Russian Reaction to the Pakistani Nuclear Tests of 28 May 1998

Dr. Scott Parrish, CNS Senior Research Associate 
28 May 1998 

Initial reaction in Moscow to the 28 May 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests has been condemnatory, and somewhat harsher than that which followed the Indian nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Given the rocky history of Russian-Pakistani relations, this response is hardly surprising. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 28 May expressing “the deepest concern” over the tests. The statement harshly criticized the Pakistani decision to respond in kind to the earlier Indian nuclear tests, saying “It is deplorable that the Pakistani leadership has been unable to cope with its emotions and to demonstrate circumspection and common sense at what is an extremely important moment.” The statement added that the Pakistani tests had been conducted “despite persistent appeals by the world community for Islamabad to show restraint and not to act on the basis of the tit for tat principle in response to [the] nuclear explosions carried out in India.” The statement urged India and Pakistan “to listen to the voice of the world community, give up further tests,” and adhere to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It argued that the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan “is today acquiring a completely new nuclear tinge, extremely dangerous for the whole of humankind.” The statement pessimistically concluded that recent developments in South Asia indicated  “a real threat is emerging of nuclear weapons spreading over the planet.” 

Coincidentally, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, meeting in Luxembourg with his NATO counterparts on 28 May for the 3rd session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, participated in a joint Russia-NATO statement condemning the Pakistani nuclear tests, saying “we are deeply concerned and dismayed by this developing regional nuclear arms race in South Asia.” The statement urged both India and Pakistan to “refrain from further tests and the deployment of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles in order to prevent the escalation of tensions and a nuclear arms race.” It also called on both countries to adhere unconditionally to the NPT and CTBT and open talks on a global treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The statement underlined that “the relations of India and Pakistan with each of us have been affected negatively by these developments,” although it did not spell out any joint action which NATO and Russia might take beyond diplomatic protests. 

Although less heavily involved than the United States, which has better relations with Pakistan, Russia had been actively involved in international efforts to discourage Pakistan from conducting its own nuclear tests. According to Interfax, only a few hours before the Pakistani tests were announced on 28 May, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin had met with Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Mansoor Alam and urged Pakistan to exercise restraint. 

Despite Russia’s condemnation of Pakistan’s action, however, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Interfax that Moscow “is not now considering the question of sanctions” against Pakistan. Instead, said Ivanov, Russia believed it was necessary to “mobilize public opinion on a bilateral and multilateral basis to convince Pakistan and India to refrain from further steps which would escalate tension” and to convince them to adhere to the NPT and CTBT. 

Russian parliamentarians sounded even more pessimistic notes than the Foreign Ministry about the Pakistani tests and the nuclear arms race which it may trigger in South Asia. Even the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, which had praised India’s tests, criticized the Pakistani action. Other comments by Russian parliamentarians following the Pakistani tests indicate that many Russian leaders are concerned about the implications for Russian national security of a full-blown nuclear arms race in South Asia, which could prompt new developments in Russian nonproliferation and security policies. 

Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma (the lower house of parliament) and a member of the liberal Yabloko faction, said that the Indian and Pakistani tests showed that “the fight for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is essentially lost.” Lukin argued that the de facto addition of India and Pakistan to the “nuclear club” would “sharply increase the appetite for this in Israel, Iran, and possibly Saudi Arabia.” Implying that other countries might also decide to follow suit, he concluded: “for all intents and purposes, this chain has no end.”  The biggest loser in recent developments, he contended, was the United States, which had “both in fact and psychologically lost its campaign for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.” 

Lukin said that the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability would probably make India and Pakistan more cautious “in the short run,” perhaps reducing the risk of war between them. But he expressed the fear that “sooner or later” it was possible that “an irresponsible political leader” in the region might decide to use nuclear weapons. Reflecting Russian pique at frequent American complaints that Russia is not sufficiently dedicated to nonproliferation, Lukin said that under the new conditions, it was time to “fairly and honestly” begin intensive international cooperation to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Lukin said that Russia was actually more interested in nonproliferation than the United States, since the new nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, are much closer to Russia geographically. In addition, he suggested that the United States, Russia, and the European Union should begin work on creating a joint missile defense system. He also argued that the Indian and Pakistani tests showed that START II, the 1993 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control agreement, should be ratified immediately by the Russian parliament, so that more effort could be made to develop a joint missile defense system. 

In a similar vein, the recently-selected chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Roman Popkovich, a member of the centrist Our Home is Russia faction, told Interfax that the Pakistani and Indian tests showed that Russia needs to revamp its national security doctrine and also increase defense spending.  Popkovich also speculated that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Indo-Pakistani conflict might “be a restraining factor” on the development of any regional conflict. But reflecting traditional Russian distrust of Pakistan, stemming in part from years of conflict over Afghanistan, he also pointed out that there could be no guarantee that nuclear weapons “would not be used under certain circumstances…by Islamic extremists in Pakistan.”  He recommended that talks be opened with the new nuclear powers and other “threshold” states to “induce” them to sign the NPT.  Popkovich emphasized that the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan meant that Russia should pay more attention to securing its southern and eastern borders than its northern and western ones. As a result, not only should the defense budget be increased, but funds should be targeted “in the first instance” at the strengthening of  ballistic missile defense systems. Russia already has a limited ballistic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, but many question its effectiveness. 

Vladimir Ryzhkov, deputy speaker of the Duma and also a member of the Our Home is Russia faction, told Interfax that the Pakistani nuclear tests were “very bad news.” He said the tests demonstrated the need to develop a new global security system, “in which each country would be given an adequate position.” Like Lukin, Ryzhkov pessimistically predicted that other countries would follow India and Pakistan’s example.  Rhyzhkov did not think that economic sanctions would be effective in dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, citing Pakistani pledges to endure any hardship necessary to ensure national security.  He noted that the increasing conflict between Pakistan and India  was a source of “serious concern, since we are witnessing a nuclear arms race which is taking place not far from our southern borders.” 

Aleksey Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma Geopolitics Committee and a member of the extreme nationalist LDPR faction, described the Pakistani test negatively.  This statement stood in stark contrast to his comments following India’s nuclear test on 11 May, which he had praised. Unlike many of his Duma colleagues, Mitrofanov explained his disapproval by noting that “Pakistan, unlike India…is not our major ally.” Mitrofanov also predicted that several other countries would now follow India and Pakistan’s example. He argued that under the new conditions created by India and Pakistan’s nuclear test, the global nonproliferation regime should be reconsidered. He contended that “the revision of the regime of nuclear nonproliferation could, paradoxically enough, positively influence the international security situation.” He argued that the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability might cause countries like India and Pakistan to act more cautiously, reducing the risk of war. Then, reflecting sharp differences with his colleagues, Mitrofanov suggested that under the new circumstances created by the Pakistani test, Russia should “appraise the possibilities of the market in military nuclear materials,” hinting that Russia should consider selling fissile material or perhaps even assembled nuclear weapons to countries that would like to acquire them. He concluded that “even if we don’t want to consider this issue now, tomorrow it may appear on the agenda of its own accord, and military components will be for sale.”  

These comments show that as is the case with India, Russia will support diplomatic efforts to pressure Pakistan into refraining from further testing and sign the NPT and CTBT. However, Russia is unlikely to participate in any sanctions against Pakistan, because to do so would be inconsistent with its stance opposing sanctions toward India, with which it has extensive military and trade ties. Nevertheless, the Pakistani tests have opened the prospect of a full-blown nuclear arms race in South Asia, which appears to disturb Russian policymakers much more than the Indian tests themselves did. It is possible that the implications of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in South Asia will push Russia to be more active in developing new nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies, including both deeper cooperation with the West and the development of ballistic missile defenses. It could also serve as a further stimulus to the ratification of the START II strategic nuclear arms control treaty, currently under consideration in the Russian Duma. 
 

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