CNS Programs: EANP Seminar

Executive Summary

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies hosted “Project Strait Talk,” a unique seminar held in Monterey on May 12-13, 2000 with participants from mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. A retired senior military officer and two academics from each side met to identify and discuss military, political, and economic events and trends that might destabilize the security environment in the Taiwan Strait.

The group identified nine key events and trends that might trigger a military confrontation:

• Indicators that the PRC was preparing for an invasion of Taiwan

• A decision by Taiwan to develop weapons of mass destruction

• US decision to sell theater missile defense (TMD) systems to Taiwan

• PRC announcement of a timetable for reunification

• Economic meltdown/chaos in mainland China

• Trend towards “creeping independence” for Taiwan

• Trend toward overt American support for Taiwan

• Trend toward increasing “Taiwan identity” and indefinite delay of reunification

• Trends in overall military balance across the Taiwan strait

Misperceptions and misunderstandings appeared to be a relatively small factor at the level of individual events. Although aggressive military actions could prompt dangerous responses, the group felt these events were unlikely to occur accidentally or inadvertently. Absent a political crisis, most small-scale military events were not considered to be that dangerous, although major military exercises were a possible exception to this rule. Similarly, the political actions (such as a declaration of independence by Taiwan) that would trigger a military confrontation were well understood. Discussions revealed considerable agreement about which individual events were most dangerous and where the “red lines” that might trigger conflict lay.

The group found that political context greatly colored interpretations of individual events. Most participants were less concerned about dangerous events occurring accidentally or inadvertently than about longer-term trends (and leadership perceptions of these trends) that might prompt political leaders to take dangerous actions despite awareness of the risks. Perceptions (and misperceptions) about what was really driving decision-making in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington were a critical factor. For example, Chinese participants noted that the perception that Taiwan’s leaders were determined to move toward independence greatly influenced interpretations of Taiwan’s statements and actions. The absence of political dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan exacerbated the problem of misperceptions and increased the danger that a trigger event or adverse trend might spark military conflict.

Discussions revealed several important differences in perceptions:

• Americans viewed talk of the PRC setting a “timetable” for reunification as an ultimatum, while other participants viewed this as a means of building domestic support.
• Chinese participants viewed the Taiwan issue as a barrier to Chinese democratization, while Taiwan hoped that democratization in mainland China would eventually make it easier to resolve cross-Strait issues.
• Mainland Chinese and Taiwan participants each worried that the trend in US policy was toward increasing support for the other side.
• Mainland Chinese participants saw military balance in the Taiwan Strait as destabilizing by permitting Taiwan to move toward independence, while participants from Taiwan and the United States viewed China’s efforts to achieve military superiority as a destabilizing effort to compel Taiwan to negotiate on mainland China’s terms.

Although some key actions such as TMD sales and US support for Taiwan had both military and political dimensions, participants stressed the importance of political causes over military factors. Political actions likely to trigger conflict included actions that promoted Taiwan independence, changes in the character of US unofficial relations with Taiwan, and Chinese actions to pressure Taiwan to move toward reunification. Chinese participants repeatedly expressed the view that US military support for Taiwan would encourage movement toward independence. American participants noted that mainland China’s missile deployments were increasing pressure to provide Taiwan with TMD and that shifts in the military balance might lead to increased arms sales. Several participants suggested a Chinese decision to scale down or move military exercises would have a positive impact on cross-Strait relations.

The group’s discussions revealed a mismatch between dangerous trends and available policy instruments. For example, Chinese participants felt that military threats were mainland China’s only means of deterring Taiwan from declaring independence. Yet military means were unlikely to reverse the trend toward a separate Taiwan identity (and might even be counter-productive). Participants felt that unofficial “track two” discussions like the Monterey seminar allowed a deeper engagement with issues and long-term trends that had considerable value in clarifying issues and dispelling misperceptions. Participants from different sides often shared a similar analysis about particular trends and events, even if they differed on policy recommendations. Future discussions would benefit from having participants from Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party and greater military representation.

The group noted a number of dangerous misperceptions and identified nine key events and trends that might destabilize the security environment. However the most critical factors were political perceptions, not military trends. Dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan can help prevent tensions from escalating into military conflict, but disagreements over the “one China” principle are preventing a resumption of talks. Seminar participants suggested one way to break the impasse would be unofficial “track two” discussions based on Taiwan’s 1991 “Guidelines for National Unification.” Mainland China would agree to discuss Taiwan’s own proposal (which envisions short-term, medium-term, and long-term phases leading toward unification). Taiwan’s new President Chen Shui-bian has already accepted the guidelines as a basis for policy. The United States might also play a useful role in facilitating discussion and clarifying issues.

Introduction

The seminar began with an explanation of goals and ground rules. Moderator Dr. Monte Bullard stressed that the purpose of the seminar was not to solve underlying political problems between mainland China and Taiwan, but rather to focus on the issue of military stability across the Taiwan Strait. Like it or not, the United States was involved in this issue. By taking an analytical approach, the group could identify potential events and trends that might trigger a war. The goal was to have a productive dialogue that identified dangerous misperceptions and misunderstandings. A follow-up seminar might consider confidence building measures that could reduce the chances of inadvertent or accidental conflict. All comments represent the personal views of seminar participants, not the views of their respective governments, and were given on a not-for-attribution basis.

Each member of the group summarized their professional background and described their previous personal and professional experience related to Taiwan. The group included two civilian analysts and one retired military general officer from each side.(1) Participants brought an unusually wide range of expertise to the seminar, including experience in military intelligence, military operations and operational planning, strategic and political analysis, service as a legislator, and diplomatic experience. Most had advanced degrees and have published widely on military and political relations between mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. (See Appendix 1 for a participant list.)

Seminar organizers prepared a long list of potential military, political, and economic events that might trigger a military crisis. (See Appendix 2 for a list of events.) Participants were asked to review the list and select the military, political, and economic trigger events that they considered most likely and most dangerous. The original plan was to compare each participant’s selections and quickly derive a list of events for further discussion and analysis. Because the process of selecting events produced interesting discussions as participants explained why they selected particular events as likely or dangerous, the time allotted to the selection process was expanded.

The first day was spent identifying and discussing military, political, and economic events that might trigger military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The group’s discussions suggested that the principal danger lay less in individual events than in conflicting political interpretations of their significance. These interpretations varied widely among the three sides and were colored by broader political and military trends. The second day focused on in-depth discussions of key events and trends. The group also developed a proposal for restarting unofficial dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan based on Taiwan’s 1991 “Guidelines for National Unification” (See Appendix III).

This report is divided into three sections: an overview of military, political, and economic trigger events; detailed discussions of key events and trends; and the group’s proposal for resumption of dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan.

(1) The PRC was represented by an active duty PLAN Senior Captain participating in a personal capacity.