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China's 11 May 1996 Pledge Not to Provide Assistance to Unsafeguarded Nuclear Facilities

Summary:

As a result of the US-China discussions that took place following the discovery of the sale of about 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), China pledged to the United States that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities--i.e. facilities not covered by IAEA safeguards--and privately confirmed that the pledge included ring magnets of the kind that had previously been transferred. This pledge reflects a "link" between China's obligations as a nuclear weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations regarding nuclear exports to countries not bound by the NPT (such as Pakistan). This pledge has been given legal effect as part of China's September 1997 nuclear export control regulations.

Comments and Statements:

On 11 May 1996, China's Xinhua news service released the following public statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following talks with the United States:

"Beijing, May 11. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman here today answered a question raised by a reporter on the decision of the US Government not to impose sanctions on China.

Question: It is reported that the US Government has announced that it has decided not to impose sanctions on China and decided to resume normal operations of US Eximbank in China. What is your comment on this?

Answer: We have taken note of the above report. As a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China strictly observes its obligations under the treaty, and is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons...The nuclear cooperation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively for peaceful purposes. China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. China stands for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the strengthening of safeguards and export control measures. [emphasis added]"

The day before, on 10 May 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States would not impose sanctions on China or Pakistan for the Chinese transfer of ring magnets to Pakistan. The State Department stated that this decision was based on:
    (1) China's pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,
    (2) its reaffirmation of its nuclear nonproliferation commitments, and
    (3) its agreement to conduct consultations with the United States on export control and proliferation issues.
The State Department also said that there was no evidence that the central Chinese government had "wilfully aided or abetted" Pakistan's nuclear weapon program with the ring magnet transfer.

According to the 10 May 1996 US State Department public statement, the Chinese confirmed that this pledge covers the future transfer of ring magnets and other nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated, "These were not winks and nods and smiles. These were express, clear assurances at the senior-most level of the Chinese government to the secretary of state." Burns said the assurances consisted of "oral commitments made to us by the government of China (and also) commitments that were conveyed through cable traffic...There is a written record of this that the historians here...will be able to talk about in ten years time or so." Burns further stated that "We and the Chinese were very clear that this general pledge the Chinese made in their written statements specifically includes ring magnets...Moreover, the United States and China together have agreed to follow up consultations at the expert level to build on these assurances." Further, "there is going to be verification of this agreement. And there's going to be a big American spotlight on some of the Chinese companies that have engaged in these practices in the past. The Chinese understand that."

Some later US government comments on the Chinese 11 May 1996 pledge include the following:

  • November 1997: In its November 1997 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated that since the May 1996 pledge:
  • "the United States has raised with Beijing concerns about certain activities with Pakistan, but there is no basis to conclude that China is not honoring its pledge." [Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997 (online version).]

  • 29 October 1997: A senior administration official stated:
  • "We have monitored this pledge very carefully over the course of the last 16, 18 months, and the Chinese appear to be taking their pledge very seriously. We have no basis to conclude that they have acted inconsistently with this May 1996 commitment."
     

  • 27 October 1997: In response to Clinton's statement, US Senators Shelby and Helms, along with nine other Senators, said in a letter to the White House that "We believe it is too soon to conclude that China has changed its policies sufficiently to merit access to US nuclear technology".
  • 24 October 1997: During his speech on "China and the National Interest," President Clinton stated: "China has lived up to its pledge not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in third countries".
  • 18 September 1997: US State Department briefer James Rubin stated in a press briefing:
"We certainly believe that since May 1996, they have followed through on their commitment not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded reactors."
  • 18 August 1997: US State Department briefer James Rubin stated in a press briefing:
"we believe that China has taken no actions that we have been able to confirm to violate the commitment it's made on May 11 of 1996. That does not mean, however, that we are fully comfortable with this whole area. We've received a number of reports, disturbing reports, in recent weeks and months...But at this point, our view...is that we believe that China has taken no action to violate that commitment."
  • August 1997: the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated, in its annual report on compliance with arms control agreement:
"On May 11, 1996, China stated that it would provide no assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Our current information does not provide a basis for concluding that China has acted inconsistently with that statement." [ACDA, "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," August 1997.]
  • October 1996: State Department spokesman Burns said: "China, we believe, based on the information available to us, is meeting its commitments made to us in its 11 May statement".
  • May 1996: US Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff told the Congress that "We have absolutely binding assurances from China, which we consider a commitment on its part, not to export any other technologies to unsafeguarded facilities."
A lingering point of discussion between the United States and China since the 11 May pledge concerned exactly what China's pledge not to provide "assistance" meant--that is, what kinds of activities or items the term "assistance" included. On 11 September 1997, China issued new nuclear export control regulations. Clause #3 of the 22-clause regulations states that China prohibits the conduct of (1) nuclear exports, (2) personnel and technical exchange, or (3) cooperation to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. These three areas may reflect a US-China understanding about the term "assistance" contained in the original 11 May 1996 pledge.

[Sources: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," 29 October 1997; US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement By Nicholas Burns, Spokesman," 10 May 1996; "A Chronology: The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," Minority Staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Carol Giacomo, Reuter, 14 May 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Silent On Nuclear Export Plans," Washington Post, 14 May 1996, p. A9; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, pp. 3, 6; Kathleen Hart and Mark Hibbs, "Clinton Administration Steps Up China Talks On Nuclear Exports," Nucleonics Week, 24 October 1996, p. 6; "Administration can't say if China is giving nuclear aid to Pakistan," Associated Press, 20 August 1997; Department of State Daily Briefing, 18 August 1997; "Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, 18 September 1997; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Senators Doubt China's Pledge On Pakistan Ties," Washington Post, 28 October 1997, p. 9.]


Last Updated January 1998
Copyright 1998, All Rights Reserved
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
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