Resources on India and Pakistan

China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan - Statements and Developments

For more in-depth information on open source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.

1999

6/99: Li Peng, while on a visit to Pakistan, told reporters April 10th that "the nuclear devices Pakistan exploded were the results of Pakistan's own scientific research, and our cooperation in the nuclear field with Pakistan is limited to the peaceful use of nuclear energy." ["China/Pakistan: No weapons aid", Nucleonics Week, 4/15/99]

4/29/99: In testimony before a Congressional committee, John Lauder - the head of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, described the CIA's views on recent progress and continuing concerns about China's nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation activities. He stated:

"The China story is a mixed picture. China is actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology, and tightened chemical export controls. We cannot yet be certain, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective, and worrisome contacts continue between Chinese entities and countries of concern.

Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear and chemical matters than on missile assistance." [Unclassified Statement for the Record by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka The Deutsch Commission), 29 April 1999.]

4/15/99:  According to The Washington Times,  a classified Pentagon report produced in March concluded that "the Chinese are proliferating on a consistent basis without technically breaking agreements with the United States."  China Poly Venture Co. disguised the shipment of U.S. metal working presses and a special furnace to Pakistan's National Development Center as "Masada Cookware." [Bill Gertz, "China still shipping arms despite pledges", The Washington Times, April 15, 1999]

2/26/99: Following the India and Pakistani nuclear tests, however, new signs emerged that China had permanently curtailed its military nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.  In remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-Indian relations, China's ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that China had not assisted Pakistan's nuclear program, stating "non-existent is the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that "all cooperation between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards."  Zhou acknowledged that China was aware of India's concerns regarding China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan and that Beijing had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned."["PRC Envoy: China Hopes To Develop Good Bilateral Ties," The Hindustan Times, 26 February 1999 in FBIS 26 February 1999; and "Chinese Envoy: China Not 'Threat' to India," Deccan Herald, 27 February 1999.]

1998

11/4/98: In an interview with Janes's Defense Weekly, Dr. A. Q. Kahn, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon, denied that China aided Pakistan in developing its nuclear weapons. He said, "I can tell you with full authority and very honestly that we have had no access to any Chinese data. If we produce a hamburger, the West will say that it has been copied by McDonald's." [Robert Karniol, Jane's Defense Weekly," 4 November 1998, p. 21-22]

2/26/98: In a meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chinese Premier Li Peng, the subject of Chinese assistance in the construction of a second nuclear power unit at Chashma was reportedly raised. Prime Minister Sharif said that the sides discussed "expansion" of the Chashma plant by building "new auxiliary power units," but added that "detailed discussion will have to take place before any final decision is made in this regard." ["China May Build Another PWR at Pakistan's Chashma Station," Nucleonics Week, 26 February 1998, p.1.]

01/28/98: The Director of Central Intelligence stated:

"Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in these countries. On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching." [Director of Central Intelligence, "Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," 28 January 1998.]

06/97: The Director of Central Intelligence stated that China "was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996. [Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions--July-December 1996, June 1997.]

1996

12/5/96: Pakistan stated that China agreed in principle to sell a second nuclear power plant to Pakistan. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, "In principle, the Chinese are willing to do so. The question of financing has yet to be resolved." [Tahir Ikram, "China Said Ready to Provide N-Plant To Pakistan," Reuters, 5 December 1996.]

12/3/96: Pakistan objected to the US urging that China end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that "No international convention or law has been violated...No country should object to this." He added that "If the United States has objections, it is their opinion...There can be no objection to this [nuclear cooperation] under international law." [Reuters, 3 December 1996; in Executive News Service, 3 December 1996; Tahir Ikram, "China Said Ready To Provide N-Plant To Pakistan," Reuters, 5 December 1996.]

12/2/96: The United States urged China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated: "We think it's best that China refrain from any type of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan...We don't think it's wise...even to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with safeguarded nuclear facilities." Burns added that "the United States does not participate in or encourage in any way any kind of nuclear trade or nuclear cooperation, even with safeguarded facilities, in Pakistan." Burns said he was not surprised with China's insistence that it would continue such cooperation, stating, "we don't always see eye-to-eye with the Chinese on this particular issue." [Refet Kaplan, "US Eases Pressure On China Over Nuke Deal With Pakistan," Washington Times, 3 December 1996, p. 11; Reuters, 2 December 1996.]

12/1/96: During a visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said: "China and Pakistan enjoy good cooperation in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...and our cooperation in this regard will continue." In response to allegations that China sells sensitive military and nuclear technology to Pakistan, Shen said, "This situation does not exist...so there is no need to discuss it." The 1 December Sino-Pakistani meetings were apparently intended to assure Pakistan that China did not plan to discontinue its nuclear assistance to Islamabad. ["Chinese To Ignore US Nuke Concerns," Washington Times, 2 December 1996, p. A11; Associated Press, 2 December 1996; News (Islamabad), 2 December 1996, in FBIS-NES-96-232, 2 December 1996.]

11/29/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated during a press conference in New Delhi: "The Chinese government does not, did not, and will not sell or transfer any nuclear weapon or technology to any country." Shen also stated: "We have some cooperation on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with Pakistan, but that is strictly supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." [Clarence Fernandez, Reuters, 29 November 1996.]

10/9/96: US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that "Senior-level people in this government have looked at these specific charges and, based on the information available to use, we do not conclude that China has violated the commitments it made in its 11 May statement." We've looked at this question, at this matter, very closely in great detail." Burns did not comment, however, on whether or not the transfer violated the NPT or U.S domestic laws. Burns also did not deny the authenticity of the 14 September 1996 CIA report, criticizing "another leak of a highly classified intelligence report." A senior State Department official, in response to a question of whether the transfer occurred or not, said: "I can't confirm that, but that's a possibility." [R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 3; Patrick Worsnip, Reuters, 9 October 1996; Reuters, 10 October 1996.]

9/96: China reportedly recently sold a special industrial furnace and high technology diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded facilities in Pakistan, apparently a violation of its 5/11/96 pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, according to a 14 September 1996 CIA report quoted in The Washington Times. The equipment reportedly is of a dual-use nature and could be applied to either civilian or military applications. The report also said that Chinese technicians were in Pakistan in September 1996 to install the equipment. The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) reportedly may have arranged the transfer. According to the CIA report, "In the aftermath of CNEIC's ring-magnet sale to Pakistan and China's 11 May commitment not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, senior-level government approval probably was needed for this most recent assistance." The report also alleged that China planned to submit false documentation on the equipment's final destination. High-temperature furnaces (also called vacuum or "skull" furnaces) can reportedly be used to mold uranium or plutonium into bomb cores for use in nuclear weapons, and mold titanium for missile nose cones and other key components. The equipment may have been headed for Pakistan's Khushab heavy water reactor.

A Pakistani embassy spokesman denied that Pakistan had received any illegal shipments of nuclear technology from China. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman said that "We deny that there was any nuclear weapons-related transfer to Pakistan...I regret to say that we seem to be becoming the victims of a series of leaks, some of which are...simply motivated or inspired by the electoral fever in the United States and by their own internal shadow-boxing among themselves. This unfortunate trend gives chances to those lobbies which are motivated against Pakistan to raise these issues. But as happened in earlier cases, I think this also will fade away."

Chinese embassy spokesman Yu Shuning dismissed the Washington Times report "groundless" and "irresponsible." After concluding an internal investigation of the sale, the Chinese government told the United States that the sale took place in late 1995 and early 1996, before its 11 May 1996 pledge.

A senior US official stated, "We are satisfied, without just taking their word for it, that the Chinese are making a real effort to comply with their commitment in May...We are also pleased that they conducted a real investigation to get to the bottom of this matter." A senior administration official, under condition of anonymity, said that "This [CIA] report is not true. The allegation is not true, there has been no violation of the pledge." [Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, pp. A1, A9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 3; Reuters, 10 October 1996; UPI, 9 October 1996; in Executive News Service, 9 October 1996.]

8/30/96: The US State Department issued a diplomatic note (demarche) to Beijing, protesting China's reported sale of a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, according to a 14 September 1996 CIA report. [Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, p. A1; Warren P. Strobel and Bill Gertz, "Chinese General Hits Arms Reports," Washington Times, 10 December 1996.]

8/96: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

5/21/96: Chinese specialists and firms are reportedly assisting Pakistan with the construction of the Khushab reactor. [PTI news agency (New Dehli), 21 May 1996; in BBC Monitoring Service, 23 May 1996.]

5/11/96: Xinhua released a public statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following talks with the United States. The statement read as follows:

5/10/96: US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States would not impose imposing sanctions on China or Pakistan for the Chinese transfer of ring magnets to Pakistan. The State Department stated that this decision was due to China's pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, its reaffirmation of its nuclear nonproliferation commitments, and its agreement to conduct consultations with the United States on export control and proliferation issues. The State Department also said that there was no evidence that the central Chinese government had "willfully aided or abetted" Pakistan's nuclear weapon program with the ring magnet transfer. [Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, pp. 3, 6.]

According to the 10 May 1996 US State Department public statement, the Chinese confirmed that this pledge covers the future transfer of ring magnets and other nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated, "These were not winks and nods and smiles. These were express, clear assurances at the senior-most level of the Chinese government to the secretary of state." Burns said the assurances consisted of "oral commitments made to us by the government of China (and also) commitments that were conveyed through cable traffic...There is a written record of this that the historians here...will be able to talk about in ten years time or so." Burns further stated that "We and the Chinese were very clear that this general pledge the Chinese made in their written statements specifically includes ring magnets...Moreover, the United States and China together have agreed to follow up consultations at the expert level to build on these assurances." Further, "there is going to be verification of this agreement. And there's going to be a big American spotlight on some of the Chinese companies that have engaged in these practices in the past. The Chinese understand that." According to one US official, "We would have preferred greater specificity and public clarity and all of that...I cannot promise you that their definition of assistance is the same as ours, but it is clearly more extensive [than what China had maintained previously,] and it clearly includes ring magnets." [US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement By Nicholas Burns, Spokesman," 10 May 1996; "A Chronology: The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," Minority Staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Carol Giacomo, Reuter, 14 May 1996; in Executive News Service, 14 May 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Silent On Nuclear Export Plans," The Washington Post, 14 May 1996, p. A9.]

4/21/96: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China would not violate the NPT, saying, "The Chinese position is clear...We signed a treaty on the (non) proliferation of nuclear weapons, and never will we attempt it (proliferation)." This statement came in response to US pressure over its nuclear-related sales to Pakistan. [Reuters, 21 April 1996.]

4/15/96: It was reported that a vice-president of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) admitted that its subsidiary China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan for between $50,000-70,000. A CNEIC official stated he had no knowledge of the transaction.

Chinese officials reportedly argue that China should not be punished for two reasons:

(1) the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the NSG trigger list only bans ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance;

(2) the sale was not approved at a high Chinese governmental level. [Kathy Chen, "Beijing Admits To Sale Of Ring Magnets To Pakistan In Bid To Clear US Tension," Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996, p. B6.]

4/12/96: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied accusations that China has re-transferred sensitive nuclear materials to other countries, stating that "Technologies and equipment imported by China...are subject to the strict control and supervision of the Chinese government. No Chinese company has ever violated its commitment...Chinese companies...have always acted in accordance with international practices," which include a "promise not to transfer the product to any third country." ["China Rejects Allegations Of Nuclear Exports," Reuters, 12 April 1996.]

4/5/96: During US-Chinese talks, China claimed that the nuclear technologies it sold to Pakistan could not be used to develop or produce nuclear weapons, and that China strictly adheres to international legal norms in its nuclear cooperation with other countries. ["China Again Denies Selling Nuclear Technologies...," Itar-Tass, 5 April 1996.]

4/4/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied that CNNC sold nuclear technology to Pakistan, stating that "China is a responsible state" that "has never and will never transfer any equipment or technology that could be viable for the production of nuclear weapons." Shen stated that as an NPT signatory, China "strictly abides by its commitments" and "does not advocate, encourage or carry out nuclear proliferation." Shen also stated that "Corporations in China are not eligible to make any kind of transactions that violate China's export policies...Sanctions based on rumors are ill-advised." ["China Denies Nuclear Technology Sale To Pakistan, "United Press International, 4 April 1996; AFP (Hong Kong), 4 April 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Warns On Imposing Sanctions Over Nuclear Row," FBIS-CHI-96-066, 4 April 1996.]

4/96: It was reported that an unidentified China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) official told Hong Kong's South China Morning Post that a CNNC subsidiary sold ring magnets to Pakistan in 1995, but he insisted they were not sophisticated enough for the production of weapons-grade uranium. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied that CNNC sold nuclear technology to Pakistan, stating that "Corporations in China are not eligible to make any kind of transactions that violate China's export policies." ["China Denies Nuclear Technology Sale To Pakistan," UPI, 4 April 1996.]

3/27/96: US officials stated that the sale of ring magnets by China to Pakistan may have taken place without the knowledge of China's central government. During a meeting between US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn and Chinese officials, China stated that the sale was conducted by an office within the state-run organization responsible for nuclear affairs, without the knowledge of the central government. At one point, China claimed that the ring magnets were to be used in automobile windshield wipers. [Sid Balman, Jr., "US Unsure China Knew Of Nuclear Sale," UPI, 27 March 1996.]

3/26/96: In response to reports that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that "China has never transferred or sold technology or equipment for the production of nuclear weapons to Pakistan." [Itar-Tass (Moscow), 26 March 1996; in "China Denies Reports On Nuke Technology For Pakistan," NNN News, 26 March 1996.]

3/20/96: Syed Rifaat Hussain, Pakistan's Minister for Press and Information, stated that "We categorically deny the claim...that China sold sensitive nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan last year. No such transaction ever took place. Contrary to your story, Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is purely for peaceful purposes and in accord with non-proliferation treaties." ["Pakistan Denies Nuclear Transaction," Wall Street Journal, 20 March 1996, p. A17.]

3/19/96: US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn held talks with Chinese officials in Beijing regarding US concerns of Chinese nuclear cooperation with unsafeguarded facilities. The United States is reportedly concerned with a "pattern of nuclear cooperation," not only specific cases of assistance. Einhorn reportedly is seeking a "common understanding" with the Chinese on what compliance with the NPT means. [Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 18 March 1996.]

2/21/96: Lu Wenxiang, First Secretary of the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, stated that China "does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons...the accusation of China's sale of nuclear weapon technology components to Pakistan is false." ["China, Pakistan And The Bomb," Washington Post, 21 February 1996, p. A18.]

2/15/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, in response to a report that the CIA had evidence that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, stated:

2/96: China has stated that it only conducts "normal international cooperation on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with Pakistan." [Evan S. Medeiros, "US Considers Sanctions On China For Weapons, Technology Transfers," Arms Control Today, February 1996, p. 21.]

2/96: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing did not deny the ring magnet sale, but stated that the sale was within the context of China's "peaceful nuclear cooperation" with Pakistan and that China has always fulfilled its obligations to the NPT.

1/96: US officials stated that Chinese firms are helping Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program, according to new intelligence information. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) officials told US diplomats that they "could not confirm" that Chinese firms are aiding in Pakistan's fissile material production efforts. [Mark Hibbs, "China Said Aiding Kahuta Project; US Credits, NPT Status On Line," Nucleonics Week, 8 February 1996, pp. 1, 12.]

1995

Late 1995: the CIA told the State Department that a China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) subsidiary, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), had supplied Pakistan's unsafeguarded state-run A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, a reported nuclear weapons laboratory, with 5,000 specialized ring magnets for the top suspension bearing of high-speed gas centrifuges to be installed at the facility. The deal was valued at between $50,000-70,000.

9/95: It was reported that Pakistan is negotiating with China for a second nuclear power reactor. ["China/Pakistan: Nuclear Power Plant Proceeding Toward Operational Readiness," S&T Perspectives, 15 September 1995, p. 8.]

6/4/95: Citing US intelligence officials, Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Foundation said China is helping Pakistan construct a research plutonium facility at Khushab which could provide Pakistan with plutonium for nuclear weapons. Spector said Pakistan can already construct nuclear weapons in "hours" by using highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The aid is also alarming because, according to Spector, "It means the Pakistanis have not frozen their nuclear weapons program as had been believed." [Asian Recorder, 4-10 June 1995, p. 24.]

5/30/95: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

4/8/95: Pakistan's construction of a 40 MW reactor at Khushab has raised concern among Clinton administration officials, who believe it would result in giving Pakistan to large amounts of plutonium. Clinton administration officials have attempted to dissuade China and other countries from becoming involved in the Khushab project. However, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto states that the Khushab plant is "tied into our nuclear power plant from China." US further note that a partially-built reprocessing plant near the Chinese-supplied reactor at Chashma would be completed within several years and, as an indigenously-produced facility, the heavy water reactor at Khushab would be exempt from international inspections. [R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 April 1995, p. A20.]

2/95: It was reported the discussions are underway regarding a second PWR. The China Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) agreed in principle to build a 300 MW reactor at the Chashma power station. ["Late News In Brief," Nuclear News, February 1995, p. 63.]

1994

6/94: China reportedly denied a Pakistani request for Chinese scientists to "correct" Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and denied a Pakistani request to use China's Lop Nur test range. [Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 August 1994, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 22 August 1994, p.16.]

1993

9/93: It was announced that more than half of $47 million in loans that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China will give to 18 nuclear power equipment companies in Shanghai will finance the production of essential equipment for the 300 MW nuclear power plant under construction by CNNC in Pakistan. [Xinhua (Beijing), 15 September 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-030, 27 September 1993; China Daily; in ENS NucNet, 23 September 1993.]

8/1/93: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) President Ishfaq Ahmad and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) President Jiang Xinxiong participated in ceremonies marking the pouring of the first concrete at Pakistan's 300 MW Chashma power plant. [Nuclear News, September 1993, p. 69; Nuclear Engineering International, November 1993, p. 7.]

2/24/93: China and the IAEA signed the "Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China (INFCIRC/418)." The agreement entered into force on the same day. The agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 19 June 1992. ["Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China," INFCIRC/418, March 1993.]

1/93: The Bush administration issued an arms control compliance report which concluded that before China joined the NPT, it "had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives," and asserted that the "United States has continuing concern regarding such assistance since China's accession" to the NPT. [John Glenn, Washington Post, 3 December 1993, p. A29.]

1992

2/92: China and Pakistan signed two agreements supplementing the first agreement. The first contract was confirmed by Pakistan's first down payment. ["International Briefs," Nuclear News, April 1992, p. 68; "International Briefs," Nuclear News, February 1993, p. 52.]

1991

12/31/91: Jiang Xinxiong, General Manager of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Ishfaq Ahmad, Chair of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), signed a contract on 31 December 1991 under which China will export a 300 MW nuclear power plant to Pakistan. Chinese Premier Li Peng was present at the signing ceremony in Beijing. According to a CNNC official, the two countries' Prime Ministers agreed in principle to the deal in November 1989. The 23rd meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee ratified the decision calling for China to join the NPT, according to Premier Li Peng. Li and Pakistan's Minister of State A.G.H. Qazi also said the Sino-Pakistan agreement is completely for "peaceful purposes," and both sides stated that the 300 MW plant will be built and operated under IAEA safeguards. ["Pakistan Gets Confirmation On Chinese Reactor," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; "More On Qinshan, Daya Bay," Proliferation Issues, 13 March 1992, pp. 4-5; "Nuclear Cooperation Accord Signed With Pakistan," Proliferation Issues, 16 January 1992, p. 2; "Deal Closed With China For 300-MWe PWR Import," Nuclear News, February 1992, p. 40.]

9/10/91: A Pakistan-IAEA agreement on applying safeguards to the miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) provided by China to Pakistan was signed and entered into force. The IAEA's Board of Governors approved the deal on 20 February 1990. [IAEA Information Circular, October 1991.]

9/91: US officials have alleged that China provided Pakistan with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons, and that Pakistan now has a "workable bomb" weighing 180 kg. German officials say China sold Pakistan enough Tritium in 1986 for ten nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been testing nuclear weapons parts of Chinese design with the aid of Chinese scientists at a clandestine nuclear project in Kahuta. ["Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19.]

1/24/91: It was reported that China was assisting Pakistan in fuel fabrication for Pakistan's Parr-1 research reactor. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.]

1990

12/3/90: Pakistan and the IAEA signed a safeguards agreement for the Chinese-supplied Parr-2 reactor. ["Pakistan Safeguards," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1991, p. 3.]

2/20/90: The IAEA's Board of Governors approved the agreement between the IAEA and Pakistan on applying safeguards to the miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) provided by China to Pakistan. [IAEA Information Circular, October 1991.]

1989

11/16/89: Chinese Premier Li Peng announced that China would provide Pakistan with a 300 MW nuclear power reactor. The same month, China and Pakistan agreed in principle to China's supplying to Pakistan of a 300 MW power reactor. [Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 109; "Nuclear Cooperation Accord Signed With Pakistan," Proliferation Issues, 16 January 1992, p. 2; "China To Supply PWR In 300-Mwe Range," Nuclear News, January 1990, p. 73.]

5/4/89: In response to a reporter's question regarding China's testing of a nuclear bomb for Pakistan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated:

1/19/89: During a weekly press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Zhaoxing stated:

1986

1986: China reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan. According to German officials, China sold Pakistan enough Tritium in 1986 for ten nuclear weapons. ["Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4.]

1986: Chinese scientists had begun working at Pakistan's Kahuta facility, assisting Pakistan in the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Milhollin and White, p. 174; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8.]

1986: China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan.

1985

10/19/85: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that Pakistan will conduct a nuclear test in China, as alleged by the chief of the Indian army staff:

1983: US intelligence agencies reportedly determined that China transferred to Pakistan a complete nuclear weapon design and enough weapons-grade uranium for two devices. The design was reportedly for a 20-25 kT solid-core implosion device weighing less than 400 lbs. Pakistan reportedly has been able to make and test nuclear weapon components separately and test the whole design with a dummy nuclear core. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, pp. 4, 9; Zachary S. Davis, "China's Non-proliferation And Export Control Policies," Strategic Digest, November 1995, p. 1682; Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 101-102; The Risk Report, November 1995, p. 4; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4; Aleksandr Chudodeyev, Novoye Vremya (Moscow), 19 October 1993, pp. 18-22; in JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 6-7.]

1980s

Early-mid 1980s: China reportedly stole information on a neutron bomb design from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and provided it to Pakistan. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]

Last Updated August 1999
Copyright 1999, All Rights Reserved
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
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