Archived Material

This page is no longer being reviewed/updated.
ARCHIVED MATERIALThis page is no longer being reviewed/updated.

Resources on China

Nuclear Warhead Modernization

MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MRV)/MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) MODERNIZATION/WARHEAD MINIATURIZATION

In order to preserve its second strike capability, China has conducted an ongoing program to develop MRV/MIRV technology as well as nuclear warhead miniaturization.  To increase survivability, China has sought to make their nuclear weapon systems smaller and lighter in order to make their forces more mobile.  The effort to develop these technologies reflect China's concerns over regional conflicts as well as future ballistic missile defense capabilities and consists of the collection of foreign classified and unclassified information as well as indigenous development.

In September 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle, reportedly giving it an incipient multiple-warhead capability. Since the mid-1980s, China has reportedly conducted missile flight tests involving MRVs, and in May 1995, China flight-tested the DF-31 missile equipped with MRVs. The London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that PRC nuclear tests indicated that China is developing "a number of new weapons," including small warheads for use on multiple warhead land-based missiles. Robert S. Norris concurred, stating, " the recent series of nuclear tests were aimed at providing warheads with improved yield-to-weight ratios for the next generation of ballistic missiles. The yield estimates of the 11 nuclear tests since 1990 suggest that one warhead candidate may be in the 100 to 200 kt range and a larger one in the 600 to 700 kt range."  IISS also reported that China had already tested a version of the DF-5 ICBM with a MIRV capability. Paul Dibb estimates that by 2010 China will deploy 50-70 MIRVed solid-fuel ICBMs with ranges of 8,000-12,000 km, deployed either on mobile launchers or in hardened silos. Dibb also states that China will deploy six SSBNs with 8,000 km-range MIRVed SLBMs.

Military sources have also indicated that China is expected to produce MIRV technology in the near future, along with  miniaturized warheads for use on MIRVed missiles.The new ballistic missile systems currently in development (the DF-31/JL-2 and DF-41) will reportedly use a new 200-300 kT warhead, which awaits certification. The new warhead is reportedly almost identical to the one currently deployed on the JL-1 and DF-21 systems, but Chinese designers have had problems with warhead miniaturization.

In early 1999, attention focused on Chinese espionage's role in nuclear warhead development.  A US intelligence community assessment of China's acquisition of US nuclear weapons information concluded that US nuclear weapons information obtained through "classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with US and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified US weapons information . . . have probably accelerated China's program to develop future nuclear weapons."  Specifically, the report concluded:

  • China obtained at least basic design information on several modern US nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88).
  • China also obtained information on a variety of US weapon design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb.
  • It is more likely that the Chinese used US design information to inform their own program than to replicate US weapons designs.
However, significant deficiencies remain in China's weapons program remain.  While China has the capability to develop MIRV technology for its missiles, it has not done so.

[Sources: Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 29-30; Chong Pin Lin, "Red Fist: China's Army In Transition," International Defense Review, February 1995, p. 32; Duncan Lennox, "Briefing: Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 1996, p. 44; Vipin Gupta, "The Status Of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, p. 31; Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 5; SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 378-379; Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming The Dragon For The 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 8; The Military Balance 1995/96, p. 176; Paul Dibb, "The Future Military Capabilities Of Asia's Great Powers," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1995, p. 230; Francis Deron, Le Monde (Paris), 8/25/95, p. 2, in FBIS-TAC-95-005, 25 August 1995; "China Exploded More Than Two Warheads-Paper," Reuter, 12 June 1996, in Executive News Service, 12 June 1996; Nicholas Doughty, Reuter, 12 October 1994; in Executive News Service, 12 October 1994; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Winter 1995/96, pp. 55-56; Paul H.B. Godwin and John J. Schulz, "China And Arms Control: Transition In East Asia," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 9; Lien Ho Pao (Hong Kong), 12 November 1995, p. 8; "New Nuclear Weapons Said Goal Of Current Tests," FBIS-CHI-95-218, 12 November 1995; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China: A Status Report," presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu, China, November 1996, p. 5; "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November-December 1996, p. 66]

For more information, see:


Last Updated June 1998


Copyright 1998, All Rights Reserved
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Monterey, CA 93940 USA (408) 647-6509


Return to the Cox Report Review
Return to the CNS Resources on China