CNS Programs: EANP Conference

Panel I

US-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Achievements

Chinese Views

The Chinese participants expressed uniformly optimistic views about the past bilateral achievements related to arms control and nonproliferation and called for more dialogue and cooperation in the future. Chinese participants identified a core set of four Sino-US arms control successes which are commonly referred to as the “Big-4.” These examples are frequently cited by both senior Chinese and American officials as evidence of real bilateral accomplishments. The first example related to North Korea. First, the Chinese participants noted that the United States and China “cooperated closely” and “played a key role” in resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis in 1994. The Chinese emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation in addressing the North Korea crisis. They noted that absent Sino-US cooperation, the crisis may not have been resolved peacefully and the current situation would be significantly more tense. Although Chinese officials are usually circumspect about the level of Chinese involvement in this issue, they provided additional details about their intervention in the North Korean nuclear issue. A Foreign Ministry arms control official noted:

China, in its unique manner, worked on North Korea and urged relevant parties to act with prudence and accommodate each other’s concerns while refraining from the use of extreme words or actions which may otherwise drive the situation out of control. Following China’s repeated admonishment, the United States and North Korea held bilateral consultations in a bid to resolve the dispute through such consultations.

Second, Chinese officials and scholars noted that the United States and China worked together to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. China worked from behind the scenes whereas the United States assumed a high profile role in promoting the indefinite extension of the NPT. As in the case of North Korea, the Chinese maintained that bilateral cooperation was crucial to securing the indefinite extension of the treaty.

The negotiation and conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) represented a third area of bilateral cooperation. Although the initial negotiating positions of China and the United States were quite different, both sides were able to gradually narrow their policy differences after several rounds of talks. According to the Chinese, “The two sides coordinated with each other on their positions on articles of entry into force and verification. The two sides also played their unique roles as nuclear weapon states to ensure that the final text of these articles [became] universally binding.” Drawing on their personal experiences, several Chinese diplomats added that the height of bilateral cooperation occurred when the United States and China met during the end-stage of the CTBT talks to discuss the approval procedures for on-site inspections; these consultations were directly between the United States and China and included no other parties. Chinese officials developed a compromise formula which was accepted by US negotiators. The Chinese participants argued that absent cooperation between the United States and China, the CTBT would never have been concluded.

The fourth and most heralded example of bilateral cooperation came in response to the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia. Washington and Beijing’s policy coordination on this issue was far greater than on any previous nonproliferation topic. Chinese participants provided several new and interesting details about the scope of bilateral coordination in May 1998. They noted that immediately after the tests Presidents Clinton and Jiang exchanged views through a hotline. The presidential consultations were followed by three phone conversations between US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. Initially, these phone calls helped to address the Chinese suspicion that the United States knew about the pending Indian test but allowed it to occur anyway. The Chinese participants noted that during the third phone call Albright and Tang agreed to jointly draft a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the tests and calling for a halt to further nuclear activities. A few weeks later the UNSC adopted resolution 1172, which the Chinese view as the “guideline” for the international community to resolve the South Asian nuclear issue.

Drawing on these core achievements, the Chinese participants placed a high value on the role of Sino-US cooperation for both future nonproliferation efforts as well as for bilateral ties. One Chinese diplomat noted “In a nutshell, over the last 8 years China and the United States have come a long way in their bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation which has greatly contributed to the resolution of certain issues, and the promotion of the arms control and disarmament process as well as international security.”

In addition to discussing examples of bilateral nonproliferation cooperation, several Chinese participants outlined four lessons or rules that should be applied to future issues. The first and most important lesson from the Chinese perspective was that both a stable international security environment as well as “sound” bilateral relations are necessary prerequisites for US-China cooperation. The Chinese argued that neither of these conditions has existed in recent years and that this accounts for the difficulties since late 1998. The Chinese listed a variety of international and bilateral events that have frustrated arms control and nonproliferation progress in the last two years, including NATO expansion, the US “vigorous pursuit” of National Missile Defense (NMD), US intervention in Kosovo, the nuclear tests in South Asia and the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. They also cited Congress characterizing China as “the worst proliferator in the world.” Chinese participants universally noted that China is not only reluctant to cooperate with the United States under these conditions, but is also unwilling to compromise on sensitive arms control and nonproliferation issues.

Second, the Chinese argued that further bilateral cooperation needs to be based on common interests, equal treatment, mutual trust, and mutual accommodation of each other’s security concerns. Chinese officials and scholars noted that such policy coordination can only continue if both sides appreciate the security concerns of the other. The Chinese pointed out that the United States continuing arms sales to Taiwan while insisting that China address US proliferation concerns remains the most obvious example of US unwillingness to appreciate China’s security concerns.

Third, the Chinese participants emphasized the role of dialogue and cooperation in resolving arms control-related disputes. They suggested that the United States abandon coercive techniques such as pressure and sanctions. Dialogue and cooperation, according to the Chinese, serve the interests of both countries while sanctions “have never produced any good result,” undermine the atmosphere for cooperation and even “reverse such possibilities for the future.” The sanctions imposed on China in 1991 and 1993 for missile proliferation activities were seen by the Chinese as particularly destructive to the overall bilateral relationship. Lastly, the Chinese argued that both governments need to take into account the national situation of each other and avoid the imposition of “national criteria” on each other. The United States and China have different views and solutions for a variety of international security issues and these differences need to be respected. “If one side imposes at will its own criteria on the other and criticizes other’s policies and practice, it will only give rise to resentment on the part of the other side. This will not be conducive to the cooperation between the two sides.” According the Chinese, the only way for bilateral cooperation to flourish in the future is for the United States and China to respect each other’s national situation and refrain from imposing its standards on the other. [Editor’s Note: Although the Chinese did not discuss specifics, they were likely referring to contentious bilateral debates over missile nonproliferation and US efforts to persuade China to improve its controls on missile technology exports.](1)

US Views

US participants discussed two broad elements of Sino-US cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation. The first aspect dealt with the scope of the bilateral achievements and the second addressed the forces propelling cooperation forward.

First, in terms of the types of achievements, US participants agreed with the Chinese list of the so-called “big-four” bilateral achievements. Yet, US officials and scholars also added to this list. US and China successes include other multilateral and bilateral issues as well. US participants pointed out that the negotiation and conclusion of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) as well as current international efforts to improve the verification mechanism of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) represent areas of significant nonproliferation cooperation. Several US experts also mentioned successes in the areas of nuclear and missile nonproliferation. US and Chinese policies and practices on nuclear nonproliferation have converged in recent years with this issue fading from the bilateral nonproliferation agenda. Even on the contentious issue of missile proliferation, US participants noted that both sides had achieved limited and incremental progress; the Sino-US agreements in 1991 and 1993 to expand China’s missile nonproliferation commitments were particularly important in this regard. Several US scholars added that in addition to the formal bilateral and multilateral interactions, an increasing variety of unofficial academic exchanges have enhanced the quality of arms control and nonproliferation dialogues between the United States and China. Most importantly, these exchanges have helped to facilitate the development of an epistemic community of arms control experts in China.

Second, US experts highlighted a number of factors and trends operating at three levels of analysis–international, bilateral and domestic–which fostered and influenced the Sino-US cooperation identified above. These trends, occurring at different times and to differing degrees, collectively created the circumstances under which Sino-US arms control and nonproliferation cooperation became increasingly possible. On the international level, three trends facilitated the convergence of the US and Chinese arms control and nonproliferation agendas over the last 20 years. These included positive trends in international arms control affairs which influenced China’s willingness to join nonproliferation treaties such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Second, global momentum and international public opinion in support of treaties such as the CTBT created conditions for US and Chinese arms control cooperation. Changing global threat perceptions represented a third trend that directly influenced the character of Sino-US discussions on nonproliferation.

In discussing bilateral trends, US participants highlighted three trends. First, US and Chinese nonproliferation cooperation resulted from the convergence of security interests and security concerns. The cases of North Korea and South Asia are most instructive. Concerns about nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula and the prospect of war resonated in Beijing as well as in Washington. Second, arms control and nonproliferation achievements have resulted from hard bargaining and trade-offs by Washington and Beijing. The anticipation of incentives and/or sanctions has played a particularly important role, especially from China’s perspective. Third, in recent years US and Chinese assessments of the current state and future development of bilateral relations explain recent nonproliferation and arms control achievements. Several US officials argued that the implicit and explicit linkages between bilateral relations and nonproliferation policy often function in reverse as well; deterioration in relations have frustrated and complicated bilateral nonproliferation dialogues.

At the domestic level of analysis, the growth and evolution of China’s domestic arms control and nonproliferation community in the last twenty years has had a profound influence on China’s understanding of arms control and nonproliferation issues. As China’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda expanded in the wake of the Cold War, the growing number of Chinese experts has augmented the quality of security discourse in China and thus Beijing’s willingness to participate in international and bilateral treaties and agreements.

Similarities and Differences

The discussion during this panel was generally optimistic and provided both Chinese and US participants with an opportunity to set a positive tone for the beginning of the conference. US and Chinese participants agreed in broad terms about the areas of past bilateral cooperation and achievement while maintaining a healthy skepticism about prospects for future nonproliferation cooperation. Although participants from both the United States and China stressed the growing importance of bilateral cooperation in addressing global proliferation threats, neither side was optimistic that the current difficulties could be overcome. Both sides agreed that ongoing debates about national missile defense had complicated prospects for more nonproliferation cooperation.

Several important policy differences between the United States and China can be discerned from the discussion of bilateral arms control and nonproliferation cooperation. First and foremost, US and Chinese participants differed over Chinese views about bilateral nonproliferation disputes and the extent to which bilateral relations should be linked to specific nonproliferation debates. The Chinese consistently argued that further nonproliferation cooperation is contingent on the overall state of Sino-US ties as well as the overall international security situation. The freeze on bilateral nonproliferation dialogues following the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy reflects this view. By contrast, US participants universally argued that nonproliferation should not be viewed through the prism of bilateral cooperation and it should not be used as “the whipping boy” of the Chinese to demonstrate their displeasure with US foreign and national security policies. Senior US officials noted that China’s view of nonproliferation appears to be incomplete because nonproliferation is often viewed as in the US security interest and not necessarily in China’s. US experts pointed out that even during the darkest days of the Cold War US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation transcended their military competition.

Second, US and Chinese participants held drastically differing perspectives on the utility of sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. The Chinese condemned sanctions as a unilateral assertion of US power and ultimately destructive to bilateral relations. According to the Chinese, sanctions and unilateral pressure have never produced positive results but rather undermine the atmosphere for cooperation. By contrast, US officials and scholars acknowledged the usefulness of sanctions and the threat of sanctions in fostering changes in Chinese nonproliferation policies. The US imposition of sanctions on China in 1991 and 1993 were viewed as particularly effective in convincing China to expand its missile nonproliferation commitments; and in 1996 during the ring magnet episode the threat of sanctions is largely seen in the United States as prodding China to begin to change its nuclear export control system.

Third, the United States and China differ on the universality of certain nonproliferation principles. Several Chinese officials and scholars pointed out that on certain issues such as missile nonproliferation there is no universal standard that can dictate China’s behavior. There is no international treaty banning missiles and this is why China approaches the MTCR with “mixed feelings.” Many Chinese do not consider missiles to be a weapon of mass destruction and feel that certain nations have legitimate right to acquire missiles for their security. A senior Chinese official explained that China lacks a consensus on which standard to use in assessing missile proliferation. While the United States utilizes the standard of “MTCR-plus domestic legislation”, China does not know what criteria to use for its own domestic legislation. This ambiguity has not yet been resolved in China.

Lastly, some US and Chinese participants differed about the extent to which bilateral nonproliferation cooperation was crucial to resolving various issues. Some US experts noted that China’s cooperation on issues such as North Korea and the NPT remains quite vague. In both cases China may have simply piggy-backed on US diplomacy while claiming that it played an active role. One US official specifically noted that during the NPT extension conference in 1995 that China played a passive role in the negotiations until it saw that indefinite extension was an inevitable outcome. In short, some Americans maintain that China is now seeking to overstate its contributions to resolving international and regional nonproliferation problems.

Panel II

The International Environment and Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

US Views

US participants sought to identify the factors that influence arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation policies in the post cold war era. US experts and officials identified several variables. First, the international security situation is in transition and moving toward a more multipolar system in which shifting coalitions of states will eventually create a balance-of-power equilibrium. Several US experts noted that the US reliance on alliances to anchor its regional security relations is not outdated Cold War thinking, as the Chinese argue. Rather, alliances for the United States are used to ensure that, as the multipolar system evolves, WMD proliferation does not increase. Alliances are not necessarily directed at an adversary but can be used as cooperative measures to ensure mutual security within a region. Alliances need not have adversaries to function well and do not need to be zero-sum in nature.

A second factor influencing global arms control affairs is technology. On the one hand, technology diffusion is an inherently difficult problem for nonproliferation. The emergence of the Internet and other information technologies makes it vastly simpler for nations and groups all over the world to get access to WMD production information. On the other hand, the recent advent of new, strategic defense technology has rekindled an old debate in the United States between advocates of deterrence and advocates of defense. Furthermore, positive benefits of technology come in the form of the development of new surveillance and verification technologies which make it much easier for both developed and developing countries to create transparency and monitor treaty compliance.

Aside from technology, US participants argued economics significantly influences international arms control and nonproliferation affairs. Trade in various technologies is intimately linked with export control management and the effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes. Economics also plays a role in influencing whether nations can implement their commitments. The case of Russia provides a glaring example of economic decline providing direct and tangible incentives for countries to engage in arms control. A final factor influencing global arms control affairs is the role of domestic politics. Internal debates in the United States and in China about relative international priorities as well as differing perceptions of the international environment have all had a direct impact on each other’s willingness and ability to enter into serious arms control discussions.

In addition to discussing the above issues, much of the discussion during this panel focused on responding to Chinese views on missile defenses. US participants universally emphasized that the discussions and debates in the United States about missile defenses are not yet complete. In the United States, the reality is far ahead of the conceptualization on this particular issue and the United States still has a long way to go before missile defenses become a reality. The United States and China need to first decide on a common definition of strategic stability and then begin to discuss how such an outcome can be achieved. In particular, US experts argued that the United States and China need to determine the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies; only then will serious bilateral discussions about strategic stability become possible.

In response to Chinese arguments, several US participants added that arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can help resolve the current bilateral dispute over missile defenses. Arms control can assist the United States and China in achieving strategic stability even in a world of missile defenses. Arms control can provide reassurances about both capabilities and intentions and also provide a channel for discussion and dialogue on a broad range of security issues. In this vein, US officials suggested that modification of the ABM treaty is not inherently destabilizing and that limited missile defenses that remain limited are not necessarily harmful. Several US officials and experts argued that the best way to codify limits on strategic defenses is to write them into a modified ABM treaty. The United States should be more transparent about its NMD policies. Putting such commitments in a legally binding treaty may be the best alternative to abandonment of the ABM treaty. While defenses themselves are not inherently dangerous, the uncertainty associated with them (and especially the possibility of future expansion) raises concerns on China’s part. Arms control measures can reduce this uncertainty and create an environment where strategic offense and defense can peacefully coexist.

Chinese Views

Chinese participants expressed uniformly negative and pessimistic views about the current international arms control and nonproliferation environment. They attributed most of the difficulties to changes in US military and arms control policies which have their origins in shifts in both US international and domestic policies. According to one senior Chinese analyst, “certain actions taken by the United States in recent years have seriously affected the international security environment and within the United States there is a tendency of arms expansion and to the neglect of arms control.” The Chinese assessments of the international arms control environment were based on four considerations. First, despite the end of the Cold War, the United States has increased military spending, reinforced its military alliances and sought to achieve its own “absolute security” (juedui anquan) at the expense of the security interests of other countries. Second, the US commitment to arms control treaties is weakening. After taking the lead in negotiating the CTBT, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty and the United States has recently threatened to withdraw from the ABM treaty. Third, the United States has begun to embrace militarism as exemplified by its intervention in Kosovo based on the ill-defined principle of “humanitarian interventionism.” Lastly, the United States “has done injustice to China” by slandering Chinese officials and experts in the Cox Report, by bombing the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and by attempting to incorporate Taiwan into a regional theater missile defense system.

Chinese scholars offered several explanations for these negative shifts in US policies. First, when the United States became the only superpower in the world, it lacked external constraints and began to act in any way it wanted. The Chinese continued that without international constraints or “checks and balances” the situation may get out of control. Second, a variety of new “ideologies” in the United States have begun to have considerable influence on US security and arms control policies. These include: neo-interventionism which posits that sovereignty is a limited concept, neo-isolationism which is a form of ultra-nationalism, and neo-conservatism which promotes both a US superiority complex and a neo-missionary impulse to shape the world based on the US model. Third, the Chinese argued that internal politics in the United States, in particular the deteriorating relationship between the President and the Congress, have negatively influenced the US approach to international security and arms control. The Republicans have sought to attack the Clinton Administration’s foreign and security policies due to their inability to attack his domestic agenda, especially in the face of consistent US economic growth. Fourth, several Chinese analysts argued the US media has exacerbated the “China threat” by spreading rumors and generally promoting negative images of China. According to one analyst, “misleading and biased coverage of and reports about China in the US media paint China as America’s enemy.”

Based on these considerations, many Chinese claimed that US security and arms control policy are currently at a crossroad between striving for strategic stability through arms control and seeking absolute security through a military buildup. The driving concern behind most of the Chinese claims was the US national missile defense program. For the Chinese, the US NMD effort is the embodiment of all of their concerns about US plans to achieve “absolute security.” The Chinese during the conference argued that the threat of rogue states does not justify an NMD program, that NMD technologies are not yet mature enough to warrant deployment of the system, and that US policymakers have severely underestimated the negative impact of NMD on global arms control efforts.

Similarities and Differences

This panel revealed a variety of differences between US and Chinese participants about both the structure of the international system and specific arms control and nonproliferation issues. First, the Chinese see the United States playing the dominant role in an international system with weak multipolar characteristics whereas US participants view the international system as increasingly moving toward multipolarity. As a result, Chinese participants saw few restrictions on US freedom of action while US participants emphasized numerous internal and external constraints. Second, the Chinese attribute many difficulties in international security affairs to US policies whereas the United States sees many of its policies as based on a sound assessment of global security. The differences between US and Chinese participants were especially acute on the issue of US alliances. The Chinese viewed them as a relic of the Cold War and adversarial; whereas many US scholars and officials argued that alliances are not necessarily directed at an enemy and in East Asia can have a generally positive influence on regional stability.

Second, US and Chinese participants differed over the contours of the NMD debate in the United States. Chinese participants argued that US NMD policies are the principal cause of the erosion of global support for arms control and nonproliferation. US participants argued that China can influence US debates by improving its export controls and limiting the sales of missile technologies to various countries of concern. For example, a senior US official noted China could help the United States forge a deal limiting North Korea’s missile testing and missile exports by providing space launch services for North Korean satellites.

US and Chinese participants agreed on ways to describe and characterize US debates on NMD and TMD. US experts agreed that US withdrawal from the ABM treaty would have a severe impact on global arms control efforts. Both sides noted that NMD still faces high technical barriers and it is not yet clear whether the United States posses the technology to deploy a fully effective system. Lastly, the comments of US and Chinese participants reflected a mutual recognition of the role of domestic political forces driving the NMD debate in the United States. The Congressional reaction to the August 1998 North Korean missile launch combined with the Rumsfeld Report led many in Congress to firmly support US development of a strategic defense system.(2)

Panel III

East Asian Security and Nonproliferation: Challenges and Responses

Chinese Views

The Chinese presentations narrowly focused on the impact of theater missile defense on East Asia security; no other regional nonproliferation issues were considered. The Chinese characterized US plans to provide TMD assistance to Japan and possibly Taiwan as poisoning the security environment in East Asia. The Chinese outlined four reasons for opposition to US TMD cooperation in East Asia. First, TMD fosters suspicions among the major power in East Asia, promotes antagonism among them and undermines the possibility for confidence building. Second, TMD will provide an impetus for militarists in Japan to reassert themselves and “will quicken Japan’s move to become a major military power.” In particular, the Chinese argue that joint TMD cooperation will enhance Japan’s early warning, intelligence collection and rapid response capabilities.

Third, US TMD cooperation in East Asia will trigger a new arms race and increase the dangers of missile proliferation in East Asia. Other nations in East Asia will build countermeasures, expand their military capabilities and some countries may leverage TMD technology to build their own ballistic missile forces. One official noted that China views TMD as a form of vertical proliferation and fears that Japan or Taiwan could use such a system to develop their own offensive missile capabilities. Lastly and most importantly for the Chinese, if the United States provides TMD assistance to Taiwan this will seriously set back Sino-US relations and “bring grave consequences to the East Asia security situation.” One of the key Chinese assumptions on TMD and NMD is that the August 1998 launch of the Taepodong missile by North Korea is simply a pretext or an excuse that the United States is using to justify increased military cooperation with Japan and Taiwan.

US Views

US participants engaged the Chinese directly on three specific issues related to East Asian security: nonproliferation, TMD and US arms sales to Taiwan. On the issue of nonproliferation, US participants emphasized that the bilateral balance sheet has moved from the red to the black and that there are currently more areas of agreement than disputes. Senior US officials pointed out that China should not view nonproliferation as “a favor that one country performs for another” but rather as “practical hard-headed objectives which countries pursue in their own interest.” Many US scholars and officials characterized the Sino-US nonproliferation progress as “remarkable” and likely to continue. The current debates about missile defenses and missile proliferation are the tough cases that represent inherent conflicts of national interest and differences about narrow nonproliferation policies and commitments–not about fundamental principles and concepts.

Regarding TMD, US participants sought to rebut many of the Chinese arguments opposing US missile defense cooperation in East Asia. All US participants emphasized the importance of the August 1998 North Korea missile launch as a motivator for Japan. Many experts argued that TMD should be seen as a purely defensive system since using it to produce ballistic missiles would be highly inefficient and time consuming. Moreover most nations in Asia already possess the basic skills to build missile systems. Some US scholars argued that TMD originally had nothing to do with Asia; TMD systems were originally developed in an effort to protect US troops from missile attacks, such as those that occurred in the Gulf War. In a further effort to engage the Chinese position on TMD, US officials pointed out several technical problems with the Chinese arguments such as: the fact that TMD has no ability to attack Chinese targets on the mainland or threaten aviation in China’s coastal regions as one Chinese participant suggested. A senior US expert noted that despite Chinese views, TMD does not possess a boost phase intercept capability because the boost phase of short-range ballistic missiles is too short to allow effective interception. Lastly, a US scholar argued that China should recognize the fact that its security relations with Taiwan and Japan in the last several years have been highly asymmetrical. China has had the ability to threaten Taiwan and Japan with missiles and nuclear weapons, while Taipei and Tokyo have had little ability to retaliate. Japan and Taiwan have been willing to tolerate this asymmetry for years but these sentiments may change in the future if China does not exercise restraint.

On the issue of Taiwan arms sales, US officials explained that the sales of “carefully selected defensive weapons” are not a matter of proliferation concern but rather are meant to provide Taiwan with a defensive capability which contributes to stability in the region. They noted that “the United States will continue to make available certain defensive goods and services to Taiwan in the context of the overall US policy of trying to preserve peace and stability in the region.”

Similarities and Differences

The similarities on this panel were limited and the differences vast. Agreement was limited to mutual acknowledgment that provision of TMD to Taiwan is a potentially explosive issue facing the United States and China in East Asia. US and Chinese conferees disagreed over a wide number of East Asia security issues. On the issue of US TMD cooperation with Japan and Taiwan, the policy differences were most acute. They included differences about threat perceptions and their relationship to TMD cooperation with Japan and Taiwan, technical capabilities of TMD systems, the linkages with arms control and nonproliferation issues and the impact of TMD on regional stability. On questions related to regional nonproliferation, the Chinese expressed grave concerns about Japan as a potential proliferator, and further argued that TMD and nonproliferation should be jointly addressed given the Chinese view of the strong linkages between these two topics.

On broader security issues, US and Chinese participants differed over the role and influence of US military presence and alliances in Asia as well as the impact of US arms sales on cross-strait security. The Chinese viewed TMD as the worst possible manifestation of arms sales given what the Chinese see as the real possibility of reestablishment of a military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. It was clear by the end of the panel that US and Chinese uncertainties about each other’s long-term intentions in East Asia will significantly complicate the future maintenance of regional stability. The central elements of each side’s strategy toward East Asia (the US reliance on alliances vs. China’s new security concept which opposes the use of alliance and promotes cooperative security concepts) are based on fundamentally different assumptions about international relations and international security affairs.

Panel IV

South Asian Security and Nonproliferation: Challenges and Responses

US Views

US participants focused strictly on the nonproliferation situation in South Asia with little discussion of the broader security issues or US relations with India. For US participants, the main threat to peace and stability in South Asia is nuclear and missile proliferation. For many US conferees, if proliferation in South Asia is not controlled then the inevitable trend is toward expanded Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and the integration of nuclear weapons into their national strategies. Many US officials see India and Pakistan as following the Cold War model of “assume the worst, build first, and then find out how much the other side has.” Neither India nor Pakistan has exercised much restraint in support of their professed adherence to minimum deterrence.

US officials identified the main challenge as dissuading India and Pakistan from taking steps toward a more dangerous posture, fostering adoption of mainstream nonproliferation policies, and urging the two countries to begin to address their deep differences over Kashmir. The US participants argued that both the United States and China are key players in this effort. The current aim of the US nonproliferation effort in South Asia is to persuade India’s leaders that their political objectives have been satisfied by demonstrating a nuclear capability and that their defense requirements do not demand actual deployment or elaborate development of nuclear forces. If India can be persuaded to follow such a restrained path then Pakistan will likely do the same.

US officials argued that to accomplish these objectives the United States has established “regular channels’ for discussions with both India and to a lesser extent Pakistan. In addition, US nonproliferation concerns have also been a part of high-level dialogues including during President Clinton’s trip to South Asia in March 2000 and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to the United States in September this year. During both the working and senior level talks the United States has urged India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the CTBT, cease production of fissile materials useful in nuclear weapons, exercise restraint in missile testing, adopt strict export controls and engage the United States in bilateral talks on a wide range of nonproliferation issues. To accomplish these goals, US officials noted that they plan to stay engaged with both India and Pakistan in the coming months, at both senior and working levels. One of the key indicators will be India’s announcement of an official nuclear doctrine, which many US officials see as a potentially “significant indicator” of the direction that India will take.

Chinese Views

Chinese participants focused their comments on three issues: the evolution of the security situation in South Asia, regional proliferation developments and the prospects for future Sino-Indian relations. In terms of regional security and nonproliferation, many Chinese analysts argued that within China there is a debate about the impact of the tests on South Asian stability. On the one hand, some argue the security situation is more stable now than before because the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan are now in the open and both sides have confirmation of each other’s capabilities. Others in China maintain that the risks of nuclear war cannot be overlooked and note that neither India nor Pakistan has accepted limits on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Chinese participants universally agreed that the problem in South Asia is with India and not Pakistan; Pakistan merely reacted to events that India initiated. Many in China fear that India’s nuclear ambitions are greater than their official policies indicate. Although India says that it will not be the first one to use nuclear weapons and that it plans to establish low force levels, at the same time its draft nuclear doctrine calls for the establishment of a nuclear triad similar to the policies adopted by the United States and Soviet Union during the hottest periods during the Cold War. The Chinese argued that even though Pakistan does not have a declared nuclear policy (and will not declare a NFU policy) it is willing to join a regional restraint regime. As further evidence of India’s culpability, many Chinese experts noted that India’s appeal to the “China threat” to justify the tests was groundless given that India began developing nuclear weapons decades ago before China became India’s rival.

In addition to the debates mentioned above, the Chinese participants noted that a new debate has emerged about US policies toward South Asia. Some in China interpreted Clinton’s visit as a sign that the United States is shifting toward India while also seeking to isolate Pakistan, especially in the wake of the military coup last year. One senior expert who is a former diplomat with expertise on India noted that the Clinton Administration is probably not pursuing such a strategy and that the recent visit to India was simply part of the gradual normalization process between India and the United States. In this sense, US policy does not seek to use India to contain China but rather simply to develop fully its relations with India as part of stabilizing the security situation in South Asia. However, this scholar noted that if the United States seeks to bolster India as a counterweight to both China and Pakistan this policy will likely backfire. It would push India to put more emphasis on their nuclear weapons and to become more arrogant in its foreign relations. Similarly, many Chinese scholars emphasized that China is really not suspicious of US relations with India but rather is a bit concerned that the Indians will exploit this relationship to take a tougher line in their dealings with China.

Some Chinese participants were cautiously optimistic about the future of Sino-Indian relations. All of the Chinese argued that Sino-Indian relations were severely damaged following the 1998 tests but noted that the normalization process is continuing at a steady pace. Their cautious optimism results from the fact that the formal and informal exchanges between the two have been increasing. They identified three main obstacles. The first one is the persistence of the “China threat” theory in India which is seen by Beijing as both insulting and an inaccurate reading of history. Second, the issue of border demarcation remains unresolved. The Chinese argued that they want to finally resolve this issue but that the Indians are not willing to make the necessary concessions. Third, India’s continued poor relations with Pakistan is the last issue that obstructs a full normalization of relations between New Delhi and Beijing.

Similarities and Differences

US and Chinese views on nonproliferation in South Asia converged on the broad goals of restraint in the region. Officials and scholars from both countries agreed that the bench-marks laid out in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1172 should remain the standard for encouraging India and Pakistan back into the nonproliferation regime. Yet, the United States and Chinese differed on the means and methods used to encourage India and Pakistan to comply with the standards laid out in UNSCR 1172. While the United States has pulled back from some of the most severe elements of the resolution (i.e. those standards related to nuclear rollback), China publicly insists on it being one of the central elements of its diplomacy with India. The United States increasingly treats nonproliferation in South Asia as a bilateral issue with India and Pakistan respectively; by contrast China fears that treating nonproliferation as a bilateral issue risks validating India’s status as a nuclear weapon state. This may be one reason why China has not opened a channel with India to specifically discuss nuclear nonproliferation issues. [Editor’s note: The recent Sino-Indian bilateral security dialogue reportedly touched upon this issue, although neither side has publicly acknowledged this.] Another important difference to emerge from the panel was that although China supports the concept that India should be punished for testing and violating an international norm, China was not willing to impose sanctions as the United States did.

The main policy differences to emerge from the panel were unrelated to South Asia but dealt with US and Chinese positions on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). Senior Chinese Foreign Ministry officials argued that China’s opposition to the negotiation of FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is specifically tied to US missile defense proposals. China’s opposition to US efforts in the CD in Geneva seeks to pressure the United States to take note of China’s opposition to US NMD plans. China argues that it will not agree to begin talks on an FMCT until the United States agrees to begin talks in the CD on a treaty banning an arms race in outer space. US officials called for China to play a more active role in the FMCT talks, citing China’s 1994 pledge to work towards an FMCT and arguing that FMCT would not constrain China’s strategic modernization because its fissile material stockpile is sufficient to support even a major expansion of its nuclear stockpile.

The debate about the FMCT also prompted a discussion about transparency and its implications for strategic stability. Senior US officials noted that the United States has a good idea about Chinese fissile material stockpiles, warhead numbers, and overall nuclear capabilities. It is not in these areas that the United States has concerns about China’s future directions. Rather, the US interest in greater Chinese transparency lies in the areas of strategy, doctrine and long-term intentions. Several US experts noted that providing more information in these areas would have a positive impact on US debates about missile defenses. [Editor’s note: These arguments suggest a possible convergence in Chinese and US views on transparency. The issues that China is most sensitive about (capabilities) are not the areas where the United States is most interested in greater transparency.]

Panel V

Current Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime

Chinese Views

Most Chinese participants, especially ones from the military community, provided very negative depictions of the current state of global nonproliferation and future challenges to it. Many Chinese conferees argued that the deterioration in the international security situation has presented “serious challenges” to the nonproliferation regime. For some Chinese participants, the inevitability of proliferation is a “foregone conclusion.” The Chinese cited several examples. First, they argued that the US use of force and specifically the use of cruise missiles in Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia have provided incentives for countries to develop ballistic missiles and other WMD. The examples of these wars have shown countries they need to develop such weapons “to retaliate against their adversaries with their distant strike means with the intention of getting control of the initiative of war.” Second, the Chinese argued that as the technology and knowledge needed to build weapons spreads, more and more countries will gain the ability to develop weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, several Chinese argued that the slow down in arms control will negatively influence global nonproliferation efforts. The Chinese argued that US and Russian progress is “far from satisfactory” given the fact that START II only limits both sides to 3500-3000 warheads and that these agreements do not cover US and Russian stockpiles of non-deployed warheads. The Chinese also expressed concern that US NMD plans will halt any further arms control negotiations to go below the current levels mandated by START II. Some of the Chinese expressed an even more extreme pessimism by arguing that the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia has never stopped as both countries are continuing to work on fourth generation weapons and on improving the capabilities of existing weapons. The Chinese viewed these latter trends as well as US missile defense plans as part of the US effort to develop “absolute security.”

Many of the Chinese identified the discriminatory and non-universal nature of the nonproliferation regime as the main threat to its viability. They argued that the United States continues to expand its military capabilities while calling for others to limit their capabilities; this situation creates an inherent contradiction in the way the nonproliferation regime functions. They continue that much of the current nonproliferation regimes was negotiated by “the superpowers or the western powers” with little participation from developing countries. The negotiation process was undemocratic and these standards were then imposed on other countries without consideration for their views or national interests. Several Chinese noted that the key to successful nonproliferation is not to place pressure on countries but rather to address the root causes of the problem and to address the motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons and other WMD. In a somber note of warning, a senior military official noted “If the United States does not modify its policies, Pakistan may not be the last country to carry out nuclear tests and proliferation will never be stopped.”

US Views

US officials and scholars identified six themes that define broad challenges to the current nonproliferation regime. First, the political commitment to nonproliferation among governments all over the world will affect prospects for regime success. Many US participants expressed concern that in the post-Cold War era commitment to multilateral approaches is giving way to narrower interpretations of national interest. A second challenge is determining the proper relationship between nonproliferation and national security. The actual weight given to nonproliferation in relation to competing political, security and economic interests will determine the effectiveness of global nonproliferation efforts. US experts expressed concern that short-term interests and priorities are being given precedence over nonproliferation. Third, national and global leadership is needed to maintain, implement and strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. In particular, in the United States the tradition of bipartisan support for nonproliferation regimes needs to be restored.

Fourth, many US officials and scholars noted that compliance is currently a central and perhaps defining challenge to the regime. The recent cases of North Korea and Iraq placed noncompliance at the centerpiece of US nonproliferation efforts. If noncompliance is not dealt with, the nonproliferation regime will erode into a gutted shell. A senior US State Department official noted “noncompliance is a cancer eating away at the heart of the nonproliferation regime.” A fifth factor eroding the viability of the regime is the actual use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The US participants noted that while actual use has not yet occurred, it is possible in South Asia. Actual use could validate the military utility of nuclear weapons and erode the foundations of the regime. Lastly, the universality of the regime, or lack of it, is a final factor. The absence of three nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan and Israel) is a major weakness of the nonproliferation regime.” US participants noted similar problems with the biological and chemical weapons regimes. US participants uniformly agreed that universality is key because it “consolidates the normative strength of the regime, strengthens the basis for noncompliance measures and removes the opportunity for the defectors to exploit the limitations of the regime.”

Similarities and Differences

During this panel US and Chinese participants differed on a wide range of issues related to the current challenges to the viability of the nonproliferation regime. First, they differed on the US and Russian record on arms control. Chinese experts criticized the slow speed of dismantlement whereas US experts and officials highlighted the accomplishments over the last 10 years. Implementing arms control treaties takes time and the United States and Russia are dismantling as fast as possible, argued many American experts.

Second, the US and Chinese differed on the linkages between arms control and nonproliferation. For the United States, progress on arms control is not intimately tied to nonproliferation whereas for China the sizes of US and Russian arsenals have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of global nonproliferation efforts. Third, the Chinese argued that the US use of force against Iraq and Yugoslavia has provided incentives for other countries to develop ballistic missiles, while US participants denied such linkages, arguing that states develop nuclear weapons for many complex reasons. Copying US behavior is seldom one of them (although it was the principal motivator for China.) Furthermore, the Chinese disagreed with the US characterization of China as not conscious of the global nonproliferation situation and of adopting a narrow view of its nonproliferation interests. The Chinese maintained that China’s senior leaders are aware of the contribution nonproliferation and arms control make to China’s national security. These issues are carefully considered when China conducts its foreign affairs. Many US experts argued that China’s “obsession” with missiles defense is misplaced. US deployment of missiles defenses is probably inevitable and China needs to think about ways to manage the problem rather than continue to oppose it.

The similarities between the United States and China covered the following issues: proliferation dangers stemming from the spread of technology and know-how; the lack of universality of some of the regimes (and the extent to which it undermines their credibility), and lastly the broad notion that the various nonproliferation regimes require careful and sustained maintenance for them to continue to function effectively.

Panel VI

Missile Defenses and Confidence Building Measures

US Views

The US presenter outlined broad trends for the future direction of the US and Chinese nuclear weapon programs as well as possible confidence building measures. The United States and China are moving into a new era of strategic relations in which the US and Chinese nuclear forces are evolving in opposite directions. China is expanding the size and sophistication of its strategic nuclear capabilities while the United States is decreasing the numbers of nuclear weapons, placing greater reliance on long-range conventional capabilities, and giving more emphasis to missile defenses. The implication of these divergent trends is that China will place greater salience on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy whereas the United States will de-emphasize them. This could lead to increased suspicion, offense-defense/defense-offense racing and some form of regional reaction to the Chinese buildup.

US participants suggested a number of confidence building measures to ensure strategic stability. Many US experts pointed out that the fundamental assumption underlying their arguments about the effectiveness of CSBMs is that some form of limited NMD is likely to be deployed. The fundamental question for the United States and China is to prevent the deployment of defenses from fostering strategic instability. A senior US scholar listed a variety of possible CSBMs including unilateral statements, bilateral dialogues, information sharing, limitations on the NMD system, and other cooperative measures. One of the most basic and widely supported CSBMs was the initiation of a strategic dialogue between the US Strategic Command and China’s Second Artillery Corps. Many US participants argued that the current Chinese diplomatic strategy of trying to force the United States to cancel its NMD program is placing China into a corner and is not realistic. US participants agreed that some form of limited NMD is inevitable, but argued that it does not have to create strategic instability between the United States and China. According to many US participants, a reasonable solution to the current problem would be to develop some form of CSBM so that China knows that US NMD capabilities are limited and will stay limited. US officials noted that one effective way to achieve such limitations would be to codify them in an amended, multilateral ABM treaty.

Regarding possible US TMD transfers to Taiwan, US officials argued that domestic pressure to deploy TMD to Taiwan is simply a response to the increasing missile deployments along China’s coastal provinces. They added that the large numbers of Chinese missiles belie the notion that these missiles are meant to deter Taiwan and not to provoke it. One senior US expert noted that if China wants to ensure that TMD upgrades are not transferred to Taiwan, then China should freeze and possibly withdraw the missiles deployed in the coastal provinces.

A US participant noted that both countries would face major diplomatic challenges on missile defense issues. China’s forceful (and partially successful) diplomatic campaign to build international opposition to NMD has also made it impossible for China to talk seriously with the United States about ways to limit the negative impact of NMD systems. These problems could worsen after the November US election. Support for the Clinton administration’s limited NMD system was weakening. If George W. Bush wins, he will likely launch a review of missile defense systems which will include investigation of boost-phase defenses. Uncertainty about which system the United States will ultimately decide to deploy will make it very difficult for US diplomats to negotiate with other countries about limits on missile defenses. Thus, both countries will face difficult diplomatic challenges over NMD.

Chinese Views

During this panel, few Chinese participants actively engaged in a discussion of possible confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) that might address bilateral debates on missile defense issues. Most reiterated their firm opposition to US NMD plans, relying on the argument that NMD is inherently destabilizing and will foster a world-wide arms race. The Chinese argued that NMD is likely targeted at them and that the location of one interceptor base in Alaska fosters particular suspicion. Many Chinese officials and scholars noted the US goal in developing NMD is to seek absolute security and military superiority. The Chinese also reiterated that the “rogue nation” missile threat simply doesn’t exist and is merely being used as a pretext for the United States to develop missile defenses. Many Chinese argue that it would be “national suicide” for any country to launch a missile strike against the United States and that reliance on traditional deterrence would work to prevent such attacks. Although Chinese participants did not identify specific CSBMs, they did support the broad goal of strengthening CSBMs between the United States and China in an effort to create a peaceful international environment. On the issue of US missile defense cooperation with Taiwan, the Chinese reiterated the concern that Taiwan would use TMD technology to develop offensive missiles.

One Chinese scholar did debate with US participants about specific elements of their proposals. This expert argued that the maintenance of China’s credible, retaliatory policy is good for both the United States and China since it preserves the deterrent relationship between them. China’s strategic modernization, which will improve the survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent, should therefore be viewed as a stabilizing factor. Whatever happens with the US NMD plan, this deterrent relationship must be maintained. This scholar also addressed the idea raised at the conference about multilateralizing the ABM treaty. He argued that it would not be a good idea for China to join the ABM treaty as a full member but probably as some sort of signatory akin to China’s membership in various regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties. This form of membership would allow China to accept all elements of the treaty without having to deploy the single ABM site permitted under the treaty.

Similarities and Differences

While US and Chinese participants shared the common goal of adopting some form of CSBMs, the agreement stopped there. Both agreed that CSBMs are needed but the Chinese felt there was not enough trust to implement such measures effectively. Chinese participants did not comment publicly on specific US proposals for confidence building. Many Chinese, especially from military circles, argued that US calls for greater Chinese transparency are unreasonable given relative American military superiority. However, some Chinese privately expressed an interest in studying US CSBM proposals in more detail. One of the difficulties China has in discussing missile defense-related CSBMs is that such discussions would require the Chinese to pull back on their current diplomatic offensive against NMD and acknowledge that NMD deployment is inevitable. Even a discussion of hypothetical CSBMs is therefore seen as weakening China’s diplomatic position.

The views expressed during this panel largely reiterated previous US and Chinese disagreements on missiles defenses.(3) These included differing assessments of the “rogue” missile threat, the extent to which NMD is directed against China, the stabilizing effect of strategic defenses, the linkage between TMD and development of offensive ballistic missiles, and the extent to which confidence building measures can help maintain strategic stability. The Chinese similarly rejected all US rationales for transferring TMD to Taiwan as a highly provocative form of military assistance which would also assist Taiwan’s offensive military programs. The discussions about Taiwan highlighted another critical difference in views. US policy (partly based on the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act) seeks to maintain a military balance across the Taiwan Strait in order to preserve regional stability. This is the rationale for US arms sales to Taiwan and the reason the United States views these sales as stabilizing. However Chinese officials and analysts increasingly view a military balance in the Taiwan Strait as destabilizing because it permits Taiwan to move toward independence. US arms sales (and especially the provision of TMD systems) are therefore seen as dangerous actions which encourage Taiwan to move toward independence and increase the risk of military conflict.(4)

Panel VII

Great Power Relations and International Arms Control

Chinese Views

Chinese officials and scholars expressed pessimistic views about both the role of “great powers” in promoting arms control and the future of arms control. In discussing the role and position of the United States, many Chinese argued that the United States has initiated “a new period of rearmament.” The Chinese placed particular emphasis on the centrality of the United States and its pivotal influence on the future of global arms control developments. The United States, according to them, must assume the leading role if arms control is to continue. The Chinese viewed Russia as desiring arms control but limited by the US unwillingness to rapidly disarm. According to one expert, “through the positive leading role of the United States and the dynamic support from Russia the likelihood of transforming the situation of arms control will increase.” China’s role, however, was seen as limited, with Chinese participants claiming that Beijing “can hardly alter the situation of world arms control.” The Chinese argued because they continue to view the economic construction as their main goal, China will not engage in a rapid military expansion and China’s policies will therefore not alter the international trends toward more arms control and disarmament.

One prominent scholar from a military-affiliated research institute outlined five points which broadly characterize conservative Chinese views on the future of global arms control and possibility of great power cooperation. This scholar noted: (1) the United States will never give up its rearmament plan and take unilateral actions for disarmament or make any major concessions to push forward the process of international arms control; (2) the United States will chase after strategic superiority and has in its arms control proposals the tendency of trying to weaken the adversary and augment its own strength thus increasing the difficulty in reaching disarmament; (3) Russia has noble aspirations for disarmament but lacks the strength to promote such changes unilaterally; (4) China can only play a limited role in the field of disarmament; (5) despite difficulties in their relations, the United States, Russia and China can strive for certain agreements on disarmament.

US Views

US participants focused on the relationship among the United States, Russia and China and the implications of these dynamics for international arms control and nonproliferation progress. One of the critical and defining factors that distinguishes the foreign policies of these three powers is the different perceptual lenses through which they view the larger international security environment. US scholars argued that the United States remains the most optimistic due to its preeminent position in the world, China remains “hopeful but vigilant,” and lastly Russia is the most “sober” given its plethora of both internal and external challenges. However, many participants noted that the principal difficulty among the great powers are the “differing visions of the global order” which in turn dictate the arms control and nonproliferation policies of Washington, Beijing and Moscow. The central contradiction, as argued by two senior US experts, is that while the United States sees its position a result of “the turning wheel of history, not of design, and its security mechanisms [as] stabilizing, not destabilizing ” other great power such as Russia and China see “a conscious strategy for continued dominance at the expense of others, and the maintenance of Cold War mechanisms that no longer serve any useful purpose other than to allow the United States to engage in power politics and hegemonies.” As a result of the rivalry inherent in these differing views of international security, the strategic context for arms control has been negatively tainted and perhaps poisoned for the near future. In particular, negative perception of other’s intentions will limit the possibilities for future arms control and nonproliferation progress.

Despite these opposing assessments of world trends, several US experts highlighted some common and unifying themes among the United States, China and Russia. All three nations place a high priority on economic growth and prosperity. US participants argued that the countries agree on a host of common transnational threats such as terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal immigration and proliferation. Drawing on this mixed set of experiences and motivations, US scholars argued that cooperation on these transnational threats has been a key feature of the post Cold-War era and will likely continue. In fact, these trends may help “to develop habits of cooperation” among the United States, Russia and China which would be useful in addressing issues of high-security such as arms control. In this context, several US officials argued that China can influence the extent to which arms control and nonproliferation become an area of cooperation or conflict between Washington and Beijing. Some possible steps include the aggressive pursuit of nonproliferation and the initiation of dedicated strategic dialogue with the aim of providing the United States will a clear assessment of China’s long-range strategic nuclear intentions as a first move towards transparency. US participants emphasized that US military planners will always assume the worst without indications to the contrary. Moreover the lack of Chinese transparency gave worst-case assumptions about China’s strategic modernization and intentions credibility within US political and policy debates.

Similarities and Differences

Two critical differences emerged from the discussions during this panel. The first relates to the US and Chinese view of the world situation and the second to the respective roles of the United States and China in promoting arms control and nonproliferation. First, in terms of their world view, the Chinese were much more pessimistic about global developments such as the apparent trend toward unipolarity and the US use of force under the “guise” of humanitarian interventionism. By contrast, US participants painted a picture of both positive and negative trends with significant disagreement on issue of high-security but common interests on issues of low-security such as transnational security threats.

The second critical difference between the United States and China was the extent to which the “great powers” could influence the future arms control and nonproliferation. Chinese participants argued that the United States plays the pivotal role, Russia functions as a secondary actor, and China possesses only very limited influence. This view likely results from Beijing’s dual view of the United States as the strongest actor in international affairs and China’s traditional view of arms control as a US-Russian affair over which it exercises very little influence. US scholars and officials agreed that on some issues the United States plays a defining role but on other topics China has significant influence. In particular, many American experts argued that China’s nonproliferation policies (especially related to missile technology exports), Chinese missile deployments and Chinese policies on transparency related to its nuclear doctrine have the ability to change the pace and direction of US debates on missile defenses. Thus, in limited areas, China’s policies have the ability to foster progress just as United States and Russian polices influence the global debates about strategic nuclear reductions.

Panel VIII

The United States and China: Bilateral Relations and Arms Control Cooperation

US Views

US participants first provided a broad overview of the challenges and opportunities for future relations and then assessed the prospects for arms control and nonproliferation cooperation. Several senior US scholars argued that future bilateral relations are defined by both cooperation and competition. The areas of deepest disputes relate to “high-security” issues such as alliances, the security architecture of East Asia, missile defenses and humanitarian intervention. Yet, the United States and China also have a multiplicity of common interest on “low security” issues such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration. The United States and China should maximize their cooperation by managing their competition and should avoid sliding into an adversarial relationship. While the United States and China may be strategic competitors there is no reason that they should become adversaries or even enemies. A senior US expert noted that the Chinese draw a false distinction between being friends (pengyou) and enemy (diren); the continuum of relations includes far more stages between these two extremes. Along these lines, the United States and China should begin to think of their relationship in a more nuanced fashion than simply swinging between two extremes. More optimistically, other US experts suggested that there is a real possibility of the development of strong strategic relations given US and Chinese common interests in Korea and increasingly in Persian Gulf security.

In terms of nonproliferation and US-China relations, several US scholars and officials collectively argued that China links nonproliferation and bilateral relations too closely. China seems to think that its doing the United States favor by addressing US nonproliferation concerns and uses nonproliferation as a tool to extract concessions from US negotiators. In particular, US officials argued that creating linkages between Taiwan and nonproliferation is the wrong channel to get concessions from the United States on Taiwan arms sales since it will simply impede progress on both issues. US nonproliferation negotiators are not knowledgeable or empowered to negotiate about Taiwan. Nonproliferation and Taiwan are both important issues, but need to be treated separately. A former US official argued that one solution to this linkage strategy is to jettison bargaining positions which view nonproliferation and Taiwan as a zero-sum game and to establish informal working groups that can depoliticize these issues and address them on their merits. By restructuring the dialogue between the United States and China through an emphasis on working level contacts, US and Chinese negotiators can focus on areas of agreement. Several US experts called for the full institutionalization of the bilateral arms control and nonproliferation dialogue so that it is immune to dramatic dips in relations. Many US participants argued that even during the most contentious periods of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union continued cooperating on nonproliferation issues. Three ideas were suggested for future cooperation: adopting measures for sharing information on monitoring the proliferation of missile technology; assisting North Korea with satellite launches as a tradeoff for canceling its ballistic missile program; and in the context of NMD discussions, the United States and China could begin to negotiate a legally binding agreement on transparency related to their nuclear doctrines.

One US participant noted that without dialogue, there was a danger that US NMD deployment plans could spark a dangerous action/reaction cycle. Some in the United States say that China will build up its nuclear forces anyway, so US NMD deployment will have no impact. Meanwhile, some Chinese say that NMD is clearly aimed against China, so that China should not consider US reactions to China’s strategic modernization. There is a real danger that suspicions on each side could spark an arms race that destabilizes bilateral relations. One way of avoiding this is to have a strategic dialogue in which China specifically keys its future force structure to US NMD architectures, making the linkage absolutely clear.

Chinese Views

The most consistent Chinese theme to emerge from this panel’s discussion was the extent to which the development of the broader bilateral relationship will determine the degree of cooperation on “high security” issues. According to one Chinese participant, “The past experiences of the relationship have indicated that only when the overall bilateral relationship is improved, can military and security cooperation be possible.” Along these lines, a senior Chinese scholar on US-China relations outlined a variety of challenges for the future. First, China and the United States differ on broad strategic matters such as the US role as a world leader and China’s role as an emerging global power. Second, the United States and China hold divergent views on some issues in the Asia-Pacific region such as the role of alliances and the stabilizing influence of missile defenses. Third, the persistence of principled differences over Taiwan and US arms sales. Fourth, China’s deep concern over the retrogression in arms control and nonproliferation which is directly attributed to recent US actions and decisions. According to one prominent scholar, US “policies and practices represent a heavy blow and grave challenge to the world’s nonproliferation process, a possible invalidation of the years’ efforts in nuclear disarmament…”

Several Chinese scholars argued that bilateral relations and arms control and nonproliferation are intimately linked. Due to the fact that arms control and nonproliferation are so tightly bound to China’s overall foreign policy and national security interests, it would be impossible for the Chinese not to consider these issues as part of the same equation. Chinese officials and scholars argued that China often incurs significant economic and political costs in changing its arms control and nonproliferation policies and the payoff for them is often in terms of improved economic and political relations with the United States. Furthermore, Chinese officials from military circles argued that both sides need to make concessions in order to build the conditions for more arms control cooperation in the future. China is willing to accept (or at least live with) US leadership whereas the United States does not appear to be willing to live with China’s status as a rising power.

A senior Chinese expert on bilateral relations offered four suggestions for the United States and China to begin to address these challenges. First, the United States and China should on paper and in practice treat each other as friends and not enemies. He argued that the United States should welcome a stronger and more prosperous China and, conversely, China should realistically evaluate the US contribution to its modernization. The burden is on both countries to create a favorable atmosphere for bilateral relations. Second, the United States and China should differentiate between various kinds of issues and problems along the lines of Mao Zedong’s proverb, “No differentiation, no policy” (Mei you qubie jiu mei you zhengce.) The United States and China should continue to cooperate on issues of mutual concern while building a base for common interests. Third, the United States and China should be more sensitive to each other’s national interests. Lastly, the United States and China should strengthen their cooperation “in an all around way.” Now that the dispute about the bombing is officially over, the United States and China need to expand contacts, increase trade, and build trust. As bilateral relations improve, trust will be enhanced and the United States and China will be able to discuss any issue, including sensitive nonproliferation topics.

Similarities and Differences

Two central differences define US and Chinese views about bilateral relations and arms control/nonproliferation issues. On one level, Chinese officials and scholars view arms control and nonproliferation as intimately tied to two issues. First, Taiwan is a nonproliferation issue and Chinese views on nonproliferation and arms control cannot be separated from US arms sales to Taiwan. Second, broad developments in bilateral relations affect Beijing’s willingness to engage in talks and to reach agreements with the United States. In stark contrast, US scholars and experts view arms control and nonproliferation as security issues of such importance to both US and Chinese national interests and to global security that they should be evaluated separately from the shifts and turns in US-China relations.

On a second level, the Chinese claimed to be willing to accept US leadership of the world (within limits) while many US participants appeared to be wary of China’s rising status and urged China to dispel fears about its rising power. Despite these differences, the United States and Chinese participants articulated similar formulas for understanding the overall bilateral relationship. Both argued that the United States and China face a critical challenge between singling out particular problems and building a broad based relationship which can serve as the foundation for resolving the inevitable problems that bedevil Sino-US ties.

Looking Forward

Despite continued suspicions about the US role in international security affairs, the Chinese believe that further development of bilateral relations is an important goal. These positive sentiments also extend to negotiations on arms control and nonproliferation affairs. For example, recent reports suggest that a deal between Beijing and Washington limiting Chinese missile technology exports is under negotiation. The prospects for progress were underscored by the positive tone of the conference. Participants from both the United States and China frankly acknowledged various problems facing the United States and China, but at the same time participants sought to identify areas of common ground that could serve as a basis for solutions.

Two main constraints on future arms control and nonproliferation cooperation exist. US missile defense programs will remain dangerous wildcards in bilateral relations and in Sino-US arms control deliberations. For China, US missile defense programs raise profound concerns about US strategic intentions and about the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent. Disputes over TMD and NMD have the potential to derail bilateral talks, stall progress in multilateral forums, and destabilize both the regional and international security environments. To a lesser extent, a second constraint is Beijing’s continued linkage of arms control and nonproliferation issues to bilateral relations, especially the Taiwan problem. From China’s perspective, US arms sales to Taiwan are the same as Chinese missile technology exports to Pakistan. The United States vehemently rejects this parallel as unpersuasive and unproductive. Disagreement about linkages will continue to hinder progress on arms control and nonproliferation issues.

The changing strategic context for these arms control challenges will further complicate future negotiations. US leaders are worried about the pace and scope of China’s military modernization efforts, especially its missile modernization program. The Chinese remain seriously concerned about US long-term strategic intentions. In the last year, military and political leaders have expressed strong fears about “neo-interventionism” on the part of the United States, which they claim will be used to intervene in China’s internal affairs. China’s October 2000 national defense white paper further articulates these views. The document clearly identifies the United States as the principal threat to international security and regional stability. The language about US “hegemonism and power politics” is far more strident than the 1998 version, and the attacks on the United States are sharper and more direct than other Chinese public statements. These views reflect perceptions in Beijing that will make arms control and nonproliferation cooperation increasingly problematic.

Nevertheless, arms control and nonproliferation issues will continue to play an important role in bilateral relations. The conference discussions highlighted several critical unresolved questions: can cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation help forge a broader consensus on bilateral security issues; can CSBMs help resolve Chinese concerns about NMD; and to what extent will disagreements on missile defense prevent progress on other common security interests. The answers to these questions will define the positive and negative possibilities for future Sino-US arms control and nonproliferation cooperation.

(1) For recent reporting about the ongoing US-China talks on missile nonproliferation see Jim Mann, “US Takes New Tack on China Arms Exports,” The Los Angeles Times, 5 October 2000, p. 1; for background on this issue see Nayan Chanda and Susan Lawrence, “The Hidden Threat to US-China Relations,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 2000; for suggestions on ways to resolve this issue Phillip C. Saunders and Evan S. Medeiros, “Don’t Push China on Proliferation,” Los Angeles Times, 18 November 1999.

(2) For a sophisticated Chinese analysis of the internal US politics driving US missile defense policies see Fan Jishe, “Weixie pingu, guo nei zhengzhi he lengzhanhou meiguo de daodan fangyu zhengce,” [Threat Assessments, Internal Politics and US Missile Defense Policies,” Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies], No. 3 (2000), p. 66-88.

(3) For Chinese views on missile defenses, see Evan S. Medeiros, Missiles, Theater Missile Defense and Regional Stability, Conference Report, Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Regional Stability, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, April 1999. http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/uschina2/report.htm

(4) For a discussion of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait, see Phillip C. Saunders, Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, July 2000. http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/strait/index.htm