed over whether agreements covered only "principles" or extended to commodities and specific lists, or whether one side or the other is in violation of the spirit or the letter (or both) of a given commitment. Subsequent concerns over secret Chinese commitments only undermine the credibility of U.S. and Chinese negotiators and bring greater distrust into the relationship. The two sides must strive to clarify their concepts, understandings, perceptions, and definitions of nonproliferation and arms control issues and commitments.

Third, until China is able to implement and enforce effective export controls, there are likely to be continued, sporadic transfers of equipment and technologies which will be contrary to Chinese commitments to the United States and to certain international agreements. For example, some participants noted that chemical export controls are a looming problem. China’s adherence to the CWC will be a "litmus test" for its ability to effectively police its sensitive exports. Similar problems will likely arise with relation to nuclear-, biological-, and missile-related exports as well. U.S. government and nongovernment initiatives should be undertaken to encourage the development of more effective export controls and the promotion of a greater "culture of control" in China.

Fourth, the emergent international nonproliferation and arms control agenda will tax the Chinese propensity for ambiguity and non-disclosure in unprecedented ways. Such future areas of discussion as warhead accountability, command and control structures, verification regimes, challenge inspections, fissile material disposition, and acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports, to name a few, will require a degree of openness, information-sharing, and intrusiveness that China has not experienced. A downside to China’s new activism and experience in nonproliferation and arms control regimes is that it could serve in the future to constrain and prevent what it may view as overly-meddlesome interference.

Finally, certain U.S. activities are seen in China as proliferation problems, and could result in Chinese proliferative responses. The first of these relates to Taiwan. The Taiwan issue was not directly addressed by the conferees, because it is largely a political and military problem, rather than one strictly related to nonproliferation and arms control. However, in its discussions with the United States, China has increasingly couched its concerns over Taiwan in terms of nonproliferation and arms control, and explicitly links U.S. concerns with China to U.S. weapons exports to Taiwan. For the United States, the provision of weapons to Taiwan and assistance to the island in the form of missile defenses are seen by many as a form of counterproliferation in response to China’s use of missiles as a tool of intimidation. Participants did not offer any easy solutions to this problem, but highlighted it as an issue emerging on the two sides’ proliferation-related agendas.

The other issue concerns the development and deployment of missile defenses by the United States. Chinese specialists continue to develop increasingly sophisticated proliferation- and security-related arguments against this development. The Chinese argue that it will embolden Japanese militarism; that it is contrary to international regimes and agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime; that it would interfere in the internal affairs of China if such defenses were extended to Taiwan; and that it poses a strategic threat to China and undermines strategic stability in East Asia. Likely Chinese responses include a qualitative and quantitative improvement of China’s strategic deterrent (a process that is going forward in any event, but might be accelerated by the deployment of more advanced missile defenses by the United States) and a less cooperative position on other bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation and arms control issues. Looking ahead, this issue area is one which will become more contentious for the two sides.

Foundation for policy: expand common ground, deepen engagement

U.S. policy should expand those areas of U.S.-China common ground, while continuing dialogue to resolve problem areas. As noted above, the United States and China do not share common views in a number of areas, but the record with regard to nuclear-related issues offers some room for encouragement that continued engagement and dialogue can pay off. For example, as nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the two sides share common interests with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. This has become increasingly evident in Chinese policies over the past three to five years through adherence to regimes and agreements, support for regional nonproliferation initiatives, pledges to the United States, and promulgation of strengthened nuclear export control regulations.

The United States should work with China to broaden these areas of common ground. This would involve a relatively wide range of activities, such as: greater coordination and cooperation in clarifying commitments to the NPT; continued collaboration related to the dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons capability; cooperation with regard to China’s participation in the Zangger Committee and encouragement toward membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group; working toward negotiations on the proposed Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty and the CTBT verification regime; assistance in developing and implementing effective nuclear export controls in China; and promoting the rule of law in China to enhance predictability, reliability, and permanence of domestic regulations and multilateral commitments.

While expanding areas of common ground, more work is needed to address continuing differences. At a minimum, the two sides should agree to establish a more regularized set of political- and expert-level exchanges to work on these issues. The discussions of the conference suggest certain approaches that can smooth this process. A greater degree of constructive and cooperative dialogue with China on nonproliferation and arms control can be expected in reaction to U.S. positions which:

• reflect a widely-accepted international norm or consensus;
• coincide with Chinese interests to enhance its international prestige and standing;
• offer relative gains for Chinese economic and security goals.

Such an approach begins with greater efforts to present the case for nonproliferation and arms control on their merits as widely recognized within the international community, and not as ideologies, causes, or sets of U.S. national interests. This requires efforts to take up these issues at a basic level to discuss and define the fundamental concepts, means, and purposes of nonproliferation and arms control. This is especially important with regard to nonproliferation, which, until recently, was largely understood in China to be a broad set of national security interests of the United States with which to attack China, rather than as a legitimate international normative concern. Such an approach also requires a genuine effort to seek Chinese ideas and opinions in a way that is not directed at China or to "educate" China, but rather in collaboration with Chinese individuals and institutions.

In addition to leveraging from clear and widely-held international interests and norms, the U.S. approach should emphasize how its goals in nonproliferation and arms control are consistent with the security interests of China. For example, the United States was able to make a clear case to China that dismantling the North Korean nuclear weapon program was not only in the U.S. interest, but served Chinese interests as well. Similarly, it appears that U.S. arguments about the potentially destabilizing consequences of nuclear cooperation with Iran may have contributed to China’s decision to cut-off its cooperation in this sphere with Teheran. More broadly, the United States should be able to make the case to China that U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policies in Northeast Asia -- which has arguably prevented the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan -- has been very much in Chinese national interests as well. Within the more pragmatic and generally more open atmosphere prevailing in China, such an approach is far more likely to take root.

Nongovernment organizations and policy research institutes can contribute to this bilateral process by working with Chinese partner institutions to re-examine and clarify first principles, definitions, and concepts, and finding common ground at this level with Chinese counterparts. Activities aimed at promoting this kind of dialogue would include offering visiting research and training fellowships, assisting in the development of university-level courses and research seminars in Chinese, facilitating the interaction of U.S. and Chinese specialists in nonproliferation and arms control, and arranging the exchange of information and analyses with Chinese counterparts.

Finally, concerned analysts and policy-makers must recognize that gaining a more constructive relationship with China on nonproliferation and arms control issues will take time. Conferees pointed out that the U.S.-China dialogue on nonproliferation and arms control is on a more cooperative footing at an earlier stage than was the case with the Soviet Union. Likewise, one should be encouraged by the degree of change that has occurred in China on these issues in just the past eight to ten years. But there remains a long road ahead and persistent commitment on the part of the U.S. policy community will be needed to effect continued progress.

ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS

• China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 1984.

• China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in November 1984.

• China announced in 1984 that it would require IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports. (However, this announcement did not require full-scope safeguards.)

• In January 1989 China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

• China declared in November 1991 that it would report to the IAEA on the export or import of nuclear materials exceeding one kilogram for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon states.

• China pledged in February 1992 to abide by the original 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.

• In March 1992 China acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

• China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993.

• In 1993 and 1994, China contributed to gaining North Korean acceptance of the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, which has led to a freeze of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

• According to the October 1994 US-China joint statement, both countries supported the negotiation and "earliest possible achievement" of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

• According to the October 1994 US-China joint statement on missile proliferation, China agreed to adhere to the MTCR and accepted the concept of "inherent capability." (According to the joint statement, "under this concept, the missile would be included in the ban if it could generate sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload.")

• China went along with the May 1995 indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

• In September 1995, China suspended plans to provide Iran with two 300 megawatt Qinshan-type nuclear power reactors.

• In December 1995 China issued new regulations on chemical export controls. The regulations include a schedule of controlled chemicals based on those of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

• In May 1996 China pledged not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

• In July 1996 China ceased nuclear testing and announced a unilateral moratorium on further testing.

• In September 1996 China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

• In November 1996 China promised to establish comprehensive nationwide regulations on nuclear export controls.

• China went along with strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, adopted by the IAEA in 1997.

• In March 1997 China issued a supplement to its December 1995 chemical export regulations.

• In May 1997 China attended the Zangger Committee as an observer.

• In May 1997 China issued a circular (executive decree) on the strict implementation of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export controls.

• Beginning in 1993 and in each year since, China has participated in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

• In April 1997 China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and joined the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as a founding member.

• As of August 1997 China reportedly cancelled its plans to construct a uranium conversion facility in Iran.

• In fall 1997, China formally established a new Arms Control and Disarmament Department (equivalent to US State Department bureau-level) within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department of approximately 40 persons will be divided into four divisions: nuclear, chemical/biological, conventional, and comprehensive, marking a significant government commitment to address arms control and nonproliferation issues.

• China agreed in September 1997 to return a Sun Microsystems supercomputer that was diverted to a military-related research institute in Changsha.

• In September 1997 China issued new nuclear export control regulations and an attached list of items to be controlled. This document formally acknowledges China’s adherence to its "Three Principles for Nuclear Exports" and mandates its pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The control list is the same as that used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Part 1).

• In September 1997 China informally pledged to the United States to halt its future export of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.

• In October 1997 China officially joined the Zangger Committee.

• In October 1997 China pledged in a confidential letter to the United States to halt new nuclear cooperation with Iran.

• In October 1997 China announced it would formulate new nuclear-related dual-use export control regulations by mid-1998.

• In October 1997 China issued new military item export control regulations (covering conventional weapons and missiles), which took effect on 1 January 1998.

• In December 1997 China issued a circular (executive decree) on strengthened chemical export controls.

• China continues to participate in multi-level US-China dialogue on nonproliferation, export controls, and on the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials.

• In January 1998 during Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s trip to China, senior Chinese military officials reaffirmed China’s October 1997 pledge not to sell any further cruise missiles or related production technology to Iran.

• In June 1998, China issued export control regulations covering dual-use nuclear exports.

• In June 1998, China expanded the coverage of its current chemical export controls to include dual-use chemicals which are covered by the Australia Group (to which China is not a member) but not by the CWC.

• During the Sino-US summit in June 1998 China promised to "actively study" MTCR membership.

• During the Sino-US summit in June 1998 China and the US signed a "nontargeting agreement" in which they agreed not to target nuclear weapons at each other.

• During the Sino-US summit in June 1998, the US and China issued a Joint Statement on South Asia in which both sides promised to ""our respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems." This statement appears to remove all remaining uncertainty about China's commitment to halt all further missile assistance to Pakistan (including MTCR Category II technologies.).

• During the Sino-US summit in June 1998, the US and China issued a Joint Statement on the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention in which both sides agreed to work for a more effective verification mechanism for the BWC

• During the Sino-US summit in June 1998, President’s Clinton and Jiang issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to ending the export and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines and to accelerating global humanitarian demining.

• In July 1998, China issued its second defense "white paper" called China’s National Defense (Zhongguo Guofang). This signals a growing recognition of the importance of military transparency measures.

• China has had difficulty adequately implementing and enforcing recently adopted export control regulations covering nuclear and chemical weapons related equipment, materials, and technologies. Also, China has not yet adopted explicit export control regulations covering missile technologies, especially dual-use missile technologies.

• China does not require full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of supply for its nuclear exports.

• China is not a member of a number of important multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

• Continued suspicions persist of the existence of Chinese offensive chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs, contrary to China’s public statements and in violation of its commitments to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

• Reports continue of Chinese non-compliance with its 1992 pledge to abide by the original 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, and its 1994 bilateral statement with the United States to accept the "inherent capability" concept associated with the MTCR. Examples of these allegations include the export of equipment and technology for missile guidance, testing, and production to Iran, and the provision of missiles and missile components to Pakistan, including the missile production complex at Fatehgarh, near Rawalpindi.

• China has not pledged to adhere to the revised 1993 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.

• Concerns persist related to Chinese chemical weapons-related sales to Iran. As a result, in May 1997 the United States imposed sanctions against two Chinese companies, a Hong Kong company, and five Chinese individuals for chemical weapons-related exports to Iran.

• Concerns continue regarding China’s nuclear-related exports and assistance to Pakistan, including to the unsafeguarded Khushab heavy water reactor and the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) at Kahuta.

• China does not participate in the US Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program.

• Chinese diversion to military-related facilities of US dual-use exports intended for peaceful uses, including machine tools and supercomputers, highlight concerns over China’s acceptance of nonproliferation norms and its ability to properly monitor the end-use of militarily-relevant technologies.