Executive Summary

• US and Chinese participants agreed that despite an overall narrowing of disagreements on arms control and nonproliferation issues, broader worries about strategic relations have emerged. US scholars and officials are worried about the implications of China's strategic modernization while Chinese participants remained concerned about US strategic intentions and the US role in the world.
• US and Chinese participants agreed in broad terms about the importance of past bilateral arms control cooperation while maintaining a healthy skepticism about prospects for future nonproliferation cooperation. Areas of previous cooperation include: North Korea, South Asia, NPT Extension, CTBT negotiations and a host of export control issues. Participants from both the United States and China jointly called for more cooperation and stressed the growing importance of bilateral policy coordination in addressing global proliferation threats.
• US and Chinese participants differed over the extent to which nonproliferation issues should be linked to bilateral relations. The Chinese consistently argued that further nonproliferation cooperation is contingent on US arms sales toward Taiwan, the state of Sino-US ties and the overall international security situation. US participants rejected these linkages by arguing that nonproliferation represents a common security interest that should be immune to inevitable ups and downs in bilateral relations.
• US and Chinese participants differed on the universality of certain nonproliferation principles. Several Chinese officials and scholars argued that on sensitive issues such as missile nonproliferation there is no universal standard that should dictate China's behavior. There is no international treaty banning missiles; this is why China approaches the MTCR with "mixed feelings." US officials maintained that preventing the spread of missile technologies is a global norm that benefits both regional and international security.
• Despite the positive impact of the Clinton administration's decision to delay NMD deployment, both sides agreed that the issue has not gone away. US NMD decisions have the potential to destabilize global arms control efforts and bilateral relations if not handled carefully. US participants argued that China could influence internal US debates by improving its export controls and limiting the sales of missile technologies to various countries of concern. A senior US official noted China could help the United States forge a deal limiting North Korea's missile testing and missile exports by providing space launch services for North Korean satellites.
• Both sides expressed interest in confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to address concerns about NMD. US participants put forward several proposals, but China's willingness to begin discussions about specific CSBMs was unclear. US participants noted that arms control can provide mutual reassurance about the capabilities and intentions and suggested limited missile defenses that remain limited are not necessarily destabilizing. Several US officials and experts argued that the best way to codify limits on strategic defenses is to write them into the ABM treaty. US participants noted China's reluctance to engage in frank official discussions on CSBMs makes a compromise increasingly difficult.
• US and Chinese views on nonproliferation in South Asia converged on the broad goals of restraint in the region. Officials and scholars from both countries agreed that the bench-marks laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 should remain the standard for encouraging India and Pakistan back into the nonproliferation regime. However, participants differed on the means and methods used to encourage India and Pakistan to comply with these standards. The United States has pulled back from parts of the standards as unrealistic, while China has made the 1172 standards a central element of its diplomacy with India.
• Significant differences emerged on the issue of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Senior Chinese Foreign Ministry officials argued China will not begin talks on an FMCT until the United States agrees to begin talks in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning an arms race in outer space. US officials cited China's 1994 pledge to work towards an FMCT and argued that FMCT would not constrain China's strategic modernization because its fissile material stockpile is sufficient to support even a major expansion of its nuclear stockpile.
• US and Chinese conferees agreed on a number of current challenges to the nonproliferation regimes including: the dangers of proliferation stemming from the spread of weapons technology and know-how; the lack of universality of some nonproliferation regimes undermines their credibility and effectiveness, and the broad notion that the various nonproliferation regimes require careful and sustained maintenance to function effectively.
• US and Chinese officials and scholars continue to have deep differences over missile defense issues. These included differing assessments of the "rogue" missile threat, whether NMD is directed against China, the stabilizing effect of strategic defenses, whether TMD facilitates development of offensive ballistic missiles, and the extent to which confidence building measures can help maintain strategic stability. The Chinese rejected all US rationales for transferring TMD to Taiwan, arguing this would be a highly provocative form of military assistance that would encourage Taiwan to move toward independence.
• Chinese participants argued that the United States plays the pivotal role in global arms control efforts, Russia functions as a secondary actor, and China possesses only very limited influence. US scholars and officials agreed that the United States plays a defining role on many issues but argued that China also has significant influence. China's nonproliferation policies (especially on missile technology exports), coastal missile deployments and transparency on nuclear doctrine and modernization can all change the pace and direction of US debates on missile defenses.
• Arms control and nonproliferation issues will clearly play an increasingly important role in bilateral relations. The conference discussions highlighted several critical unresolved questions: can cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation help forge a broader consensus on bilateral security issues; can CSBMs help resolve Chinese concerns about NMD; and to what extent will disagreements on missile defense prevent progress on other common security interests. The answers to these questions will define the positive and negative possibilities for future Sino-US arms control and nonproliferation cooperation.

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