CNS Programs: EANP Conference

Conference Report

Prepared by Evan Medeiros

• About the Conference
• Aims and Salience
• Participants and Agenda
• Executive Summary
• Summary of Conference Proceedings
• Opening Remarks by Senior Advisor Donald Gross and Ambassador Sha Zukang 
• Missile in National Security Strategy: Theater and Strategic Objectives 
• Current and Future TMD Technology 

      TABLE 1.1: US "Family" of TMD Systems
• Missile Defense Politics and Economics 
• Missile Deployments, Missile Defenses and Regional Stability 
• Arms Control Responses to Missiles or TMD: The Problem 
• Arms Control Responses to Missiles or TMD Deployments: The Solution 
• The Impact of Missile Proliferation on Stability in Other Regions: South Asia and the Middle East 
• Current Arms Control and Nonproliferation Issues in Sino-US Relations 
• Notes
• APPENDIX I: Chinese Arguments Opposing US Missile Defense Programs 
• APPENDIX II: US Arguments Defending Its Missile Defense Programs 

About the Conference

AIMS AND SALIENCE

Despite significant progress in US-China efforts to resolve disputes over arms control and nonproliferation over the last decade, lingering policy differences have become more acute in recent months. US plans to deploy a national missile defense system (NMD) and to share theater missile defense (TMD) technology with Japan, Taiwan and possibly South Korea have emerged as highly contentious issues in Sino-US dialogues. Disagreements over US missile defense policies have threatened to severely undermine US-China ties and to hinder future bilateral cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation. In previous years, disputes over NMD and TMD were seen as manageable but the current controversy has escalated to the point at which it represents a serious threat to international security. 

China’s growing opposition to US missile defense policies in the end of 1998 and 1999 also occurred during a period of worsening bilateral ties, further exacerbating policy differences over NMD and TMD. China has opposed US military intervention in Kosovo arguing the US was acting hegemonically, the US and China engaged in contentious talks about China’s membership in World Trade Organization, and accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage attracted Congressional and media attention which contributed to the "China Threat" thesis. These events collectively created an environment particularly unconducive to dialogue on critical security issues, such as missile defenses, which go to the heart of US and Chinese national security concerns. 

Given the seriousness of the divide between the US and China and the potential for it to deepen, US and Chinese officials and scholars must begin to understand and to address the nature and scope of Sino-US differences over national and theater missile defenses. Bilateral discussions on these issues will help both sides to narrow their differences and to seek possible solutions. 

To assist this process, The Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation had four main goals: 

• Identify the nature and the scope of key differences related to missiles, missile defenses and regional stability. 

• Based on a mutual understanding of the key issues dividing Washington and Beijing, develop a range of possible solutions to address US defense requirements and Chinese security concerns. 

• Enhance US and Chinese understanding of the policy trends and key persons and institutions involved in internal discussions about missile deployments, missile defenses and regional security. 

• Promote interactions between US and Chinese arms control officials and experts in order to exchange information and insights, coordinate activities and open new lines of communication. 

PARTICIPANTS AND AGENDA

The Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation focused on key issues of "Missiles, Missile Defenses and Regional Stability." Held from 27-29 April in Monterey, California, the meeting brought together a unique collection of over 60 government officials and nongovernmental experts from the US and China to discuss missile China’s deployments and bilateral disputes over US plans to deploy a national missile defense system and TMD technology sharing with Japan and Taiwan. 

This track 1 ½ conference was the second in a series of bilateral conferences bringing together the arms control communities in the United States and China. The conference featured high-level representation by officials from both countries as well unusually frank and substantive exchanges. The discussions were divided into eight panels which covered a range of missile and missile defense-related issues. Panels included: the role of missile defenses in national security strategy; current and future TMD technology; missile defense politics and economics; the regional security implications of missile deployments and missile defenses; and current arms control and nonproliferation issues in Sino-US relations. 

This Conference Report aims to bring these issues into brighter light and sharper focus by providing comprehensive description and analysis of the panel discussions. This conference report begins with a executive summary highlighting the conference’s major findings and conclusions. It continues with a panel-by-panel analysis of the conference proceedings. Particular emphasis is placed on identifying key differences between US and Chinese participants in an effort to establish a base-line understanding from which solutions may emerge. 

Executive Summary

• US and Chinese officials and scholars voiced drastically divergent positions about the role and significance of missile defenses in US and Chinese national security planning. US participants argued that national and theater missile defenses play a central role in US policies to promote national and international security. The Chinese, by contrast, questioned the assumptions and logic of US support for both NMD and TMD. The Chinese rejected the US position that either system would contribute to Asian or international security. The only area of agreement among the participants was that if this problem is not addressed then an arms race may emerge in East Asia. 

• US and Chinese participants held contrasting views on the nature of nuclear deterrence, and these differences are driving Sino-US debates on missile defenses. For the US, nuclear deterrence derives from its reliance on both the US strategic nuclear triad and ballistic missile defenses, and the latter reinforces the stabilizing effects of deterrence. By contrast, nuclear deterrence for China derives from its exclusive reliance on a land-based missile force and missile defenses undermine nuclear deterrence. Chinese participants also rejected that a sharp distinction can be drawn between offensive and defensive military technology. 

• US and Chinese participants held asymmetrical threat perceptions. US officials see a growing missile threat from "rogue nations" and the threat of accidental and unauthorized launches as a real possibility. North Korea’s 1998 launch of the Taepodong-1 was a pivotal event that changed views about TMD in Washington and Japan. Chinese conferees denied these threats were serious enough to justify NMD and TMD development. Rather, the Chinese conferees viewed both NMD and TMD as a response to China’s growing power. Underlying this position is the persistent concern that US missile defense programs are actually part of a US containment strategy aimed at China. 

• Chinese and US participants differed about the arms control and nonproliferation implications of NMD and TMD. Chinese officials were very pessimistic, arguing that deployment will lead to serious set-backs in global arms control and nonproliferation efforts with negative implications for START II, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). US officials rejected this position by arguing that arms control and nonproliferation would continue to be in the interest of nations all over the world and that any threats to arms control and nonproliferation could be managed. 

• Several US experts noted that China’s concerns play little – if any- role in current Congressional debates over the development and deployment of national and theater missile defenses. Congress’s concerns are: protecting the US and its allies from missile threats, the technological feasibility of NMD/TMD, project cost and the implications for the ABM treaty. However, China does play a central role in Congressional debates about arms sales to Taiwan. 

• US and Chinese participants differed about the purposes and implications of China’s coastal missile deployments. Chinese participants viewed the deployments as stabilizing because they are meant to deter Taiwanese independence, not to provoke an arms race. None of the Chinese participants were willing to discuss reductions or changes to the pace of the deployments, arguing it is a sovereignty issue. By contrast, US participants see China’s missile deployments as provocative moves fueling concerns about China’s intentions, as a direct threat to Taiwan’s security and as an impediment to cross-strait dialogue. 

• US and Chinese participants disagreed about the impact of TMD on Taiwanese politics. The Chinese fear that TMD will bolster independence advocates whereas the US sees TMD as providing Taiwan’s current leaders with sufficient political cover to renew cross-strait dialogue. US participants noted that China’s anti-TMD rhetoric and its missile deployments are driving TMD debates in Taiwan. Without TMD Taiwan’s leaders are under enormous political pressure to develop military means to protect Taiwan from Chinese missiles, which could involve offensive ballistic missile development. 

• Much of the Chinese opposition to TMD sales to Taiwan is based on the perception that it represents the first step towards the re-establishment of a US military alliance with Taiwan. TMD, the Chinese argued, is different from other weapons systems because it necessitates continuous military cooperation between the US and Taiwan. Such cooperation would include communications systems, early warning satellites, long-range ground-based radar, and possibly space-based sensors for cueing purposes. The result would be deeper US obligations to train and defend Taiwan. 

• Several US officials said that TMD deployments in Japan are inevitable given growing technology cooperation between the US and Japan. US participants emphasized that, at a minimum, lower-tier TMD deployments in Japan will continually be upgraded to protect US troops and military assets. Chinese officials and experts expressed a willingness to accept lower-tier TMD deployments which protect US bases but opposed the deployment of upper-tier TMD systems, especially sea-based versions which could also be deployed to protect Taiwan. 

• US and Chinese participants differed about the value and applicability of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to resolve the Taiwan/TMD issue. US participants recommended several possible steps to forestall the emergence of a regional arms race. Proposals included the adoption of reciprocal unilateral steps in which both China and Taiwan agree to exercise military restraint or China’s agreement to cap or reduce its missile deployments in exchange for Taiwan’s agreement not to purchase advanced TMD. The Chinese participants rejected all of these proposals. 

• US and Chinese participants held differing views on the relationship between the MTCR and missile defense debates. Chinese participants underscored the linkages between China’s membership in the MTCR and US missile defenses cooperation with Taiwan and Japan. In broad terms, US officials and experts stressed the importance of de-linking Sino-US discussions about missile proliferation and the MTCR from bilateral debates on missile defenses. US experts also argued that TMD cooperation with other countries does not constitute a form of missile proliferation and will not necessarily violate the MTCR. From the US viewpoint, TMD is yet another factor adding to China’s decade-long reluctance to become an MTCR member. 

• A final, key difference was divergent assessments of the prospects for continued Sino-US cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation. The Chinese were highly pessimistic about future Sino-US cooperation whereas the US participants emphasized past policy coordination (such as on South Asia) and prospects for more joint action in the future, possibly related to North Korea. Indeed, Chinese comments suggested that Sino-US arms control dialogue might stop in the future if the US fails to take into account China’s "legitimate security concerns" such as arms sales to Taiwan and deployment of missile defenses in the US and Asia. 

Summary Of Conference Proceedings

I. OPENING REMARKS BY DONALD GROSS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE ACTING UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND AMBASSADOR SHA ZUKANG, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY. 

Comments by Donald Gross and Sha Zukang formally opened the conference discussions on 28 April 1999. Donald Gross began by noting the importance of holding this conference given the recent complications in US-China relations, especially regarding Taiwan, missile defense issues, and China’s participation in the WTO. Gross highlighted that the Clinton Administration is committed to building a "constructive, strategic partnership" with Beijing while recognizing that there are many barriers to reaching that goal. In reading from a letter that President Clinton had written to Prime Minister Zhu Rongji during his April 1999 visit to the US (See Appendix I), Gross noted that given the overall improvement in US-China relations following the summits in 1997 and 1998, both countries must be sincere and discuss issues in a frank and open manner. Gross cautioned the participants not to be overly optimistic following Zhu Rongji’s visit and emphasized the importance of focusing on the numerous, complex security issues which currently frustrate Sino-US relations. Gross challenged the participants to view the world through each other’s eyes and argued that future diplomacy should be based on mutual threat reduction, not military buildups. He optimistically ended his remarks by reminding the conferees of the growing maturity of Sino-US relations in the post Cold War era. He noted the plethora of economic, strategic and political disputes which the US and China have weathered in the past 20 years of relations and, thus, Gross concluded that the current difficulties over Taiwan and missile defense can and should be diplomatically resolved. 

In contrast to Donald Gross' introductory comments, Ambassador Sha Zukang provided a detailed critique of US plans to develop and deploy national and theater missile defenses. Sha made three overall points about US missile defense policies. First, he argued that "the US development of national missile defense (NMD) does not contribute to global stability, nor will it serve the interests of the US itself." Sha argued that US deployments of NMD will lead to a halt in current strategic arms reductions by the US and Russia. He maintained that NMD violates the ABM treaty (in at least three ways) and that the loss of the treaty will lead to a disruption of the strategic balance between the US and Russia which, in turn, will result in greater insecurity for all countries. Specifically Sha said: 

"The NMD Program, however, is designed to gain unilateral strategic superiority by building US security on the insecurity of others. This will undoubtedly undercut the basis for its cooperation with relevant countries. How can you expect progress in [the] arms control and nonproliferation field while you yourself are developing NMD at full steam? Its just wishful thinking." 

Second, Sha argued that US-Japan joint development of TMD will make security in Asia-Pacific unpredictable and will not contribute to peace and security in the region. Specifically, Sha said that the advanced TMD will be "technically" intertwined with NMD, US-Japan cooperation will substantially change the nature of their military alliance, that such cooperation could be "a stepping stone" for Japan’s return to militarism and, lastly, that TMD cooperation between the US and Japan will exacerbate tensions on the Korean peninsula by "aggravating differences" among nations in the region. Sha cautioned the US to be "prudent in selecting Japan for joint development of TMD." 

The third major argument Sha outlined was that US deployment of TMD in Taiwan would meet "China’s strongest opposition." Sha argued that the Taiwanese are using TMD to drive a wedge between the US and China. He explained that China is opposed to all forms of TMD in Taiwan, regardless of whether they are lower-tier or upper-tier systems. (Editor’s Note: By contrast, China appears to only oppose the development and deployment of upper-tier TMD systems in Japan). China’s opposition to TMD in Taiwan is based on Beijing’s conclusions that it would enhance Taiwan’s defensive and offensive military capabilities and would constitute a form of missile proliferation given the types of technologies involved. Furthermore, Sha added that China’s opposition to TMD in Taiwan extends beyond concerns about Taiwan’s military capabilities. He noted that, following the US sale of TMD to Taiwan, the US would likely provide additional military assistance (such as early warning radars) which "will lead to a de-facto para-military relationship between the US and Taiwan." Sha specifically said that China would never tolerate such an outcome and that an intentionally ambiguous policy on the part of the US would damage Sino-US relations as well. In addition, he reiterated the Chinese position that Taiwan’s status is a domestic Chinese issue and US policies regarding military sales to China constitute an interference in China’s internal affairs. Sha concluded his remarks by noting that if the US provides TMD to Taiwan, ignoring the three US-China Communiqués and other bilateral agreements, then China will seriously reconsider the overall bilateral relationship with the US. 

II. MISSILES IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THEATER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The first substantive panel began with US and Chinese conferees exchanging views about the respective roles and missions of missiles and missile defenses in US and Chinese national security policies. Chinese and US views on this issue differed sharply. US participants argued that missile defenses, both theater and strategic, have a central role in US policies to promote national and international security. The Chinese, by contrast, question the assumptions and logic of US thinking about both TMD and NMD. Most basically, the Chinese rejected the US position that either system would enhance Asian or international security. 

US Views

US participants, especially the government officials, explained the strategic and political rational behind the US’s TMD and NMD policies. First, on a conceptual level, a US Defense Department official stated that the US military views deterrence as possessing both offensive and defensive dimensions. Offensive deterrence is the classic type of intimidation used throughout the Cold War in which the possession of a highly reliable and survivable nuclear force is central to the maintenance of a deterrent relationship and the costs of retaliation are too high for an adversary to risk aggression. Defensive deterrence, by contrast, uses defensive technologies like NMD or TMD to reduce an adversary’s ability to achieve its political and military objectives (such as decapitation of command, control and communications capabilities through a first strike), diminishing the possibility of an attack. 

Furthermore, US officials outlined the specific policy purposes of US missile defense programs. First, TMD will be used to protect US military personnel deployed abroad, to defend military installations such as ports and airfields, and to defend US allies and friends. Japan was mentioned several times in this context. In addition, TMD systems have the added political element of helping to hold together regional coalitions during times of conflict. Second, the US is developing NMD in response to two specific threats: (1) the long-range missile programs in North Korea and Iran and (2) possible accidental or unauthorized launches from Russia or China. Several US officials openly acknowledged that although the risk of the latter threat is low, it still justifies the deployment of defenses assuming they are technologically feasible. US Defense Department officials added that NMD is still in the research phase and that no decision has been made about NMD deployment. The Defense Department has requested $10.5 billion over the next six years for NMD research but the US will not make a deployment decision until Summer 2000. This decision will take into account several factors including: an assessment of the current and future ballistic missile threat to the US, the cost of an NMD system, the available technologies and the implications for US arms control objectives. However, US officials were adamant that NMD is not being developed to protect the US from deliberate attacks from Russia or China. 

Several US scholars challenged the views of the officials by arguing that the US government’s NMD policies did not adequately take into account China’s concerns and likely responses to NMD deployment. NMD, several experts maintained, could push China’s current nuclear and missile modernization program in new and undesirable directions such as toward a large increase in the number of ICBMs deployed or the development of multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles. US officials countered these criticisms by arguing that China’s nuclear force modernization campaign has been ongoing for years and is not being driven by US policies. US officials also maintain that an NMD system would be a "thin defense" which could easily be penetrated by several Russian or Chinese missiles. 

In other areas, US scholars pointed out that China’s views on nuclear and conventional deterrence are unclear due to its secrecy and its lack of transparency. Based on US assessments, China’s current nuclear doctrine appears to be some form of minimum deterrence relying on counter-value targeting but which is also constrained by a no-first-use posture. Yet, it is unclear how China’s current nuclear force modernization efforts fit into this minimum deterrence framework. US scholars pointed out there are two major consequences of China’s unwillingness to talk about its views on deterrence: it perpetuates the notion of a "China threat" and it provides little assurance to states weaker than China. Several US scholars challenged Chinese arms control experts to discuss in detail China’s view of deterrence as they apply to both missile defenses and its nuclear force modernization effort. 

Chinese Views

Chinese participants articulated a wide range of arguments in total opposition to US positions on NMD and TMD. First, several Chinese scholars and officials denied that the US and its allies face sufficient missile threats to justify development of NMD and TMD. Chinese analysts argued that North Korean and Iranian missile activities (such as the August test of the 1998 Taepo Dong 1) were an illegitimate "pretext" for TMD and NMD. Some experts suggested that Japan’s existing TMD systems are sufficient to protect against the North Korean threat. One Chinese expert mentioned that it was not cost effective for the US to develop NMD and TMD in response to "rogue-nations" missile threats because it was like "using a cannon to hit a fly." Rather, Chinese participants perceive that US missile defense policies "target China." In response to this perception, Chinese conferees argued China does not raise a "realistic or potential threat" to the US or its allies. Chinese officials maintain that Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles pose no threat to the US because both the US and China are committed to a constructive strategic partnership, China is committed to its no-first-use posture and China is a "peace loving and responsible nation." No Chinese scholars or officials during this panel addressed the US arguments concerning the risks to the US from accidental or unauthorized missile launches from Russia. 

Second, Chinese experts questioned the defense-offense distinction which US officials apply to TMD technologies, especially in the Taiwan context. On the one hand, Chinese maintain that TMD should not be considered an exclusively defensive system because it can be used to protect offensive military assets such as troops and weapons systems, similar to the way in which a tank’s armor is intrinsically a defensive technology which becomes offensive when used as part of a tank. On the other hand, Chinese participants argued that TMD technologies could be used by Taiwan or Japan to build offensive missiles, giving both nations a greater capability to threaten China’s interests. 

Third, Chinese participants raised ideological concerns about US missile defense policies, viewing them as a means for the US to perpetuate "hegemony and power politics." According to one Chinese scholar "the purpose of the US to deploy TMD is to seize strategic superiority in the 21^st Century and to further incorporate allies in the international security system led by the US." Lastly, Chinese experts and officials enumerated a number of the negative consequences of US missile defense policies for US-China relations, US-Russian ties and global arms control efforts. These consequences included: generally undermining the growth of US-China relations, disrupting the strategic balance between the superpowers, countering the trend toward world peace, seriously hurting US-Russian arms control efforts such as ratification of START II, promoting missile proliferation through the transfer of advanced TMD technologies to other nations, stimulating an arms race across the Taiwan Strait, and accelerating Japanese remilitarization through joint TMD development. 

Key Differences

The differences between US and Chinese participants on this panel were stark and ranged from conceptual to technical and policy issues. These differences can be generally divided into three categories. First, US and Chinese participants hold differing views of the nature of nuclear deterrence. For the US, deterrence has both offensive and defensive components, whereas for China deterrence has only has an offensive component and defense technologies such as TMD and NMD undermine offensive nuclear deterrence. These differences also seemed to extend to US and Chinese arguments about whether TMD is an offensive or a defensive military technology. Chinese participants maintained that TMD was inherently offensive whereas the US argued that it was defensive in so far as it would only be used to protect against an offensive missile threat. 

Second, there appeared to be an asymmetry of threat perceptions among US and Chinese participants. The US and Chinese participants held vastly different perceptions of the ballistic missile threats facing the US and its allies. US officials see "rogue-nation" missile threats from North Korea and Iran as getting more serious; the Rumsfeld Report [1] and the August 1998 launch of the Taepdong-1 missile were often mentioned in this context. In addition, US officials view the threat of accidental and unauthorized launches as a real possibility. US participants noted that China’s increasing missile deployments along the coastline represent a direct threat to Taiwan. By contrast, Chinese officials and experts deny these threats are serious enough to justify NMD and TMD development. Underlying this position is the persistent concern that US missile defense programs are really targeted against China as part of a US containment strategy. 

Third, Chinese and US participants differed about the arms control and nonproliferation implications of NMD and TMD. Chinese officials were very pessimistic, arguing that deployment will lead to a complete halt in global arms control and nonproliferation efforts with direct implications for START II, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). US officials argued that arms control and nonproliferation would continue to be in the interest of nations all over the world and that any threats to arms control and nonproliferation could be managed. 

III. CURRENT AND FUTURE TMD TECHNOLOGY

This second panel was distinct from all others because it did not include any Chinese presenters; the Chinese preferred not to provide presentations during this panel. Rather this panel was comprised of three US experts who discussed: the recent Taepodong-1 launch and its implications for the proliferation of missile technology, the advances in Patriot technologies and the variety of TMD technology the US is currently developing. 

This panel began with a viewing and an analysis of a video (provided by a Japanese news agency) of the 31 August 1998 launch of the Taepodong-1 missile by North Korea. The video highlighted key technical aspects of the missile such as its three stages, its separation capabilities, the composition of the missile using Scud technology, the missiles flight trajectory, a picture of the third stage "satellite" and North Korean launch facilities. In particular, an analysis of the video verified claims by the US that the first stage of the missile was a Nodong and the second stage was a Scud-C. An analysis of portions of the video also revealed that portions of the missile were covered with Cyrillic numbering, suggesting that Russian entities may have provided some materials and technical expertise for the construction of the Taepodong-1. Prior to the launch of the missile, many US experts had underestimated North Korea’s ability to build a missile with such a range, mainly based on earlier (and incorrect) assessments that North Korea could not master staging technology. 

The second presentation was a technical overview of the current and future configurations of the Patriot missile defense system by US military experts. The Patriot missile system is currently deployed in several countries all over the world including: Israel, the Netherlands, Germany, Korea, Japan, Kuwait, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. In addition, there are 26 units deployed within the US. The Patriot system has three types of configurations: PAC-1, which was used during the Gulf War; PAC-2 which is currently deployed in many foreign countries and PAC-3 which is still under development. In addition, each PAC configuration has many sub-configurations based on the types of radar technologies, the interceptors and command, control and communications systems being used. For example, many of the foreign Patriot deployments are the PAC-2 Plus configuration which has the largest "footprint" of any Patriot system currently in service. 

The PAC-3 system, which is the most advanced version of the Patriot missile defense system currently under development, represents a significant advance over the PAC-2 systems because it incorporates significant radar improvements, software enhancements, enhancements to the remote launch/communications capabilities, and joint interoperability with other TMD systems like the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Most importantly, the PAC-3 configuration uses a new interceptor armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) rather than the older interceptors which use fragmentation warheads. The KKV (also known as a hit-to-kill vehicle) destroys a missile warhead by hitting it directly as opposed to just exploding in the vicinity of the warhead. The PAC-3 system is expected to be deployed by 2001. 

The third presentation was an overview by an official from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) on the entire range of TMD systems the US is currently developing and the concepts which underlie these development projects. The BMDO official explained that the US is developing "a family" of TMD technologies to protect a variety of sites inside and outside the US including: troops, population centers, ports, military command centers, multiple theaters and pre-positioned support. Given the range of assets that TMD technologies are expected to support, the US is developing both land-based and sea-based TMD systems as part of this family. According to several US missile defense experts, "no single system can do it alone." The family of TMD systems is listed below and each system falls into one of four categories based on the type of coverage provided, the types of missile which can be intercepted and the point at which the system intercepts incoming missiles. For example, lower tier systems provide the least amount of coverage and can only intercept short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs) because of the limited capabilities of their radars and interceptors. 

Table 1.1 US "Family" of TMD Systems

Lower Tier Systems	PAC-3 with new KKV interceptor  Navy Area System  Medium Extended Area Defense Systems (MEADS)
Upper Tier Systems	Theater High Altitude Area System (THAAD) with endo- and exo-atmospheric intercept capabilities  Navy Theater Wide (NTW) with only exo-atmospheric intercept capabilities
Ascent Phase Interceptor Systems	Navy Theater Wide System
Boost Phase Interceptor Systems	Airborne Laser System

The US’s TMD development plans are based on the concept of a "layered defense" in which several systems are simultaneously used to provide maximum coverage for a variety of potential targets. This system of layered defenses aims to extend the coverage of the TMD systems, especially to forward areas, and it provides protection against a full assortment of missile threats from short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. A layered defense also will mitigate the effect of missile attacks using nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. 

Furthermore, "international cooperation" is one of the underlying foundations for the US TMD programs. Such cooperation allows the US to fight as part of a coalition, supports the US’s international counterproliferation policy, supports the US’s political, economic, and military objectives, and strengthens US relationships with its friends and allies in Asia. US-Japanese TMD cooperation was highlighted as a model for the way the US can use international missile defense cooperation to support its TMD development strategies, to improve the security of its allies and to bolster its international relationships. One US government expert also pointed out, in response to Chinese claims to the contrary, that Japan’s current TMD technologies are not sufficient to protect against the attack of North Korean missiles. Many of Japan’s current TMD systems are PAC-2 Plus configurations and are deployed in an air-defense rather than an anti-missile mode. 

The Chinese input in this panel came during the question and answer session. The Chinese participants were particularly interested in the capabilities of the various TMD systems to defend against strategic ballistic missiles. In order to determine the potential applicability of US TMD cooperation to the development of offensive missiles, many Chinese were also interested in the technical differences between offensive ballistic missiles and TMD interceptor technology. (One of China’s arguments against TMD cooperation with Japan and/or Taiwan is that it would provide either country with the ability to build offensive ballistic missiles.) China’s interest in TMD technologies also seemed to stem from their concerns that US TMD cooperation with Japan and/or Taiwan would constitute a violation of the MTCR. US government experts responded by pointing out that the US assistance to Israel’s Arrow missile defense program was consistent with the US’s MTCR obligations and that the US could share much technology with other countries while remaining within the legal boundaries of the MTCR. 

IV. MISSILE DEFENSE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The Chinese and US presentations during this panel differed significantly as did their subsequent discussions. Chinese participants reiterated their concerns about and objections to NMD and TMD policies based on Chinese assessments of the threats the US faces and the arms control implications of missile defenses. In contrast, US conferees focused on the role of domestic politics on US debates over TMD and NMD. 

US Views

The US conferees discussed the role of China’s objections in debates in the US Congress over missile defenses. One of the central themes in this discussion was that Chinese objections play virtually no role in Congressional debates over NMD and TMD. First, regarding national missile defense programs, a US congressional expert pointed out that Congressional discussions about national missile defenses do not consider China’s possible reactions. The central issues in Congressional NMD debates are the technological feasibility of the project, the cost and the implications for the ABM treaty. US experts pointed out that congressional sentiments in favor of missile defenses are extremely strong. These sentiments are mainly driven by the 1998 Taepodong-1 launch, the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Report, and, to a lesser extent, Congressional support for US military industries. Furthermore, several US participants highlighted that there is a partisan political element to NMD debates in the US. With a US Presidential election approaching, the Republicans are trying to portray the Democrats as weak on national security issues such as missile threats to the US. As a result, there is significant pressure on the Democrats to appear strong and firm on missile defense issues as indicated by the Clinton Administration’s January 1999 decision to support a robust NMD development effort after years of rejecting such a policy. 

Second, US experts also noted that China’s objections to TMD do not rank highly on the list of Congressional concerns in debates on theater missile defenses. The central TMD issues for the Congress are cost, technologies, ABM Treaty implications, and oversight issues. Congress is broadly supportive of TMD cooperation with Japan, and China’s objections – again – are not a factor in the current congressional debates. TMD cooperation with Japan, from the Congressional perspective, is seen as an extension of the US-Japan alliance and as a means for Japan to share defense costs with the US. For example, US-Japan TMD cooperation helps to reduce the costs to the US of developing missile defense technologies. In short, it is seen as a burden-sharing issue. 

Third, in contrast to other congressional debates, China does play a major role in Congressional debates about arms sales and, specifically, TMD sales to Taiwan. Congress has been one the main advocates in the US government of deploying missile defenses in Taiwan. Specifically, many members of Congress see China’s increasing missile deployments off Taiwan’s coastline as provocative, as a direct threat to Taiwan, and as a justification to support expanded arms sales to Taiwan. Congressional support for TMD in Taiwan has come in the form of resolutions such as The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which, while not binding, reflects a growing sentiment in favor of protecting Taiwan. US officials and experts pointed out that members of Congress are calling for steps to remedy the perceived military imbalance between China and Taiwan. They said that as China’s perceived threat to Taiwan increases support for arms sales to Taiwan grows even greater. Furthermore, several US experts noted that Congressional support for TMD in Taiwan is driven by three distinct constituencies: the pro-TMD lobby, the pro-Taiwan lobby, and the anti-China Lobby. 

Beyond these three points, several US conferees pointed out the importance of distinguishing between Congressional opinions on NMD and TMD from Executive branch opinions- especially the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council. China’s objections to missile defenses are much more important to these organizations than to Congress. 

Chinese Views

None of the Chinese participants discussed the internal political or economic considerations within China which are influencing domestic debates about China’s response to US missile defense programs. Rather, the Chinese participants focused their comments on denying the US rational for developing missile defenses. First, as in panel one, Chinese participants reiterated that China does not represent a threat to the US, an argument which is based on the assumption that NMD and TMD are being developed to counter or contain China. (This is also an argument which US officials have continually denied.) Chinese conferees maintain that China has developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles exclusively for defensive purposes. Many pointed out that "China opposes the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons." According to one commentator, "So its absurd to think that China will now or in the foreseeable future have the ability to wage a nuclear war." In addition, Chinese participants rejected the logic of US politicians that China - currently or in the future - represents a threats to the US. "The past historical tradition can prove the falsehood of the logic." China’s past history also proves that China is not an expansionist country nor aggressive in nature. In addition, they argued that China’s current domestic priority is to develop a robust economy in order to raise the living standards of the people while military development is a secondary priority. 

Furthermore, Chinese officials and experts rejected specific US arguments about missile threats facing the US. On NMD, they argued that the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch is "very small" and such instances are "very rare." Also, Chinese experts argued that the threat of missile attacks from rogue nations is exaggerated (especially from North Korea); Chinese experts maintain that the technical barriers to effective missile development are still very high. 

Aside from the technical issues, Chinese conferees raised several political problems associated with US NMD proposals. The US will likely have to revise or repeal the ABM treaty. Either one of these steps would (1) trigger a new arms race between the US and Russia, especially in space; (2) would "grievously retard" global arms control and nonproliferation efforts and (3) seriously undermine US-China relations. One Chinese official asked: "Why does the US spend so much time trying to support global arms control and nonproliferation efforts while undermining it at the same time?" 

Regarding other political issues, several Chinese conferees expressed concern that the US sale of TMD technology to Taiwan would strengthen the independence movement. One prominent Chinese scholar noted that since 1992, there has been a positive correlation between US arms sales to Taiwan and the growing voice of the independence movement in Taiwan. This scholar also noted that only after China’s missile tests in 1996 that the "splitist" movement in Taiwan became much less influential; also China’s current missile deployments along the coastline are meant to deter moves toward independence. 

Beyond the technical and political issues, several Chinese scholars added that the missile defense problem does not stem from a series of misunderstandings about political and technical issues but rather results from fundamental differences over the US’s and China’s respective roles in global politics. China views NMD and TMD as yet another way for the US to expand its power and influence throughout the world. These steps fit into a pattern of activity, following NATO expansion and the redefinition of the US-Japan defense guidelines, in which the US expects to extend its military power to all major regions of the world. According to a well-known Chinese arms control expert, many Chinese simply do not believe that TMD and NMD is not intended to counter the perception of a "China threat." 

Key Differences

During this panel, US and Chinese participants generally talked past one another with little agreement. The Chinese participants reiterated arguments made in previous panels about the negative implications of missile defenses for arms control and the insufficient threats used to justify US missile defense policies. The Chinese arguments underscored key US and Chinese differences over threat perceptions and the arms control implications of NMD and TMD. More importantly, Chinese and US participants held differing views on the internal US debates about missile defenses. None of the Chinese participants commented on or acknowledged the US position that US TMD and NMD policies are being largely influenced by Congress and that China’s concerns are simply not a major factor in congressional debates. In addition, US and Chinese participants held vastly differing views about the role of missile defense in US national security and foreign policymaking. US conferees see it as a means to protect the US from missile attacks and to support US allies military assets deployed abroad. By contrast, many Chinese conferees view missile defense policies as targeted against China and part of a US global strategy to extend its military power while limiting China’s international influence and its power projection capabilities. 

V. MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, MISSILE DEFENSES AND REGIONAL STABILITY

This panel focused on the regional security implications of Chinese missile deployments opposite Taiwan and the possible US sale of TMD to Taiwan. There was pervasive disagreement between the US and the Chinese participants about the purposes and implications of both China’s missile deployments and TMD in Taiwan. Chinese participants viewed the former as stabilizing and the latter as causing instability whereas the US participants held an opposite view. This panel revealed the depth of discord and misunderstanding between the US and China on the dual issues of missile deployment and missile defenses. The only element which both sides agreed on was that an action-reaction cycle exits between missiles and TMD across the Taiwan strait and that an arms race could emerge. 

US Views

US experts and officials agreed, almost universally, that China’s growing missile deployments opposite Taiwan are the driving force behind Taiwan’s desire for TMD. US military experts pointed out that China has deployed some 150-200 M-9 and M-11 missiles in coastal provinces and that these deployments have been continually increasing since 1992. Many US officials argued that these missile deployments are uniquely destabilizing because of their large size and scope, the unwillingness of China’s political and military leaders to discuss them, the Chinese military’s overall campaign to develop offensive, power-projection capabilities, China’s demonstrated willingness to use these missiles, and Beijing’s failure to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. In addition, both experts and officials stressed that China’s missiles would undermine regional stability by souring US-China relations and Sino-Japanese relations, creating incentives for an offensive military buildup in the region, and increasing domestic support for TMD in Taiwan as well as US Congressional support for Taiwan. 

Furthermore, US participants agreed that it is important to distinguish between Taiwan and Japan when discussing TMD issues. First, they noted that US-Japan TMD cooperation is going forward regardless of China’s opposition. The US commitment to Japanese security is strong and TMD is seen as part of the US military commitment to Japan. (In addition, the domestic debates in Japan regarding TMD are different than in Taiwan because Japan has to deal with the issues of its legacy of militarism.) The central question for Japan is the extent to which it will be involved in TMD cooperation with the US. Will Japan deploy just lower tier or also upper tier TMD systems? There is also a looming policy question for Japan about whether TMD cooperation with Japan will weaken or strengthen its alliance with the US. [2]

Second, regarding Taiwan, some US officials, especially Defense Department representatives, argued that US arms sales, in particular TMD, have had a positive impact on regional stability. US military exports to Taiwan have provided Taipei with confidence in its defensive capabilities so that it can engage in a positive and productive cross-strait dialogue with China. One former DOD official, referring to China’s missile deployments, noted that Taiwan will be a much more willing negotiating partner if Taipei does not feel "it has a gun pointed to its head" – a reference to China’s coastal missile deployments. Along these lines, several US experts and officials rejected the Chinese position that providing TMD to Taiwan would lead to independence. Rather, they argued that, given the missile threat Taiwan faces, TMD would provide a sense of security and reassurance to Taiwan’s public which, in turn, would allow the leadership sufficient political cover to re-engage Beijing in a dialogue on cross-strait issues. 

Also, US officials pointed out that arms sales to Taiwan have a broader foreign policy function for the US in so far as they demonstrate that the US is a dependable friend which can meet its obligations. Several US officials and experts defended the US arms sales policy to Taiwan by arguing that the US has been prudent in its exports to Taiwan. For example, the US previously chose not to supply many military systems to Taiwan (given their extensive requests) and the systems sold were strictly for defensive purposes. One former DOD official expert pointed out that even the F-16s sold in 1992 were "paired down" to have a minimal offensive capabilities; they did not include air-to-ground missiles, no strike training was provided to Taiwan, and the aircraft did not possess aerial refueling capabilities. 

One key US position to emerge from the discussions was the view that the 1982 US-China Communiqué which addresses the arms sales issue is a de-facto bargain of sorts. In the communiqué, the US pledged to reduce the quantity and quality of arms sold to Taiwan in exchange for China striving towards "a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." Many US participants see China’s missile deployments as totally inconsistent with China’s efforts to resolve the Taiwan issue without military force. 

Lastly, several US scholars pointed out that the actual number of Chinese missiles deployed along the coastline is quite important because the numbers appear to be driving the debates in the US and in Taiwan. There have been many, conflicting press reports in the US about the current numbers of missiles deployed and whether they represent an increase from previous years and whether the increase has been rapid or gradual. One participant even suggested that China reveal some of the numbers of deployed missiles in an effort to set the record straight and to control the debate. No Chinese participant accepted this suggestion. 

Chinese Views

The Chinese participants were universally opposed to any and all TMD sales or cooperation between the US and Taiwan. One of the central themes which emerged from this panel was the unwillingness of Chinese officials and scholars to discuss China’s coastal missile deployments. Chinese officials and experts universally argued that, as a sovereign country, China has the right to deploy missiles anywhere in the mainland and the US has no right to tell China how many missiles to deploy or where it can deploy them. In short, Chinese officials see the missile deployments as a sovereignty issue and, thus, will not discuss them. Moreover, Chinese participants rejected the US position that TMD in Taiwan is driven by China’s missile deployments along the coastline. Rather, they maintain that the US and Taiwan are using China as a pretext to expand US military ties with Taiwan. Along these lines, the Chinese participants maintained that China’s missiles are meant to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence and are not intended to provoke it. 

In this context, Chinese conferees reiterated the often-heard argument that TMD would encourage Taiwan’s advocates of independence. Giving them missiles would provide Taiwan’s political leaders with a false sense of security. This could lead them to become more "independence-minded" and begin to take actions Beijing sees as provocative. 

Chinese conferees also articulated a litany of arguments on the negative implications for US-China relations and regional security of continued US arms sales to Taiwan. First, Chinese participants argued that TMD exports to Taiwan will seriously undermine the development of Sino-US relations, but in ways more serious than previous military exports. Several Chinese noted that, since US arms sales to Taiwan have increased dramatically since 1992, TMD represents "another breakthrough in US arms sales to Taiwan." Chinese officials and scholars view TMD as qualitatively different from other weapons systems in terms of what it signals about the US political commitment to Taiwan. Almost all of the Chinese participants viewed TMD as the first step towards the re-establishment of a military alliance between the US and Taiwan. TMD, the Chinese argued, is much different from other weapons systems because it also requires significant military cooperation between the US and Taiwan. Such cooperation would come in the form of early warning satellites, long-range ground-based radar, and possibly space-based sensors for cueing purposes. In addition, Taiwan will have to rely on the US for much of this technology and the training to use it, leading the US to assume certain obligations to defend Taiwan. One senior Chinese official ominously noted that Sino-US relations are important to Chinese leaders but they are not more important, and possibly less important, than reunification. He added, "we hope that the US will understand China’s aspiration and stop selling arms." 

Second, the Chinese participants argued that TMD in Taiwan would trigger a regional arms race for two reasons. First, TMD would require China to build up its missiles to overcome the missile defense system and this action-reaction cycle could spiral out of control. In this context, the Chinese participants maintained that China is in favor of peaceful reunification and that the purpose of their missile deployments is simply to deter "the splitist movement" in Taiwan. Second, Chinese experts and officials noted that Taiwan could use TMD technologies to develop more capable offensive missiles. If Taiwan began to develop such missiles, then the mainland would see this as a highly provocative act requiring a military response, most likely in the form of increasing deployments on the Chinese side. 

Key Differences

Several key differences between the US and Chinese participants related to TMD in Taiwan emerged from this panel’s discussions. First, Chinese and US conferees differed significantly about the role and functions of the China’s missiles deployed along the coastline. The US sees them as provocative, as a direct threat to Taiwan’s security and, ultimately, as an impediment to cross-strait dialogue. By contrast, Chinese officials were unwilling to discuss their deployments, arguing it is a sovereignty issue. The Chinese participants also maintained that China’s missiles are meant to deter Taiwanese independence, not to provoke it. Second, there were significant differences regarding the US and Chinese interpretations of the 1982 communiqué. Many US officials see the communiqué as an implicit bargain in which the US promises to reduce arms sales to Taiwan while China promises to create an atmosphere conducive to cross-strait dialogue. By contrast, the Chinese participants did not seem to view the communiqué as a bargain; there was no acknowledgment of China’s obligations under the communiqué. Third, US and Chinese participants disagreed about the impact of TMD on Taiwanese politics. The Chinese fear that TMD will bolster the independence advocates whereas the US sees TMD as providing Taiwan’s current leaders with sufficient political cover to re-engage China in cross-strait dialogue. In this context, US participants added that without TMD Taiwan’s leaders are under enormous political pressure to develop some military means to protect Taiwan from the threat of Chinese missiles. If Taiwan does not acquire TMD systems, then it might develop offensive ballistic systems which, according to some reports is already under development. 

Lastly, another major divide between US and Chinese conferees was that US participants argued that peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and arms sales to Taiwan are not mutually exclusive policies. The US supports both goals simultaneously. Chinese participants argued that US arms sales to Taiwan will prevent peaceful reunification by providing advocates of independence with the military tools and the confidence to move toward independence. 

VI. ARMS CONTROL RESPONSES TO MISSILES OR TMD: THE PROBLEM

During this panel, the conference participants once again discussed the nature and scope of their differences related to TMD in Taiwan. The Chinese participants also began to discuss the arms control implications of the US’s NMD and TMD programs. Major disagreements emerged about the potential negative impact of arms control on NMD and TMD. 

US Views

Regarding Taiwan, US officials and experts argued that Chinese actions, specifically its missile deployments, have created Taiwan’s demand for TMD. Several participants noted that a year ago Taiwan was not interested in TMD but now it is a top military priority. Specific Chinese actions such as the gradual buildup of missiles along the coastline and Beijing’s intense campaign to oppose TMD have led Taiwan to intensify the pursuit of TMD technology in response to a perceived threat from China. A US State Department official noted that Taiwan’s military is not enthusiastic about TMD systems because of the huge cost involved but, since Taiwan is heading into an election cycle, the political pressure for the leadership to deploy advanced TMD as a response to Chinese missiles will grow stronger. According to several scholars and officials, the US, China and Taiwan are facing an intractable security dilemma. 

Despite these tensions, several officials argued that Sino-US differences over TMD should not be seen as constituting an immediate crisis because TMD technologies will not be ready for deployment until 2007. "We have time to get out of this box," said one senior US official. This official added that the US is not rushing toward TMD deployment in Taiwan and the US has not made any decision about selling TMD to Taiwan. The only TMD-related deployment decision the US has made regards lower-tier TMD deployments in Japan to protect US troops and facilities. Several US participants also pointed that there is no region-wide TMD system that Taiwan can "plug-into" and that Chinese views of TMD should not be based on the misperception that the US seeks to build a regional TMD architecture. 

Furthermore, officials argued that US support for TMD should not be taken as a signal of support for Taiwan’s independence. Rather, the US has made clear through the "three no’s" policy that it does not support such an outcome.[3] While this is not a new policy, it remains a central element of the US approach as proven by President Clinton’s restatement of the policy while in China in 1998. US participants argued that Clinton’s June 1998 restatement of the "three no’s" moderated the words and actions of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. Despite these reassurances, Beijing in the last year has hardened its position on Taiwan as if the risks of Taiwanese independence have gotten worse. US officials argued that China should show Taiwan that it will benefit from reunification as opposed to intimidating them into favoring that option. 

US officials noted that the central US goal is to create an environment for positive cross-strait dialogue. The US wants to push both China and Taiwan to create the conditions in which both sides can discuss the reunification issue. US officials called for both sides to focus on "positive statesmanship" and "creative diplomacy" not coercive military measures such as missile deployments. 

Many US participants acknowledged the difficulties for Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan but added that China’s current missile deployments appear particularly aggressive. China’s actions have alienated the people of Taiwan and prompted strong reactions by them. US officials and experts pointed out that if China’s does not, at a minimum, freeze its missile deployments, then Taiwan will have no other option than to deploy TMD systems. 

Lastly, a senior State Department official sought to clarify some of the confusion about Chinese missile deployments. This official noted the US believes that China has deployed some 150-200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan; this is about the size of a missile brigade. The US believe deployments began in 1992 or 1993 and have increased steadily. This buildup has happened gradually with no major surges. If these deployment trends do not shift then Taiwan will be faced with a larger number of missiles in years to come. 

Chinese Views

The Chinese conferees focused their comments on two areas: (1) The impact of TMD and NMD on global arms control efforts and (2) Responding to US critiques of Chinese missile deployments. First, Chinese experts agreed that both TMD and NMD would undermine the ABM treaty. Specifically, the current US NMD proposals violate the ABM treaty in 4 ways: the ABM treaty bans the deployment of systems which cover an entire country (as the US NMD plans are intended to do); the ABM treaty limits a nation to no more than 100 interceptors (the US is considering deploying 200 ground-based interceptors); the ABM treaty bans the use of sea-based, space-based, air-based, or mobile land-based components, all of which the US is considering. Regarding TMD technologies, Chinese experts deny that there is a threshold between theater and strategic missile defense systems. Thus they claim that lower-tier systems are treaty compliant but upper-tier TMD systems like THAAD and NTW have the capability to intercept strategic missiles and thus violate the ABM treaty. 

Furthermore, the Chinese participants placed great value on the ABM treaty as a means of promoting international security. According to a well known Chinese arms-controller, "The ABM treaty is currently the most important arms control protocol being implemented" because it has served as the foundation for other key arms control accords such as the INF treaty and START I and START II. One of their main concerns is that deployment of NMD will prevent Russia from ratifying START II and cause Russia to withdraw from preliminary negotiations on START III. In addition, undermining the ABM treaty will hinder the prospects for CTBT ratification and FMCT talks. Furthermore, Chinese experts hinted that NMD may lead China to increase the size and possibly the quality of its nuclear forces as well. "NMD will also cause many nations to build-up their own nuclear forces and further retard the nuclear disarmament process." 

Regarding TMD, Chinese experts argued that TMD sales and cooperation would encourage missile proliferation. TMD cooperation, they maintained, violates the basic spirit of the MTCR and that TMD technologies can be used to build offensive ballistic missiles. A Chinese expert also added that beyond the arms control implications of TMD, the main goals of US TMD plans are for the US to intensify its military presence in Asia, to strengthen its alliance with Japan and South Korea, and "to safeguard its strategic interests in the region." Based on these concerns, many Chinese argued that if the US deployed a sea-based upper-tier system in Japan that this system might also be used to cover Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation. 

Furthermore, several Chinese scholars and experts responded to US critiques about China’s approach to Taiwan. First, a senior Chinese official argued that China’s position on the Taiwan issue is non-negotiable. "Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair, so ‘hands off ’." Chinese participants added that they consider any and all US arms sales to Taiwan as violation of the 1982 communiqué. Second, some Chinese scholars denied the US logic about the "negative influence" of Chinese missiles on Taiwan’s politics. They argued that Taiwan’s politicians have become much more moderate due to China’s missile tests, its missile deployments and the US restatement of the "three no’s" policy. Other experts rejected the US argument that there is a window of opportunity to discuss these issues considering that a deployment decision on TMD will not be made for several years. Many officials suggested that the US would not be developing these technologies if it did not intend to deploy some or all of them at some point. The US is simply hoping to use the years between development and deployment to convince China to accept TMD deployments. Chinese participants also expressed concern that once the US sells lower-tier systems to Taiwan, it will then sell upper-tier systems when the technology becomes available. The only reason that they US is considering selling lower-tier systems to Taiwan is because the technology will soon be available. Thus, the Chinese see the pending US sale of lower-tier PAC-3 systems to Taiwan as a key indicator of the US’s future TMD sales. 

Nature of Differences

It is difficult to isolate key differences from this panel because both sides discussed different issues. The US presenters and participants focused their comments on Taiwan-related issues whereas the Chinese presenters discussed the arms control implications of NMD and, to a lesser extent, of TMD. On the arms control issues, US experts highlighted the security benefits which China accrues from its participation in various accords such as the CTBT, the MTCR and in the future the FMCT. They argued that it is not in China’s interest to allow the nonproliferation regime to weaken based on their opposition to TMD because the nonproliferation regime will provide direct benefits to Chinese security. 

The discussions regarding Taiwan reflected the key perceptual and policy differences that were evident in the previous panel. However, some new differences arose. The Chinese rejected the US position that Chinese missile deployments provoke Taiwan. Several prominent Chinese experts noted that the 1996 missile tests, the current missile deployments, and the US restatement of the "three no’s" policy had a moderating influence on Taiwan’s politicians. 

VII. ARMS CONTROL RESPONSES TO MISSILES OR TMD DEPLOYMENTS: THE SOLUTION

The aim of this panel was for US and Chinese participants to suggest possible solutions to the security dilemma created by the NMD/TMD programs. The US and Chinese approaches to this dilemma varied widely, however, which further reflected their divergent perspectives on the resolving the NMD/TMD issue. As in previous discussions, the Chinese participants continued to highlight the negative implications of Washington’s missile defense policies. By contrast, the US conferees suggested several broad-based confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to address missile defense issues. 

Chinese Views

During this panel, the Chinese conferees focused on the arms control implications of NMD and TMD and reiterated other arguments in opposition to TMD in Taiwan. Several senior officials noted that the US must "seriously consider" the negative impacts global arms control trends if the US moves forward with NMD and TMD deployments. Specifically, Chinese experts noted that missile defense programs would harm disarmament efforts by blocking further nuclear reductions, reversing the process of de-MIRVing, threatening to undermine China’s support for no-first-use and reducing confidence in de-alerting. Also, US missile defense polices will weaken China’s support for the CTBT, its role in the current FMCT negotiations and China’s consideration of MTCR membership. [4] One scholar added that NMD would create pressures in China for the development of anti-satellite weapons. 

Moreover, several Chinese participants argued that China’s opposition to NMD/TMD is based on political considerations rather than military calculations. They argue that such policies signal to Beijing that the US sees China as a national security threat and, as a result, China’s incentives to participate in arms control and nonproliferation will be greatly diminished. In addition, NMD/TMD will directly jeopardize US strategic interests by weakening the incentives of other countries to participate in global arms control and nonproliferation efforts. 

Other Chinese conferees questioned the internal US politics driving the NMD/TMD issues. Many asked why Clinton’s policy on NMD changed so dramatically in January 1990 from weak to robust financial support for NMD efforts. Some Chinese suggested that the media, the Congress and academics in the US were driving this issue forward. 

Regarding Taiwan, a senior Chinese arms control official added that the US and China continue to "talk at cross purposes." China considers the Taiwan issue to be a domestic affair whereas the US sees it as an international issue. China appreciates "the good intention" of the US, but the leaders in the US should recognize that China’s model of "one country, two systems" has worked in Hong Kong, will be applied to Macao at the end of 1999 and will work in Taiwan. This official added that China needs the US to firmly hold to its commitments as outlined in the three communiqués. Specifically, in referring to the Taiwan Relations Act, this official argued that international agreements must take priority over domestic laws. The US should not assume international obligations and then abrogate them using domestic law, otherwise the basis of bilateral relations will be seriously undermined. 

US Views

US participants suggested a range of possible solutions to the problems raised by NMD and TMD. Many of these possible remedies involve simultaneous, unilateral steps on the part of the US and China. US officials argued that Chinese actions regarding Taiwan (especially its missile deployments) are sending mixed signals; on the one hand Beijing claims to support a peaceful approach to resolving the Taiwan question, but on the other hand China’s missile deployments suggest that it favors a military approach which goes beyond deterrence. US participants argued that China’s missile deployments undermine the potential for cooperation by reducing support in Taiwan and in the US for cross-strait dialogues and augment Taiwan’s support for TMD, especially during an election cycle. 

US conferees continued that CSBMs such as mutual threat reduction steps may offer a possible solution to the Taiwan/TMD problem or may offer a path to a solution. For example, CSBMs may help to reduce the possibility of miscommunication and miscalculation. There is a need for reciprocal unilateral steps in which both China and Taiwan agree to exercise restraint. According to a senior State Department official, "we need to turn a negative, action-reaction cycle into a positive and constructive dynamic" in which each step helps to reinforce other ones. This official added that possible CSBMs could come in the form of joint statements between the US and China noting their mutual commitment to stability across the Taiwan Strait. Another possible CSBM is for China to agree to cap or reduce its missile deployments in exchange for Taiwan’s agreement to issue reassurances that it is not moving toward independence and that its fundamental goal is peaceful reunification with the mainland. 

Moreover, a US scholar suggested other possible confidence building measures such as: coordinated unilateral steps to determine a baseline number of China’s missile deployments which would help China to control the debate in the US, and China’s adoption of a unilateral ceiling on missile deployments in coastal regions. Indeed, given current US projections on China’s growing missile deployments, the latter step could actually be a concession. There was no discussion about the technical difficulties associated with verifying such CSBMs. 

From the US perspective, the threat to Taiwan has three aspects: coercion, economic disruption and the risk of war. Several officials and experts added that the US accepts that China views this as a domestic matter but the practical reality is that China’s actions are driving policymakers in Washington and Taipei, making China’s missile deployments an international issue. 

Several US participants noted that, in fact, there are some areas of agreement between the US and Chinese sides of the missile defense debate. Both sides, it was added, should capitalize on these areas of agreement. They agree that: a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is the main goal, the US and China are caught in an action-reaction cycle on the Taiwan/TMD issue, if nothing is done then there will be much damage to Sino-US relations, and harming the Sino-US relationship is not in the interest of either Beijing or Washington. 

Beyond the question of possible CSBMs, a US official sought to answer Chinese arguments that TMD sales to Taiwan would violate the MTCR. This senior State Department official argued that TMD transfers to Taiwan do not necessarily violate the MTCR because there are very few absolute prohibitions included in the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR (aside from a complete ban on the transfer of missile production technologies.) When a nation sells technologies controlled by the MTCR, it must evaluate the context of the recipient to determine MTCR compliance. This criteria for determining the suitability of a possible recipient is outlined in the MTCR guidelines and parameters. For example, the US sales to Israel for the Arrow missile defense program do not violate the MTCR. 

Key Differences

Several key differences emerged from the discussions. First, US and Chinese participants have different analyses of the impact of missile deployments on politics in Taiwan and in the US. US participants maintained China’s missile deployments will reduce the prospects for cross-strait dialogue because China’s missiles place enormous political pressure on Taiwan’s politicians to defend the population which, in turn, translates into strong political support for TMD. By contrast, Chinese participants see the missiles as deterring the independence advocates in Taiwan. In addition, US participants pointed out that Chinese missile deployments are also a driving force behind support for TMD in Congress. 

Second, US and Chinese participants differed about the value and applicability of CSBMs to resolving the Taiwan/TMD issue. The US participants recommended several possible steps to reduce the outbreak of an action-reaction cycle. The Chinese participants rejected most of these ideas. The Chinese conferees reiterated that the Taiwan issue is a domestic affair not an international one. Therefore, China’s missiles are not subject to outside control. All suggestions about a unilateral freeze on future missile deployments were summarily rejected by Chinese participants. Third, the US participants did not share China’s concerns about the impact on NMD and TMD on international arms control and nonproliferation talks. US officials and experts argued that TMD transfers do not violate the MTCR and that the other arms control implications of NMD and TMD can be managed through bilateral consultations with China, Russia and others. US officials reiterated that neither TMD nor NMD are targeted at China and are not meant to degrade China’s strategic military capabilities. 

VIII. THE IMPACT OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION ON STABILITY IN OTHER REGIONS: SOUTH ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

US Views

US experts and officials emphasized the risks posed by missile proliferation to stability and security in East Asia; US officials also outlined the range of US responses to those threats. In discussing these threats and the responses to them, US conferees made several points. First, missile proliferation is getting worse and that it continues to represent a threat to international security. Second, a strong linkage exists between missile proliferation in East Asia and missile proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. On one level, the missile programs in South Asia and the Middle East can strike nations in East Asia such as China; one senior US official noted that the missile-range arcs can be drawn as far north as Xian. On a second level, entities in East Asia, such as North Korea, supply missile programs in the Middle East and South Asia, and, thirdly, regional instability in South Asia and the Middle East resulting from ballistic missile use can have a direct impact on the economic and security interests of East Asian nations such as disrupting the flow of oil from the Middle East to East Asia. 

US officials also outlined the range of US responses to these threats. The US strictly enforces export controls and promotes the acceptance of similar policies in other countries; the US provides significant material assistance to other countries to help them to improve their export controls and the US shares its intelligence with other countries to help them to combat missile proliferation. [5]  The US also has an active diplomatic element to its missile nonproliferation efforts; the US supports the reformist elements in Iran and has been actively talking, albeit unsuccessfully, with North Korea about possible diplomatic solutions to its missile export activities. 

Regarding China’s involvement in missile proliferation, the US continues to have a variety of concerns. US officials argued that China should recognize that the risk of missile proliferation outweighs the political benefit of supporting missile programs in other countries such as Iran. In addition, they stressed that China needs to adopt tighter restrictions on MTCR controlled technologies; China should use its influence on North Korea to curb its missile exports and its missile flight tests; China should not support the lifting of sanctions on Iraq; and China should participate in multilateral discussions on missile proliferation. Several officials and experts pushed China to make a clear-cut decision not to assist the missile programs in Pakistan and to encourage Islamabad to stop flight testing its missiles. 

Chinese Views

Chinese views on missile proliferation were articulated by both technical experts from research institutes and senior Chinese officials. The comments by senior officials were in direct response to the US arguments. First, Chinese experts argued that a missile race has developed in Asia as evidenced by the recent missile tests by India and Pakistan, Russia’s development of a new ICBM, North Korea’s missile test, South Korea’s missile development activities, Taiwan’s cruise missile programs and the potential for Japan to modify their missiles. Interestingly, no Chinese expert mentioned the missile programs in the Middle East and the threats they present to Asian security. These experts cited several reasons for the emergence of this missile race. They highlighted "indefinite and antagonistic factors" in the relations of nations, suggesting that missile development is seen as a response to perceived threats to national security. Other factors included: "the fact that many industrialized nations dump a large amount of advanced weapons and armaments" into the region and that nations develop missiles because they are under an embargo and that missiles are developed as a poor man’s equivalent to counter the aircraft of rich nations. These experts conclude that the Asian missile proliferation problem can not be resolved by poor nations alone, but rather "the great powers should also take the lead and make their contributions in restraining the arms race in the region." Thus, some Chinese experts see missile proliferation as an issue of supply rather than demand due to the willingness of many developed countries to sell missile technologies into the region. 

In addition, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials responded to the critiques of the US officials. First, the Chinese stressed that the US should not examine missile proliferation in isolation but rather should also consider the regional security implications of exports of other delivery means such as advanced strike aircraft. They noted that the US is one of the largest "proliferators" of advanced strike aircraft. Second, Chinese officials added that selling missiles to sensitive areas is not in China’s or the US’s interests and that both have cooperated on this issue. In fact, Chinese officials highlighted that Beijing has harmed its relations with other countries by curbing its missile exports, such as to Iran. Third, Chinese officials expressed their continued reservations about the effectiveness of the MTCR. According to one senior Foreign Ministry official, the MTCR is "a strange animal" because it is so discriminatory; on one level it bans missile exports but not strike aircraft and on a second level, the MTCR allows some members to keep MTCR-class missiles while most members are required to destroy all MTCR-class missiles. This official concluded that although the MTCR is "a flawed instrument," it has a role to play. 

Next, a senior Chinese arms control official detailed China’s nonproliferation approach to Iran, which has been a persistent source of tension in Sino-US relations. This official noted that the US and China obviously have differences about Iran, mainly because US positions on Iran have "flip-flopped" in the past. The US can not expect China to change its position on Iran as often as the US does. In addition, China has incurred huge economic and political losses due to its promises to the US to halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran and its promise not to export advanced cruise missiles to Iran. As a result of those policies, Iranians have argued that China has sold out its friends in Iran and surrendered to the US. The Iranians, in particular, were very upset about the 1997 cancellation of the cruise missile deal and sought compensation from Beijing. The relationship has been strained ever since 1997. According to this official, the US has created real problems for China’s relations with Iran and, as a result, China now feels that it owes Iran . 

Despite China’s concerns, however, Chinese officials stressed the need for Sino-US cooperation on the missile proliferation issue. However, the precondition for this cooperation should be equality in which China is not constantly being put in a position of having to accept US demands or face sanctions. All cooperation must be equal and reciprocal. China’s concerns must be taken into account as the US conducts its missile nonproliferation diplomacy. In this regard, China’s central request has been for the US to halt all arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese participants argued continually throughout this panel that Beijing has accepted and complied with many of the US’s nonproliferation requests while the US has failed to meet China’s one request: to halt arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese view this policy as unfair and unequal treatment on the part of the US. 

Key Differences

The US and Chinese participants expressed a number of differences related to the nature of the missile proliferation threat as well as possible responses to it. First, US and Chinese participants held vastly differing views on the relationship between the MTCR and current missile defense debates. In broad terms, US officials and experts stressed the importance of delinking Sino-US discussion about missile proliferation and the MTCR from bilateral talks on missile defense issues. Also, US experts stressed that TMD cooperation with other countries does not constitute a form of missile proliferation and does not violate the MTCR. By contrast, the Chinese participants stressed the linkages between debates over the China’s membership in the MTCR and US missile defenses cooperation with Taiwan and Japan. Secondly, US participants seemed to express more faith in supply-side missile nonproliferation measures than Chinese conferees. The Chinese participants were highly skeptical of the MTCR as a nonproliferation tool and noted the regime’s inability to influence the demand aspects of missile proliferation and its discriminatory nature. 

Third, Chinese and US officials held differing views on Iran and missile nonproliferation. The US holds an absolutist position by opposing any and all cooperation with Iran. Chinese officials acknowledged the value of their current policy of halting all nuclear and cruise missile cooperation with Iran but added that these steps were taken in response to US pressure and that China’s relationship with Iran has suffered as a result. Chinese officials stressed that the US cannot expect China to change its policies on Iran in sync with US policy shifts. Lastly, Chinese participants chastised the US for constantly demanding that China modify its policies (such as adopting more controls on MTCR technologies). China maintains that US pressure on China to halt all missile cooperation with Iran is an example of unfair and unequal treatment on nonproliferation issues. Beijing argued that while the US wants it to adopt policies in line with US security interests, Washington will not do the same for China, especially regarding Taiwan. While Beijing wants Sino-US cooperation on missile nonproliferation to continue, they argue that it must proceed based on fairness and equality. The US, by contrast, sees missile proliferation and missile defense as distinct issues which should be treated separately. Thus, the differences between China’s concerns about US policies and the US approach to missile proliferation persist. 

IX. CURRENT ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES IN SINO-US RELATIONS

Chinese Views

Chinese experts and officials expressed much skepticism about future US-China cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation issues. Future progress, they argued, is overshadowed by several interrelated factors including US missile defense policies, Washington’s continued demands on China to adopt nonproliferation policies which the US views as important to global security, and the US failure to acknowledge China’s "legitimate security concerns." A senior Chinese military official noted that the US response to China’s concerns seems to be: "so what and who cares." The US is always asking China to do more but then fails to respond to Beijing’s concerns. For example, the US is pushing China to ratify the CTBT while the US Congress will not consider taking a similar step. These perceptions in China have generated much frustration, indignation and impatience on the part of China’s political and military leaders as well as academics and students. Chinese participants added that these concerns were influencing China’s positions on a number of current arms control and nonproliferation issues such as the MTCR and missile proliferation, FMCT negotiations, the CTBT’s entry into force, and the May 1999 NPT PrepCom meeting at the UN. 

First, regarding missile proliferation and the MTCR, Chinese officials argued that the US use of missiles in combat (such as the US missile strike on Sudan and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan) serves "to advertise" to other countries the power of missiles as military tools. This use of missiles, they argued, will actually contribute to missile proliferation. Specifically a Foreign Ministry official said: 

"On the one hand, Western countries are willfully using advanced missiles against developing countries, while on the other hand, they are trying their best to curb the missiles of developing countries in two ways. Offensively, they make use of the MTCR….to check the supply side. Defensively, they build up a missile defense umbrella. This is not convincing. If such a trend goes on, then missile proliferation will not be checked. On the contrary, some countries will speed up their ballistic and/or cruise missile developing programs." 

Second, the Chinese held similar reservations about the FMCT. While Chinese officials continue to "actively support" the initiation of FMCT negotiations, they blamed the US for the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad-Hoc Committee on FMCT negotiations this past spring. They argued that the obstinate position of the US on the issue of nuclear disarmament and the military uses of outer space was the root cause of the difficulties in the CD. Many CD members questioned the desirability of negotiating a FMCT if the US and other nuclear weapon states do not pledge to reduce their nuclear weapons according to a set schedule and if a new arms race emerges in space. Furthermore, Chinese officials maintained that the lack of progress on the FMCT results from a much broader problem which is the lack of trust by the non-nuclear weapons states that the nuclear weapons states will continue to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. In addition, the Chinese argued that Beijing will not consider its position on the FMCT in isolation from other security issues such as the US-China debates on missile defenses. According to a Foreign Ministry arms control expert, "we have to consider the relationship between the BMD plans of the US and FMCT." [Editor’s note: No Chinese experts or officials discussed this linkage in more detail, such as whether NMD deployment would lead China to restart its production of fissile materials. China is believed to have stopped the production of both uranium and plutonium.] 

Furthermore, Chinese officials expressed concerns about CTBT ratification. They argued that the prospects for ratification are grim considering that the US and Russia have not yet ratified the treaty and several "key" countries are still outside the CTBT such as India, Pakistan and North Korea. China continues to support the convening of a ratification conference but does not want this meeting to become a review conference or a mechanism for the treaty to enter into force; such a step, according to Chinese officials, "will not meet the requirement of relevant international laws and will also lose the participation of some key countries." Chinese officials added that Beijing has already begun the preparation process for the CTBT’s ratification in China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) but that the NPC’s decision will be based on "its judgement of the current international situation, particularly China’s security environment." 

In discussing the NPT PrepCom, Chinese officials stressed their interest in playing an active and constructive role in the talks. Chinese participants emphasized their view that the purpose of the PrepCom is to review the NPT’s implementation and to put forward new proposals but not to negotiate "new legal instruments." 

US Views 

US experts and officials voiced more optimistic views on the current state of Sino-US cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation. They noted that while the US and China continue to disagree on a host of issues, the scope of bilateral cooperation has expanded as well. US participants highlighted a number of areas of current and future cooperation between Washington and Beijing on nonproliferation. 

US experts noted there was extensive Sino-US coordination in reaction to the nuclear tests in South Asia in May 1998. The US and China both took leading roles in drafting and promoting UN Security Council Resolution 1172 which condemned the tests. In addition, the Sino-US Joint Statement on South Asia, which was issued during June 1999 summit meetings, required both sides to assume commitments on promoting regional security and nonproliferation which had not previously been outlined. To be sure, the US and Chinese approaches to encouraging nuclear rollback in South Asia have not been identical, but in recent months Beijing and Washington have been narrowing their differences. In other areas, US participants noted the number of common interests the US and China share in curbing North Korea’s missile testing and exporting activities, especially given the role that North Korea’s missile capabilities play in US debates about national missile defenses. US experts pointed out that despite these overlapping interests, Sino-US cooperation on North Korea has been ambiguous. Beijing’s approach appears to rely on private diplomacy, leaving US policymakers guessing about China’s role. US participants encouraged China to be more open in its dealings with the North in order to demonstrate its support for missile nonproliferation. 

In addition to discussing regional nonproliferation issues, US experts and officials raised concerns about functional nonproliferation issues such as China’s positions on the MTCR, the CTBT, FMCT, and the CWC. First, US concerns about China’s possible membership in the MTCR are longstanding and were discussed throughout the conference. US experts encouraged the Chinese to recognize that linking MTCR membership to NMD/TMD issues plays into the hands of anti-China advocates in the US and will only perpetuate a resolution of both issues. According to one US expert, "Linking progress on the MTCR to conflicts over Taiwan or missile defenses, for example, serves to tie an issue of mutual concern to the most chronic and controversial disagreements in Sino-US relations." One possible solution which was raised was for China to adopt and implement export controls covering MTCR items as an interim step, while forgoing the complex and highly politicized step of becoming a full MTCR member. 

US experts detailed the difficulties of CTBT ratification within the Congress. The current Republican-dominated Congress is generally opposed to the treaty and congressional debates about revising the ABM treaty are likely to take precedence over a debate and vote on the CTBT. US experts acknowledged the possible delays in China’s ratification of the CTBT but also stressed the overall importance of both the US and China ratifying the CTBT in order to send a positive signal to India and Pakistan. A US expert suggested that during the CTBT review conference in September 1999 that the US and China lead an effort by all the current signatories to declare that the treaty’s provisions are legally binding on them, regardless of whether the treaty has entered into force. 

Furthermore, regarding the FMCT, US experts and officials highlighted that the FMCT serves both disarmament and nonproliferation goals. The US and China face three major hurdles in negotiating the treaty once a negotiating mandate is provided. First, the US, China and others do not agree on the specific scope of the treaty which specifies the types of fissile material to be covered by the treaty. Second, the scope of the verification measures will be another issue of significant disagreement. What types of facilities will be covered under the treaty? Several US experts pointed out that the US and China overcame similar barriers during negotiations of the CWC and the CTBT. A third task for the US and China is to break the linkage between the FMCT and the initiation of parallel talks on nuclear disarmament. US officials and experts argued that both the US and China should actively work to break this linkage in order for formal negotiations to begin. 

US experts noted that China has taken several positive steps in the realm of chemical weapons nonproliferation, although some concerns about its export activities remain. US participants pointed out that China’s efforts to implement its CWC commitments have been more substantial than the US. China has submitted its initial and annual declarations to the OPCW and China has already allowed more than a dozen inspections of military and civilian sites. The US has not yet submitted declarations or hosted inspections at commercial industry plants although these steps are expected to occur in 1999. To be sure, China still has difficulty controlling the export of dual-use chemicals to nations of proliferation concern. US participants also highlighted that one of the key CW nonproliferation issues to be resolved between the US and China is Beijing’s opposition to the Australia Group (AG). China refuses to join the AG because it targets certain countries (e.g. Iran) and Beijing feels the AG undercuts the authority of the CWC. Yet, the US has sanctioned Chinese companies for exporting AG-controlled dual-use chemicals that are not covered by the CWC. US participants stressed that this policy difference needs to be resolved in order to prevent continued episodes of sanctions imposition. 

Lastly, US experts identified a series of three dynamics which have broadly influenced Sino-US discussions on arms control and nonproliferation. First, Sino-US arms control dialogues have been occurring in a highly politicized context in the US and in China. The US Congress is highly wary of China as demonstrated by the Cox Committee investigations. In such a politically charged environment, US nonproliferation and arms control officials are restricted in their dealings with Beijing. Second, while the internal politics in China are less clear, arms control and nonproliferation have undoubtedly assumed a much higher profile in China’s national security policymaking. China has established a department within the Foreign Ministry devoted to arms control, and in March 1999 China’s President Jiang Zemin gave a major speech at the CD on arms control, a first for any Chinese president. [6]  This heightened profile for arms control and nonproliferation issues will result in their inclusion in China’s broader political and foreign policy calculations and, thus, their politicization. Chinese leaders may increasingly view these issues as potential bargaining chips to be used during talks with the US on unrelated issues such as human rights, Taiwan, or trade. 

Third, US conferees argued that another important dynamic evident in Sino-US discussions on arms control and nonproliferation is the convergence of interests which has occurred in recent years. The US and China appear to have moved away from the era in which nonproliferation discussions were exclusively characterized by conflict to a period of cooperation and overlapping interests. Consider 10 years ago, when the US was reeling from the DF-3 sale to Saudi Arabia, Chinese companies marketed M-11 and M-9 missiles to Syria and Iran, China secretly helped Algeria to build a small reactor, China assisted unsafeguarded facilities in Pakistan (possibly including ones related to nuclear weapon production), and Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation had begun to expand. Nowadays, China’s nonproliferation balance sheet looks much different; it has moved from the red to the black. 

Key Differences

One of the most fundamental differences between Chinese and US participants during this panel was in the prospects for continued Sino-US cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation issues. Chinese officials and experts were highly pessimistic about future Sino-US cooperation, whereas US participants emphasized the amount of past policy coordination (such as on South Asia) and the prospects for more joint action in the future, possibly related to North Korea. Some Chinese comments hinted that all arms control cooperation could stop in the future if the US fails to take into account China’s "legitimate security concerns" such as arms sales to Taiwan and missile defense deployment in the US. 

In addition, the Chinese seemed to hedge many of their positions on arms control and nonproliferation on Washington’s missile defense policies. Chinese participants stated numerous times that China’s consideration of the MTCR and its missile proliferation activities is explicitly tied to NMD/TMD, and thus Beijing’s approach to CTBT ratification as well as its participation in FMCT talks also hinges on the future of missile defense debates. By contrast, US participants stressed repeatedly that Chinese policymakers should distinguish between arms control and nonproliferation and missile defense issues. For the US, these are separate topics and their linkage will only complicate the resolution of each one. Similarly, China’s positions on arms control and nonproliferation issues also reflect Beijing’s broader foreign policy concerns about the US trying to contain China through expansion of its military alliances in Europe and Asia. The comments of some Chinese officials and scholars suggested that they see arms control and nonproliferation cooperation with the US as one sided, in which the US promotes its policies at the expense of China’s security interests. In this sense, arms control cooperation with the US is seen by some as another means for the US to limit China’s global influence and to compromise its national security interests. 

Notes

[1] The Rumsfeld Report, which was issued in 1998, is a Congressionally mandated study on current and future ballistic missile threats to the US. It was produced in order to provide a non-government assessment of the missile threats facing the US. The Rumsfeld Commission was comprised of  several former senior US officials and several non-government experts; the commission was headed by Donald Rumsfeld, former Defense Secretary for the Ford Administration. 

[2] For a consideration of issues related to US-Japan TMD co-operation and the impact of TMD co-operation regional security see: Thomas J. Christensen, “China, The US-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”  International Security, Spring 1999, pp. 49-80. 

[3] The “three no’s” as stated by President Clinton in Shanghai during the June 1998 Sino-US summit are: no US support for Taiwan’s independence, no support for two China’s or one China, one Taiwan; and no support for Taiwanese entrance into international organizations for which statehood is a prerequisite. According to State Department officials at the conference, Clinton’s June 1998 trip was the first time this policy had been articulated in China.

[4] China has not yet ratified the CTBT. President Jiang Zemin pledged in a March 1999 speech on arms control in Geneva that the CTBT would soon be presented to National People’s Congress for ratification. However, he did not set a specific timeline for ratification.  This speech is available on the website of the Chinese mission to the UN in Geneva, see http://www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/China/.

[5] One example of this effort is the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). Since its creation, the NDF has helped aspiring MTCR members like South Africa, Hungary and Poland to destroy missiles with ranges above 300 kilometres. The NDF has also sponsored seminars attended by several developing countries to help them to monitor and control the transhipment of technologies controlled by the MTCR. For more information see www.ndf.org. 

[6] The text of this speech can be found on the website of the Chinese Mission to the UN in Geneva. See http://www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/China/. An op-ed by Jiang Zemin, which is very similar to the CD speech, was published  in the International Herald Tribune on 16 June 1999.