Resources on India and PakistanMissile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)Summary: The Missile Technology Control Regime (mtcr) is a set of guidelines regulating the export of missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The mtcr was formed in 1987 by the G-7 partners, and is an informal voluntary arrangement, not a treaty or an international agreement. The mtcr consists of common export policy applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the context of its own national export laws. In addition to the mtcr's members, a number of countries unilaterally observe -- or "adhere to"-- the Guidelines. The mtcr considers "missiles" to include: ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles (SLVs) and sounding rockets. UAVs include: cruise missiles, drones, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). The mtcr Guidelines specifically state that the Regime is "not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction." The mtcr was originally concerned only with nuclear capable delivery systems. In January 1993, the Partners extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems capable of delivering all WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological). The mtcr’s annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into "Category I" and "Category II" items. It includes equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production, and operation. According to the Guidelines, export of Category I items is subject to a presumption of export denial. Category I includes complete rocket systems, unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones, specially-designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems. Category II covers a wide range of parts, components and subsystems such as propellants, structural materials, test equipment and facilities, and flight instruments. These items may be exported at the discretion of the mtcr Partner government, on a case by case basis, for acceptable end-uses. They may also be exported under government-to-government assurances, which provide that they not be used on a missile system capable of delivering a 500 kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers. For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/. China and the mtcr: China is not a member of the mtcr, but has agreed to abide by the original 1987 mtcr Guidelines and Annex (not the subsequent revisions). China first verbally pledged that it would adhere to the mtcr in November 1991, and included these assurances in a letter from Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in February 1992. China reiterated its pledge in the October 1994 US-China joint statement. China's pledges to abide by the mtcr (in 1992 and 1994) have been presented bilaterally to the United States in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. In its October 1994 joint statement with the United States, China agreed to the concept of "inherent capability," which states that "the missile would be included in the ban if it could generate sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload." In their 29 October 1997 joint statement, the United States and China stated that they agree "to build on the 1994 Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation. They reaffirm their respective commitments to the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (mtcr)." China was not included in the original negotiations of the mtcr, and China initially insisted that, since it was not party to the mtcr negotiations and was not a member of the regime, China should not be held to mtcr restrictions. Furthermore, China criticized the regime for being discriminatory, for failing to restrict ground-attack aircraft (which China argues are equally capable delivery systems for WMD), and for interfering with the internal affairs of sovereign countries. For example, Chinese arms control researcher Liu Huaqiu argued in a November 1995 paper that: Chinese compliance with the mtcr: US law requires that sanctions be placed on countries that export equipment or technology restricted by mtcr guidelines, and in June 1991 the United States imposed sanctions on China for allegedly exporting M-11 missile technology to Pakistan and planning to export M-9 missile technology to Syria. In November 1991, China for the first time gave verbal assurances to the United States that it would adhere to the mtcr guidelines, in return for which the United States lifted the sanctions. This deal was finalized in February 1992, when China gave written assurances that it would abide by the mtcr. In August 1993, the United States again imposed sanctions on China for allegedly transferring M-11 missile technology to Pakistan. China responded by calling the sanctions groundless and threatening to scrap its promise to abide by mtcr guidelines. The impasse was broken in October 1994, when China and the United States issued a joint statement on missile proliferation, in which China agreed to ban all exports of mtcr-class missiles, and the US agreed to lift sanctions. China's 1994 commitment exceeds the "strong presumption of denial" principle contained in the mtcr Guidelines. China also agreed to the "inherent capability" principle in defining an mtcr-class missile. In April 1997 testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn stated that since the 1994 joint statement:
"At a minimum, the Chinese do not appear to interpret their responsibilities under the guidelines as restrictively as we do, or as other mtcr members do. (Although China states that it abides by the mtcr guidelines, it is not a member of the multilateral regime.) Moreover, as we have learned more about current Chinese procedures for controlling missile-related goods and services, we have become more skeptical about the ability of Beijing's control system to implement missile restraints effectively. We will continue to urge the Chinese to live up to their October 1994 commitment, to interpret that commitment meaningfully, and to put in place the control regulations and procedures that would enable them to fulfill it conscientiously. In addition, we will need to review the applicability of relevant provisions of U.S. law." [Testimony by Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997.] [Sources: Richard T. Cupitt, "Export Controls And The
People's Republic Of China: Some Considerations," The Monitor: Nonproliferation,
Demilitarization, and Arms Control, Center for International Trade
and Security, University of Georgia, Fall 1995, p. 15; Robert Shuey and
Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For
Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, pp. 2-3; Harry Harding, "Cooperative
Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global
Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 425..]
For more on missile proliferation issues, see: [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN] Last Updated January 1998
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