CNS Programs: EANP FactsheetsChina's Opposition to US Missile Defense ProgramsIntroductionChina has always opposed missile defenses, but its opposition has become more vocal in recent years as the United States has accelerated its national missile defense (NMD) program and sought to expand theater missile defense (TMD) cooperation with Japan and Taiwan. Chinese opposition to US missile defense programs is based on both historical and substantive concerns about the danger of nuclear blackmail, the United States' superpower status, US alliances, Japan's military potential and US military aid to Taiwan. Some of these Chinese concerns have played a role in Sino-US relations since normalization. This section explains the historical background and the rationale behind Chinese concerns about US missile defense programs. China's arguments against US missile defenses programs fall into three categories:
China's Opposition to Theater Missile Defense in Taiwan China's Opposition to Theater Missile Defense in Japan China's Opposition to National Missile Defense To counter US deployment plans, China has conducted a broad-based attack including denouncing missile defenses in bilateral talks with the United States, partnering with Russia to oppose revisions to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, an anti-NMD diplomatic offensive in multilateral fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and continued modernization (and the option of expansion) of its strategic missile force. China has also made some preliminary efforts to develop indigenous missile defense capabilities of its own. China's various concerns about US missile defense systems are not all equally important. Concerns about Taiwan are based primarily on the political impact of TMD deployment on reunification efforts, not its military significance. However these concerns are sufficiently strong that both political and military responses are likely, included increased missile deployments in coastal areas opposite Taiwan to saturate any TMD system. China's concerns about TMD deployment in Japan have less urgency and are based on longer-term concerns about Japan's future strategic direction. China's reactions to Japanese participation in TMD would therefore probably be more restrained. China's concerns about US NMD deployment are based on the strong belief that vulnerability to a potential US first strike or to US nuclear blackmail is unacceptable. If the United States deploys a NMD system, China would likely respond through a combination of increased ICBM deployments, use of penetration aids, and the possible use of MRV or MIRV technology. China would try to maintain a credible deterrent capability to avoid vulnerability to nuclear blackmail, but would seek to avoid an all-out strategic arms race with the United States. Historical BackgroundAs early as 1983, after President Ronald Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, Chinese officials and experts began studying the implications of US missile defenses for Chinese security. Even in the 1980s--during the height of Sino-US rapprochement--PRC strategists opposed SDI on the grounds that it would accelerate the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the 1980s, Chinese experts concluded that SDI would be detrimental to its four national goals: "preservation of a peaceful international environment; maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent; modernization of the Chinese economy; and enhancement of China's position in the international community."[1] SDI deployment would fuel the superpower strategic arms race, undermining China's nuclear deterrent by causing China to fall even farther behind the United States and the Soviet Union. Chinese scholars believed that SDI was not intended to defend the United States from missile attack, but rather was "part of an overall economic, political, and military strategy aimed at enhancing the US position in the global balance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union."[2] By forcing the Soviet Union to counter SDI, the United States hoped that it would "be pressed economically, the modernization of its offensive forces disrupted, and its land-based ICBM's rendered obsolete."[3] While SDI would give the United States a first strike advantage, Chinese analysts did not believe that the United States would actually conduct a first strike. Rather, SDI would be used as a means to achieve political goals in areas such as arms control or in "constraining Soviet military actions in the Third World."[4] Chinese experts concluded that there were three possible technological options for China to respond to SDI's deployment: (1) expansion of offensive forces (quantitative response); (2) development of countermeasures such as shielding and spinning of ballistic missiles to penetrate missile defenses (qualitative response); and (3) deployment of systems such as anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to destroy US space based missile defense systems.[5] China's current opposition to US missile defense program is remarkably consistent with its opposition to SDI in the 1980s. However, one of the most significant differences is China's concern that current US missile defense programs are designed to entrench US military supremacy and achieve "absolute security." Chinese experts and officials bluntly state that NMD is directed against China. China believes that the missile threat to US territory from rogue states has been exaggerated and that the United States is using the missile threat as a pretext to garner Japanese assistance in missile defense research and development and to contain China. Chinese analysts are also concerned that missile defense deployment will fuel arms races between the United States and China, China and Taiwan, and Russia and the United States. China's Opposition to Theater Missile Defense in TaiwanChina vehemently opposes US provision of TMD systems or technology to Taiwan on the grounds that missile defenses could embolden Taiwanese separatists to declare independence. China considers Taiwan to be an inalienable part of China and considers any action that promotes Taiwan's continued separation a violation of China's sovereignty. Because China currently lacks the ability to invade Taiwan, it relies on ballistic missiles to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. China is therefore stridently opposed to the transfer of any type of missile defense system to Taiwan. China's ambassador for arms control, Sha Zukang, has stated: "TMD in Taiwan will give the pro-independence forces in Taiwan a sense of security, which may incite them to reckless moves. This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait or even in the entire Northeast Asian Region."[6] This opposition has resulted in a Chinese declaration that if the United States provided TMD to Taiwan "US-Sino relations would suffer a setback unprecedented since the normalization of bilateral ties" because TMD would forge a "de facto military alliance" between the United States and Taiwan.[7] Another major concern is China's fear that the transfer of TMD technology will lead to increased US-Taiwan military cooperation, making it more difficult for China to recover Taiwan. Ambassador Sha has noted that if the United States provides TMD to Taiwan then Taiwan will also require extensive ground support, an early warning radar, and possibly other advanced weapon systems which "will lead to a de facto paramilitary relationship between the US and Taiwan."[8] Such a relationship could set a precedent for more official cooperation, which would hinder China's efforts to isolate Taiwan from the United States. Furthermore, China views the transfer of TMD technology as a violation of the 1982 Sino-US Joint-Communique, which states that "the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution." To the Chinese, transfer of TMD technology would not only violate the US promise to gradually reduce the quantity of arms sales to Taiwan, but would also mark a significant increase in quality. Chinese officials support their position by arguing that missile defense technology potentially has offensive applications and therefore constitutes a form of missile proliferation. China argues that transfers of TMD technology would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by helping Taiwan develop offensive ballistic missiles. Because of this, China has linked its membership in the MTCR to a halt in US efforts to modify the ABM Treaty. Ambassador Sha has stated: transferring TMD systems to other countries or regions, or jointly developing them with other countries, will inevitably result in the proliferation of missile technology. Missile and anti-missile technologies are related. Many of the technologies used in anti-missile systems are easily applicable in offensive missiles. This is one of the main reasons why China stands against the cooperation between the United States and Japan to develop TMD and opposes any transfer of TMD systems to Taiwan.[9]China's argument that missile and anti-missile technologies are intimately related has led to accusations that the United States is hypocritical in proposing to sell TMD technology to Taiwan and Japan while denouncing Chinese missile technology sales to Iran and Pakistan. An unnamed Chinese official reportedly stated that, "Since the US can lead the way in breaking this regime, other countries have an absolute right not to follow the rules of this regime and undertake cooperation on missiles and missile technology with third countries."[10] Arms Racing Across the Taiwan Strait
The US position is that Taiwan's need for TMD is linked to PRC missile deployments. The US has repeatedly criticized China for disrupting peace and stability through its recent missile deployments along the coast and the March 1996 missile exercises in which China lobbed missiles off Taiwan's coastline. Madeline Albright has stated that relaxation of tensions between the two sides would reduce Taiwan's need for missile defenses, which might prevent TMD deployment to Taiwan.[14] China rejects this linkage because it considers the Taiwan problem to be an internal affair that does not affect the security of surrounding states. It argues that foreign powers have no right to sell weapons to Taiwan or to support Taiwan against the mainland. To the Chinese, China's missile deployments are irrelevant because the United States should not be providing TMD or other military items to Taiwan in the first place. China's vocal opposition to TMD deployment in Taiwan contrasts with its relatively muted protest to the sale of Patriot PAC-2 systems to Taiwan in 1997. China's restrained response to the earlier sale was partly due to Chinese efforts to repair relations with the United States following the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The fact that the Patriot PAC-2 systems are primarily intended for air defense and have only limited anti-missile capabilities was probably also a factor. China realizes it cannot force Taiwan to return these systems, but has stated its firm opposition to any further enhancement of Taiwan's missile defense capabilities. Newer TMD systems such as Navy Theater-Wide and Patriot PAC-3 are intended primarily for ballistic missile defense and would require greater integration with early warning sensor technology (including US satellites) for maximum effectiveness. China's Opposition to Theater Missile Defense in JapanUS-Japan cooperation on missile defenses stagnated for years prior to the August 1998 North Korean missile launch. Japan repeatedly studied participation in a TMD program with the US, but refused to make any concrete commitments. Japan's reluctance was based on three legal arguments: (1) Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces collective defense rights, preventing Japan from participating in a multinational global protection program (although a bilateral agreement with the United States would be possible); (2) parliamentary resolutions prevent Japan from using space for military purposes; and (3) Japanese legal requirements specify that Japanese dual-use technology can only be exported to the United States, so precautions must be taken to prevent the United States from transferring Japanese technology to its other allies.[15] On 14 February 1998 the United States and Japan reached an agreement to jointly conduct research on light-weight exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP) technology.[16] However, US-Japan cooperation did not assume a sense of urgency until after the North Korean missile launch. On 26 December 1998 the United States and Japan announced that they would conduct joint research on a TMD system[17] and on 16 August 1999 the United States and Japan signed an agreement for a five year program focusing on development of an advanced missile sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, second stage propulsion and a lightweight nose cone design for the Navy Theater Wide Missile Block 2 missile system. The project is scheduled to be deployed in 2011 and is estimated to cost $500 million, of which Japan is expected to pay more than half.[18] China believes that the United States is using North Korea's missile launch as a pretext for developing missile defenses, especially since Japan was reluctant to cooperate with the United States on missile defense for many years. China states that the North Korean threat should not be exaggerated and that TMD for Japan is unnecessary since the United States and Japan did not develop TMD during the cold war when the danger of attack was much greater.[19] Officially, China has stated four reasons for opposing US-Japan TMD cooperation. First, TMD and NMD are closely related, so joint development of TMD will assist the US in development of NMD. Second, cooperation on TMD would change the nature of the US-Japan military alliance. At present, US protection of Japan restrains Japanese military ambitions. However, TMD cooperation will place the US-Japan military alliance on a more equal basis. China points to the 1997 revisions of the US-Japan defense guidelines which allow Japan to assist the US military in conflicts around Japan as evidence of this trend. Third, Japan is already a major military power. TMD will not only improve Japan's defense industry, but might also encourage Japan to shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy. Chinese analysts claim that Japan will first develop missile defenses (a "shield") and then may develop offensive missile forces (a "spear"). A Japan equipped with strong offensive and defensive capabilities might become more aggressive. Japan has a history of conducting sneak attacks and TMD may make this easier. Fourth, China believes that "US-Japan cooperation on TMD will aggravate tension on the Korean peninsula" and that "the nuclear and missile-related problems with Korea can only be settled by political means through dialogue. Military exercises, missile tests, and deployment of TMD will not help solve the problem and will further intensify the conflict."[20] China's position on TMD is largely influenced by its profound mistrust of Japan, which dates back to the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and atrocities committed during World War II. Ambassador Sha has stated, "We are still suffering from our nightmare with Japan since the war. These are a people who even deny the fact that there was something called the Nanking Massacre; some of them feel it didn't happen at all. So how can we have any confidence in a country like that?"[21] Despite China's strong opposition to TMD cooperation with Japan, PRC officials have indicated a willingness to accept deployment of lower-tier TMD in Japan. China considers lower-tier theater missile defenses to be "legitimate" missile defenses since these systems have a limited footprint that can only protect small areas such as military bases and troop deployments from missile attacks.[22] China's concerns about Japan's development of an upper-tier TMD system, especially a sea-based one, are based on the fear that such a system would also be capable of defending Taiwan in the event of a missile attack from the mainland. The US Navy's Theater Wide (NTW) system could be based in Japan but still be easily deployed near Taiwan. According to a 1999 Pentagon report, one Aegis cruiser equipped with the NTW system could defend all of Taiwan. China's Opposition to National Missile DefenseChina's vehement opposition to US NMD plans is based on two main arguments. On the one hand, China is concerned that US efforts to modify the ABM Treaty and plans to deploy a multi-site NMD system will severely undermine China's small strategic deterrent capability. On the other hand, US NMD plans would lead to a complete halt to US-Russian strategic arms reductions, a possible resumption of an arms race and a general deterioration in other global arms control and nonproliferation efforts such as CTBT ratification and negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).[23] Chinese analysts argue that the United States has exaggerated the risk of rogue nations developing long range missiles with nuclear warheads. Chinese experts have argued that spending the time and resources on developing NMD in response to the rogue-nation missile threat is akin to "using a cannon to hit a fly." US retaliatory capabilities are sufficient to deter rogue nations from launching an attack. Many Chinese further maintain that the United States is using the rogue missile threat as "a pretext" to develop and deploy NMD, when its actual purpose is to contain China. Undermining China's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
Collapse of US-Russian Arms Control Efforts
Chinese Efforts to Counter NMD
Despite these indications, China has stated that it will not enter an arms race with the United States.[25] Having seen the demise of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders do not want to sacrifice China's economic modernization in a costly arms race with the United States. Matching the United States missile for missile or developing a Chinese NMD system would require diverting billions of US dollars and many of China's brightest minds away from economic modernization. This reallocation of resources would only delay China's emergence as a world power and ultimately hinder China's overall military modernization. China's Anti-NMD Diplomatic OffensiveChina has launched a broad diplomatic effort to oppose US efforts to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to deploy NMD. Bilaterally, China has begun cooperating with Russia to denounce NMD as a violation of the ABM Treaty and to halt US efforts to modify the ABM Treaty. Multilaterally, China has used the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to oppose missile defense (and especially space-based missile defenses). Opposition to Revision of ABM Treaty
the ABM Treaty is, however, now confronted with grave challenges flowing from some recent negative developments in the international situation. In seeking its own absolute security and strategic advantage, a state party to the Treaty is now not only vigorously pursuing its own NMD program, but also pressing rapidly ahead with its joint TMD development program with some other individual countries. Such moves not only fly in the face of the purposes and principles of the Treaty, but are also very much at odds with the core provision of the Treaty.[26]China believes that initial US moves to amend the Treaty will only be followed by requests for more amendments, which will eviscerate the Treaty. Sha Zukang has stated: We can say with certainty that once the treaty is amended, it will be amended again and again because of the change of situations, and finally it will be nullified. If so, the "Anti-Missile Treaty" will exist in name only and will be a mere scrap of paper. We hope that the United States will start afresh, give up the treaty amendment attempt, and return to the correct track of really safeguarding the ABM Treaty.[27]As part of its effort to pressure the United States not to modify the ABM Treaty, China has begun cooperating with Russia to condemn US efforts to develop missile defense systems. On 14 April 1999, China and Russia released a joint press communiqué on the ABM Treaty which stated that "to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty is of critical importance" and that the ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone for maintaining global strategic stability." The statement also committed both sides to continue "consultations and cooperation" on efforts to preserve the ABM Treaty.[28] As a result of this cooperation, on 21 October 1999 China co-sponsored a Russian resolution at the United Nations entitled, "Prevention and Compliance with Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty." The resolution called for "renewed efforts by each of the states parties to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty through full and strict compliance."[29] However, Sino-Russian cooperation has thus far been limited to rhetoric. Responding to a question on whether Chinese and Russian opposition to missile defense systems would result in cooperative efforts, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stated that while both countries are opposed to missile defenses, it "did not mean that [we] have already discussed joint measures to counter this program. The time has not yet come for that."[30] Despite Sino-Russian cooperation on revisting changes in the ABM Treaty, Chinese officials are aware that US NMD deployment would not threaten the credibility of Russia's deterrent. They worry that Russia will ultimately compromise with the United States on ABM Treaty revisions at the expense of Chinese interests. China has also proposed making the ABM Treaty a multilateral accord.[31] By becoming a member of the ABM Treaty China would be able to influence negotiations between the United States and Russia, strengthening Russia's opposition to amending the Treaty. China would also be able to prevent the transfer of missile defense technology from the United States to Russia as payment for Russia's approval of the amendments to the Treaty. This effort indicates Chinese fears that Russia will agree to modifications of the ABM treaty that harm China's strategic interests. Opposition at the Conference on Disarmament
A certain country has, on the one hand, tried hard to block the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS at the Conference on Disarmament, but on the other hand, pressed rapidly ahead in pursuing its outer space and missile defense programs in an attempt to seek military advantage on the ground through dominating and controlling outer space. . .The development in the vigorous pursuit of missile defense systems since the beginning of this year is most disturbing.[32]Since China currently lacks the resources to compete with the United States in an outer space arms race, it fears that deployment of space-based weapons could give the United States an overwhelming edge and the ability to negate China's nuclear deterrent for years to come. China is also concerned that an arms race with the technologically superior United States could derail China's economic growth. Although China has a vibrant space program, it would require years and billions of dollars to even approach US space defense technology. China's Indigenous Missile Defense CapabilitiesChina is not opposed to every form of missile defense. China considers lower-tier theater missile defenses to be "legitimate" missile defenses since these systems can only protect small areas from missile attacks. China's approval of lower-tier missile defenses also stems from the fact that China has purchased S-300 (NATO designation: SA-10) anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia which have an inherent anti-missile capability. According to an unconfirmed source, China is also developing its own TMD, called KDI. KDI is said to have a range of 25 km with a maximum speed of Mach 4 and is capable of hitting a number of missiles.[33]China and Russia have reportedly discussed the potential for cooperation in the missile defense area, but to date there has been no evidence that any specific development efforts are underway.[34]
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