Resources on China

The Consequences of Chinese Espionage to International Security: A Cox Report Review

The 700-page Cox report, released on April 25, should be read in conjunction with the "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment" issued by the Central Intelligence Agency on April 21. While the Cox report was written by a bipartisan congressional committee concerned with American security and commercial interests, the DCI assessment was prepared by an independent panel of senior nuclear and security experts concerned with the damage caused by the espionage.

While much of the Cox report was concerned with the prevention of future losses by improving counterintelligence and export controls, the essence of the Cox report is that the People’s Republic of China stole over a period of 20 years, through espionage, "classified design information on the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons." The report explains what exactly was stolen, from where it was stolen, and how and when it was stolen. The report also predicts how the PRC might use the information to accelerate the improvement of its military force.

The principal data lost, in the form of nuclear test codes, computer design models and other data forms, were in three critical areas:

• nuclear warhead modernization

• missile guidance and design technology

• electromagnetic weapons technology

Based on this data, China's nuclear warhead modernization would most affect U.S. security in three areas:

• Road-mobile ICBM’s

• Submarine-launched ICBMs

• ICBM’s with multiple warheads (MRVs or MIRV’s)

The missile guidance and design technology that would most affect U.S. security would be the technology permitting China to improve the accuracy of its complete range of missiles which could threaten U.S. troops in Asia, American allies and the North American Continent.

Finally, the information on electromagnetic weapons could be used to develop space-based weapons to attack satellites or missiles and could be used to threaten American submarines.

The DCI Damage Assessment noted that China’s principal motivation is to develop survivable long-range missiles that place U.S. and Russian populations at risk in order to prevent intimidation by either country (a second-strike capability). This report recognized that China had obtained weapons design concepts and weaponization features, and that the information did make a significant contribution to China’s second-strike capability. However, it did temper the Cox report somewhat by noting:

• The information obtained was from a variety of sources, including open sources, not just espionage.

• The information was used more to inform and guide China's weapons development programs than to copy U.S. designs.

• Significant deficiencies still exist in China’s weapons development programs and to date the Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force.

• China has had a MRV capability for many years but has not deployed any.

• There is no information available that China has shared U.S. technical information with other countries.

While the Cox Report concludes that China's espionage programs have resulted in the acquisition of "classified information on seven thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal," the consequences of this are less clear and must be taken into the context of China's security strategy and technical capabilities.

• China has been modernizing and professionalizing the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA) for more than 20 years, not just its nuclear forces. The PLA is improving its personnel through better selection and training, it is streamlining its organizations and improving its weapons systems through purchase, reverse engineering, intelligence collection and domestic research and development. Though China is committed to modernizing its nuclear forces, it must be viewed in the context of China's total military modernization effort. It will continue to improve its military, as all nations will. However, it still has only conducted 45 nuclear tests since 1964 and only developed possible MRV capability in 1981 and neutron bomb capability in 1988.

• As stated by the DCI Damage Assessment, China is modernizing their nuclear forces to preserve their second strike capability and to counter future ballistic missile defenses, not to develop a first strike capability. Because of this, China's nuclear forces represent less of a threat to the United States than did Soviet nuclear forces. The United States nuclear forces consist of 11,000 ICBMs, while Chinese nuclear forces include only 20 missiles capable of hitting the United States. While China could rapidly expand its nuclear force, it has not shown an inclination to do so. In fact, China's ability to quickly design and deploy complex weapons systems is questionable. For example, China has not yet deployed the DF-31 ballistic missile, which has been in development for 15 years and still has only one ballistic missile nuclear submarine after launching its first in 1986.

• China values weapons systems not only militarily but also politically. Nuclear weapons improve China's national prestige and influence by exhibiting super- power status. Possession of nuclear weapons are also seen as a deterrent to what China sees as U.S. hegemonistic aggression. Also, China's limited resources will be focused on deterring U.S. involvement in a conflict with Taiwan, rather than preparing for a nuclear war with the United States.

China's espionage must also be viewed in the broader context of its arms control and nonproliferation policies. While China has been seen as a proliferator of missile technology, in recent years China has come to realize that arms control can also enhance its national security and has consequently increased its membership in nonproliferation and arms control regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Based on this broader context, China's theft of US nuclear secrets must be viewed with concern, but should not be the defining issue in US-Sino relations. Like every country, China will modernize its armed forces through all available means and the United States must be fully aware of this. However, to really achieve national security, the dialogue between the United States and China will need to continue in order to understand both country's frame of reference and to develop a true strategic partnership for the future.

To learn more about China's nuclear weapons program, see the following:

• China's Nuclear Delivery System Modernization
• China's Nuclear Testing Program
• China's Nuclear Stockpile and Deployments