Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities

Created by Andrew Koch

Updated by Andrew Koch, Christopher Derrick, and Shelby McNichols

Last modified July 1999

© 1999, by Monterey Institute of International Studies

Calcutta

The Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics in Calcutta conducts research on theoretical and experimental physics and provides post-graduate training in nuclear, plasma, and high-energy physics. Founded in 1940 as the Institute of Nuclear Physics, Saha has a staff of 548 including 389 researchers and technicians.(1) The institute is headed by Bikash Sinha and receives Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) support, including grants worth Rs 10.3 million in fiscal year 1997.(2) The US Departments of Commerce and Energy named Saha as one of the Indian organizations affected by trade sanctions due to proliferation concerns.(3)

Saha’s centerpiece is a tokamak fusion research reactor, acquired from Japan’s Toshiba Corp. and commissioned in 1987.(4) Work on the tokamak, which includes research on magnetically confined fusion, has been conducted by Saha personnel in cooperation with the Institute of Plasma Research in Ahmedabad and the Bhaba Atomic Research Center (BARC).(5) To support the tokamak, Saha has a machine-tool workshop that can manufacture components for the fusion reactor, as well as for carbon dioxide-laser equipment.(6) Saha also has a mass spectrometer and an “isotope-separator.”(7)

The Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), also in Calcutta, conducts studies of nuclear physics and radiochemistry, and has several cyclotrons. Operated by the DAE, the center houses the variable-energy cyclotron built in 1978, and is building a KV500 super-conducting cyclotron in conjunction with BARC.(8) Although these devices are primarily used for scientific purposes, a proton beam at VECC was used by scientists from Saha to strike Lithium-6 targets, a process, which produces tritium gas.(9) VECC was named by the US Departments of Energy and Commerce as one of the Indian organizations affected by US trade sanctions, presumably due to its DAE ties.(10)

Proliferation Implications

India’s DAE supports two autonomously operated research institutes in Calcutta. The largest, the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, conducts research that is primarily for peaceful purposes. However, some of the institute’s research does have applications for building nuclear weapons, including work on tritium production and inertial confinement fusion. While there is no publicly available evidence to link Saha’s work directly with India’s nuclear weapons program, the center’s ties to the DAE and the nature of the institute’s work suggests that at least some of the knowledge gained there has been transferred to the weapons program. The fact that security around the facility was tightened following the May 1998 nuclear tests lends further credence to these suspicions.(11) In addition to the tokamak, the site has carbon dioxide-laser production equipment and an “isotope separator,” both of which could be used in a uranium enrichment program, although such an outcome is unlikely.

VECC appears to be geared for purely peaceful scientific research. Nevertheless, Indian government documents show that the facility’s cyclotrons have been used for potentially weapons-related research on at least one occasion.(12) That experiment involved striking Lithium-6 isotope targets with a proton beam, the byproduct of which is tritium gas, which can be used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons.

Mumbai [Bombay]

The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) in Mumbai [Bombay] is primarily a training and basic science research institute. Founded in 1945, the institute has a staff of approximately 800 under the direction of S.S. Jha.(13) While most of the center’s work has no weapons application, the Atomic and Molecular Sciences Laboratory’s research includes plasma physics and work on high-powered gas lasers and fusion reactors, which have applications for thermonuclear weapons design.(14) TIFR also has a 14MeV Pelletron accelerator that is being upgraded in cooperation with BARC, a 1MeV cyclotron commissioned in 1950, and a subsidiary in Bangalore that conducts research on nuclear and high-energy physics.(15)

In fiscal year 1997, the institute received Rs50.24 million in DAE support, making it the largest grantee among the department’s autonomous research institutes.(16) The institute was named by the US Departments of Commerce and Energy as one of the Indian organizations affected by US trade sanctions, presumably due to its DAE ties.(17)

Proliferation Implications

The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research is not a proliferation concern. Its primary contribution to New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program would likely come from work done at its Atomic and Molecular Sciences Laboratory, which could include research on nuclear fusion with applications for building thermonuclear weapons. Most of TIFR’s other research appears to have little weapons application, although the institute could provide training for nuclear specialists.

Trombay

Located in the Mumbai [Bombay] suburb of Trombay, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) is India’s premier nuclear research laboratory. Anil Kakodkar heads a staff of over 6,750 who conduct research and operate facilities in nearly every aspect of nuclear technology.(18) While much of this work has civilian applications, BARC is the center of New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program and BARC personnel were instrumental in designing and building the nuclear devices that were tested in May 1998.(19)

Although India indigenously produces most of its own nuclear-related equipment, the center has imported key components from abroad when they were available. For instance, BARC received at least 33 shipments of dual-use goods from the United States between 1988 and 1992, including computers, laser equipment, photo-multiplier tubes, and specialized measuring equipment.(20) To support its activities, BARC receives government support from the DAE, including $78 million of the department’s $418 million budget for fiscal year 1997.(21)

BARC is home to most of India’s research reactors, including the country’s oldest nuclear reactor. Apsara, a one megawatt thermal (MWt) light-water swimming pool-type research reactor which burns medium-enriched uranium in plate-type fuel. Apsara was built with assistance from the United Kingdom and started operations on 4 August 1956.(22) While the reactor is not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the UK-origin fuel is safeguarded as per the supply contract. BARC officials plan to refurbish the aging reactor, modifying it to test a new indigenous design of a 5-10 MWt research reactor.(23) The work is scheduled to begin after repairs on the Cirus reactor are completed.

India’s second research reactor, named Cirus, is significantly larger than Apsara and was supplied by Canada. Although the United States supplied the reactor’s initial heavy water load, it has subsequently used heavy water produced indigenously at Nangal and other Indian plants.(24) The 40MWt heavy water reactor went critical in 1960 and can produce up to 10kg of weapons-grade plutonium in its spent fuel annually.(25) Although the reactor is not under IAEA safeguards, a 1956 Indo-Canadian agreement prohibits the use of plutonium produced in the reactor for non-peaceful purposes. However, the agreement includes no enforcement mechanism and India has interpreted the prohibition to exclude “peaceful nuclear explosions.” India used plutonium produced in the Cirus reactor for its 1974 nuclear test, causing Canada to cease all nuclear cooperation with India, including nuclear fuel shipments. The Cirus reactor is currently shut down for repairs and refurbishment.

BARC also built several critical assemblies, the first of which was the Zerlina heavy-water critical assembly that had a nominal power rating of 100W.(26) The unsafeguarded unit, which burned natural uranium fuel, operated from 1961 until it was decommissioned and dismantled in 1983.(27) Zerlina was indigenously built but used US-supplied heavy water.(28) India also built the Purnima-1 zero-power experimental reactor, which operated from 1972-74 and was fueled by 35kg of plutonium oxide pellets.(29) Purnima-1 was decommissioned and renovated to make Purnima-2, a critical assembly which burned thorium [U-233] fuel.(30) Purnima-2 was an unsafeguarded unit commissioned in 1984.(31) The zero-power reactor was renovated to create Purnima-3, a 1W light-water critical assembly which went critical in 1990 and also burns thorium [U-233] fuel.(32)

Using knowledge gained from the operation and design of its other older reactors, BARC personnel built Dhruva, India's largest research reactor and primary generator of weapons-grade plutonium-bearing spent fuel. Formerly called the R-5, construction of the unsafeguarded 100MWt high-flux heavy water reactor took 10 years to complete, achieving criticality in 1985.(33) However, the unit did not attain full power until 1988, an indication that India had problems with its operation. The reactor experienced at least one serious accident when 4Mt of heavy water overflowed from the reactor core in 1985 following vibration problems.(34) Ironically, that initial load of heavy water was likely acquired from China, a charge Indian officials deny.(35) According to conservative estimates, the reactor produces an average of 16–26kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year in its spent fuel, while former Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar said the unit could produce up to 30kg of weapons-grade plutonium each year.(36)

To supplement or replace the aging Cirus and Dhruva reactors, BARC officials have announced that they plan to build a new 100MWt research reactor at the Trombay complex.(37) The new reactor would be based on the Dhruva design and is optimistically expected to become operational by 2010. Another reactor design team at Trombay has completed a preliminary plan for building a new 500 megawatt electric (MWe) Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) that will burn mixed-oxide (MOX) and thorium fuel.(38) The Indian government has approved the building of a critical assembly that would be used to conduct experiments on that design.(39)

BARC personnel have also developed many of the necessary technologies and facilities needed to support the country’s reactor program. For example, the Trombay complex houses a pilot-plant for enriching the Boron-10 isotope to 80 percent purity.(40) Boron-10 has many nuclear applications, including controlling criticality in nuclear weapons storage sites, reactors, plutonium reprocessing plants, and nuclear materials storage facilities. Other relevant BARC facilities include a heavy water upgrading pilot-plant, a zirconium pilot-plant, and a titanium pilot-plant.(41)

BARC also has an unsafeguarded plant that fabricates fuel for the Dhruva and Cirus research reactors using uranium mined and milled at Jaduguda in Bihar. The plant, which can make up to 135Mt of metallic uranium fuel elements per year, began operating in 1960.(42) Called the Uranium Metal Plant, the facility converts yellowcake (U3O8) feedstock to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) and then reduces it to a metallic form using high-purity calcium or magnesium supplied by the Nuclear Fuel Complex. As of late 1998, the plant was being expanded although its present status is unclear.(43) This facility can also covert yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for use in a uranium enrichment plant, and could be used to convert weapons-grade uranium or plutonium into metal for machining into nuclear weapon cores. Although India does not have a large uranium enrichment program, BARC reportedly has a facility that can produce up to 185Mt of UF6 per year, a reference to the Uranium Metal Plant.(44) BARC has also developed technology that uses electrolysis cells to make fluorine, a precursor for UF6 production.(45)

The uranium hexafluoride BARC produces could be used at Rattehalli or at Trombay’s experimental-scale uranium enrichment facility. The latter, officially revealed in 1986, has as many as 100 gas centrifuges and can produce up to 2kg of highly enriched uranium per year.(46) BARC’s central workshop supports the centrifuge production efforts and can heat-treat hardened metal alloys, possibly including maraging steel.(47) The center is also a research and development site for laser enrichment technologies. To date, BARC has developed carbon dioxide and copper vapor lasers for enriching uranium and high-powered neodymium glass lasers for studying inertial confinement fusion.(48) BARC scientists have also been interested in developing lasers for reprocessing plutonium and for purifiying heavy water.(49) Most of the laser enrichment program was moved to Indore’s Centre for Advanced Technology (CAT) in 1986.

BARC continues to conduct research on plutonium extraction technologies in addition to running the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (Prefre), which can reprocess up to 50Mt of spent fuel each year using the Purex process.(50) That facility, run by the head of BARC's Fuel Reprocessing Division, D. D. Bajpai, began operations in 1964, but was shut down from 1973-82.(51) The indigenously built plant reopened in 1982 and is believed to have reprocessed unsafeguarded metallic uranium fuel from the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors, creating India's primary stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.(52) The center may investigate using a new sol-gel process, that was developed by the Fuel Chemistry Division under V. Vengopal, to reprocess plutonium and may build a pilot-plant as a precursor to a larger facility being built at Tarapur or Kalpakkam.(53)

Trombay has developed a range of technologies to support these reprocessing efforts. The complex houses a plant for manufacturing Di-Ethyl Hexyl Phosphoric Acid [D2EHPA], a chemical used in the liquid reprocessing of metals such as plutonium and uranium.(54) BARC has also developed a wide-range of machine-tools and robotic servo-manipulators, including a five-axis servo robot for assembling and disassembling fuel bundles or for handling radioactive waste in reprocessing facilities.(55) To handle the unwanted radioactive by-products, India is building a high-level waste vitrification plant at Trombay, which, at the time of writing, is expected to become operational “shortly.”(56)

In addition to operating uranium- and plutonium-based facilities for the production of fissile material, the Trombay site has investigated processing and burning thorium fuel as part of India’s long-term plan to utilize its vast thorium reserves. A plant that converts thorium cake into thorium metal, a substance that can be used in reactors, has reportedly been in operation at BARC for more than 12 years. (57) The center has been irradiating thorium in its research reactors for many years, and has devised a process for extracting U-233 from the irradiated thorium fuel rods.(58)

India could use any of its fissile material in the Plutonium Metallurgy Laboratory, the most likely site where India would fabricate that material into nuclear weapon cores.(59) Although the lab is designed to produce up to 200kg of MOX fuel per year, it has never operated at anywhere near capacity since beginning operations in 1979. It is likely that some of its capacity has been used to make weapon cores; the Indian government noted that all the nuclear devices exploded in the May 1998 tests were machined at BARC.(60) BARC and DAE scientists have reportedly made about 25 spherical cores for an implosion device since production began in 1974.(61) While it is not known how many of these cores have actually been placed into weapons, they are believed to be based on the design used for New Delhi’s first nuclear test in 1974.(62)

Finally, BARC is India’s primary nuclear weapons laboratory and has led efforts to design thermonuclear weapons and develop a nuclear warhead that can be carried on the Prithvi, Agni, or other future missile delivery platforms.(63) Indian scientists at Trombay have worked on designing nuclear weapons since at least 1974, a fact that former AEC Chairman Raja Ramanna admitted in 1997 and BARC Director Kakodkar later confirmed.(64) Ramanna said that the 1974 explosion was indeed an atomic bomb test. According to the DRDO’s chief technical advisor, Indian scientists were ordered to begin weaponizing their nuclear stockpile in the late 1980s.(65) While it is not known how many nuclear weapon designs India has produced or tested, AEC Chairman R. Chidambaram said that India has tested at least three atomic bomb designs as a result of the May 1998 nuclear tests.(66) Several leading Indian scientists have also claimed that India is capable of building a neutron bomb, although there is no publicly available evidence that such work has begun.(67) Kokodkar has noted that the nuclear weapon design work is continuing at the center, saying, “the research is on. We have not stopped.”(68)

Western governments have known of the design work for some time. For instance, Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) intelligence agency reported in 1985 that then BARC Director P.K. Iyengar had been given the task of “developing a thermonuclear weapon.”(69) Following that directive, BARC began an inertial confinement fusion research program, which has applications for understanding hydrogen blast phenomena associated with designing thermonuclear weapons.(70) BARC’s inertial confinement fusion research includes work on Z-pinch and high-powered lasers [most of which has been transferred to the Center for Advanced Technology].(71) In 1989, then Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency William Webster testified before Congress that India was pursuing a thermonuclear weapons capability, noting that New Delhi had imported nuclear-grade beryllium and had studied the use of Lithium-6 and Helium-3 to produce tritium.(72)

Webster was referring to a 1984 deal in which BARC secretly obtained 95kg of 98–99 percent pure beryllium metal, of US origin, from the German firm Degussa.(73) Although India now has the ability to produce nuclear-grade beryllium and operates a beryllium production pilot-plant in Mumbai, India’s import behavior indicates past troubles with the country’s beryllium production capability. Indian government documents claim the problems have been solved, noting that the country has “facilities for the production of Be [Beryllium] blocks and for machining Be into desired components” for use in India’s nuclear and space programs.(74)

BARC’s tritium production efforts included experiments by scientists from the Saha Institute for Nuclear Physics, who investigated striking Lithium-6 targets with a proton beam at the VECC in Calcutta.(75) Striking Lithium-6 targets creates tritium, which is used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. However, instead of pursuing the Lithium-6 experiments, BARC scientists developed a process to extract tritium from heavy water. The first Detritiation Pilot-Plant, which extracts high-purity tritium built up in Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) by using a liquid-phase catalytic exchange process, was completed in 1992.(76) Although the technology is new, India has the capability to build a tritium extraction plant at each of its PHWRs, and could produce up to 2,400 curies of tritium per megawatt of generating capacity.(77) These plants would give New Delhi more than enough tritium to build a large atomic arsenal.

BARC was instrumental in preparing for and conducting the May 1998 nuclear tests, along with the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) Pune-based High Energy Materials Research Laboratory, the Institute for Armament Technology, the Armament Research and Development Establishment, and the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory in Chandigarh.(78) At least five leading scientists from BARC were instrumental in designing the devices and conducting the May 1998 tests. These include: the director of the Nuclear Fuels and Automation Group, M. S. Ramkumar; the head of the High Pressure Physics Group, S. K. Sikka; the director of the Radiochemistry Division, D. D. Sood; the Associate Director of the Reactor Control Group, R. Govindrajan; and the head of the Health Physics Group, M. K. Gupta.(79) For their part, the DRDO labs developed the explosives and explosives-related components of the devices as well as performed systems engineering and integration.(80) DRDO was tasked with 'weaponising' the designs, producing the detonators, ruggedizing the high volt trigger systems, and providing expertise in arming, fusing, and safety interlocks.(81)

Proliferation Implications

BARC is India’s primary nuclear development establishment that conducts both civilian and weapons development activities. As such, BARC is a significant proliferation concern and fabricates many of the materials and equipment used in India’s military nuclear program.

For its primary fissile material generation method, BARC converts uranium into metallic reactor fuel, irradiates that fuel in the Dhruva and Cirus reactors, and then reprocesses the spent fuel to extract weapons-grade plutonium. The Cirus reactor has produced an estimated total of 240–336kg of plutonium from 1964 until 1999. The larger Dhruva reactor has produced an estimated total of 280kg of plutonium from 1985 to late 1999. Together, New Delhi’s stockpile of fissile material produced is conservatively estimated to be about 560kg of plutonium. Minus the plutonium lost in reprocessing, used in nuclear tests, and to fuel the Purnima and Fast Breeder Test Reactor [140kg total], New Delhi has enough weapons-grade plutonium [420kg] to build about 85 weapons.(82) Larger estimates, such as claims by Indian defence ministry officials that India has enough weapons-grade material to build a stockpile of 125 warheads, appear to be inflated.(83)

BARC also has a limited capability to convert natural uranium into UF6 and enrich that material using ultracentrifuges. However, India’s capability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade is limited to two small and rather ineffective gas centrifuge facilities. The enriched uranium produced in these facilities is more likely to be used as fuel for the country’s planned nuclear-powered submarine than for nuclear weapons. New Delhi has attempted to enrich uranium using lasers as well, but this program has not yet succeeded. Moreover, India’s goal of achieving laser enrichment appears overly optimistic as only a few states have been able to develop this technology and none has succeeded in making the process economically viable.(84)

The Trombay site houses some facilities that are part of India’s program to exploit its vast thorium reserves as well. Thorium metal itself is not a fissile material, but production of the metal is necessary in order to obtain a form that can be irradiated in reactors. The irradiated fuel can then be reprocessed to extract U-233, which is a fissile material. However, because irradiated thorium is highly radioactive, it presents serious handling problems. As a result, large-scale production of the material is unlikely and much less of a proliferation risk than plutonium reprocessing.

The Trombay complex also appears to be the center where nuclear weapons cores are manufactured and machined from New Delhi’s fissile material stockpile. Not only does the site have the ability to machine and fabricate weapon parts, but it produces a variety of weapons-related special materials including beryllium, tritium, Lithium-6, Boron-10, and titanium. It is not clear how much beryllium India can produce annually. However, as little as 3kg of the material, which is used as a neutron initiator, tamper, or reflector in a nuclear weapon, is required for each warhead.(85) Therefore, it is likely that New Delhi has a sufficient stockpile of the material to use as tampers or reflectors in at least some nuclear weapons. If used efficiently, beryllium could help India reduce the amount of plutonium needed in each weapon core by as much as 73 percent.

Finally, BARC is central to India’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, and its scientists are responsible for designing the country’s nuclear arsenal. Although this work includes input from DRDO laboratories, including the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory, the Institute for Armament Technology, the Armament Research and Development Establishment, and the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory, the Trombay complex has been the focus of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon design efforts since at least the 1980s. Today, BARC personnel are working on a variety of tactical and strategic weapon designs, including boosted and thermonuclear weapons small and light enough to be carried by ballistic missiles.

Nangal

India’s oldest heavy-water production facility, the Nangal heavy-water production plant in Punjab state was supplied by the West German firm Linde in 1962.(86) This unsafeguarded facility, operated by the DAEs Heavy Water Board uses an electrolysis of water and low-temperature distillation process. It had an original design capacity of 14.11Mt of heavy water per year.(87) However, modifications made to the plant in 1990 have cut its maximum output to 7Mt per year. (88) During the 1980s, the plant provided approximately half of its output to maintain India’s Cirus research reactor, and supplied the Dhruva reactor with additional heavy water.(89)

Proliferation Implications

Unlike most of India’s heavy-water production facilities, the Nangal plant was able to maintain a high level of output efficiency throughout the 1980s. However, because the facility was based on antiquated 1940s-era technology that is power-intensive and expensive, modifications were made to the plant that decreased costs but also halved output.(90) Even so, Nangal served to provide unsafeguarded heavy water to India’s primary plutonium production reactors when the country’s other heavy water plants were undergoing serious difficulties.

Tarapur

The Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) houses India’s oldest commercial nuclear reactors, which were provided by the United States in the 1960s. TAPS-1 and -2 are boiling water reactors (BWRs) that have maximum design capacities of 210MWe but have historically been operated at lower capacity levels and now have maximum net outputs of 160MWe.(91) Despite these problems, the Tarapur reactors have produced relatively more electricity as a percentage of their capacity than India’s other troubled nuclear power stations. The reactors, owned and operated by India’s Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), have operated at 58 percent capacity since beginning commercial operations in 1969. Although Tarapur’s output has been greater than the India-wide average of 49 percent capacity load factor, it is still significantly less than the world average of 70 percent.(92) The aging reactors are now reaching the end of their planned operational life-span and at least one former high-ranking Indian nuclear official has said they are a serious safety hazard.(93) Despite those warnings, Indian officials claim the TAPS-1 and -2 reactors are in good condition and could have their operational lives extended by another twenty years.(94) New Delhi’s desire to extend the reactors’ operational life is an indication of the severe energy shortages the country faces and the government’s willingness to take safety risks to meet that demand.

In addition to building the Tarapur reactors, the United States agreed to provide the low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the BWRs under a 30-year nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement stipulated that the United Sates would supply India with sufficient LEU to fuel the reactors until 1993, but Washington terminated the agreement in 1979 because the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act required that all recipients of US nuclear technology permit full-scope IAEA safeguards of their nuclear facilities; inspections which India has consistently refused to allow.(95) To comply with the law, the Reagan administration arranged to have France supply Tarapur with LEU under a tripartite agreement completed in 1983.(96) However, France also began requiring full-scope safeguards in late 1991 and Paris ceased supplying LEU in early 1993. India then secured a supply of LEU from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation in early 1995.(97)

New Delhi is building two additional reactors at Tarapur that will have design capacities of 500MWe and maximum net outputs of 470MWe. These PHWRs, which would be India’s largest indigenously produced nuclear power plants, are tentatively scheduled to be completed by 2006 and 2007 respectively by Larsen and Toubro and Walchandnagar Industries, Ltd.(98) Site preparations and excavation for TAPS-3 and -4 have finally begun after having been ordered in 1991 but delayed due to a lack of funding.(99) Once built, the unsafeguarded reactors will have the capability to produce large amounts of plutonium in their spent fuel, although that plutonium would be reactor-grade and therefore not ideally suited for use in nuclear weapons due to a low content of the desirable Pu-239 isotope.

As part of its nuclear power production program, India seeks to burn MOX fuel, which contains a mixture of uranium and plutonium. India loaded a total of at least 70kg of MOX fuel in TAPS-1 in 1994 and in TAPS-2 in October 1995.(100) New Delhi did so despite US objections about using plutonium in civilian reactors due to proliferation concerns. India said that using MOX fuel was necessary because Washington and Paris cut-off promised supplies of LEU fuel.(101)

The Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility, run by BARC personnel, has fabricated four of the MOX cores for TAPS-1 and -2.(102) This facility has a design capacity to manufacture 10–20Mt of MOX fuel per year using plutonium extracted at Tarapur’s Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (Prefre).(103) In the future, India may use a sol-gel pilot-plant that is being developed at Tarapur to fabricate MOX fuel or to reprocess plutonium. The sol-gel process uses a glass-like substance to fabricate nuclear fuel that is easier and less hazardous to handle than standard nuclear fuel. The pilot-plant will cost Rs100–120 million and was developed by BARC.(104) A similar project is also expected to be undertaken at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam.(105)

Prefre, one of three Indian facilities that extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel, has a designed capacity to reprocess as much as 100Mt of Candu spent fuel each year using the Purex process.(106) However, technical problems and a lack of spent fuel are believed to have caused the plant to operate at significantly lower levels since it began operations in 1979.(107) These problems have led the DAE to revamp the plant’s design and construction of the re-done facility was expected to begin in 1998-99, although its status is unknown.(108) Prefre will not come under IAEA safeguards unless it reprocesses safeguarded fuel.

The plant is designed to reprocess the spent fuel from India’s nuclear power plants, including the Tarapur, Rajasthan, and Madras reactors. While the plant has reprocessed up to 20Mt of spent fuel from the Rajasthan-1 reactor, no Rajasthan spent fuel is believed to have been reprocessed since the early 1980s.(109) Prefre is not known to have reprocessed spent fuel from either Tarapur-1 or -2 because that fuel is under IAEA safeguards and would require prior consent from the United States, a request Washington has not granted. The plant did begin reprocessing spent fuel from the Madras atomic power plant in 1985-86, and up to 10kg of high-quality plutonium could have been extracted from Madras-1 and -2 spent fuel for use in India’s nuclear weapons program.(110) DAE officials denied those allegations in December 1997, claiming that the plutonium was used to fuel the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam.(111) Prefre supplies plutonium to the FBTR and Tarapur’s MOX fuel fabrication facility, but it is not known whether any of its extracted plutonium has been used in India’s nuclear weapons program.

Tarapur also houses a nuclear waste immobilization (vitrification) plant that was commissioned in 1985 and is run by BARC personnel.(112) A 1995 leak at the plant caused the nearby reactors to be shut down, highlighting the safety and environmental problems India has had with many of its nuclear facilities.(113)

Proliferation Implications

The Prefre reprocessing facility is the principal proliferation concern at Tarapur. That plant can extract plutonium from spent fuel produced at India’s unsafeguarded commercial reactors. However, under normal conditions, plutonium extracted from commercial reactors is not desirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentration of Pu-239. To date, the plutonium extracted at Prefre is not known to have been used for any activity other than producing MOX fuel or research.

The sol-gel pilot-plant and the MOX fuel fabrication facility are also proliferation concerns because they increase India’s ability to produce plutonium-bearing spent fuel. MOX fuel is particularly worrisome because it involves the use of plutonium in the civilian power reactors and greatly increases the danger that plutonium could be diverted or stolen. Moreover, the presence of large amounts of plutonium makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult.

The two US-supplied BWRs at Tarapur, however, are not a proliferation concern because the spent fuel they generate is under IAEA safeguards. If the Tarapur-3 and-4 reactors are completed, they will provide New Delhi with another source of unsafeguarded spent fuel, but like India’s other commercial reactors, the quality of plutonium would make it unattractive for use in building nuclear weapons.

Jaduguda

The Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL), which is headquartered in Jaduguda and headed by J. L. Bhasin, owns and operates three uranium mines in the Singhbum East district of Bihar state. India’s first and largest mine, the Jaduguda Uranium Mine, has been in operation since 1967 and can produce up to 200Mt of yellowcake per year, although actual production has averaged 115Mt per year.(114) The second mine in Bhatin, which started operations in 1986, is located 4km northwest of Jaduguda.(115) The third mine, the Narwarpahar Uranium Mine and Mill, is located 10km from Jaduguda and began operating in 1995.(116)

Also located near Jaduguda is the Turamdih Uranium Mill. That facility can process up to 170Mt of yellowcake per year, and is being expanded to 230Mt per year in order to handle additional uranium from the Narwapahar mine.(117) The mill processes all of India’s indigenously mined uranium, most of which is then shipped to the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad.(118) Despite efforts to expand New Delhi’s uranium production capacity, the mines and mill have suffered financial difficulties and lower than scheduled output due to the low-grade of uranium located there.(119) UCIL has also come under increasing pressure from local leaders and environmental groups over radiation leaks and health hazards from the facilities’ tailing ponds.(120)

Proliferation Implications

The uranium mines and mill located near Jaduguda are India’s primary source of indigenously produced uranium. As such, at least some of this facility’s output contributes to the country’s nuclear weapons program; whether by fuelling New Delhi’s plutonium production reactors at Trombay or being enriched at the Rattehalli uranium enrichment plant in Mysore. Sanctions were imposed on the Jaduguda, Narwapahar, and Turamdih mines in November 1998 by the United States for being suspected of nuclear weapons-related activities.(121)

The bulk of the uranium mined and milled at Jaduguda, however, is fabricated into fuel for the country’s commercial power reactors. Production at the mines has been lower than expected, causing a shortfall in uranium needed for the commercial power plants. With the expected completion of at least two new indigenously built reactors, demands will increase and the challenge of meeting them will become more difficult.

Hyderabad

The city of Hyderabad is home to three government-owned facilities that conduct nuclear-related activities. The Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) was established in the early 1970s to make nuclear fuel and reactor core components for India’s atomic power program. The complex is operated by DAE under the direction of Chief Executive C. Ganguly and was allocated $8.6 million in DAE grants for fiscal year 1997.(122) The site has a vast array of imported and domestically produced nuclear-related machinery, including a slurry-extraction system for uranium-oxide production, high-temperature pellet sintering furnaces, vacuum annealing furnaces, cold reducing mills, bearing pad welding machines, and specialized welding equipment.(123) The complex’s primary function is to fabricate nuclear fuel and related materials for New Delhi’s power reactors. A facility that can convert yellowcake (U308) into uranium oxide (U02) began operations in 1971. That plant, which can produce 250Mt of UO2 per year, is being expanded to a 600Mt per year capacity.(124)

After converting yellowcake into uranium oxide, the NFC fabricates the UO2 into nuclear fuel. A facility that can make 300Mt of heavy water reactor fuel per year has been operating since 1971 and its capacity is being expanded to 600Mt per year.(125) Called the New Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant, work on that facility has been completed and trial production has begun.(126) The NFC also has a smaller 25Mt per year facility that makes fuel for light water moderated reactors such as those at Tarapur.(127) None of these facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards unless they are handling imported enriched uranium or are supplying fuel to safeguarded facilities.

Facilities to support the production of nuclear fuel are also located at the Hyderabad site. These include a zirconium metal production plant, which has a 210Mt per year capacity and began operations 1972, a titanium production plant, and a plant that separates zirconium and hafnium using what a DAE report described as a “pyrochemical” process.(128) Furthermore, the NFC has a plant which can make 80Mt of zirconium and zircaloy heavy water reactor tubing each year. That plant began operations in 1972 and is being expanded by an additional 80Mt per year capacity.(129) Developed by NFC and BARC personnel, work on the New Zircaloy Fabrication Project has been completed and trial production has begun.(130) To date, the NFC has produced zircaloy coolant and calandria tubes for the Kalpakkam, Narora, and Kakrapar nuclear power plants, zircaloy “structural components” for the planned Fast Breeder Test Reactor, and has conducted pre-test trials of components for the 500MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam.(131)

The Hyderabad site has additional facilities to produce special materials used to weaponize fissile material into atomic bomb cores. One plant produces high-purity tantalum oxide, a chemical which is resistant to corrosion by liquid actinides such as plutonium nitrate and, therefore, can be used to line hot cells for reprocessing plutonium or crucibles for casting weapon cores.(132) Although tantalum is not on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List of controlled goods, it is listed in an IAEA memorandum on dual-use technology.(133) The Hyderabad firm also oversees a plant that purifies calcium to nuclear-grade [99.6 percent] and produces nuclear-grade magnesium using a vacuum distillation processes developed by BARC and the Defence Metallurgical Development Laboratory.(134) The process was developed in cooperation with the Central Electrochemical Research Institute in Alwaye, which supplies lower-grade calcium feedstock.(135) High-purity calcium and nuclear-grade magnesium are used as reduction agents to convert uranium halides and plutonium oxide to metal. Equipment that uses this process to separate hafnium and zirconium has also been installed in preparation for full-scale production.(136)

While the NFC now indigenously produces much of what it needs, it has depended on specialized equipment such as vacuum arc melting furnaces and high-temperature sintering furnaces obtained from the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, and the former Soviet Union to make fuel assemblies.(137) Former NFC head K.K. Sinha said the center has developed its own production capabilities and produces high temperature sintering furnaces, special purpose resistance welding machines, and high vacuum arc melting furnaces.(138) Other equipment built at the Hyderabad site includes sophisticated machine-tools such as “linear cutting machines, rotary crushing machines for control laboratory, pendulum-type abrasive cut-off machines, hydraulic press and semi-automatic three-axes UT machines.”(139)

The Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. (MIDHANI) steel plant is a government-owned company of approximately 1,500 employees that was founded in 1973.(140) The plant pioneered maraging steel production in India and produces titanium and titanium alloys, tungsten, molybdenum, and other special high-strength alloys.(141) MIDHANI also has conducted pre-fabrication trials on the planned 500MW Prototype Faster Breeder Reactor that will be built at Kalpakkam.(142)

The Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL), headed by S. N. L. Acharyulu, houses a titanium metal pilot-plant that can produce up to 100Mt of the high-strength alloy per year.(143) The laboratory has also been closely involved with India’s ballistic missile development programs and is reportedly researching laser technology with potential applications for uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy water purification.(144) The US Departments of Energy and Commerce identified DMRL as an organization affected by US trade sanctions because of these and other ties to India’s strategic weapons programs.(145)

Proliferation Implications

The NFC is a moderate proliferation threat. While the complex’s primary mission is to produce nuclear fuel for commercial reactors, the production of materials such as tantalum oxide and nuclear-grade calcium could directly contribute to India’s nuclear weapons program. The site also produces specialized equipment like vacuum arc furnaces, which can be used to fabricate nuclear weapon cores.

Most of the NFC’s output, such as nuclear fuel and zirconium components, can indirectly contribute to New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program if India extracts plutonium from commercial reactor fuel and uses it to build atomic bombs. While such an outcome is unlikely and there is no open-source evidence that it has occurred, the possibility cannot be completely precluded because most of the fuel and power reactors are not under IAEA safeguards.

The complex’s main contribution has been to supply the vast majority of the country’s nuclear fuel needs, and its facilities are being expanded to meet future demand. To date, output has been high enough to enable the NFC break into the world nuclear fuel component market, having sold 1,805kg of zircaloy-4 rods to South Korea.(146)

The MIDHANI steel plant and DMRL are proliferation risks because they produce maraging steel which New Delhi could use to make uranium-enrichment centrifuges or other nuclear equipment. Both entities have close ties to India’s strategic weapons development programs, including DMRL’s work on the nuclear-capable Agni Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and maraging steel motor casings for the Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV).(147)

Baroda

The Baroda heavy-water production plant in Gujarat state is India’s second heavy-water production facility, having been supplied as a turnkey project by the French-Swiss consortium M-S Gelpra. Construction of the unsafeguarded plant, which uses a mono-thermal ammonia-hydrogen exchange process to produce up to 67.2Mt of heavy water per year, began in 1970.(148) Baroda is operated under the direction of the DAE’s Heavy Water Board and did not begin commercial operations until 1980.(149) The plant is co-located with Gujarat Fertilizer’s Baroda Ammonia Plant, which provides the requisite ammonia inputs.(150)

Although based on imported technology, the Baroda plant has had numerous difficulties. The problems started during the plant’s construction, which suffered huge cost overruns, production cost increases, and a 53-month delay in commissioning.(151) The plant has subsequently operated at significantly under capacity throughout its life-span, largely due to a lower deuterium content than originally planned.(152) The plant has also been shut down for a variety of reasons, ranging from a May 1982 closure due to a labor dispute to a spring 1988 explosion and fire.(153) The facility was closed again several times in 1996-97 for maintenance of equipment and machinery that had failed.(154)

Proliferation Implications

The heavy-water production facility at Baroda has not been a large proliferation concern because of its poor operating performance, rarely running at more than 30 percent capacity.(155) The facility did contribute at least some of the 100Mt of heavy water used to start-up the Dhruva research reactor, but other Indian plants contributed much more.

Bangalore

Bangalore, India’s high-technology center, is the location of two companies and two research institutes that conduct nuclear-related activities. The Indian Institute of Science’s (IISc) Bangalore division has several departments which have conducted research and developed applications for India’s strategic weapons programs. The institute houses the Supercomputer Education and Research Centre (SERC), which was identified by the British government as a possible weapons lab for developing ballistic missiles, a charge the center denies.(156) SERC was not listed on either the US Departments of Commerce or Energy’s list of Indian entities to be placed under sanctions due to suspected involvement in New Delhi’s nuclear or missile programs.(157)

The center, founded in 1985 under the leadership of N. Balakrishnan, has a staff of 70 working on linking 2,300 computers in parallel.(158) SERC began research and development work on parallel supercomputers after the United States canceled a deal to sell India a Cray supercomputer due to proliferation concerns.(159) Today, the facility has supercomputers several times more powerful than the Cray machine, including an IBM RSK 000 SP2 and an indigenously built PARAM 8600 system.(160) The IBM machine, SERC’s fastest supercomputer, was first installed in 1994 and has subsequently been upgraded to run at 5.8 billion operations per second.(161) The IISc Bangalore is scheduled to receive an indigenously built PARAM 10000 supercomputer paid for by India’s Department of Electronics.(162)

Other departments of the IISc have assisted New Delhi’s nuclear program. One division worked with personnel from BARC to develop a five-axis servo robot with a 5kg payload, which can be used for assembling or disassembling fuel bundles or handling radioactive waste in reprocessing facilities.(163) The institute’s Department of Chemical Engineering also helped develop processes used in the production of heavy water.(164)

The Bangalore-based Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) produces a variety of heavy industrial products for India’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Due to these activities, the company has been on the US Department of Commerce export restriction list since June 1997.(165) The Indian government-owned establishment has a research and development division in Hyderabad with a staff of 1,023, including the Welding Research Institute.(166) V.G. Jagannath heads a research staff of 175 at that institute, which develops specialized welding machines and technology.(167)

BHEL’s primary involvement in India’s nuclear program has been its manufacturing of steam generators and turbines for commercial nuclear reactors. The company has also built the pressure vessel for the PFBR at Kalpakkam and manufactures low-vibration AC/DC motors (which can be used in gas centrifuge compressors), capacitors, compressors, and control gear among its nuclear power-related equipment.(168)

Hindustan Machine Tools (HMt) has long been suspected of being involved in India’s strategic weapon programs. HMt is India’s largest supplier of machine-tools to the defense sector and has manufactured servo-manipulators with payloads of up to 15kg that are being used by BARC.(169) In addition to HMt, India has an advanced machine-tool industry and the capability to indigenously produce them in large numbers. BARC personnel have cooperated with the Machine-Tool Prototype Factory in Ambernath to build a 6kW high-vacuum electron beam welding machine, which BARC says is used “for the fabrication of special components for defense applications.”(170)

Additional research related to machine-tool development is being conducted at the Ministry of Industry’s Bangalore-based Central Manufacturing Technology Institute. Formerly called the Central Machine Tool Institute, the institute has a staff of 450 working on design and development of computer-numeric-controlled (CNC) machine-tools, robotics, and computer-aided design software.(171)

Proliferation Implications

Although the IISc Bangalore has developed supercomputer technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons or the ballistic missiles that carry them, there is no open-source evidence to directly link the institute to India’s strategic weapons programs. However, the nature of the work, plus the IISc’s past activities such as developing heavy-water production techniques and building nuclear-capable servo-manipulators, raises the possibility that SERC could be aiding India’s nuclear weapons program. If SERC is involved with that program, the institute’s supercomputers could be used to simulate nuclear weapon explosions or assist in modeling atomic bomb designs.

SERC, however, is not the only site where India is developing supercomputers. There are other Indian supercomputers, such as the Advanced Numerical Processor for Airborne and Missile Applications [Anupam] system, which has a maximum speed of 5.7 billion operations per second. The parallel processing system, which was developed by BARC and the DRDO's Applied Numerical Research and Analysis Group (ANURAG), will be given to DAE institutes and could be used to simulate nuclear weapon explosions or to design ballistic missiles.(172) DRDO is expanding on the 8 billion operations per second speed of a second supercomputer called Pace Plus 32, and hopes to complete a new 30 billion operations per second supercomputer by the end of 1999.(173) The Pace Plus 32 was used to design India’s Light Combat Aircraft and could be configured to simulate ballistic missile warheads or nuclear explosions.

The industrial giant BHEL has primarily contributed to India’s nuclear programs by manufacturing components used in the country’s nuclear power reactors. These reactors do not directly contribute the New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program, although some increase its stockpile of unsafeguarded spent fuel that could be reprocessed and used to build atomic arms. Other BHEL products such as motors for gas centrifuge compressors, control gear, and capacitors are more troubling when they directly contribute to New Delhi’s ability to produce fissile material or weaponize that material.

As India’s largest machine-tool maker, HMt could be involved with a vast array of New Delhi’s strategic weapon development programs. Machine-tools have uses throughout the country’s nuclear program, from manufacturing precision equipment for commercial nuclear reactors to machining nuclear weapon cores and gas centrifuges. Although BARC has its own machine-tool workshop where India’s nuclear weapon cores are likely manufactured, establishments such as HMt could provide equipment and expertise for these efforts. Moreover, HMt-produced machine-tools could be used to fabricate nuclear fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex, to produce uranium enrichment centrifuges for the Rattehalli plant, or to manufacture ballistic missile parts. Additionally, the servo-manipulators developed for BARC can be used in a variety of nuclear weapon-related activities, including plutonium reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and reactor repairs. Finally, the electron beam welding machine developed by BARC can be used to fabricate nuclear fuel or to help cast nuclear weapon cores.

Kota

The area near Rawatbhata, 64 kilometers southwest of Kota in Rajasthan state, is home to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) and the Kota heavy water production plant. RAPS, which is owned by the DAE and operated by the government-owned NPC, consists of two Candu PHWRs with maximum design capacities of 220MWe.(174) Both RAPS-1 and -2, are under IAEA facility-specific safeguards.(175)

RAPS-1 was supplied by Canada’s General Electric at an estimated cost of Rs1.78 billion and began commercial operations in 1973.(176) Canada provided half of the initial nuclear fuel core load as well as 130Mt of heavy water. The Soviet Union provided additional heavy water in 1973.(177) While most of the fuel for RAPS-1 has been fabricated at the NFC using indigenous uranium, France has also supplied the reactor with nuclear fuel.(178) New Delhi has reprocessed up to 20Mt of spent fuel from the RAPS-1 reactor at its Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant at Tarapur in the 1980s, although it is not known to have reprocessed any of the reactor’s spent fuel since that time.(179)

RAPS-1 has suffered numerous technical problems and shutdowns throughout its history, causing it to be India’s least productive reactor. It has operated at full capacity just 21 percent of the time, which is lower than both the India-wide average of 49 percent and the world average of 70 percent.(180) RAPS-1 has been particularly plagued by a crack in its end-shield that caused the reactor to be shutdown for much of the 1980s. Efforts to repair the damage were hampered by the cessation of Canadian nuclear assistance following India’s 1974 atomic blast. As a consequence, the reactor’s estimated production capacity has been down-rated from 220MWe to 100MWe, while RAPS-2 remains at 200MWe.(181) To date, the reactor has not achieved even the down-rated output since restarting operations in late 1997.

Other troubles including a shortage of heavy water, cracks in the reactor’s turbines, and a 1994 heavy water leak have also caused numerous shutdowns.(182) These problems became so common that India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Atomic Energy recommended that the reactor’s status be changed from a commercial plant to a research facility which would be run by the DAE.(183)

Construction of RAPS-2 was begun by Canadian General Electric but completed by India’s Larsen and Toubro after Canada ceased nuclear cooperation with India in 1974. The reactor has a maximum design capacity of 220MWe and started commercial operations in April 1981.(184) Nuclear fuel for this reactor has been fabricated at the NFC using both indigenous and French-supplied uranium.(185) The Soviet Union provided some of the required heavy water and the remainder was produced indigenously.(186)

While faring somewhat better than its older counterpart, RAPS-2 has had technical problems, which have led to frequent shutdowns. The reactor was shutdown from September 1994 until May 1998 to replace its 306 coolant channels following repeated heavy water leaks. Indian engineers completed the $22 million repair job using indigenous expertise after failing to secure Canadian assistance.(187) However, although the reactor has been restarted, it is not expected to reach full capacity anytime soon. Throughout its life-span, RAPS-2 has operated at full capacity just 46 percent of the time, lower than both the India-wide average of 49 percent and the world average of 70 percent.(188)

India is building two additional PHWRs at RAPS that will have design capacities of 235MWe and maximum net outputs of 220MWe, respectively.(189) Construction of the reactors by India’s Walchandnagar Industries began in 1990 using an indigenous design, but work was halted after the Kaiga-1 reactor’s containment dome collapsed in 1994. The reactors have a similar design to Kaiga-1 and are now expected to go critical in September 1999 and early 2000 respectively, and will use indigenously produced heavy water.(190) The unsafeguarded reactors will burn natural uranium mined in India and fabricated at the NFC, and their spent fuel could be reprocessed at either Tarapur or Kalpakkam. New Delhi also hopes to eventually build four additional 500MWe reactors at the site, but such plans are tentative at best.(191)

The Kota heavy-water production plant, operated by the DAE’s Heavy Water Board, formerly used steam generated at RAPS-1 and -2. Construction of the plant was begun by Canada, but Ottawa ceased cooperation after India’s 1974 nuclear test. BARC then completed designing the plant, which can produce up to 100Mt of heavy water per year using a hydrogen sulfide water-exchange process.(192) Operations were originally expected to begin in 1976, but were delayed until 1985 due to problems associated with the accumulation of toxic chemicals created during the production of hydrogen sulfide gas.(193) The problems raised the original cost estimates from Rs1.94 billion to at least Rs7.2 billion.(194) Inadequate and unreliable supplies of power and steam from the adjacent RAPS reactors also plagued the plant and contributed to its low output.(195) To solve the power supply issue, two oil-fired boilers where built at the plant and have provided sufficient steam for it to resume production.(196)

Proliferation Implications

The nuclear reactors at RAPS are in many ways a microcosm of the Indian commercial nuclear power program as a whole. RAPS-1 and -2 have a long history of technical difficulties, making them uneconomical. Moreover, the frequent shutdowns adversely affected production at Kota's heavy-water production plant. Those problems now appear to have been resolved and Indian officials claim that the Kota facility is operating efficiently.(197) However, the heavy water plant’s history of low output, huge cost overruns, and frequent shutdowns made it a financial burden on India’s struggling nuclear power program for much of its existence.

Despite RAPS’ problems, the reactors have been kept in operation because they provide indirect benefits to the nuclear program such as giving Indian nuclear scientists and engineers experience working with Candu technology; expertise that was used to indigenously design India’s unsafeguarded reactors. More recently, experience gained by changing RAPS-2s coolant channels will be applied to keep India’s other PHWRs operating more efficiently.

The RAPS reactors have contributed to the country’s fissile material stockpile as well. To date, at least 25kg of reactor-grade plutonium has been extracted from RAPS-1s safeguarded spent fuel, and much more could be reprocessed if needed. When completed, RAPS-3 and-4 will have the capability to produce significant amounts of unsafeguarded plutonium-bearing spent fuel. That plutonium, however, would be less desirable for use in building nuclear weapons due to a lower concentration of Pu-239. More likely, the resulting reactor-grade plutonium would be used to fuel India’s planned breeder reactors, which produce more plutonium than they use. The presence of large amounts of plutonium increases the danger that fissile material could be diverted or stolen and makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult.

Tuticorin

The Tuticorin heavy-water production plant in Tamil Nadu state was supplied by the French-Swiss consortium M-S Gelpra and is operated by the DAEs Heavy Water Board .(198) The plant uses a mono-thermal ammonia-hydrogen exchange process, which can produce up to 71.3Mt of heavy water per year.(199) Although a supply contract was signed in 1971, the facility did not begin commercial operations until 1978 and has operated at significantly under capacity, endured numerous basic equipment failures and experienced huge cost overruns ever since.(200) These problems continued during 1996-97, with scattered shutdowns occurring due to power failures, equipment and machinery failures, and shutdowns at the adjacent Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation’s Tuticorin Ammonia Plant, which supplies the ammonia feedstock.(201)

Proliferation Implications

The Tuticorin plant’s problems are illustrative of the trouble experienced by India’s heavy water production efforts. The unsafeguarded facility has been unable to produce significant amounts of heavy water due to frequent shutdowns, cost overruns, and equipment failures. Therefore, Tuticorin has not been a significant proliferation concern despite contributing at least some of the 100Mt of heavy water used to start-up the Dhruva research reactor.(202)

Thal-Vaishet

The Thal-Vaishet heavy water facility and ammonia plant in Maharashtra state can produce up to 110Mt of heavy water per year using an ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.(203) Although the facility was indigenously built based on lessons learned at Baroda, Tuticorin, and Talcher, the Thal plant was a modification of M-S Gelpra’s design and received engineering support from Denmark’s Haldor Topsoe.(204) The plant, which is operated by the DAE’s Heavy Water Board and was completed in 1986 by India’s Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers (RCF) at an estimated cost of Rs1.9 billion.(205) An RCF fertilizer plant is integrated into the Thal-Vaishet facility to provide ammonia and steam inputs.(206)

Proliferation Implications

Although there is little publicly available operating data on the Thal-Vaishat facility, it appears to have produced significantly more heavy water than its predecessors at Baroda, Tuticorin, and Talcher. The facility, therefore, is a proliferation risk to the extent that the plant is able to supply significant amounts of heavy water to New Delhi’s unsafeguarded plutonium-producing reactors.

Kalpakkam

The area around Kalpakkam, which is located 80km south of Chennai [Madras], is home to two major nuclear facilities. The first, called the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS), is owned and operated by India’s NPC. The MAPS-1 and -2 PHWRs originally had maximum design outputs of 235MWe, but they have been down-rated to 170MWe.(207) The reactors were built by the DAE and Larsen and Toubro based on experience obtained by working with the Candu designed reactors at Kota and began commercial operations in 1984 and 1986, respectively.(208) The reactors are not under IAEA safeguards and burn uranium mined in India and fabricated into fuel at the NFC in Hyderabad. While India produced some of the requisite heavy water indigenously, a lack of heavy water may have forced New Delhi to import additional quantities from China, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Norway.(209) The heavy-water shortage caused delays and under-utilization of the MAPS-1 reactor in particular.

Throughout their history, the MAPS-1 and -2 reactors have performed reasonably well by Indian standards, having operated at full capacity 51 and 54 percent of the time, respectively.(210) While this is better than the India-wide average of 49 percent, it is still significantly less than the world average of 70 percent. MAPS-1 and -2s output dropped below average in recent years due to problems with their coolant channels, which are scheduled to be replaced. The problem has become so serious that it caused a major heavy water leak at MAPS-2 in March 1999.(211)

Indian scientists are searching for ways to make their struggling nuclear power program more affordable. One proposal is to use thermal energy created by commercial reactors to desalinate sea-water. Scientists at BARC have completed a design for a 6,300-liter per day nuclear-powered desalination plant to be co-located at MAPS.(212) It is unclear, however, whether India will pursue this plan or first try to build a prototype at BARC that will link the desalination facility and the Cirus research reactor.(213)

BARC scientists are also looking to use commercial reactors for the country’s nuclear weapons program. BARC personnel have developed a tritium extraction plant designed to remove high-purity tritium built up in reactors’ heavy water moderator by using a liquid-phase catalytic exchange process that is said to be the first of its kind.(214) BARC scientists have built a pilot-scale version of the plant at their Trombay complex, and are reportedly building a full-scale plant at MAPS-1.(215) One by-product of the plant is tritium gas, which can be used for making boosted- fission and thermonuclear weapons. The plant could produce up to 2,400 curies of tritium per megawatt of electricity generated.(216)

Since MAPS-1 and -2 are unsafeguarded reactors, their spent fuel is an attractive feedstock for India’s plutonium reprocessing plants. Tarapur’s Prefre started reprocessing spent fuel from the Madras reactors in 1985-86. Such activity led to speculation that up to 10kg of weapons-grade plutonium could have been extracted for use in India’s nuclear weapons program.(217) DAE officials denied the charge in December 1997, saying that the reprocessed plutonium was used to fuel the FBTR at Kalpakkam.(218) Once the Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant becomes operational, it will replace Prefre in handling the spent fuel from MAPS.

The DAE is nearing completion of its third reprocessing plant, the Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant (KARP). Headed by M.P. Patil, the plant was cold commissioned on 27 March 1996 and was “dedicated to the nation” on 15 September 1998.(219) Also known as the Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant, it will reprocess spent fuel from MAPS as well as the FBTR.(220) The unsafeguarded facility has a design capacity to reprocess 100Mt of spent CANDU fuel each year using the Purex process.(221) Construction of KARP began in 1985 and the plant was originally scheduled to begin operations in 1990, but has suffered years of technical delays and financial problems.(222) Those problems now appear to have been overcome, and it received $2.4 million in DAE support for fiscal year 1997.(223) Although most of the components for the plant were indigenously developed and manufactured, at least two specialized servo- manipulators were imported from Germany, an indication that India has had difficulty producing these machines.(224)

KARP is just one of the several nuclear facilities located at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), one of India’s premier nuclear research and development institutes. Established in 1971 and headed by Placid Rodriguez, the center’s staff of approximately 2,300, including 1,000 scientists and engineers, conduct research on fast breeder reactors, sodium technology, plutonium reprocessing, and developing naval reactors.(225) IGCAR received $16.7 million in grants from the DAE for fiscal year 1997, most for the Fast Breeder Test Reactor and KARP.(226)

Formerly known as the Reactor Research Centre, IGCAR conducts research and development of fast breeder reactors (FBRs).(227) The center’s showcase, the FBTR, received $5.8 million in DAE funding for fiscal year 1997.(228) The FBTR has a design capacity of 40MWt but has rarely operated above 10.5MWt. It first achieved criticality on 18 October 1985 and is based on the French reactor RAPSODIE, having enjoyed French assistance but incorporating indigenous design changes.(229) The facility has experienced numerous technical problems and shutdowns and was closed from 1987-89 and ran at a mere 1MWt from 1989-92.(230) Although the reactor has rarely operated at its designed output due to an undersized fuel core, a reported increase in its output to 12.5MWt may be an indication that Indian personnel are overcoming some of the problems.(231) The FBTR is run by IGCAR and BARC personnel and burns MOX fuel developed at BARC. Its initial nuclear fuel core used approximately 50kg of weapons-grade plutonium, and DAE officials have said the reactor is now being fueled by plutonium extracted from fuel irradiated in the Madras power reactors and reprocessed at Prefre [Tarapur].(232)

To complement the Fast Breeder Test Reactor, IGCAR and BARC personnel have built the Kamini 30kWt research reactor. The Kamini reactor is fueled by U-233 (irradiated thorium) and is instrumental in neutron radiography studies of fuel irradiated in the FBTR.(233) The unsafeguarded reactor was commissioned in 1989, went critical on 29 October 1996, and reached full power on 17 September 1997.(234) IGCAR has reportedly reprocessed U-233 from irradiated thorium as part of a strategy to eventually use U-233 as the primary fuel for India’s nuclear program.(235) To handle waste from Kamini, the FBTR, and IGCAR’s reprocessing facilities, BARC personnel are building a waste immobilization (vitrification) plant at Kalpakkam.(236)

India intends to eventually build commercially viable FBRs. To achieve that goal, New Delhi plans to construct the 500MWe PFBR at Kalpakkam. The sodium cooled reactor’s initial core load will be MOX fuel containing 2,000kg of plutonium extracted from spent fuel irradiated in India’s commercial reactors.(237) Conceptual design work of the PFBR was completed in 1996-97 and construction is optimistically scheduled to begin in 2002.(238) However, construction of the $800 million project was initially scheduled to begin in 1999, making the expected completion date of 2008 appear overly optimistic.(239) The Indian government has allocated $143 million to develop the reactor between 1997-2002, including $3.7 million in fiscal year 1999.(240)

The PFBR is being developed in conjunction with a variety of Indian research institutes and commercial enterprises, several of which are located in Kalpakkam. The Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Kalpakkam is working on the reactor’s structural mechanics, thermal hydraulics, and “component handling,” while IIT Delhi completed a simulator for mocking-up the PFBR’s main pressure vessel.(241) Pre-fabrication trials of the pressure vessel were held jointly with NFC and the MIDHANI and Steel Authority of India’s Durgapur steel plants.(242) That vessel was built by Bharat Heavy Electricals, Ltd.(243)

The Structural Engineering Research Centre, located in Kalpakkam and headed by S.R. Appa Rao, also helped develop the pressure vessel structure.(244) That center has completed additional research on an aluminum tank that will hold the reactor’s corrosive liquid sodium coolant.(245) Engineers at India’s Kirloskar Brothers have overcome one obstacle to building the FBTR, having developed a high-capacity mechanical sodium pump.(246) The Central Water and Power Research Station in Pune has provided the project with research on vibration control, probably for the sodium coolant.(247) The Fluid Control Research Institute in Palakkad, the Central Building Research Institute in Roorkee, the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory in Chandigarh, and the University of Earthquake Engineering in Roorkee are also involved in developing the PFBR.(248)

Kalpakkam is also a development site for India’s nuclear-powered submarine program called the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) as well. Nuclear specialists from BARC are designing the ATV’s reactor, while IGCAR personnel are charged with its construction.(249) The reactor will burn plate-type 20 percent enriched uranium fuel fabricated at the NFC and enriched at the Rattehalli uranium enrichment plant. Initial tests of the ATV’s reactor were reportedly conducted at IGCAR in November and December 1995, but failed.(250) Other facilities have been established at ICGAR to test key components such as the submarine’s drive turbines, propellers, and dynamo meter.(251)

To aid its fast breeder reactor program, IGCAR plans to build a sol-gel pilot-plant to fabricate MOX fuel for breeder reactors or to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel.(252) The process was developed at BARC, and the Kalpakkam plant will be built after a similar facility is established at Tarapur. India is also building a pilot-plant utilizing electro-refining technology to complement the sol-gel facility. The electro-refining plant, which can be used to extract plutonium and uranium from spent fuel for later fabrication into MOX, could be completed as early as 1999.(253) In August 1998, IGCAR Director Rodrigues announced that the electro-refining pilot-plant will reprocess spent fuel from the FBTR.(254) It is unclear, however, whether the plant refers to a new facility or is an expansion of the lab-scale facility that has been reprocessing spent fuel from the FBTR since 1985.(255)

IGCAR houses additional facilities, including a pilot-scale ion-exchange chromatograph facility that can produce Boron-10, presumably for use in control rods for fast breeder reactors.(256) Boron-10 has many nuclear applications, including controlling criticality in nuclear weapons storage sites, reactors, plutonium reprocessing plants, and nuclear materials storage facilities.

Work is also under way on a large reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam, called the Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP). Indian engineers have completed designing the plant, which will have a capacity to reprocess up to 1,000Mt of spent fuel per year, and a limited number of components, such as ventilation equipment, have been manufactured.(257) The FRFRP is tentatively scheduled to be cold commissioned in December of 2000.(258) However, given the problems experienced by the DAE with its other reprocessing facilities and a lack of financing, it is doubtful that this facility will actually begin to reprocess significant amounts of spent fuel in the near future.

Proliferation Implications

Of the nuclear facilities affiliated with MAPS, the tritium extraction plant is the only one directly related to New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program. It could provide New Delhi with more than enough tritium to build a large arsenal of boosted fission or thermonuclear weapons if operational. The tritium production plant would also be the first documented case in which India has directly used a commercial reactor in its nuclear weapons program.

Each MAPS reactor produces plutonium-bearing spent fuel, some of which is reprocessed at Prefre [Tarapur]. This plutonium, however, will likely only be used for research or to fuel the FBTR due to its low quality. The presence of large amounts of plutonium does increase the possibility that fissile material could be diverted or stolen and it makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult.

The other nuclear facilities at Kalpakkam, including those associated with IGCAR, directly contribute to the country’s nuclear weapons program and are extensive in size and scope. Most troubling is the presence of large-scale reprocessing facilities and plans to build fast breeder reactors which could provide the spent fuel feedstock reprocessing plants require. Moreover, none of these facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards, giving New Delhi a free hand to use the fissile material produced at Kalpakkam to build nuclear weapons. However, Indian officials have stated that the Kalpakkam reprocessing plants will primarily extract plutonium from spent fuel irradiated in the country’s commercial reactors. Under normal conditions, plutonium extracted from commercial reactors is not desirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentration of Pu-239. To date, the plutonium extracted at Prefre is not known to have been used for any activity other than to produce MOX fuel or to conduct research.

The sol-gel pilot-plant and electro-refining plant are proliferation concerns to the degree that they increase India’s ability to produce and reprocess plutonium-bearing spent fuel. As with all of Kalpakkam’s programs, the presence of plutonium is worrisome because it increases the danger that the fissile material could be diverted or stolen and because it makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult.

India’s pursuit of fast breeder reactors is troubling, since these reactors produce more plutonium than they use. New Delhi’s attempts to build commercial FBRs, however, does not appear to be advancing rapidly. Fast breeder reactor technology has either been abandoned or put permanently on hold by two states with more technically advanced nuclear programs. France decided to abandon its Super-Phenix FBR due to technical troubles that led to repeated shutdowns and high costs. An accident at Japan’s Monju FBR in December 1995 has also led to that facility’s closure for the indefinite future.

India’s attempts to build a nuclear-powered submarine could also be worrisome. Of particular concern is the possibility that such a submarine could be armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. That outcome, however, is a long-term concern as Indian scientists are having trouble completing the submarine itself. BARC has had difficulty building an effective containment vessel small enough to fit the submarine’s 600-ton design weight, leading to a postponement of the reactor’s sea trials. The Indian navy hopes to build five submarines eventually, with the first launched by 2004, a schedule that appears overly optimistic given the program’s history of technical problems.

Chennai [Madras]

The Institute of Mathematical Sciences (IMSc) in Chennai [Madras] is an autonomous research center fully funded by the DAE. The institute has a staff of 40 faculty members and conducts fundamental research on theoretical physics and mathematics under the direction of R. Ramachandran.(259) The IMSc received Rs2.9 million in DAE funds for fiscal year 1997, the likely reason the United States imposed sanctions on the institute in November 1998.(260)

Proliferation Implications

Despite being listed as a proliferation concern by the US Department of Commerce, there is no open source evidence to demonstrate that the IMSc has made anything more than a tangential contribution to New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program. What contribution the institute could have made would involve providing training to nuclear specialists and conducting basic physics research. More likely, the institute was listed because of its DAE funding.

Talcher

The Talcher heavy-water production plant in Orissa state is operated by the DAE’s Heavy Water Board. The plant is linked to a fertilizer factory owned by the Fertilizer Corporation of India and was built and designed by West Germany’s UHDE GmbH.(261) Construction of the plant began in 1972 and was completed in 1982, but production did not begin until 1985.(262) The plant uses a bi-thermal version of the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and has a capacity of 72Mt of heavy water per year, up from the original capacity of 62.7Mt per year.(263) However, the Talcher facility has been plagued by frequent shutdowns and equipment failures due to poor design and equipment choices made during construction, unrealistic assumptions made on the quality of coal it would receive, and other technical deficiencies.(264) These problems required New Delhi to make major modifications in the early 1980s before the plant could begin operations, raising construction costs from an original estimate of Rs2.1 billion to a final estimate of at least Rs6.6 billion.(265)

Shortly after beginning operations, a severe fire at the plant in April 1986 kept it closed for repairs until July 1987.(266) The plant’s output has been meager due to periodic shutdowns at the adjoining fertilizer facility that supplies the ammonia feedstock and steam.(267) The shortages caused the suspension of production at Talcher from April 1994 until at least 1998, the most recent date data was available for.(268)

Proliferation Implications

The heavy-water production facility at Talcher has not been a large proliferation concern. The plant’s low output, caused by repeated problems, huge cost overruns, and frequent shutdowns has made it a burden on India’s financially strapped nuclear power program.

Hazira

The Hazira Ammonia Extension Plant in Gujarat state, also known as the KRIBHCO Heavy Water Plant, is owned and operated by the DAEs Heavy Water Board. The plant is co-located with the Krishak Bharati Cooperative Ltd. (KRIBHCO) fertilizer plant, which provides chemical and steam inputs.(269) The Hazira facility was commissioned in 1991 and can produce up to 110Mt of heavy water per year using an ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.(270) Although most of the Rs2.64 billion plant was built indigenously, Germany’s Siemens provided the plant with sophisticated computerized mixing equipment, called a Teleperm M plant system.(271) India had previously tried to obtain an “ammonium optimizer” with a Digital Equipment Micro Vax II computer along with specialized software through the British firm ICI, but the transfer was stopped after the US Department of Commerce denied the export license.(272)

Proliferation Implications

Although there is little publicly available operating data on the Hazira facility, it appears to have produced significantly more heavy water than its predecessors at Baroda, Tuticorin, and Talcher. The facility, therefore, is a proliferation risk to the extent that it can supply significant amounts of heavy water to New Delhi’s unsafeguarded plutonium-producing reactors.

Mysore

BARC scientists built and help operate the Rare Materials Plant (RMP), located near Mysore in Karnataka state, along with India Rare Earths, Ltd.(273) While the precise capacity of the Rattehalli pilot-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant is not known, it is generally believed to be capable of producing several kilograms of HEU each year.(274) In 1992, P.K. Iyengar, then head of the DAE, supported this assessment when he said that an Indian gas centrifuge plant composed of “several hundred... centrifuges made of domestically produced maraging steel” was operating.(275) The Mysore facility could use maraging steel supplied by the DMRL or the MIDHANI steel plant, both located in Hyderabad.(276) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., which manufactures low-vibration AC/DC motors that can be used in gas centrifuge compressors, could also contribute to the plant.(277)

Other Indian officials have begun to mention the Rattehalli enrichment facility after years of denying its existence. In December 1997, defense ministry officials reportedly said that the facility was built to enrich uranium to 30–45 percent for future use in fuelling nuclear-powered submarines. The US government also acknowledged the facility's existence when it was placed on the Department of Commerce export restriction list due to suspected involvement in India’s nuclear weapons program.(278)

The unsafeguarded facility was built in the late 1980s, and is based on work done at BARC’s experimental-scale gas centrifuge enrichment facility. Despite trying to master centrifuge enrichment technology for at least a decade, BARC personnel continue to experience significant operating difficulties. In late 1997, Indian defense officials reportedly said that the centrifuges’ rotor assemblies had to be re-designed to overcome “technical limitations.”(279) Another indication that the centrifuge plant is not operating at a high capacity is India’s insistence that Russia provide LEU fuel to the planned Koodankulam nuclear reactors. This demand suggests that India does not have the indigenous capability to enrich significant amounts of uranium, even to LEU. India’s purchase of LEU from China to fuel the Tarapur nuclear power reactors in 1995 is a further indication that the centrifuge plant's output has been limited.

Proliferation Implications

Research and development activities in Mysore are a direct proliferation concern due to the uranium enrichment plant’s potential to produce unsafeguarded weapons-grade fissile material. If the plant does produce HEU, it could be used to increase the yield of a hydrogen bomb or to fuel boosted nuclear weapons. At present, this may not be a pressing concern because India has other sources of unsafeguarded weapons-grade fissile material and because the plant may not be able to produce militarily significant quantities of HEU.

Even so, the plant could have other uses. If India successfully completes a nuclear-powered submarine, it will burn uranium enriched at the Rattehalli facility. Such a submarine would be worrisome to neighbors as well as other powers operating in the region, particularly if the submarine is armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. Successful operation of the plant and HEU production could also enhance New Delhi’s prestige by demonstrating its scientific prowess vis-a-vis Pakistan, which bases its nuclear weapons program on weapons-grade uranium. Moreover, HEU produced at the Rattehalli plant would add to the country’s fissile material stockpile for building atomic weapons or could be used to fuel a future research reactor which burns enriched uranium.

Kakrapar

The Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS), owned and operated by the NPC under the supervision of J.B. Kalaiya, is located in Gujarat state.(280) The KAPS-1 and -2 PHWRs have maximum design outputs of 235MWe, maximum net outputs of 220MWe, and are not subject to IAEA safeguards.(281) Both reactors were built indigenously by Larsen and Toubro and Walchandnagar Industries, with construction of KAPS-1 and -2 beginning in December 1984 and April 1985, respectively.(282) The reactors’ turbines and steam generators were built by BHEL and use indigenously produced heavy water.(283) They burn natural uranium mined in India and fabricated into fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex. After years of construction delays, KAPS-1 went critical in September 1992 while KAPS-2 achieved criticality in January 1995.(284)

India’s newest nuclear reactors, KAPS-1 and -2, have avoided the kind of serious setbacks that plague India’s nuclear power program. Throughout its lifetime, Kakrapar-2 has been India’s most reliable reactor, performing at full capacity 62 percent of the time, greater than the India-wide average of 49 percent, but still less than the world average of 70 percent.(285) KAPS-1 has a lifetime efficiency rating of 46 percent.

The site may also be the location of a plant to cleanse heavy water. According to the US Department of Commerce, Kakrapar is home to a heavy water upgrade facility.(286)

Proliferation Implications

The KAPS-1 and -2 commercial power reactors are not a direct proliferation concern because they add little capability that India’s nuclear weapons program can not attain elsewhere. The largest concern is the plants’ ability to produce significant amounts of plutonium-bearing spent fuel which could be reprocessed and used to build atomic arms. The presence of large amounts of plutonium is also dangerous because the fissile material could be diverted or stolen, and because it makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult. Plutonium extracted from Kakrapar spent fuel, however, is undesirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentration of plutonium-239.

Indore

The Center for Advanced Technology (CAT) was established by the DAE to continue work done by scientists from BARC on lasers and accelerators as part of its inertial confinement fusion and uranium enrichment programs.(287) Headed by D. D. Bhawalker, the center was founded in 1986 following the transfer of personnel and equipment from BARC.(288)

Today, CAT conducts work in the fields of cryogenics, accelerators, and high-vacuum technology, as well as on copper vapor and nitrogen lasers.(289) The center also has a unit working on laser-plasma technology for inertial confinement fusion using a 100J 1nS Nd: glass laser, and has reportedly developed thermonuclear triggering devices using lasers.(290) Moreover, CAT has developed carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and copper vapor (10–40W) lasers which can be used to enrich uranium and can produce them on a pilot-scale.(291) These lasers could potentially be used in cleaning U-232 from U-233 fuel as well. Although the cleansing process is unproved and untried as of yet, India apparently regards it as an important challenge in its quest to exploit U-233 as fuel.(292)

Due to these activities and its ties to the DAE, the center was named by the US Departments of Energy and Commerce as one of the organizations affected by US trade sanctions.(293) CAT received $8 million in DAE support for fiscal year 1997.(294)

Proliferation Implications

CAT has conducted a variety of research that is of direct proliferation concern. Most troubling is its inertial confinement fusion activities which can be used to help design and build thermonuclear weapons. The development of lasers to enrich uranium is also worrisome, although it is unlikely that New Delhi will successfully build a useful laser-enrichment facility anytime soon. Moreover, high-powered lasers could be used to fabricate nuclear fuel and to recover tritium from irradiated heavy water.

India could further seek to exploit laser technology for its thorium fuel program. U-233 fuel contains dangerous amounts of U-232 which must be removed, and New Delhi hopes that laser-enrichment techniques will be of use in eliminating the unwanted material. Finding a means of removing the U-232 would eliminate one of the main difficulties to using U-233 more widely. This research is a high proliferation risk, mainly because the same technology can be used to enrich uranium.

Despite these programs, most of the center’s research is for peaceful applications. The center has completed developing the 450MeV Indus-1 Synchrotron Radiation Source (SRS) and is working on the Indus-2 SRS with a 2GeV capability.(295)

Pune

The Centre for the Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) was established in 1988 to develop supercomputers. Run by Executive Director R.K. Arora, the center employs 400 personnel and is one of India’s premier supercomputer development institutes.(296) In April 1998, C-DAC unveiled a 100 gigaflop-sized [100 billion operations per second] prototype of the Param 10000 supercomputer that is being expanded to be able to perform 1 trillion operations per second [teraflop-sized].(297) The Param 10000, which is comprised of 160 computers clustered together in parallel, uses Sun Microelectronics’ Ultrasparc II chips, California-based Myricom’s high-speed messaging software , and its own communications processor.(298) The supercomputer was reportedly developed for only $12.5 million and is the central node of a larger wide-area network called the National PARAM Supercomputing Facility at the Pune center.(299) C-DAC has put the Param 10000 on the world market and has already secured orders from Moscow’s Institute for Computer Aided Design and Singapore’s Nanyang Technology University.(300) The Indian Department of Electronics will provide 10 PARAM 10000s to Indian research centers, including the IISC, Bangalore.(301)

Following the May 1998 nuclear tests, C-DAC founding director Vijay Bhatkar said India could conduct nuclear weapon design work and computer simulations on indigenously produced supercomputers, ostensibly referring to the PARAM 10000.(302) The leader of India’s 1974 nuclear test team and former AEC Chairman Raja Ramanna added that Indian supercomputers such as the PARAM had been “essential” to India’s 1998 nuclear tests and to its ability to conduct simulated tests in the future.(303) The center’s ties to India’s strategic weapons programs were further alluded to on its web-site, which noted that it has worked with ISRO to simulate work such as heat shielding analysis.(304) Although Arora later denied that C-DAC did any military-related work and said the web-site claims were “overstated,” those claims remain on C-DACs homepage a full year later.(305) Moreover, C-DAC says that it is developing software for the PARAM 10000 that can be used for Computational Fluid Dynamics applications, which could be used as part of a nuclear test simulation program.(306)

India had previously completed two versions of the PARAM, the most powerful of which is the PARAM 9000 which can complete 10 billion operations per second.(307)

Proliferation Implications

Although there is no direct evidence of C-DAC being involved in India’s nuclear program, there is strong circumstantial evidence that the center is a proliferation risk. The supercomputers developed there, particularly the PARAM 10000, can be used to conduct nuclear test simulations. Of particular concern is the center’s past work for ISRO and software for Computational Fluid Dynamics applications.

Although the PARAM 10000 uses US-produced computer chips and messaging software, India has the capability to develop and build all the necessary components for the supercomputer. Moreover, the low-cost that developing parallel supercomputers entails could allow New Delhi to develop and build many of the powerful machines in a cost-effective manner. Other Indian defense-related organizations involved in developing supercomputers include BARC, DRDO, the National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL).(308)

Narora

The Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS) in Uttar Pradesh state is owned and operated by the NPC. The NAPs-1 and -2 PHWRs have maximum design capacities of 235MWe and maximum net outputs of 220MWe.(309) Built by India’s Larsen and Toubro and Walchandnagar Industries, NAPS-1 went critical in March 1989 and began commercial operations in 1991. NAPS-2 went critical in October 1991 and began commercial operations 1992.(310) Both plants use indigenously produced heavy water and burn natural uranium mined in India and fabricated into fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex.(311) Although they are not under IAEA safeguards, India has not stated an interest in reprocessing the reactor’s spent fuel, possibly due to their being situated far away from potential reprocessing facilities.

Throughout their lifetimes, NAPS-1 and -2 have operated at 42 and 52 percent efficiency, respectively, compared to an India-wide average of 49 percent and a world average of 70 percent.(312) One reason for the low output was the difficulty the plants had in the initial years of operation. On 31 March 1993, a serious turbine fire at the plant could have led to a meltdown of the facility had operators not acted quickly.(313) Since 1995, however, both have greatly improved in productivity and reliability.

Proliferation Implications

The Narora commercial power reactors are not a direct proliferation concern because they add little capability to India’s nuclear weapons program. The greatest concern is the plants’ ability to produce significant amounts of plutonium-bearing spent fuel, which could be reprocessed and used to build atomic arms. The presence of large amounts of plutonium is a proliferation danger because the fissile material could be diverted or stolen, and because it makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult. The NAPS-generated plutonium, however, is undesirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentration of the Plutonium-239 isotope. Moreover, the great distances India would be forced to ship Narora-origin spent fuel for reprocessing [to Tarapur, Trombay, or Kalpakkam] make this option unattractive for economic, safety, and environmental reasons.

Kaiga

India is currently engaged in the Kaiga Atomic Power Project (KAPP) in Karnataka state, which consists of building two PHWRs (Kaiga-1 and -2). The reactors, owned and operated by the NPC under the direction of V.K. Sharma, will have maximum design outputs of 235MWe and maximum net outputs of 220MWe.(314) India’s Larsen and Toubro and Walchandnagar Industries began building the reactors in 1989, and unit-2 of the reactor achieved criticality on 24 September 1999.(315) The reactors will use indigenously produced heavy water and burn uranium mined in India and fabricated into fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex.

KAPP, which will not be subject to IAEA safeguards. Costs for the project have escalated from Rs7.74 billion to Rs29 billion.(316) Construction costs and long delays have come as a result of a partial collapse of Kaiga-1s inner containment dome in 1994. Indian engineers have revised the dome’s design and unit-1 is expected to reach criticality in June 2000.(317) New Delhi plans to eventually build four additional 235MWe PHWRs at the site.(318)

Proliferation Implications

The Kiaga-1 and -2 commercial power reactors will not be a significant proliferation concern because they would add little capability to India’s nuclear weapons program. The greatest concern would be the plants’ ability to produce significant amounts of plutonium-bearing spent fuel for reprocessing and use in atomic arms. The presence of large amounts of plutonium is a concern because the fissile material could be diverted or stolen, and because it makes the task of detecting clandestine nuclear weapon activities more difficult. Plutonium extracted from Kaiga spent fuel, however, would be undesirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentration of the desired Pu-239 isotope.

India’s difficulties with the Kaiga reactors symbolizes the commercial nuclear power program as a whole. Construction has suffered years of delay and high cost overruns. Moreover, the collapse of Kaiga-1s containment dome in 1994 was a major accident that caused New Delhi to re-think its entire commercial PHWR design, and delay the program by several years.

Domiasiat

The UCIL operates a pilot-scale uranium mine and mill in the town of Domiasiat in Meghalaya state as a first step toward starting full-scale production. Begun by the DAE’s Atomic Minerals Division (AMD) in the early 1990s, 1Mt of yellowcake has been taken from the mine for testing.(319) Full-scale operations, however, are stalled awaiting the necessary permits and are not scheduled to begin until at least 2004.(320) Delays have been caused due civil unrest in northeast India and opposition from the local government.(321) Although the area contains an estimated 1,710Mt of uranium reserves, its remote location would require building a mill near any future uranium mine.(322)

Proliferation Implications

In the future, India will need the Domiasiat Mine because other sources of indigenous uranium are nearing exhaustion. While uranium could be acquired easily and more cheaply on the world market, New Delhi may be wary of relying on foreign suppliers of uranium for its nuclear program due to its strategic and economic importance.

Lamabapur and Peddagattu

In the early 1990s, the DAE’s Atomic Minerals Division conducted uranium exploration and exploratory drilling in Andhra Pradesh. The survey found an estimated 1,640Mt of uranium reserves at Lamabapur and 2,550Mt of uranium reserves at Peddaguttu.(323) More recent surveys indicate there are only 490Mt of uranium reserves in the Peddagattu area.(324) The DAE plans to begin exploratory mining in the area in 1999 and hopes to expand the project to include a commercial-scale mine and mill sometime around 2003.(325)

Proliferation Implications

The uranium reserves at Lamabapur and Peddaguttu are of minimal proliferation concern at present. While the reserves could be used in the future to replace or supplement uranium mined at Jadugada, there are no definite plans to due so. Even if the uranium reserves at Lamabapur and Peddaguttu are mined, the most of resulting yellowcake would be fabricated into fuel for India’s nuclear power reactors. Most likely, only a small portion of the uranium would contribute to the country’s nuclear weapons program by fuelling the plutonium production reactors at Trombay or feeding the Rattehalli uranium enrichment plant at Mysore.

Bhima Basin

The DAE’s Atomic Minerals Division (AMD) has discovered an estimated 2,900Mt of high-grade uranium ore in Bhima Basin at Gogi in Karnataka state.(326)

Proliferation Implications

The uranium reserves at Bhima Basin are of minimal proliferation concern at present. While the reserves could eventually be used to replace or supplement uranium mined elsewhere in the country, there are no plans to mine the material at present. Over the long-term, the existence of large uranium deposits could provide India sufficient uranium reserves to maintain independence from outside suppliers.

Mosaboni, Rakha, Surda(t)

The UCIL runs uranium recovery plants in Mosaboni, Rakha, and Surda, each capable of extracting 15 metric tons (Mt) of uranium per year from copper mine tailings. Tailings from Hindustan Copper Ltd’s mines are sent to the plants for recovery, and the concentrates are then shipped to Jaduguda for further processing.(327)

Proliferation Implications

The Mosaboni, Rakha, and Surda uranium recovery plants are of minimal proliferation concern due to their low output and indirect contribution to India’s nuclear weapons program. While at least some of the facilities' output is probably used to fuel New Delhi’s plutonium production reactors at Trombay or to feed the Rattehalli uranium enrichment plant at Mysore, the bulk of the uranium is likely burned in commercial power reactors. Sanctions were imposed on the Mosaboni, Rakha, and Surda plants in November 1998 by the US Department of Commerce for suspected of nuclear weapons-related activities.(328)

Alwaye

An India Rare Earths Plant in Alwaye converts some of the almost 100,000Mt of thorium present in the monazite-rich sand of Kerala into thorium cake. The thorium deposits contain as much energy as 500 billion Mt of coal, and have the potential to meet India’s energy needs for far longer than its uranium reserves.(329) India also has large thorium deposits in Gopalpur-Chatrapur, although little effort has been made to exploit that deposit thus far.(330)

Proliferation Implications

Thorium can be irradiated to form U-233, which is almost as good a fissile material as plutonium. However, problems with the U-233 fuel cycle, particularly high-levels of dangerous hard gamma ray emissions present in one of its by-products [U-232], makes use of U-233 difficult at present. If India solves these problems and begins large-scale exploitation of thorium fuel, the activities would pose a proliferation concern approximately equivalent to that of plutonium production.

Manuguru

The Manuguru heavy-water production plant in Andhra Pradesh state is operated by the DAE’s Heavy Water Board. The indigenously built plant, which began operating in 1991, can produce up to 185Mt of heavy water per year using a hydrogen-sulfide water-exchange process.(331) Although Indian engineers avoided some of the mistakes that had been made at the Kota facility by building an independent source of steam and power, Manuguru has suffered cost overruns, possibly due to corrupt management.(332)

Proliferation Implications

Although there is little publicly available operating data on the Manuguru facility, it appears to have produced significantly more heavy water than its predecessor at Kota. The unsafeguarded facility, therefore, is a proliferation risk to the extent that it is can supply significant amounts of heavy water to New Delhi’s plutonium-producing reactors. The facility has not completely escaped trouble, however, and the plant’s former general manager alleged that corrupt business practices were conducted by Manuguru management.

Bhubaneswar

The Institute of Physics in Bhubaneswar is primarily a basic science and training facility that houses a 3MV Pellatron accelerator. This institute was named by the US Departments of Commerce and Energy as an organization to be affected by US trade sanctions, presumably due to the Rs5.8 million in DAE support it received for fiscal year 1997.(333)

Proliferation Implications

Although there is little publicly available information about it, the Institute of Physics does not appear to be a proliferation concern. What contribution the institute could make to New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program would involve training of nuclear specialists and conducting basic nuclear science research.

Ahmedabad

Located just outside the city of Ahmedabad, the Institute for Plasma Research houses the Aditya tokamak fusion reactor and is headed by P.K. Kaw.(334) The center is supported by the DAE and conducts experimental and theoretical research of plasma physics with an emphasis on magnetic confinement fusion and designs for tokamak reactors.(335) Researchers from the institute have also completed a conceptual design for a Steady-State Superconducting Cyclotron.(336) Personnel from the Ahmedabad center and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics in Calcutta have been the primary users of the Aditya tokamak.(337)

Proliferation Implications

The Aditya tokamak is a fusion research reactor, which uses magnetic fields to confine and heat deuterium and tritium plasma fuel. As part of normal operations, most tokamaks remove and recycle small amounts of tritium, a vital nuclear weapon component. Such a device would also give Indian technicians experience working with magnetic confinement fusion technology, which has applications for a thermonuclear weapons design program. Therefore, knowledge gained at the institute could be used in New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program.

Koodankulam

In the wake of the 1994 Kaiga dome collapse and problems with its indigenously built reactors, India has looked to foreign suppliers of nuclear power reactors. In doing so, New Delhi has focused on completing a deal that was signed with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s for the supply of two 1,000MW power plants. Although the original deal was suspended, it has been successfully revived and is proceeding forward.

In June 1998, Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Rajagopal Chidambaram and Russian Minster of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov signed a contract under which Russia agreed to build two 1,000MW light-water reactors (LWRs) at Koodankulam in southern India.(338) As part of the nearly $3 billion agreement, Russia also agreed to extend $2.6 billion in long-term soft credits and will provide the plants with 30Mt of LEU fuel per year.(339) A follow-on deal signed on 20 July 1998 by Y.S.R. Prasad, managing director of India’s Nuclear Power Corporation and Viktor Kozlov, general-director of Russia’s Atomstroiexport, calls for Russia to prepare a detailed plan to build the reactors.(340) Moscow expects to take up to 30 months to prepare that report and an additional seven years to complete construction of the reactors.(341) Project Chief Engineer S. K. Jain has said that he expects construction of the plant to begin in 2002.(342)

The contracts were the culmination of nearly two decades of negotiations. A deal was originally signed in 1988 by then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for the Soviet Union to provide India with a multi-billion dollar credit package to purchase the LWRs.(343) The original contract called for the reactors to be provided by Soviet vendor Atomstroiexport on a turnkey basis and operated by Indian technicians trained in the Soviet Union.(344) After years of deadlocked negotiations, Russian President Boris Yeltsin convinced Indian officials that the deal could be revived during a visit to India in late 1993.(345)

However, financial and technical details, as well as a controversy regarding whether Russia would require India to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards of its other nuclear facilities, stalled the deal throughout the early 1990s. Until late 1997, the two sides disagreed about how much of the finance package would be repaid in hard currency. This deadlock was broken in December 1997 when Russian and Indian officials agreed that New Delhi would repay all of the loans in hard currency, but would be afforded low interest rates and a several-year grace period.(346)

Another controversy centered on whether Russia would abide by its nonproliferation commitments to demand full-scope safeguards. The United States has argued that the deal violates NSG guidelines, which were revised in 1992 to demand that “a non-nuclear weapons state must accept full scope IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities and fissionable material” in order to receive nuclear technology. Moreover, Washington notes, the “Principles and Objectives” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPTs) 1995 Extension Conference says that new supply agreements to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) must require full-scope safeguards.(347) Russia, however, says the deal is not subject to the new NSG and NPT guidelines because it was signed in 1988, thereby being “grandfathered.”(348) Moscow does admit that the technology it plans to transfer is more advanced than that in the original 1988 agreement, an action which according to critics, flouts the spirit if not letter of the NSG and NPT restrictions.

Proliferation Implications

India hopes that the agreement with Russia to build the Koodankulam nuclear reactors will help it meet the optimistic goal of creating 10,000MW of installed nuclear power capacity by the year 2000. New Delhi’s commercial nuclear power industry has suffered greatly over the past decade because supplier countries have adopted tight restrictions against providing nuclear technology to India following its refusal to join the international nonproliferation regime. In light of India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, agreements such as the Koodankulam deal appear to reward New Delhi for its atomic indiscretions and thereby undermine the nonproliferation regime. The deal is also troubling because it indicates Russia’s unwillingness to abide by its international commitments when commercial interests are at stake.

Despite the controversy surrounding the effects of the deal on the nonproliferation regime, the reactors themselves will not be a proliferation concern because the spent fuel they generate will be under IAEA safeguards until it is repatriated to Russia.

Pokharan

Located at the Khetolai military range in the Thar desert, Pokharan is the site where India has conducted all of its nuclear tests. The most recent, held in May 1998 and code-named Operation Shakti-1, were part of what the Indian government said was a series of five tests held as a joint project between the DAE and the DRDO. According to the Indian government, the five tests involved: a 12 kiloton (kT) fission device, a 43kT thermonuclear [fusion] device, a sub-kiloton [0.2-0.6kT] device on 11 May 1998, and two sub-kiloton devices with yields of 0.2-0.6kT on 13 May 1998.(349)

One of Shakti’s chief designers, S. K. Sikka, who also heads the Solid State Physics Group at BARC, claimed that the first stage of the hydrogen bomb comprised of a boosted fission device instead of the usual fission device.(350) According to an Indian press report, one of the low-yield bombs tested on May 13 used plutonium derived from commercial power reactors, raising the specter that India’s large stockpile of unsafeguarded commercial-grade plutonium could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.(351) Another report said scientists had prepared a test site 10km away from the main Pokharan location where they intended to test a third low-yield device on May 13, but abandoned the test due to a technical glitch and political concerns.(352)

Despite international skepticism about India’s hydrogen bomb claims, the head of India's AEC, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram has repeatedly insisted that New Delhi tested a two-stage thermonuclear bomb, noting that the yield was deliberately kept low to minimize damage to the surrounding area.(353) He added that India has the ability to make hydrogen bombs of yields up to 200kT. Chidambaram later said that India has developed three new nuclear bomb designs as a result of the May 1998 tests.(354)

However, independent and US intelligence analysts have publicly doubted these claims, noting that the largest test was of an attempted thermonuclear weapon test, the second stage of which failed, and had a significantly smaller yield than claimed.(355) An analysis by independent seismologists is even more skeptical of New Delhi’s claims, noting that the seismological data indicates there was probably only a single explosion on 11 May 1998, likely yielding 9-16 kT and not more than 30 kT.(356) Data from 13 May 1998, the seismologists say, suggests that the tests could not have yielded greater explosive power than a dozen tons of high-explosives.(357) US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth told the US Congress that the number of nuclear tests conducted by India were “less than they said.”(358)

The May 1998 tests were not the first time Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee authorized DAE to conduct nuclear tests. Vajpayee had previously given DAE the green signal to conduct nuclear tests, when he acceded to power briefly in the spring of 1996. However, Vajapyee retracted the order when he realized that the BJP was unlikely to win a vote of confidence in parliament. Preparations for a nuclear test had been completed in late 1995 under the previous government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. At that time, the US government was able to detect the test preparations and press New Delhi not to test. US intelligence satellites had detected signs of renewed activity at Pokharan including work to excavate an underground shaft for testing nuclear weapons and installing data gathering instrumentation.(359)

India had previously conducted its first nuclear test, code-named Smiling Buddha, at the Pokharan site on 18 May 1974.(360) Although New Delhi officially called the blast a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” former AEC Chairman Raja Ramanna admitted in October 1997 that it was indeed an atomic bomb test.(361) The bomb used a Polonium-210/Beryllium neutron initiator, code-named Flower, which had been designed and fabricated with some difficulty by BARC scientists.(362) According to Ramanna, BARC personnel took two years to reprocess, purify, convert to metal, and machine the device’s core and to manufacture the implosion lenses [made by the DRDO] and associated electronics package.(363) Although the Indian government says the 1974 test had a 12kT yield, other observers have placed the yield between 10kT-15kT.(364)

While India did not conduct subsequent nuclear tests at Pokharan during the 1970s and early 1980s, additional shafts were dug in preparation for at least two future tests.(365) Those preparations were publicly revealed by US Senator Alan Cranston in 1981 when he said that India had performed “surface excavations for burial of a nuclear warhead — for an underground test.”(366) His accusation was followed by an article in theIndian Express which described the sudden fencing off of a large area near the Khetolai artillery range, and noted that nine villages near the old test site could be evacuated in preparation for another nuclear test.(367) A similar article in the Indian press during 1982 described heavy nighttime industrial activity at the site, and the efforts of the Indian army to cordon off an area near the range.(368) Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and then former president and defense minister, R. Venkataraman, have subsequently verified the news accounts, saying that New Delhi completed all the necessary preparations for conducting a nuclear test in 1983, but the test was canceled due to international pressure.(369) India used the shafts dug during the 1980s for its May 1998 tests.(370)

Proliferation Implications

The Pokharan nuclear test site, the only facility of its kind in India, is a direct proliferation concern. According to the Indian government, the current program of tests is complete and India has gained valuable data in the process. That data will help New Delhi refine its weapon designs, create new designs, and enhance its ability to conduct computer testing simulations.

The May 1998 tests and related statements by current and former Indian government officials have made it clear that New Delhi has had an active nuclear weapons program since at least the early 1970s. While work and support for that program may have been sporadic, the 1974 test and subsequent preparations for additional tests in the early 1980s are evidence of a nuclear weapons program’s existence. Although India did not carry those preparations to fruition, the test site was maintained and preparations were made anew in late 1995, culminating in the May 1998 nuclear explosions. While India’s nuclear testing has ended for now, the prospect that the attempted hydrogen bomb test was unsuccessful raises the possibility that Indian weapon designers within the DAE will pressure New Delhi forgo signing the CTBT and leave open the option of conducting more tests in the future.

End Notes

(1) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), pp. 186-202.

(2) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), pp. 183-84.

(3) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies On Scientists’ Expulsion,” Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com);“Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(4) “Japanese Fusion Device,” Hindu, 11 March 1 985, p. 5; in Worldwide Report (23 April 1986), p. 51; “Tokamak for Saha Institute,” Nuclear Engineering International, June 1987, p. 8.

(5) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), p. 11.

(6) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), p. 181; “Plasma Related Work in India,” (http://www.cat.ernet.in).

(7) “Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics,” (http://202.41.94.1/sahainst).

(8) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(9) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report; 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), pp. 3-4.

(10) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies On Scientists’ Expulsion,” Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com);“Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(11) “Security Beefed Up at Nuclear Installations in Calcutta,” Indian Express, 21 May 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(12) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report; 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), pp. 3-4.

(13) Engineering Research Centers, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 211; “Tata Institute of Fundamental Research,” (http://www.tifr.res.in).

(14) “Welcome to the Atomic and Molecular Sciences Laboratory: Research Interests,” (http://www.tifr.res.in).

(15) “Research Efforts at TIFR,” (http://www.tifr.res.in); Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Annual Report 1996-1997 (Mumbai, India: Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 1997), p. 37; “Atomic Energy in India: Research and Development,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(16) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(17) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies On Scientists’ Expulsion,” Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com); “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(18) “Anil Kakodkar Honoured,” BARC Newsletter, September 1997, p. 1; Engineering Research Centers, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 210.

(19) “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence and Research Development Organisation,” Indian Government Press Release, 17 May 1998, (http://www.indianembassy.org).

(20) General Accounting Office, Export Licensing Procedures For Dual-Use Items Need To Be Strengthened, 17 May 1994, GAO-NSIAD-94-119.

(21) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(22) “Research Reactors,” Nuclear Review, April 1996, p. 17; “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(23) “New Reactor Being Planned in Trombay,” The Hindu, 28 April 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(24) Pearl Marshall, “India, Wanting No Constraints, Loath to Seek Heavy Water from SU,” Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1982, pp. 4-5; Leonard Spector with Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 87.

(25) Assuming the reactor has operated at 50-80% efficiency, it can produce 8.8-10 kg of plutonium per year. See “Research Reactors,” Nuclear Review, April 1996, p. 17; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 266.

(26) “Zerlina Reactor,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(27) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 105; “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(28) “Purnima-I Reactor,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(29) “Purnima-I Reactor,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in), “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 269.

(30) “Purnima-II Reactor,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(31) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 105; “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(32) “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Purnima-III Reactor,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(33) “Research Reactors,” Nuclear Review, April 1996, p. 17, W.P.S. Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Tests; Technical and Military Imperatives,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1996, pp. 171.

(34) Times of India, 10 August 1985, p. 1; in Worldwide Report (23 September 1985), p. 73; “Dhruva Back in Action,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 1987, p. 8.

(35) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; John J. Fialka, “How ‘Heavy Water’ Seeps Through Cracks of Nuclear Regulations,” Wall Street Journal, 3 January 1989, pp. A1, A8.

(36) This calculation is based on an average capacity factor of 50–80 percent. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 266; Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7.

(37) “New Reactor Being Planned in Trombay,” The Hindu, 28 April 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com), “New ‘Dhruva’ Type Reactor Being Planned at BARC,” Indian Express, 27 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(38) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “No Alternative to N-Power; Chidambaram,’ Times of India, 1 June 1999, (http://www.timesofindia.com).

(39) “New Reactor Being Planned in Trombay,” The Hindu, 28 April 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com), “New ‘Dhruva’ Type Reactor Being Planned at BARC,” Indian Express, 27 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(40) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report — 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 37.

(41) The World Of Learning, 47th Edition (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 676; Times of India, 10 August 1985, p. 1; in Worldwide Report (23 September 1985), p. 73; S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.”

(42) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997.

(43) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report — 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 37.

(44) As listed in the Indian-Pakistan agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “India and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities,” Nucleonics Week, 4 January 1992, p. 10; “World Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities,” (http://www.antenna.nl).

(45) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report — 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 37; “Production of Sulphur Hexafluoride,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(46) Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “India and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities,” Nucleonics Week, 4 January 1992, p. 10; “India Admits It Can Enrich,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 1987, p. 8; “DAE Chief Denies Industrial HEU Production at BARC,” NuclearFuel, 29 June 1987, p. 6; Manoj Joshi, “India’s Nuclear Dilemma,” The Hindu, 3 November 1990, p. 9.

(47) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(48) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16; Brahma Chellaney, “Indian Scientists Exploring U Enrichment, Advanced Technologies,” Nucleonics Week, 5 March 1987, pp. 9-10.

(49) Mark Hibbs, “Iran Said to Be Stepping Up Efforts to Support Laser Enrichment,” Nuclear Fuel, 5 October 1998, pp. 1, 17.

(50) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(51) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 116; Frans Berkhout and Surendra Gadekar, “India,” Energy And Security, February 1997, p. 12; “BARC Organisation,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(52) Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1987-88, Government of India, 1988; in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 267.

(53) “BARC Develops ‘Sol-Gel’ for Fabricating N-Fuel,” The Hindu, 3 March 1997, p. 15, (http://www.webpage.com); “BARC Organisation,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(54) “Manufacture of Di (2-Ethyl Hexyl) Phosphoric Acid,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(55) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 72.

(56) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Delhi Acquires Nuclear Waste Management Technology,” 23 March 1998, Financial Express, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(57) “Tapping thorium - Indian way,” ComCom, October 1998, (http//www.vigyanprasar.com).

(58) “Tapping thorium - Indian way,” ComCom, October 1998, (http//www.vigyanprasar.com).

(59) Mark Hibbs, “India Made ‘About 25 Bomb Cores’ Since First Test in 1974,” Nuclear Watch, 17 June 1998, (http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat). Chengappa, Raj. The Bomb Makers, (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com).

(60) G. Sudhakar Nair, Telegraph, 8 January 1985; in Worldwide Report (13 February 1985), pp. 77-81; “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Milestones,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence and Research Development Organisation,” Indian Government Press Release, 17 May 1998, (http://www.indianembassy.org).

(61) Mark Hibbs, “India Made ‘About 25 Bomb Cores’ Since First Test in 1974,” Nuclear Watch, 17 June 1998, (http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat)

(62) Mark Hibbs, “India Made ‘About 25 Bomb Cores’ Since First Test in 1974,” Nuclear Watch, 17 June 1998, (http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat)

(63) David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 265.

(64) Asian Age, 10 October 1997; in FBIS-TAC-97-285 (10 October 1997); Adirupa Sengupta, “Scientist Says Bomb Was Tested in ’74,” India Abroad, 17 October 1997, p. 14; “‘Safety Determined Bomb’s Size,’ Says BARC Chief,” Times of India, 20 May 1998, (http://www.timesofindia.com).

(65) “India Capable of Making Neutron Bomb: Santhanam,” Indian Express, 9 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(66) “Pokhran Tests Sufficient: AEC Chief,” Indian Express, 3 February 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(67) “India Can Make Neutron Bomb,” The Hindu, 17 August 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com); “India Capable of Making Neutron Bomb: Santhanam,” Indian Express, 9 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(68) “India Can Make Neutron Bomb,” The Hindu, 17 August 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(69) Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, “Degussa Says It Exported US Beryllium to India Without US Authorization,” NuclearFuel, 6 February 1989, pp. 1-2.

(70) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1988-1989, Government of India, 1989; in Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 72.

(71) “Plasma Related Work in India,” (http://www.cat.ernet.in).

(72) US Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Testimony Of William Webster, 18 May 1989, First Session, 101st Congress.

(73) Stephen Engelberg, “German Atomic Sale Challenged,” New York Times, 1 February 1989, p. A2; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, “Degussa Says It Exported US Beryllium to India Without US Authorization,” NuclearFuel, 6 February 1989, pp. 1-2.

(74) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1984-85, Government of India, 1985, p. 27; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, “German Firm’s Beryllium Exports to India May Have Violated US Law,” NuclearFuel, 30 January 1989, pp. 1-3; R. Chidambaram, “Nuclear Energy; Programme and Its Impact,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 77-79.

(75) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report; 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), pp. 3-4.

(76) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Heavy Water,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Tritium Breakthrough Brings India Closer to An H-Bomb Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, p. 29.

(77) T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Tritium Breakthrough Brings India Closer to An H-Bomb Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, p. 29.

(78) “A Mushrooming Armada,” Outlook, 6 July 1998, pp. 26-27; in FBIS-NES-98-190 (9 July 1998), Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Prepare Nuclear Doctrine, Arsenal for Deployment,” Defense News, 1-7 June 1998, p. 14.

(79) “‘Safety Determined Bomb’s Size,’ Says BARC Chief,” Times of India, 20 May 1998, (http://www.timesofindia.com).

(80) “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence and Research Development Organisation,” Indian Government Press Release, 17 May 1998, (http://www.indianembassy.org).

(81) “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence and Research Development Organisation,” Indian Government Press Release, 17 May 1998, (http://www.indianembassy.org).

(82) These figures are estimates based on using 5kg of weapons-grade plutonium per weapon, subtracting the approximately 140kg India consumed; [35kg in weapon tests, 35 kg for the Purnima reactor, 50 kg for the FBTR, and 10 kg in reprocessing losses]. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 269; Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7.

(83) Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Prepare Nuclear Doctrine, Arsenal for Deployment,” Defense News, 1-7 June 1998, p. 14.

(84) For instance, South Africa canceled a program to build a commercial laser enrichment plan after France withdrew financial backing. See Ann MacLachlan and Michael Knapik, “South Africa to End MIS SWU Project,” NuclearFuel, 29 December 1997, p. 4.

(85) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(86) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; Pearl Marshall, “India and France Renew Old Friendship,”Nucleonics Week, 4 July 1985, pp. 12-14.

(87) Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7; Jairam Ramesh, “India’s Stalled Nuclear Plans; Why Heavy Water Is Not Available,” Times of India, 21 July 1982, p. 8; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(88) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(89) Pearl Marshall, “India, Wanting No Constraints, Loath to Seek Heavy Water from SU,” Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1982, pp. 4-5; “Dhruva-India’s First Home Grown Research Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 1986, p 53.

(90) Jairam Ramesh, “India’s Stalled Nuclear Plans; Why Heavy Water Is Not Available,” Times of India, 21 July 1982, p. 8; G.K. Reddy, The Hindu, 2 February 1984; in Worldwide Report (29 March 1984), pp. 17-18; S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(91) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22.

(92) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1971-97. See Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(93) A. Gopalakrishnan, “Of the Shortcomings, the Risks,” Frontline, 8-21 May 1999 (http://www.indiaserver.com).

(94) “Aging Tarapur Atomic Power Station to Live Longer,” Indian Express, 25 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(95) Mark Hibbs and Ann Maclachlan, “India Can’t Count on France for Tarapur Fuel Past 1993,” Nucleonics Week, 16 April 1992, pp. 9-10.

(96) “May Date for Fuel Delivery?” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1983, p. 7; Pearl Marshall, “India and France Renew Old Friendship,” Nucleonics Week, 4 July 1985, pp. 12-14.

(97) “Hyderabad Reactor Begins Using Uranium from China,” Business Line, 20 February 1995, p. 9; in FBIS-NES-95-038 (27 February 1995).

(98) Ux Weekly, 14 September 1998; in Uranium Institute News Briefing, 9-15 September 1998, (http://www.uilondon.org).

(99) “Work on TAPS 3 and 4 to Start Soon,” Indian Express, 6 February 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); “No Alternative to N-Power; Chidambaram,’ Times of India, 1 June 1999, (http://www.timesofindia.com).

(100) Mark Hibbs, “Tarapur-2 to Join Twin BWR in Burning PHWR Plutonium,” NuclearFuel, 25 September 1995, pp. 18-19; Mark Hibbs, “China Will Supply U, SWU to India,” NuclearFuel, 24 October 1994, p. 6.

(101) Mark Hibbs, “Tarapur-2 to Join Twin BWR in Burning PHWR Plutonium,” NuclearFuel, 25 September 1995, pp. 18-19.

(102) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 113; V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 3.

(103) Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7; “The Bomb Behind Nuclear Power,” Plutonium Investigation, 10 December 1998, pp. 1-6.

(104) “BARC Develops ‘Sol-Gel’ for Fabricating N-Fuel,” The Hindu, 3 March 1997, (http://www.webpage.com); Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(105) “BARC Develops ‘Sol-Gel’ for Fabricating N-Fuel,” The Hindu, 3 March 1997, (http://www.webpage.com).

(106) This plant could reprocess up to 500kg of reactor-grade plutonium each year, but is not known to have reached that capacity. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 181; Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 116; Frans Berkhout and Surendra Gadekar, “India,” Energy And Security, February 1997, p. 12.

(107) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1980-81, Government of India, 1981; in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 267.

(108) G. Sudhakar Nair, Telegraph, 8 January 1985, p. 7; in Worldwide Report (13 February 1985), pp. 77-81; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 3.

(109) The Rajasthan spent fuel is believed to have yielded 25kg of plutonium. See A. Abraham, “Plutonium Missing in Tarapur Plant,” Sunday Observer, 16-22 October 1983; in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 181.

(110) Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8.

(111) Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8.

(112) Brahma Chellaney, “Indian Scientists Exploring U Enrichment, Advanced Technologies,” Nucleonics Week, 5 March 1987, pp. 9-10; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(113) Sumit Ghoshal, “Series of Near Accidents Cast Doubt on Safety at BARC,” Indian Express, 17 July 1996, (http://www.expressindia.com); R. Abreau, “Tarapur Lapse,” India Today, 31 July 1995, p. 42; Rahul Bedi, “Radioactive Water Leak Threatens Indian Town,” Washington Times, 8 July 1998, p. A5.

(114) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1997 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1996), p. 117.

(115) “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 195.

(116) Xavier Dias, “Chatijkocha...Another Story” (Chaibasa, India: Unpublished Report, Mining Concerns Desk, Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action, 1996); “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 196.

(117) “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 197.

(118) “Uranium; Resources, Production And Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 197; Xavier Dias, “Chatijkocha...Another Story” (Chaibasa, India: Unpublished Report, Mining Concerns Desk, Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action, 1996); Doordarshan Television Network, 4 February 1996, in FBIS-TAC-96-003 (4 February 1996).

(119) “India’s Nuclear Programme,” The Hindu, 27 December 1997, p. 12; Ritu Sarin, “Hunt for the Yellow Cake,” Indian Express, 4 June 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(120) See for example; “Soutik Biswas, “Nuclear Fallout,” Asiaweek, 25 June 1999, (http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek); Kalpana Sharma, “The Other Side of Security,” The Hindu, 27 January 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com); Julian West, “Thousands at Risk of Poisoning from ‘India’s Chernobyl’,” Daily Telegraph, 25 April 1999, (http://www.telegraph.co.uk).

(121) “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(122) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(123) “Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Near AP,” Financial Express, 7 August 1995, p. 5; Author’s correspondence with NFC officials, 31 July 1996.

(124) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 113; Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “India and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities,” Nucleonics Week, 4 January 1992, p. 10.

(125) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 114; “Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Near AP,” Financial Express, 7 August 1995, p. 5.

(126) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 114; “NFC Gearing to Double Uranium Output,” The Hindu, 15 July 1996, p. 6; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997

(127) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 114; “World Light Water Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facilities,” (http://www.antenna.nl).

(128) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16; “Atomic Energy in India: Nuclear Fuels and Structural Components,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); Author’s correspondence with Nuclear Fuel Complex officials, 31 July 1996.

(129) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117.

(130) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(131) “Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Near AP,” Financial Express, 7 August 1995, p. 5; “NFC Gearing to Double Uranium Output,” The Hindu, 15 July 1996, p. 6; “Atomic Energy; Indigenous Technology,” (http://www.meadev.gov.in); Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,”Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(132) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Nuclear Fuels and Structural Components,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in).

(133) “Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment, and Technology,” International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, 24 February 1998, INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2.

(134) Somasekhar Mulugu, “Titanium Sponge Unit in Central Sector,” Business Line, 24 June 1997, p. 2, (http://www.indiaserver.com); V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 169; Central Electro Chemical Research Institute Annual Report 1995-96 (Karaikudi, India: Central Electro Chemical Research Institute, 1996), p. 37.

(135) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 169; Central Electro Chemical Research Institute Annual Report 1995-96 (Karaikudi, India: Central Electro Chemical Research Institute, 1996), p. 37.

(136) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(137) “Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Near AP,” Financial Express, 7 August 1995, p. 5.

(138) Author’s correspondence with Nuclear Fuel Complex officials, 31 July 1996.

(139) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(140) “About the Company,” (http://www.stph.net/midhani).

(141) “India Indian Scientists Develop Maraging Steel,” Nucleonics Week, 15 October 1987, p. 14; N. Gopal Raj, The Hindu, 11 September 1993, p. 8; in JPRS-TND-93-035 (10 November 1993), pp. 31-32; “Product Mix,” (http://www.stph.net).

(142) Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997 (http://www.expressindia.com).

(143) R. Chidambaram, “Nuclear Energy; Programme and its Impact,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 77-79.

(144) Mark Hibbs, “Iran Said to be Stepping Up Effort to Support Laser Enrichment,” NuclearFuel, 5 October 1998, pp. 1, 17.

(145) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies on Scientists’ Expulsion,” The Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com); Andrew R. Koch, “Nuclear-Powered Submarines: India’s Strategic Trump Card,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1998, pp. 29-31; “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(146) “NFC Gearing to Double Uranium Output,” The Hindu, 15 July 1996, p. 6; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(147) N. Gopal Raj, The Hindu, 11 September 1993, p. 8; in JPRS-TND-93-035 (10 November 1993), pp. 31-32; “Indian Defence Information,” (http://www.geocities.com).

(148) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; N. Srinivasan, The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1983, p. 143; in Worldwide Report (9 April 1984), pp. 18-20.

(149) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117.

(150) Sheila Tefft, “Government Report Criticizes Tuticorn Heavy Water Plant,” Nucleonics Week, 5 May 1988, pp. 1, 10; Times of India, 2 May 1989, p. 6; in Nuclear Developments (14 July 1989), pp. 13-14.

(151) Times of India, 2 May 1989, p. 6; in Nuclear Developments (14 July 1989), pp. 13-14.

(152) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 8 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 22-26; N. Srinivasan, The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1983, p. 143; in Worldwide Report (9 April 1984), pp. 18-20.

(153) Pearl Marshall, “India’s Desperate Push for Enough Indigenous Heavy Water,” Nucleonics Week, 27 May 1982, p. 12.

(154) “India Makes Light of Heavy Water,” Nuclear Engineering International, September 1982, pp. 12-13; Sheila Teft, “Investigators Blame Gasket Leak for Baroda Explosion and Fire,” Nucleonics Week, 28 April 1988, pp. 5-6; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(155) “Dhruva-India’s First Home Grown Research Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 1986, p. 53; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 8 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 22-26.

(156) “HPC in India: White House Failure or Conservative Hysteria?” Defense Week, 8 June 1998, p. 14; Gary Milhollin, “Made in America; How US Exports Helped Fuel the South Asian Arms Race,” Washington Post, 7 June 1998, (http://www.washingonpost.com).

(157) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies on Scientists’ Expulsion,” The Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com);“Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(158) Michael Drudge, “India/Supercomputer,” Voice of America, March 3, 1997; Francois Gautier, “The Breakthrough of the High Technologies in South Asia,” Le Figaro Economic, 9 September 1998, (http://www.indiagov.org).

(159) Hanif Arafat, “India Unveils National Supercomputing Facility,” Reuters, 2 March 1997; in Executive News Service (2 March 1997); Michael Drudge, “India/Supercomputer,” Voice of America, 3 March 1997.

(160) Hanif Arafat, “India Unveils National Supercomputing Facility,” Reuters, March 2, 1997; in Executive News Service, March 2, 1997 “Supercomputer Education and Research Centre,” (http://www.serc.iisc.ernet.in).

(161) “Supercomputer Education and Research Centre,” (http://www.serc.iisc.ernet.in); “HPC in India: White House Failure or Conservative Hysteria?” Defense Week, 8 June 1998, p. 14.

(162) “C-DAC to Install PARAM 10000 at Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore,” 6 August 1999, C-DAC Press Release, (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(163) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 72.

(164) “Chemical Engineering; Research and Development Studies,” (http://chemeng.iisc.ernet.in).

(165) “The Entity List,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 30 June 1997, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(166) Anthony Gerring, ed., International Research Centers, 9th Edition (Detroit: Gale Research, 1996), p. 379.

(167) Engineering Research Centers, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 218.

(168) Davinder Kumar, “Advanced Pump for Kalpakkam Reactor,” Indian Express, 13 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); “BHEL Largest Maker of AC/DC Motors,” Financial Express, 14 October 1996, (http://www.expressindia.com); Engineering Research Centers, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 210.

(169) All India Radio Network, 4 November 1996; in FBIS-NES-96-214 (4 November 1996); V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), pp. 70-71.

(170) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 159.

(171) Anthony Gerring, ed., International Research Centers Directory, 9th Edition (Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research, 1996), p. 410.

(172) “DRDO to Develop Advanced Materials,” Indian Express, 23 February 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 3; “India Can Simulate Nuclear Tests,” Deccan Herald, 12 July 1998, (http://www.deccanherald.com).

(173) “DRDO to Develop Advanced Materials,” Indian Express, 23 February 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); “India to Launch Its Most Powerful Supercomputer,” Tech Mantra, February 1998, (http://www.techmantra.com).

(174) “On Line, Off Line in India,” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1994, p. 8.

(175) Ray Silver, “AECL Founder Says Soviets to Be Tough on Safeguards with India,” Nucleonics Week, 19 January 1989, p. 11.

(176) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22; “Rapp 1 for Scrap,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 1986, p. 11.

(177) Leonard Spector with Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 83.

(178) Delhi Domestic Service, 12 October 1989; in Nuclear Developments (26 October 1989), p. 33.

(179) The Rajasthan spent fuel is believed to have yielded 25kg of plutonium. See A. Abraham, “Plutonium Missing in Tarapur Plant,” Sunday Observer, 16-22 October 1983; in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 181.

(180) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1974-1997. See Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(181) “On Line, Off Line, in India,” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1994, p. 8; “Damage to Rajasthan N-Power Unit 1 Told,” The Hindu, 13 August 1986, p. 1; in Worldwide Report (2 October 1986), p. 24.

(182) “India’s N-Power Development Crosses Another Milestone,” Deccan Herald, 24 December 1997, (http://www.deccaanherald.com); “Indo-Russian Reactor Deal On: AEC Chief,” Deccan Herald, 15 June 1998, (http://www.deccanherald.com); The Hindu, 19 June 1986, p. 9; in Worldwide Report (11 August 1986), p. 33.

(183) “Committees Consider Indian Programme,” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1996, p. 8.

(184) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(185) Delhi Domestic Service, 12 October 1989; in Nuclear Developments (26 October 1989), p. 33.

(186) Times of India, 31 August 1986, p. 7; in Worldwide Report (22 October 1986), p. 18; Leonard Spector with Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 83.

(187) Power in Asia, 12 January 1998, p. 10; in Uranium Institute News Briefing, 7-13 January 1998, (http://www.uilondon.org); “Indo-Russian Reactor Deal On: AEC Chief,” Deccan Herald, 15 June 1998, (http://www.deccanherald.com).

(188) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1982-1997. See Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(189) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997.

(190) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997; “Kaiga-2 to Go Critical on Aug. 25,” The Hindu, 9 August 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(191) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22.

(192) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7.

(193) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(194) Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 7 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 18-22.

(195) Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 7 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 18-22.

(196) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(197) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(198) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; N. Srinivasan, The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1983, p. 143; in Worldwide Report (9 April 1984), pp. 18-20

(199) Pearl Marshall, “India and France Renew Old Friendship,” Nucleonics Week, 4 July 1985, pp. 12-14; G.K. Reddy, The Hindu, 2 February 1984; in Worldwide Report (29 March 1984), pp. 17-18.

(200) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 8 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 22-26; Neal Patri, “India: No Heavy Water Plants but Lawmakers Protest Secrecy,” Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p. 14.

(201) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(202) “Dhruva-India’s First Home Grown Research Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 1986, p. 53; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 8 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 22-26.

(203) As listed in the Indian-Pakistan agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “India and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities,” Nucleonics Week, 9 January 1992, p. 10; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(204) Prawful Bidwai, Times of India, 9 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 26-30; “Thal-III Fertilizer Project,” (http://www.rcfltd.com).

(205) “DAE Chief Denies Industrial HEU Production at BARC,” NuclearFuel, 29 June 1987, p. 6; N. Srinivasan, The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1983, p. 143; in Worldwide Report (9 April 1984), pp. 18-20; Prawful Bidwai, Times of India, 9 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 26-30.

(206) S. K. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(207) “Madras Atomic Power Station,” (http://www.npcil.org).

(208) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22.

(209) “India’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” (http://www.warewulf.com); Leonard Spector with Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 83.

(210) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1985-1997. India’s Nuclear Power Corporation claims that the reactors have performed more efficiently since 1997, but base their calculations on the down-rate capacity rather than the installed capacity that India paid for. For the Indian government figures, see (http://www.npcil.org). For an independent assessment, see Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(211) The leak was variously reported at 6 and 14 Mt. See “Heavy Water Leak in Kalpakkam Reactor,” The Hindu, 27 March 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com); A. Gopalakrishnan, “Of the Shortcomings, the Risks,” Frontline, 8-21 May 1999 (http://www.indiaserver.com); “Panel Set Up to Probe MAPS Leakage,” The Hindu, 21 April 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(212) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Address to 41st Regular Session of IAEA General Conference,” BARC Newsletter, October 1997, p. 5.

(213) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 67.

(214) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Heavy Water,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Tritium Breakthrough Brings India Closer to An H-Bomb Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, p. 29.

(215) T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Tritium Breakthrough Brings India Closer to An H-Bomb Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, p. 29.

(216) T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Tritium Breakthrough Brings India Closer to An H-Bomb Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, p. 29.

(217) Commercial reactors typically burn their fuel slowly, a process which is more economical but which dilutes the purity of Pu-239, the desired element for making nuclear weapons. However, when new commercial reactors begin operations, they often burn the initial fuel load quickly, which can create up to 5kg of weapons-grade plutonium in each reactor’s spent fuel. See Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8.

(218) Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8.

(219) “Vajpayee to Dedicate Plutonium Plant to the Nation,” Indian Express, 13 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(220) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 120; “Third Reprocessing Plant Starts Up,” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1996, p. 8; “Third Reprocessing Plant Opened at Kalpakkam,” Nuclear News, May 1996, p. 43.

(221) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(222) G. Sudhakar Nair, “Efforts for Self-Sufficiency in N-Energy Reviewed,” Telegraph, 8 January 1985, p. 7; in Worldwide Report (13 February 1985), pp. 77-81.

(223) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(224) V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 306.

(225) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy,” (http://www.meadev.gov.in); “Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,” (http://www.igcar.ernet.in).

(226) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(227) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1997 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1996), p. 132.

(228) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(229) Vyvyan Tenorio, “India’s 40-MWt FBTR Went Critical Late Last Week,” Nucleonics Week, 24 October 1985, p. 5; “Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,” (http://www.igcar.ernet.in); Pearl Marshall, “India and France Renew Old Friendship,” Nucleonics Week, 4 July 1985, pp. 12-14.

(230) “India’s Test Breeder Reactor Was Restarted May 11,” Nuclear News, July 1989, p. 67; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Reactor Group,” (http;//www.igcar.ernet.in).

(231) Mark Hibbs, “Indian FBTR Operating at 12.5MW, Reprocessing Line Sought by 1999,” Nucleonics Week, 10 July 1997, pp. 7-8.

(232) Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 268.

(233) Neel Patri, “India Starts Up Research Unit Using Fuel Made from Thorium,” Nucleonics Week, 7 November 1996, p. 2; “Reactor Group,” (http://www.igcar.ernet.in).

(234) Neel Patri, “India Starts Up Research Unit Using Fuel Made From Thorium,” Nucleonics Week, 7 November 1996, p. 2; “Nuclear Reactor at Kalpakkam Begins ‘Full Power’ Operation,” Doordarshan Television Network, 17 September 1997; in FBIS-NES-97-261 (18 September 1997); “Reactor Group,” (http://www.igcar.ernet.in).

(235) “Thorium based nuclear power plant,” Calcutta Online, 30 May 1998, (http://www.calonline.com).

(236) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Delhi Acquires Nuclear Waste Management Technology,” Financial Express, 23 March 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(237) Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com); Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7.

(238) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(239) Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com); Davinder Kumar, “Advanced Pump for Kalpakkam Reactor,” Indian Express, 13 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(240) Power in Asia, 20 October 1997, p. 14; in Uranium Institute News Briefing, 15-21 October 1997, (http://www.uilondon.org); “Indian 1999-2000 Science Budget Sees 20% Hike in Outlays,” Skali, 2 March 1999, (http://www.skali.com).

(241) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(242) Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(243) Davinder Kumar, “Advanced Pump for Kalpakkam Reactor,” Indian Express, 13 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(244) The World of Learning, 47th Edition (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 672.

(245) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(246) Davinder Kumar, “Advanced Pump for Kalpakkam Reactor,” Indian Express, 13 September 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(247) Engineering Research Centres, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 212; Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(248) Maya Ranganathan, “New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007,” Indian Express, 24 January 1997, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(249) “Submarine’s N-Power Plant Getting Ready,” Times of India, 29 December 1995; in Strategic Digest, March 1996, pp. 440-441.

(250) Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Technical Snags Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program,” Defense News, 24-30 June 1996, p. 40.

(251) For more on India’s nuclear submarine program, see Andrew R. Koch, “Nuclear-Powered Submarines: India’s Strategic Trump Card,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1998, pp. 29-31.

(252) “BARC Develops ‘Sol-Gel’ for Fabricating N-Fuel,” The Hindu, 3 March 1997, (http://www.webpage.com).

(253) Mark Hibbs, “Indian FBTR Operating at 12.5MW, Reprocessing Line Sought by 1999,” Nucleonics Week, 10 July 1997, pp. 7-8.

(254) “IGCAR to Set Up Pilot Plant,” The Hindu, 4 August 1998, (http://www.webpage.com).

(255) Mark Hibbs, “First Separation Line at Kalpakkam Slated to Begin Operations Next Year,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, p. 8; “The Bomb Behind Nuclear Power,” Plutonium Investigation, 10 December 1998, pp. 1-6.

(256) “Reactor Group,” (http://www.igcar.ernet.in).

(257) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(258) N-Safety Research Facility Near Chennai,” The Hindu, 21 February 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(259) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Research and Development,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “The Institute of Mathematical Sciences; Welcome to Matscience,” (http://www.imsc.ernet.in).

(260) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Research and Development,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(261) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(262) “Talcher Makes Heavy Water,” Nuclear Engineering International, February 1985, p. 13; “DAE Chief Denies Industrial HEU Production at BARC,” NuclearFuel, 29 June 1987, p. 6; Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117.

(263) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; Mark Hibbs, “Indian Reprocessing Program Grows, Increasing Stock of Unsafeguarded PU,” NuclearFuel, 15 October 1990, pp. 5-7; Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117.

(264) N. Srinivasan, The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1983, p. 143; in Worldwide Report (9 April 1984), pp. 18-20; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 4 May 1984, p. 1; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 12-14; Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 6 May 1984, p.1; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 15-18.

(265) Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 6 May 1984, p. 1; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 15-18; “Talcher Makes Heavy Water,” Nuclear Engineering International, February 1985, p. 13.

(266) Telegraph, 31 August 1986, p. 9; in Worldwide Report (2 October 1986), pp. 21-22; C. Veeraraghavan, “The Thal Vaishet Heavy Water Plant Has Begun Production,” Nucleonics Week, 27 November 1986, pp. 2-3.

(267) Vyvyan Tenorio, “India Is Not Building An Enrichment Plant,” Nucleonics Week, 23 July 1987, p. 13.

(268) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997; S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(269) S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(270) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(271) Der Spiegel, 24 December 1990, pp. 69-72; in Nuclear Developments (5 February 1991), pp. 37-39; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 358; “Indigenous D2O Plant Commissioned,” Nuclear Engineering International, February 1991, p. 4.

(272) “US Blocks Export...,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 1989, p. 10.

(273) P. M. Vijendra Rao, Deccan Herald, 14 March 1997; in FBIS-TEN-97-073 (14 March 1997).

(274) Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Technical Snags Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program,” Defense News, 24-30 June 1996, p. 40.

(275) Mark Hibbs, “Second Indian Enrichment Facility Using Centrifuges Is Operational,” Nucleonics Week, 26 March 1992, pp. 9-10.

(276) “Indian Scientists Develop Maraging Steel,” Nucleonics Week, 15 October 1987, p. 14; N. Gopal Raj, The Hindu, 11 September 1993, p. 8; in JPRS-TND-93-035 (10 November 1993), pp. 31-32; “Indian Defence Information,” (http://www.geocities.com).

(277) “BHEL Largest Maker of AC/DC Motors,” Financial Express, 14 October 1996, (http://www.expressindia.com); Engineering Research Centers, 4th Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), p. 210.

(278) “The Entity List,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 30 June 1997, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(279) Mark Hibbs, “India to Equip Centrifuge Plant with Improved Rotor Assemblies,” NuclearFuel, 1 December 1997, pp. 7-8.

(280) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 88.

(281) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(282) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(283) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(284) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(285) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1994-1997. See Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(286) “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(287) Indian officials have said that Indian continues to research laser technology for enriching uranium for its inertial confinement fusion program. See “Pokharan Test Sufficient: AEC Chief,” Indian Express, 3 February 1999, (http://www.indianexpress.com);“Centre for Advanced Technology,” (http://www.ee.ualberta.ca/~naik); “Plasma Related Work in India,” (http://www.cat.ernet.in).

(288) “Centre for Advanced Technology,” (http://www.cat.ernet.in).

(289) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(290) “Basic Research Using Lasers,” (http://www.ee.ualberta.ca/~naik); “India Soon to Launch Thermonuclear Research,” Patriot, 12 February 1987, p. 5; in Worldwide Report (8 April 1987), p. 22; “India to Test Run Thermonuclear Fusion Device,” Defense And Foreign Affairs Weekly, 14-20 May 1990, p. 1.

(291) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Lasers for Industrial and Medical Application,” (http://www.ce.ualberta.ca/~naik).

(292) R. Chidambaram, “Nuclear Energy; Programme and its Impact,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 77-79.

(293) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies on Scientists’ Expulsion,” The Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com);“Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(294) Neel Patri, “Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

(295) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Address to 41st Regular Session of IAEA General Conference,” BARC Newsletter, October 1997, p. 4; R. Chidambam, “Nuclear Energy; Program and its Impact,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 77-79.

(296) “CDAC Corporate Profile,” (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(297) “Super ‘Weapon’ to Escape CTBT,” Indian Express, 6 April 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); “Param 1000: India’s Answer to Nuclear Ban,” Pakistan Link, 6 April 1998, (http://www.pakistanlink.com).

(298) Srinivas Venugopal, “Supercomputer Development Set to Enter Next Phase.” Business Standard, 9 May 1996, p. 8; in FBIS-NES-96-094 (9 May 1996); “Indian Scientists Expelled to Cripple the Country’s Chip Technology,” Indian Express, 27 July 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); Carla Anne Robbins, “Why Nuclear Threat Today Can Be Found at the Electronics Store,” Wall Street Journal, 14 December 1998, pp. A1, A12.

(299) Uday Pai, “India Prepares Homemade Supercomputer Network,” TecWeb, 8 April 1998, (http:www.tecweb.com); “C-DAC to Install PARAM 10000 at Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore,” 6 August 1999, C-DAC Press Release, (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(300) R. Dev. Raj, “India Beats US Bans on Supercomputer Exports,” Dawn, 1 April 1998, (http://www.dawn.com); Vijay Shankar, “C-DAC’s Supercomputers Are A Big Draw,” Rediff on the Net, 5 December 1998, (http://www.rediff.com).

(301) “C-DAC to Install PARAM 10000 at Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore,” 6 August 1999, C-DAC Press Release, (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(302) “India Can Simulate Nuclear Tests,” Deccan Herald, 12 July 1998, (http://www.deccanherald.com); “Indian Scientists Expelled to Cripple the Country’s Chip Technology,” Indian Express, 27 July 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(303) Francois Gautier, “The Breakthrough of the High Technologies in South Asia,” Le Figaro Economic, 9 September 1998, (http://www.indiagov.org).

(304) “Applications Development Programme,” (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(305) Carla Anne Robbins, “Why Nuclear Threat Today Can Be Found at the Electronics Store,” Wall Street Journal, 14 December 1998, pp. A1, A12.

(306) “C-DAC to Install PARAM 10000 at Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore,” 6 August 1999, C-DAC Press Release, (http://www.cdac.org.in).

(307) Uday Pai, “India Prepares Homemade Supercomputer Network,” TecWeb, 8 April 1998, (http:www.tecweb.com).

(308) “Development Of Super Computers,” India News, 1 January 1997, p. 7.

(309) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 23.

(310) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997.

(311) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997.

(312) These figures are based on the average energy availability factor for 1992-1997. See Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons And Arms Control In South Asia After The Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 8; “Nuclear Electricity Generation,” Nucleonics Week, various issues.

(313) “Narora Fire: More Rehabilitation Work,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 1993, p. 6; “Narrowly Averted Meltdown in 1993,” The Hindu, 29 January 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(314) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-97, Government of India, 1997.

(315) “Kaiga-2 Finally Goes Critical,” Nucleonics Week, Vol.40 No.40, October 1999.

(316) “Kaiga-2 to Go Critical on Aug. 25,” The Hindu, 9 August 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(317) “Kaiga-2 to Go Critical on Aug. 25,” The Hindu, 9 August 1999, (http://www.hinduonline.com).

(318) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 22.

(319) “High Grade Uranium to Be Mined in Meghalaya,” Times of India, 5 May 1993, p. 21; in Proliferation Issues (12 July 1993), p. 11; V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report – 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1996), p. 323; “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 195.

(320) “Domiasiat Mine Hanging in Wind,” Press Trust of India, 3 September 1996; in Financial Express, 3 September 1996, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(321) “Domiasiat Mine Hanging in Wind,” Press Trust of India, 3 September 1996; in Financial Express, 3 September 1996, (http://www.expressindia.com); “Tribes Withdraw Protest Against Uranium Mining,” Canberra Times, 23 August 1993, p. 8; Ritu Sarin, “Hunt for the Yellow Cake,” Indian Express, 4 June 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(322) “New Zone with Heavy Mineral Potential Found in Andhra,” Indian Express, 21 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(323) Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 190.

(324) “New zone with heavy mineral potential found in Andhra,” Indian Express, 21 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(325) “High-Grade Uranium Found in Gulbarga,” Rediff on the Net, 22 June 1998, (http://www.rediff.com).

(326) “New zone with heavy mineral potential found in Andhra,” Indian Express, 21 April 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com); “High-Grade Uranium Found in Gulbarga,” Rediff on the Net, 22 June 1998, (http://www.rediff.com).

(327) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1997 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1996), p. 117; “Uranium; Resources, Production and Demand,” Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 197.

(328) “Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov).

(329) “Tapping thorium - Indian way,” ComCom, October 1998, (http//www.vigyanprasar.com).

(330) “Tapping thorium - Indian way,” ComCom, October 1998, (http//www.vigyanprasar.com).

(331) Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996 (London: Reed Business Publishing, 1995), p. 117; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(332) Praful Bidwai, Times of India, 7 May 1984, pp. 1, 9; in Worldwide Report (2 July 1984), pp. 18-22; S. P. Mukherjee, “Heavy Water; Surplus Output for Export,” The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry 1998, pp. 87-89.

(333) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “US Institute Clarifies on Scientists’ Expulsion,” The Hindu, 26 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com);“Dual-Use Export Control Sanctions India and Pakistan,” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 13 November 1998, (http://www.bxa.doc.gov); Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997.

(334) The World of Learning, 47th Edition (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 672.

(335) “Address to 41st Regular Session of IAEA General Conference,” BARC Newsletter, October 1997, p. 6; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India, 1997; “Atomic Energy in India: Research and Development,” (http://www.barc.ernet.in); “Ahmedabad Nuclear Fusion Efforts Described,” Times of India, 12 November 1991, p. 13; in Proliferation Issues (16 January 1992), pp. 18-19.

(336) “The SST Programme,” (http://www.plasma.ernet.in).

(337) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Biennial Report 1994-1996 (Calcutta: Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1997), p. 11.

(338) Vladimir Radyuhin, “Project Report Contract for Koodankulam Signed,” The Hindu, 21 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com).

(339) Vladimir Radyuhin, “Project Report Contract for Koodankulam Signed,” The Hindu, 21 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com); Vandana Saxena, “Russia to Extend 85% of Debt in Kundankulam Power Plan,”Financial Express, 24 June 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); “India Says Design Work Starts on Russian N-Plant,” Reuters, 4 November 1998; in Inquisit Agent Report, 4 November 1998.

(340) Vladimir Radyuhin, “Project Report Contract for Koodankulam Signed,” The Hindu, 21 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com); Vandana Saxena, “Russia to Extend 85% of Debt in Kundankulam Power Plan,”Financial Express, 24 June 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(341) Vladimir Radyuhin, “Project Report Contract for Koodankulam Signed,” The Hindu, 21 July 1998, (http://www.webpage.com).

(342) Siddharta Arya, “Work on India’s First 2000 MW Atomic Plant to Start in 2002,” Rediff on the Net, 16 February 1999, (http://www.rediff.com).

(343) “Gorbachev Visit Includes Credit Pact for Reactors,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 1989, p. 105; “Indo-Soviet Agreement Signed,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 1989, p. 2.

(344) The Hindu, 27 November 1988; in JPRS-TND-89-017 (29 August 1989), pp. 5-6; “Indo-Soviet Agreement Signed,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 1989, p. 2.

(345) “Off Again, on Again, at Koondankulam,” Nuclear Engineering International, May 1994, pp. 8-9.

(346) Vladimir Radyuhin, “India Agrees to Repay Russia in Dollars,” The Hindu, 16 January 1998, (http://www.webpage.com); Dadan Upadhyaya and Jyoti Malhotra, “Electrifying Indo-Russia Nuke Deal,” Indian Express, 10 January 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(347) “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” NPT/CONF.95/32/DEC. 2 (11 May 1995).

(348) “Communication of 29 April 1996 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment, and Technology,” INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1/Add. 1 (7 June 1996).

(349) “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence and Research Development Organisation,” Indian Government Press Release, 17 May 1998, (http://www.indianembassy.org).

(350) Raj Chengappa, “Is India’s H-Bomb a Dud?,” India Today, 12 October 1998, (http://www.india-today.com).

(351) Raj Chengappa, “Is India’s H-Bomb a Dud?,” India Today, 12 October 1998, (http://www.india-today.com).

(352) “New Delhi’s Secret Test Sites Escape Satellite Detection,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 June 1998, p. 5.

(353) “We Will Not Allow Misuse of Nuclear Tech: Chidambaram,” Indian Express, 31 October 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(354) “Pokharan Tests Sufficient: AEC Chief,” Indian Express, 3 February 1999, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(355) Mark Hibbs, “India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S. Believes,” Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1998; Reprinted in Nuclear Watch, (http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat); Brian Barker et al., “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science, 25 September 1998, pp. 1967-1968.

(356) Brian Barker et al., “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science, 25 September 1998, pp. 1967-1968; Robert Lee Hotz, “Pakistan, India Nuclear Claims Called Inflated,” Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1998, (http://www.latimes.com); Duncan Campbell, “India, Pakistan May Have Fooled Each Other Over N-Tests,” Dawn, 12 September 1998, (http://www.dawn.com).

(357) Brian Barker et al., “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science, 25 September 1998, pp. 1967-1968; Robert Lee Hotz, “Pakistan, India Nuclear Claims Called Inflated,” Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1998, (http://www.latimes.com); Duncan Campbell, “India, Pakistan May Have Fooled Each Other Over N-Tests,” Dawn, 12 September 1998, (http://www.dawn.com).

(358) Robert Lee Hotz, “Pakistan, India Nuclear Claims Called Inflated,” Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1998, (http://www.latimes.com).

(359) Tim Weiner, “India Suspected of Preparing for A-Bomb Test,” New York Times, 15 December 1995, p. A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Possible Nuclear Arms Test by India Concerns US,” Washington Post, 16 December 1995, p. A17.

(360) R. Chidambraram and R. Ramanna, “Some Studies on India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Experiment,” Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV: Proceedings of a Technical Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20-24 January 1975, pp. 421-436; as sited in Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, “Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert,” Science and Global Security 6 (1996), pp. 101-189.

(361) “The Smiling Buddha”, Hindustan Times, 5 December 1997, (http://www.hindustantimes.com); Manvendra Singh, “Pokharan Was a Bomb, Ramanna Lets Out India’s Nuclear Genie,” Indian Express, (http://www.expressindia.com).

(362) “India’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” (http://www.warewulf.com); “Subsidence Crater of India’s Only Nuclear Test,” (http://www.pal.xgw.fi); “The Smiling Buddha”, Hindustan Times, 5 December 1997, (http://www.hindustantimes.com).

(363) “India’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” (http://www.warewulf.com); “The Smiling Buddha”, Hindustan Times, 5 December 1997, (http://www.hindustantimes.com).

(364) “Subsidence Crater of India’s Only Nuclear Test,” (http://www.pal.xgw.fi); W.P.S. Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Tests,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1996, p. 170.

(365) Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, “Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert,” Science and Global Security 6 (1996), pp. 101-189.

(366) Senator Alan Cranston, “Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia Endangers US Security Interests,” Congressional Record, US Senate, 27 April 1981, p. 7375.

(367) Rahul Bedi, “Pokharan Full of N-Test Talk,” Indian Express, 5 May 1981, p. 1; “Villagers Expect Nuclear Test in Rajasthan,” Dawn, 7 May 1981, p. 14.

(368) Shubhabrata Bhattarcharya, “Another Nuclear Blast at Pokharan?,” Sunday Magazine, 9-15 May 1982, pp. 13; W.P.S. Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Tests: Technical and Military Imperatives,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1996, pp. 170-173.

(369) “Verkataraman Speaks of an Aborted N-Test,” Indian Express, 27 May 1998, (http://www.expressindia.com); Narayanan Madhavan, “Stage for N-Tests Set Years Ago, Says India’s PM,” Reuters, 26 May 1998.

(370) Mark Hibbs, “India Will Join CTBT, Test Were India’s Last, Ramanna Says,” Nucleonics Week, 14 May 1998, pp. 1-2.