Resources on ChinaChina's Nuclear DoctrineChina's official position on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons generally, is that it advocates total nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. According to the July 1998 "white paper" called China's National Defense: "As a nuclear-weapon state, China vigorously supports and participates in the international non-nuclear proliferation efforts, promotes the process of nuclear disarmament and works hard for the realization of the final goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide."For many years after China first tested nuclear weapons its actual nuclear doctrine was unclear. As Alastair Johnston states: "For about 30 years after China exploded its first nuclear weapon there was no coherent, publicly articulated nuclear doctrine." According to some analysts, both foreign and Chinese, this ambiguity is deliberate. [Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-553.] Despite the overall ambiguity, there are some definable attributes of China nuclear doctrine. China has stated that it possesses of a small number of nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defense, and that it manufactures nuclear weapons "exclusively for the purpose of self-defense and does not plan to threaten other countries." China has consistently stated that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time. China has been at the forefront of international efforts to get other countries to adopt a No-First-Use (NFU) policy. In the words of China's 1998 "white paper" on national defense: "From the first day it possessed nuclear weapons, China has solemnly declared its determination not to be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and later undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones." As a result of this defensive orientation, China's doctrine has been characterized as "anti-nuclear blackmail." China reportedly follows a "city-busting" (countervalue) second-strike deterrence strategy. Representative of China's views on this issue, in 1983, Deng Xiaoping stated: "China only wants to adhere to this principle: we must have what others have, and anyone who wants to destroy us will be subject to retaliation." In a 15 July 1997 speech to the US Army War College, Lt. General Li Jijun, Vice President of the PLA's Academy of Military Science described China's nuclear strategy: "China's nuclear strategy is purely defensive in nature. The decision to develop nuclear weapons was a choice China had to make in the face of real nuclear threats. A small arsenal is retained only for the purpose of self-defense. China has unilaterally committed itself to responsibilities not yet taken by other nuclear nations, including the declaration of a no-first-use policy, the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and in nuclear-free zones...In short, China's strategy is completely defensive, focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear blackmail being used against China by other nuclear powers." [“Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,” An Address at the US Army War College by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Letort Paper No. 1, 29 August 1997, p. 7.]However, according to some sources, there is support among Chinese military strategists that China should adopt a nuclear doctrine of "limited deterrence," seeking a capability to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require increased accuracy and expanded deployments. Such a limited deterrence capability may still be a long way off. According to Alastair Johnston, "While the data on extant Chinese operational nuclear capabilities, targeting and launch doctrine are extremely poor, it is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence." [Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-558.] China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing the capacity for a limited nuclear deterrence strategy. Also, reflecting a shift in Chinese military strategy toward the preparation for "local wars," Chinese strategists are contemplating the use of non-nuclear strategic missiles. China's deterrent posture may, therefore, rest on the use of non-nuclear-tipped missiles against non-nuclear-weapon states, coupled with a warning of potential escalation to nuclear attack. China reportedly follows a retaliation strategy similar to one of delayed second strike (DSS): China will retaliate after withstanding a nuclear strike, rather than attempting either a launch under attack (LUA) or a launch-on-warning (LOW)-type strategy, where missiles are launched after detection of an attack but before impact. China arguably does not possess the requisite early warning capabilities in order to move toward a LOW-type policy. It is not clear, however, in what time frame China would retaliate after an initial nuclear attack--hours, days, weeks, or months. In September 1994, China concluded a detargeting and no-first-use (NFU) agreement with Russia and in June 1998 China and the US agreed not to target nuclear weapons at each other. The agreement was called a "non-targeting" accord. For many years, Beijing insisted that such an agreement include a mutual NFU pledge which the United States rejected. Some US analysts speculated that Chinese leaders backed off such a linkage because Beijing recognized the political impossibility of getting a no-first-use commitment from the U.S. and that China traded the non-targeting agreement for a public restatement by President Clinton of the "three no's policy" on Taiwan. Chinese analysts have suggested that the delinking of no-first-use from detargeting was made by senior political officials in China and was opposed by working level officials in China's arms control community. Another issue related to China's nuclear deterrence concerns various US proposals to deploy national and theater missile defenses in the East Asian region. China believes that such developments would undermine the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent, and strongly opposes both NMD and TMD. China has indicated that the further development or deployment of such systems could compel China to expand its nuclear arsenal and intensify its nuclear weapons modernization efforts. [Sources: John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 233; Vipin Gupta, "Assessment Of China's Nuclear Test Site Near Lop Nor," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1993, p. 380; Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming The Dragon For The 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 6; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Yong Liu, "China And A Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," Survival, Winter 1995-96, p. 152; Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 5-42; Viktor Stefashin, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 11 July 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-133, 11 July 1995.] For information on China's current and projected future nuclear weapons capabilities, see: Other Critical Issues Related to China's Nuclear Doctrine:
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