North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramSelected Missile Abstracts: 1993
Doc. Code: 3056
ABSTRACT: On 20 December 1992, Russia's Security Ministry announced that 64 missile technicians were barred from leaving the country. The announcement follows Russian authorities detainment of scientists attempting to leave the country on 15 October 1992 and 5 November 1992. In addition, Russian security personnel removed 36 nuclear weapon specialists from a plane preparing to leave Moscow for North Korea on 8 December 1992. North Korea had hired the Russian nuclear weapon specialists at monthly salaries ranging from $1,500 to $3,000. [1] Supporting Sources: [1] Proliferation Issues, 7 January 1993, p. 6, "Arrival Of Russian Nuclear Specialists Thwarted"; Original Source: KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 20 December 1992. <<>> Doc. Code: 3074
ABSTRACT: In January 1993, North Korea gave assurances to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze that it will not employ Russian missile and nuclear scientists and engineers. The North Korean decision followed UN pressure to inspect suspected nuclear waste sites in North Korea and Russian threats to suspend diplomatic relations if demands not to employ Russian technicians remained unmet. Kunadze pointed out that attempts to hire Russian missile experts could support the international belief that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. <<>> Doc. Code: 3018
ABSTRACT: North Korea is using third- and fourth-generation ethnic Koreans, called "chosen soren," in Japan to acquire advanced electronics manufacturing equipment, guidance kits, composite materials, machine tools, and other technology necessary for ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Ethnic Koreans are also being used to divert technology from Germany through third countries such as Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia to North Korea. <<>> Doc. Code: 3462
ABSTRACT: Iran's ties with the DPRK have resulted in missile transactions between these two countries. Iran acquired several dozen 300 mile-range SCUD-Cs in 1991 from the DPRK and is thought to have purchased more SCUD-Cs since then, which arrived on shipments destined for Syria. Iran has also been trying to acquire the 600 mile-range, liquid fuel, two stage No-dong-1 missiles from the DPRK, as many as 150 missiles according to some US government officials. According to leaders of the People's Mujahedeen of Iran, a leading Iranian opposition group, there have been 5 military delegation teams sent to the DPRK in the past year, the last of which arrived in Pyongyang in March 1993 with 21 members headed by Brig. Gen. Hossein Mantequei, the Revolutionary Guard commander in charge of Tehran's surface-to-surface missile force. The prominence of missile experts in the delegation indicates that it has come to observe final tests of the No-dong-1, and to become trained in the missile's use; opposition group leaders say that some of the delegation is to remain in the DPRK for at least a month. Part of Iran's $2 billion effort to acquire intermediate range missile capability was an attempt to purchase Chinese M-11 missiles, an effort which was blocked by the Bush administration. R. James Woolsey, Director of CIA, said in testimony before the Congress that the spread of intermediate missiles, with regard to the "rigor of North Korea's efforts," in Asia and the Middle East was "not too far away." <<>> Doc. Code: 3071
ABSTRACT: In a 10 April 1993 report in Jane's Defence Weekly, Joseph Bermudez traces the history of North Korea's ballistic missile development. In 1975,North Korea and China began the co-development the DF-61 liquid-fuelled tactical ballistic missile, which was canceled around 1976. In 1979, North Korea initiated an indigenous program to develop a missile of the DF-61 class. In 1981, North Korea acquired a number of Soviet Scud-B (R-17E) missiles and MAZ-543 Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) as part of a cooperative development agreement with Egypt. The first indigenously produced North Korean "Scud" missile was the Scud Mod A, a direct reverse-engineered copy of the Scud-B, three of which were successfully test launched from the No-dong test facility between April 1984 and September 1984. A number of unsuccessful test were also conducted. The Mod A was a proof-of-concept model and none are believed to have been deployed operationally. Iran and North Korea agreed to an exchange of missile technology following the Iran-Iraq War, in which Iran offered monetary support for North Korea's missile program with an option to purchase Scud Mod Bs, which had a 15% increase in range to 320km with a 1000kg warhead, an improvement over the original Soviet version with a range of only 280km, but is believed to have a similar circular error probability (CEP) of 500-800 m. Scud Mod B production began in 1985, eventually replacing Scud Mod A production, and is believed to have reached full-scale production in 1986 with a monthly capacity of eight to twelve missiles. In 1985 the Korean People's Army established a Scud Mod B missile unit at To-Kol from cadre from the test and evaluation unit, adding a second regiment attached to the IV DMZ Corps in 1986. In July 1987, the first of around 100 Scud Mod Bs arrived in Iran from North Korea, with deliveries continuing into the early part of 1988, and played a significant role in "War of the Cities" that same year. North Korea helped Iran set up a Scud Mod B assembly/production facility in Iran. In late 1988/early 1989, two parallel development programs began to extend the range of the Scud Mod B. The first was a modification of the existing system, involving the possible reduction in warhead weight from 1000kg to 700kg and the installation of an improved inertial guidance system. This new system, the Scud Mod C (aka Scud PIP/Scud C), is believed to have begun production in 1989 and reached full-scale production in 1991, replacing the Scud Mod B, and has a monthly production rate of four to eight missiles per month. Two test firings of the Scud Mod C were made, the first in June 1990 from the No-dong test facility, and the second in 1991 from a domestically produced TEL at a KPA base in Kangwon province. In 1991 the Scud regiment was expanded to a brigade with 36 Scud C missiles and stationed with the IV DMZ Corps near Sari-won. In late 1990 Iran agreed to purchase Scud Mod Cs and North Korean assistance in the conversion of an Iranian missile maintenance facility to a production facility. In January 1991 Iran took delivery of Scud Mod Cs and related equipment, which was believed to be followed by deliveries to Syria, beginning with an initial delivery of about 60 missiles and 12 TELs in April 1991. The second system developed was the Scud Mod D (No-dong-1), begun in 1989 with the first prototypes being ready in early 1991. The No-dong-1 is believed to be a redesigned system based on Scud technology, with a range of between 1000-1300km. The No-dong-1 has been successfully tested, although not to its full range and with at least one reported failure in 1991, results of which could be a poor CEP. First production models were probably available in late 1992 or early 1993, and are expected to be operational with KPA units by the end of 1993, and will augment existing Mod Cs until the next system, the Mod E becomes available. The "Scud" Mod E (aka No-dong-2, Scud-X) may be a new design, unrelated to the Scud family of missiles. The "Scud" Mod E is still in the planning stage, and the first prototype is not expected before 1994-1995, due to the fact that the expected range of 1500-2000km can only be achieved through multi-staging or clustering, neither of which the North Koreans have experience in. The North Koreans may have been counting on missile designers from the Russian Makayev design bureau, responsible for Scud design, to aid in multi-staging or clustering. Russia stopped the missile designers from travelling to North Korea. <<>> Doc. Code: 3072
ABSTRACT: On 1 May 1993, Japanese Defense Agency sources said that North Korea is expected to complete development of the 1,000km-range No-dong-1 missile, based on the Scud missile and capable of delivering nuclear or biochemical warheads in 1993. On 3 May 1993, North Korean information minister Kim Gi-ryong said that his country did not intend to use the No-dong missile against Japan or other countries in the region, dismissing Japanese concerns as propaganda efforts to justify its own nuclear program. [1] On 3 May 1993, the US and Japanese defense ministers Les Aspen and Toshio Nakayama, were expected to discuss North Korean missile developments. Supporting Source: [1] Proliferation Issues, 4 May 1993, p. 4 <<>> Doc. Code: 3583
ABSTRACT: On 16 August 1993, at the behest of the US, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that Israel would break off discussions with North Korea designed to convince them not to sell missiles to Middle Eastern countries. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated, "Israel would support very much the leading role of the US to limit dangers which are coming from North Korea concerning the supply of missiles and concerning the production of the nuclear option" [1]. Also on 16 August 1993, US State Department spokesman Mike McCurry stated, "we believe meetings between Israel and North Korean officials would not be helpful." Foreign Minister Peres had received US support for Israel's efforts after a meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 18 June 1993 in Vienna; this support stemmed from the US' own lack of success in dealing with the North Koreans [2]. Israel was hoping to be as successful with the North Koreans as they had been with the Chinese. In May 1993, Peres was assured by China that it would not sell missiles in the Middle East. Israel may have been using the successful model of the US deals with South Africa and Argentina in buying up or bartering away their nuclear and missile projects, respectively [1]. This was followed by a 25 June 1993 visit to Beijing by Israeli Foreign Ministry deputy director Eitan Bentsur to meet with North Korean officials in an attempt to dissuade them from concluding a reported deal to provide Iran with 150 No-dong-1 missiles in exchange for cash and oil [1]. This meeting reportedly ended with the North Koreans demanding cash for compliance. In October 1992, Bentsur made a secret visit to Pyongyang, North Korea to discuss possible Israeli involvement in a gold mining operation and economic contacts in exchange for a North Korean promise not to sell missiles in the Middle East. Supporting Sources: [1] Reuters, 17 August 1993; in US-Korea Review, September 1993, p. 3, "News In Review." [2] Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1993, pp. 8-9, "The Israeli Initiative." <<>> Doc. Code: 3556
ABSTRACT: On 12 November 1993, a spokesman for the Japanese Defense Ministry's intelligence department stated, "We cannot accurately say when and where the missiles [No-dong-1] would be deployed, but it is true that they [the North Koreans] are very close to completing development of this missile." In August 1993, North Korea confirmed the development of the No-dong-1 after reports that it had test fired the missile into the Sea of Japan. The Japanese official said that the Japanese Defense Ministry believes the No-dong-1 is a liquid-fuel missile, and that North Korea has not yet developed an advanced solid-fuel missile. However, the official could not confirm whether North Korea had begun development of the longer-range No-dong-2. <<>> Doc. Code: 3555
ABSTRACT: On 2 December 1993, a high-ranking South Korean intelligence official confirmed that North Korea had conducted its first successful test launch of the No-dong-1 missile from a mobile launcher at the end of May 1993 from a site in Taep'o-dong, Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province; the missile struck a target at a range of 500km. The mobile-launch capability demonstrates an improvement over the previous fixed launch site capability of the No-dong-1 missile. <<>> Doc. Code: 3529
ABSTRACT: US officials said that North Korea has delayed plans to sell Iran the No-dong-1 missile. The reason for the delay is unclear, but it may be related to diplomatic maneuvering on nuclear inspections, production problems, or difficulties in making final arrangements for the sale. CIA Director James Woolsey testified before the US Congress in July 1993 that the No-dong-1, which could be fitted with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, had been tested and that "of greatest concern is North Korea's continued efforts to sell the missile abroad - particularly to dangerous and potentially hostile countries such as Iran." Woolsey noted that "with this missile, North Korea could reach Japan; Iran could reach Israel; and Libya could reach US bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean region." In December 1993, the North Korean Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ho Jong, said that North Korea never had any intention of selling missiles to Iran, stating, "There is no sale. It is entirely false." Supporting Sources: [1] Asian Recorder, 15 January 1994, p. 23686, "Missile Sale Off." <<>> Acknowledgements:
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