CNS Programs: EANP Conference

Luncheon Address by the Hon. Anthony Beilenson

April 29, 1999

First, may I say it's been a pleasure and a privilege being with you these past 24 hours.

You are doing invaluable work in this "Track" 2 setting—that almost no one else knows about—but I hope you all take satisfaction from knowing there is no more important work in the world than what you are involved in here.

So, I salute and commend all of you—the Monterey Institute, and your Chinese colleagues—for your efforts in trying to make this world of ours a safer place.

I was asked to talk about two things:

1. Congress' perspectives on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and also

2. How Congress makes its decisions on foreign and military policy.

Although, in truth, I think my two real jobs today are first, to tell you how Congress works; and, second, to tell you to try to ignore Congress as best you can—as I'm sure President Clinton and our NATO allies are trying to do today!

As I was preparing this talk, I found myself getting depressed and upset. And I remembered that just after leaving Congress 2 and 1/2 years ago, and becoming a regular citizen again, one who watched Washington from a distance, instead of from the inside—my first thought was that we in Congress should stay away from foreign policy as much as possible—because we seldom do a useful or responsible job of it when we do get involved.

I’m generalizing, of course—sometimes Congress plays a very useful and valuable role.

But the truth is that Congress, which was a very great invention, and a most necessary part of our government, is not, by its very nature and its size, well-designed to deal with foreign policy questions.

I must admit its difficult for me to be confident in what I tell you about Congress' perspective—not because I'm no longer a member; it would be just as difficult if I were still there.

But because, as you know, there are 100 US Senators, and 435 members of the House of Representatives. And there are, therefore, not quite 535, but many different perspectives on these complicated issues. Which makes it difficult for the US to have a focused policy—a consistent single, articulated policy.

And makes it impossible, often, for others—either regular US citizens, or, especially, citizens of other countries, to understand exactly what our policy in a particular area is.

As you all know, we have a federal government made up of three separate branches:

1. Executive, or President—whose job is to formulate policy and to execute, or carry it out;

2. Legislative branch—to help formulate—and fund or finance programs and policies;

3. Judiciary—to act as a referee between the other two, and to protect the rights of individual citizens.

Whereas the Executive and Legislative branches can usually work well enough together to formulate domestic policy—health, transportation, jobs, agriculture, housing—it’s quite a different matter with foreign policy—where we are not just dealing and compromising with one another, but are dealing with other countries—and should be speaking with one, clear voice.

As I don't need to point out, we often don't succeed in doing that, unless we're all in a big war together such as World War I and World War 11. Even during the Cold War period, and especially during the war in Vietnam, there was a great amount of very public debate, discussion and disagreement about what US policy should be.

We especially don't succeed in speaking with one voice when we do not have a clear agreement/conception of our role in the world—of where and how, we should be involved.

That, of course, is the situation we find ourselves in today. It's not as simple, or obvious, as in the old days.

There are, in fact, for us in the US, no clear or obvious answers—and it is, therefore, normal, natural and healthy for us to be arguing about our policies overseas—even as it makes it difficult for our own government to carry out well-defined policies. And, as I've said, even more difficult for other nations to know what to expect from us.

Now, all of these problems are magnified by the fact that, unlike most democracies, we do not have a parliamentary system of government—but rather the three distinct branches mentioned above. In a parliamentary system, the government can speak with one voice; and in a parliamentary system, there is discipline in the majority party (the government can fall and new elections are called, if it cannot maintain its majority on important votes).

Whereas, our presidents, (unlike British prime ministers, for example), often have problems dealing with Congress even in the best of times.

Presidents have even greater problems when we have a divided government (which one cannot generally have in parliamentary systems), as President Clinton has now—i.e., a Democratic president, and Republican majorities in both houses of Congress.

For example,

(a) the Administration (and the American people) support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but Sen. Helms can hold up ratification of the Treaty in the Senate,

(b) the Administration can and does strongly support family planning programs around the world, but the Republican Congress can and does cut the funding for such programs.

And, last in this list of difficulties, Presidents have their most serious problems/troubles with Congress when, as is happening now, the opposition party tries to make national security an election issue.

That is, apparently, why President Clinton approved the announcements that the US will develop, or assist in deploying, missile defense systems involving cooperation with US allies. That was done, at least partially, in response to Republican allegations about nuclear espionage at the national laboratories; about lax export controls on advanced satellite technology; about possible questionable campaign contributions in 1996; as well as bipartisan concerns about North Korean missile tests and the Rumsfeld Report; and bipartisan concerns about Chinese transfers of missile and chemical weapons technology and advanced conventional weapons to Iran, and China’s technology and missile transfers to Pakistan.

Anyway, these are the kinds of messy, often foolish, political realities that American presidents—and other countries—have to understand and learn to deal with, or, at least, accept.

And, especially, you have to understand that just because one, or a few, members of Congress introduce legislation that offends you, or makes statements on the floor of Congress that are offensive or counterproductive, you don't have to take them seriously—they are just the position of one, or a handful, of individual Members of Congress.

Congress is, nonetheless, part of the government. And, under our Constitution, the Congress has precise and important responsibilities, including the authorization and appropriation of funds for the United States' international role, the requirement for Senate advice and consent to US participation in international treaties, the responsibility of both houses to oversee the administration's conduct of policy, and declaration of war, should that be necessary.

Congress' means of managing and/or interfering with foreign military policy include, especially, control over funding, over the money necessary to carry out these policies—which is generally done in the enactment of defense, State Department and foreign aid authorization and appropriations bills, usually considered annually. Control over funding key White House defense and foreign policy initiatives, such as the costs of deploying American forces to Bosnia, paying US obligations at the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, procuring military weapons systems, and supporting Middle East peace efforts, gives Congress additional influence and control over specific policy matters.

Congress can, and has, passed laws providing that no money included in a bill can be used for a particular purpose—i.e. support for the Contras in Nicaragua.

Congress can, and has, directed that money it votes be spent for weapons systems the Defense Department itself does not want! "Buy planes (or ships) that are manufactured in my district." A big reason it's difficult to stop some systems is that parts are subcontracted into many Congressional districts, providing jobs that a Congressman doesn't want to lose.

And, Congress has voted to keep military bases open that the Defense Department wants to close down.

What influences Congress in making its foreign and military policy decisions? Unfortunately, the same kind of considerations that influence all of its decisions: that is, political considerations.

First, will my vote please or displease the voters back home?

1. Defense spending. I, myself, always faced a difficult vote of conscience—there was so much defense industry in my district, but I was against the level of defense appropriations—and voting "no" on that bill always angered constituents of mine who worked in defense industries.

2. Resolutions on human rights. These are virtually impossible for members of Congress to vote against.

3. Family planning and abortion (anti-abortion groups have held up US funding of the U.N!);

4. Worries about voting constituencies has subverted our Cuba policy (so as not to displease Cuban-American voters in Florida and New Jersey);

5. Worries about negative campaign ads. It for example, I vote to spend money to improve the security of fissile material, or nuclear warheads, in Russia, I know that my opponent next year can use that vote in his campaign: "Congressman Anthony C. Beilenson voted to give aid to Russia, while we have so many needs for funding here at home in California." That’s also why so many Members of Congress vote against foreign aid of any kind.

Second, will my vote please or anger any of my sources of election campaign money?

It takes a lot of money to get elected, and you do not get money from the Party, so Members of Congress don't feel responsible to the Party, but to individuals and special interests (business and labor) who donate large amounts. (That's why, on WTO, the President was worried that Democrats were afraid of labor—from whom they get most of their money). On the other hand, Republicans (and some Democrats) are responsive to businesses that want to do business in China. So those were the main considerations, instead of asking whether getting China in the WTO would be good for our two countries—which, of course, should have been the question.

There's another important consideration in how Congress makes its decisions in foreign policy, especially—and that is a lack of serious involvement on the part of most Members of Congress in this policy area, and the lack of real responsibility—at least on the part of individual Members of Congress—for a serious and sensible foreign policy. If something goes wrong, it's the President who gets blamed; Congress itself is seldom blamed, and the individual Congressmen never are blamed.

So. Congress criticizes the President a lot, and passes lots of non-binding resolutions—i.e., resolutions without the force and effect of law. But it seldom takes the responsible and difficult course of joining the President, of playing an active and cooperative part with him in conducting American foreign policy.

For too many members, foreign policy has become just another battleground for political advantage over the president. These members see foreign policy as an extension of the open conflict that characterizes much of American domestic policy and politics. They see no difference between criticizing the president's policy on health care and education, and criticizing his policy on China. These members do not see the Congress as a partner with the president in developing American foreign policy. They miss any sense that Congress has a responsibility to help make good policy.

So, for instance, the Congress wants to see US leadership in the world, but over the last 10 years it has sharply cut the international affairs budget. Doing so, it undermines the United States’ ability to conduct even the most basic functions of diplomacy.

Congress favors NATO expansion, but it ultimately approved it only after the president assured them that it wouldn't cost us much. It supports the Dayton Accords, but does not want to take the risk or pay the high cost of implementation. Congress has resisted funding for KEDO (Korean Economic Development Organization) in North Korea from the moment the agreed framework was approved without offering an alternative policy for managing relations with North Korea or blocking its nuclear ambitions.

Congress evades its responsibility in other ways, too, most notably in avoiding taking a position when US troops are deployed overseas.

Somalia is a good example. Here you had a major military intervention by the United States involving 25,000 American forces at its peak involved in frequent combat engagement and the Congress never authorized it or approved it. Or, take Bosnia. US troops have now been deployed in Bosnia for three years, 20,000 men and women at the peak. Not once in that time has the Congress exercised its constitutional responsibility to authorize the deployment. It has been content to sit back and let the president exercise his authority and assume the risks and responsibility.

And now, of course, Kosovo.

Perhaps the most infuriating way Congress has developed to avoid any real responsibility is the growing use of sanctions and presidential waivers. With great frequency now, the Congress turns to the use of unilateral sanctions. From nuclear testing, to terrorism, to religious persecution, it wants to address virtually every foreign policy problem with a unilateral sanction. Unilateral sanctions allow the Congress to moralize and to posture, but they seldom have much of an impact. The president is left to make the hard decisions by the use of the waiver on when and whether to impose sanctions.

Congress thus tries to get the credit for acting tough, and then it is primed to criticize the president when he exercises his waiver authority to avoid sanctions harmful to the American national interest. With sanctions, Congress postures, but takes none of the real responsibility of putting forward a constructive foreign policy alternative.

I have mentioned several other issues because it’s important to understand that Congress makes—or fails to make—its decisions with respect to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament exactly as it does, or does not, make decisions in other areas.

Usually, for political reasons, and, often, not very responsible or sensible reasons—far removed from any rational consideration of these issues and how they can best be resolved.

With respect to these particular issues—and I am generalizing a bit:

Congress worries about, and is concerned these days, with terrorism and proliferation;

It does not think much about, or take action, on arms control and disarmament (except to make them more difficult by prohibiting our going below START I levels until START II is ratified by the Russian Duma).

It is mainly interested in terrorism because it thinks of that as a domestic issue—a criminal law issue;

And it worries about proliferation both as an adjunct, a part, of terrorism and also, of course, as something by which another nation could threaten the safety and security of the American people.

That is why Congress established the Commission I currently serve on.

On the other hand, arms control and disarmament are not much on Congress' minds, unfortunately—or, maybe, fortunately! They seem like distant and arcane issues which hold—at the moment—little interest in the minds of the voters.

We here know differently. We know there are no more important issues facing the world than proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and disarmament.

Our governments know that, too. That is, part of your government, and part of ours.

I leave China’s concerns in your capable hands—but how do we in the US get both parts of our government that deal with foreign policy—i.e., the legislative branch, as well as the executive branch, to concern themselves seriously with these issues?

There are several parts to the answer-and the most important, by far, is that it requires political leadership.

In this country, real political leadership can only come from the President—speaking out, to the country, about the importance of certain problems, and the need for something to be done about them. Only a President can educate and bring along the people of the country.

And, with them (the people), the Congress—which, after all, represents and responds to the perceived views of the voters. But those views must be shaped by the President.

A perfect example of the lack of such leadership: President Clinton and WTO.

A perfect example of the exercise of such leadership was Prime Minister Jhu's week-long campaign to convince US groups that acceptance of China in the WTO is good for the US. He did President Clinton's job for him, and it looks like it's going to succeed.

A second part of the answer requires more mutual understanding and tolerance of each other's views—and here again I use the US and China as examples.

We, in the US, need to understand the difficulties facing the government of China in providing for the needs of 1.2 billion people; and its success in allowing personal economic freedom to evolve so quickly.

We need to remember that, although China’s record on nonproliferation is not perfect,

• China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995;
• China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in time to become an original party;
• China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has refrained from nuclear testing;
• China has pledged not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
• China has agreed to terminate its nuclear assistance to Iran—even though such assistance is perfectly legal under the terms of the NPT;
• China has joined a major international nuclear suppliers group, the Zangger Committee, and is in the process of putting into place stronger nuclear export controls;
• And China has played an important role in the effort to stop North Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program.

And, we need to understand China’s real, and rational, concerns about our proposed development and deployment of missile defense systems.

And China, for its part, needs to understand that most, if not all, of the push to develop missile defenses is because of the fear of terrorist or rogue state attacks on us (the US seems to be the object of much of the animosity and anger that provoke such attacks—not PRC or Russia).

It seems to me that we might have some quiet assurances or understandings that there would be no missile defense deployments on Taiwan, in return for an understanding that there would be no more missile build-up on the mainland. I know that's an internal matter for you—but you could be very helpful—if you don't mind my saying so.

Taiwan is not the reason for trying to develop missile defenses—and most congressmen probably believe that there would be no reason to deploy such a system in East Asia except for the threat we perceive from North Korea—and that concern may no longer exist a couple of years from now.

And, it would also be helpful if other nations realized that we may not be able to develop such systems in the near future anyway.

Others also need to understand our concern for human rights—after all, they are at the core of what we are as a country.

And, they need to understand our very public and messy discussion and handling of many issues—it's simply in the nature of our system.

A third part of our dealing more successfully with proliferation issues is for the US to make clear to the PRC that, among all the issues that sometimes divide us, non-proliferation is our major concern—and not just one of many things on our list of what China should not be doing;

That continuing to find agreement on how to deal with Iran and Pakistan is a principal goal of ours;

And that working together to solve the peculiar problem of North Korea and its nuclear and ballistic missile threats could serve as the basis for even greater cooperative efforts by our two countries in the future.

And, lastly, for today at least, of the answers to the question of how we can more successfully deal with these issues—are a couple of areas in which the US could, it seems to me, usefully take some steps that would both make the world a safer place for all of us, and give added credibility to our efforts, and leadership, concerning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

First, with respect to Russia:

a) We should spend more money more quickly for securing the safety of warheads and fissile materials in Russia, which remain the single greatest proliferation threat in the world;

b) We should go beyond START II and lower the number of our nuclear weapons to 1,000 or fewer in the next very few years; and

c) We should get Russia to join us in taking our nuclear forces off alert-to eliminate the hair-trigger response we both still maintain—so there is no longer any real possibility of the accidental launch of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, with respect to North Korea

a) We should be spending more money in order to fully fund our commitments to the Korean Peninsula Development Organization; and

b) We should remove our 50 year old economic sanctions against North Korea and start to normalize relations with that country.

Perhaps our friends from China have some other useful suggestions as to how we can deal with our continuing concerns about North Korean missile tests and their involvement in missile proliferation to many parts of the world.

Well, that's it.

In ending, may I say again that it has been a privilege to have been here in Monterey with all of you.

And may I express the hope and belief that meetings such as this will strengthen and protect the relationship between our two nations—a relationship that many of us believe is essential, if we are to realize our shared goals of a peaceful, secure and prosperous world.

My own strong belief is that we can be optimistic about the future of that relationship, despite the difficulties and disagreements that will, inevitably, arise between us—as they do between all countries.

And I foresee the time, in the very near future, when our two countries will be working closely together, in the shared responsibility of great nations, to keep this planet we share a good and a happy place for all of us human beings who are destined to live out our lives on it.

Return to the Conference index.