North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramSelected Missile Abstracts: 1994
Doc. Code: 3747
ABSTRACT: On 14 January 1994, Japanese police raided several firms suspected to be involved in the 1989 sale of spectrum analyzers -- electronic equipment used in missile development -- to North Korea by way of China; both the Japanese police and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry have launched investigations into the matter, although no arrests had been made as of 20 January 1994 [1,3]. One of the firms reportedly involved in the sale is the Yokohama Machinery Trading Company, which is being investigated for violating the Foreign Exchange Control Law, say Japanese Foreign Ministry officials [3]. Yokohama Machinery Company, which specializes in trade with China, North Korea and Vietnam, is licensed to export the electronic devices but is not the manufacturer[2,3]; the producer of the spectrum analyzers is the Anritsu Corporation, a mid-sized maker of communications equipment [4]. At a January 1994 news conference at their Tokyo headquarters, Anritsu officials admitted they had shipped some of the equipment, but "had been led to believe" it was headed to a company-owned firm in China [4]. Japanese police confirmed that it was possible that Anritsu staff did not know where the equipment was headed [2]. At a price of 3 million yen ($27,000) per unit, a spectrum or signal
analyzer measures electric wave frequencies and can be used for missile
targeting [3]. Initial reports speculated that the Japanese equipment was
used to improve the accuracy of North Korea's No-dong-1 missile, but at
a 18 January 1994 news conference, Foreign Ministry press secretary Teruhiko
Terada said, "We understand that the possibility that the signal analyzers
are used for the No-dong missiles is very low.... If used for missiles,
signal analyzers will be used in ground-to-air missiles [3]." In November
1993, a Japanese defense ministry official said North Korea would soon
complete No-dong's development, a missile that could hit western Japan
within 10 minutes of
On 19 January 1994, the North Korean Central News Agency called the Tokyo investigations baseless [3]. However, US intelligence officials recently have stated that they are following a number of North Korean attempts to purchase electronic parts in Japan, apparently in an effort to improve missile accuracy [4]. It is unclear how the spectrum analyzers in this case reached Pyongyang, but American and Japanese officials say much electronic equipment bound for North Korea is purchased by Koreans living in Japan[4]. Supporting Sources: [1] Reuters, 15 January 1994, "China Was Conduit For Exports To N. Korea - Agency." [2] Michiyo Nakamoto, Financial Times, 15 January 1994, p. 3, "Japanese Raided Over Exports." [3] Naoaki Usui, Defense News, 24 January 1994, p. 26, "Japan Continues Inquiry Of Korean Tech Transfers." [4] New York Times, 14 January 1994, p. 5, "Tokyo Tries To Foil Arms Aid To North Korea," by David E. Sanger. <<>> Doc. Code: 4296
ABSTRACT: In February 1994, the commander of the North Korean Air Force, General Cho Myong-rok, led a 29-man team of military and nuclear experts to Iran and, according to the Paris-based Arabic newspaper Al-Watan Al-Arabi, set up "new agreements to intensify military and nuclear cooperation." According to Arabic and Western diplomatic sources, Cho's delegation most likely went to Iran in order to discuss testing of the North Korean No-dong-2 ballistic missile in Iran. Another report indicates that North Korea and Iran discussed testing of the No-dong-1 ballistic missile [1]. According to Western military officials, Iran would like to purchase 150 No-dong missiles from North Korea. The No-dong is a two-stage missile based on the Soviet-designed Scud missile and is estimated to have a 620 mile range. With the No-dong, Iran could hit Israel and the Persian Gulf states, and North Korea could strike Japan. The No-dong-2 is an intermediate range missile based on the No-dong-1, which was designed by North Korea and Iran; it is capable of carrying a 1,750lb conventional warhead and "could also be fitted with chemical or nuclear warheads." The No-dong-2 can hit a target at maximum range in seven minutes. Iran, which supplies North Korea with 40 percent of its oil, would like to start producing the No-dong in order to improve manufacturing techniques it has acquired from North Korea and China. Iranian production of the No-dong would help North Korea avoid surveillance of its missile sales to Iran, Syria, and Libya. Cho's visit to Iran followed a December 1993 visit by Iran's Defense Minister Mohammad Fourouzandeh to North Korea, during which Fourouzandeh discussed possible technological cooperation between Iran and North Korea. Five other high-ranking delegations from Iran visited North Korea in the 15 months preceding Fourouzandeh's visit. Iran postponed a November 1993 test of the No-dong missile. Diplomatic sources have "speculated" that the North Korean delegation may have gone to Iranian military and nuclear facilities, including the Shard missile test facility 320km east of Teheran [1]. Supporting Sources: [1] KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 February 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-007, 23 March 1994, pp.27-28, "DPRK Military Delegation's Iran Visit Reported." <<>> Doc. Code: 4177
ABSTRACT: On 24 February 1994, in an interview published in the Tehran Times, Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) head Major General Mohsen Reza'i denied allegations in the Western press that Iran may have provided North Korea with the necessary facilities to test 1,000km-range [No-dong-1] missiles, or will provide North Korea with such facilities in the future. Reza'i stated, "By now the entire world should know that Iran is very sensitive as far as our soil and military facilities are concerned and we will never allow others to use it . . . no matter how friendly 'others' [North Koreans] are." Doc. Code: 4286
ABSTRACT: On 17 March 1994, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director R. James Woolsey confirmed that North Korea is developing two new ballistic missiles, the Taep'o-dong-1 and Taep'o-dong-2. Woolsey stated, "These new missile have yet to be flown, and we will monitor their development, including any attempts to export them in the future to countries such as Iran." US officials said that the missiles would not be ready until the late 1990s [1]. Woolsey commented that the missiles may be fitted with NBC warheads. He further stated, "Unlike the missiles the North Koreans have already tested, these two [IRBMs] . . . could put at risk all of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific area, and if exported to the Middle East, could threaten Europe as well." US intelligence analysts estimate that the Taep'o-dong-1 and Taep'o-dong-2 could have ranges of 1,240 and 2,170 miles, respectively. Although the Taep'o-dong-2 resembles the Chinese CSS-2, US intelligence agencies disagree as to whether China shared technology with North Korea, an action that China denies. While the majority of analysts at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believe that North Korea is developing the missiles independently, a minority opinion at the DIA is that China may have assisted North Korea [1]. Officials say that this issue will be cleared up as the program progresses [1]. Supporting Sources: [1] R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 18 March 1994, p. A24, "CIA Confirms North Korea's New Missiles." [2] New York Times, 18 March 1994, p. A5, "C.I.A. Warns Of New North Korean Missiles." [3] Jurek Martin, Financial Times, 19 March 1994, p. 4, "US Concern Over Pyongyang Missiles." <<>> Doc. Code: 4202
ABSTRACT: On 17 March 1994, China denied allegations that it had transferred advanced missile technology to North Korea. A 16 March 1994 Wall Street Journal report quoted US Defense Intelligence Agency sources as saying that a new, developmental, long-range DPRK missile appeared to incorporate some Chinese technology. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the charges "totally groundless." Supporting Sources: [1] Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 March 1994, p. 5, "China Denies Transfer." <<>> Doc. Code: 4173
ABSTRACT: David Wright and Timur Kadyshev present an in-depth analysis of the North Korean missile program and draw a number of conclusions concerning capabilities and limitations. First, North Korea could build a 1,000km-range missile with a 1,000 kg payload [No-dong-1] using existing Scud technology, but the quality of the systems would be questionable given North Korea's industrial capabilities and track record of faulty workmanship. Second, while it appears possible to extend the range of No-dong-1 to 1,300km by making the missile body out of high-strength aluminum, it is not known if this is being done, and it would not represent a breakthrough if the missile is based on Scud technology. Other methods which could extend the range of the missile are staging and/or construction of more powerful engines. The authors conclude that No-dong-1 is the longest range missile North Korea could build with current technology, and that any advances will take considerably longer than previous developments. While the No-dong-1 missile took five years to develop from existing technology, future range increases requiring new technologies will take proportionately longer, though this time could be shortened with foreign assistance. The authors also note that the No-dong-1 would have a poor circular error probability of 2 to 4km due to problems caused by atmospheric forces and buffeting during reentry, which would limit the missile to use as a terror weapon. The threat posed by such weapons could lead some countries, such as Israel and Japan, to develop a theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) capability, though the inherent inaccuracy of the No-dong-1 may help it defeat any missile defense system. The authors state that missile defense systems would not be adequate in protecting the countries concerned and that other solutions to the threat posed by the No-dong-1 must be sought. Supporting Sources: [1] Timur Kadyshev and David Wright, Defense News, 11 April 1994, p. 19, "N.Korea's No-dong Presents Threat, But Suffers Limitations." <<>> Doc. Code: 4009
ABSTRACT: In March 1994, Israeli diplomats met with senior North Korean officials in Beijing in an effort to bring about an agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring the 1,000km-range No-dong missiles from North Korea. In return for halting No-dong shipments to Iran, Israel is hoping to raise $1 billion among American Jewish businesspersons for North Korean civilian projects. The secret talks are being held despite objections by the United States. Secret Israeli-North Korean talks began approximately two years ago. After initial contacts, the Deputy Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Eytan Bentzur, held secret talks in North Korea and had prepared for a visit to the DPRK by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres when the US intervened. Afterwards, Peres agreed to coordinate all future contacts with the United States. However, a senior Israeli political source said that the most recent contacts with North Korea "are not necessarily being coordinated with the United States." On March 1922, the Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that Israel and North Korea were still conducting secret talks. <<>> Doc. Code: 4361
ABSTRACT: On 9 June 1994, South Korean Defense Minister Rhee Byoung-tae, in a report to the South Korean parliament, stated that since early May 1994 North Korea had been preparing to test launch the upgraded Taep'o-dong missile, which has a range of over 1,000km. Rhee stated, "The North is continuously developing strategic weapons." <<>> Doc. Code: 4368
ABSTRACT: On 9 June 1994, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam told reporters at Kiev airport after a visit to Ukraine that North Korea would continue to test-launch missiles, stating, "Missile launches occur in any country regularly, and the United States and Japan do this most often. Until now, no one ever mentioned anything about our launches of experimental missiles. We don't understand why there is so much noise about it now." Kim also said that if sanctions were imposed or South Korea started a war, the South would be devastated, because "We [North Korea] have the strength to protect ourselves." <<>> Doc. Code: 4365
ABSTRACT: According to the Deputy Director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, Robert D. Walpole, "North Korea is the world's largest proliferator of ballistic missiles." Walpole added that "Iran will probably be the first" country to buy the North Korean No-dong missile, which would "double the range of any weapon in Iran's current inventory." Walpole stated that with the current version of the nuclear capable No-dong missile, which has a range of about 600 miles, Iran "could threaten Europe"; an upgraded 800 mile range version that is under development could also strike Israel. Walpole added, "North Korea has apparently discussed the sale of missiles to Libya." <<>> Doc. Code: 4363
ABSTRACT: On 14 June 1994, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau testified before the House Foreign Relations Committee that "North Korea has in the past delivered Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, primarily to Iran and Syria." Pelletreau added, "We're concerned about press reports and other intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the No-dong missile -- with a much longer range than the Scud-B and -C." According to intelligence and nonproliferation sources, North Korea, since 1988, has delivered 200 to 300 "knock-down" kits of Scud-B missiles to Iran, where they were assembled at a plant near Isfahan; since 1992, these sources say, 150 completed Scud-Cs have been delivered. North Korean experts are in Iran attempting to extend the range of the Scud missiles. According to intelligence sources, North Korea may test its No-dong-1 missile in Iran within six to 12 months because "[t]esting facilities don't exist for a full-range test [of the No-dong-1] in North Korea," and because it wants to avoid increasing the existing tension over the nuclear issue. U.S. government analysts believe that "North Korea will not sell operational No-dong missile systems to Iran in the foreseeable future." According to a US diplomatic source, "The Japanese have told the Iranians that if they acquire it [the No-dong missile], they would be crossing a diplomatic red line," which would result in the severing of diplomatic relations. <<>> Doc. Code: 4412
ABSTRACT: On 14 June 1994, North Korea conducted its first test on the engine for its new ballistic missiles, the Taep'o-dong-1 and Taep'o-dong-2, at its Hamgyon Pukto missile testing site, according to the 1 July 1994 early edition of the South Korean newspaper Chosen Ilbo. The Taep'o-dong missile is a continuation of the No-dong-1 and is currently in the testing stage of development. It is estimated that the Taep'o-dong has a range of over 2,000km. According to Chosen Ilbo, the tests were detected by US spy satellites, and indicate that the speed of development of the Taep'o-dong is quicker than first thought. <<>> Doc. Code: 4364
ABSTRACT: On 4 September 1994, U.S. Administration sources revealed that US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci and Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Chief Eytan Bentzur had discussed cooperative arrangements to forestall North Korean exports of No-dong-1 and -2 missiles to Iran. An unidentified official is quoted as saying, "During the talks, Israel strongly asked the United States to convey to North Korea, during the US-North Korea talks, Israel's concern about the high possibility that North Korea will export the improved models of missiles to Iran." Since 1993, Iran has been negotiating for the purchase of either No-dong-1 and -2 missiles or their manufacturing technology. Libya and other Middle Eastern countries were also interested in the No-dong missiles. <<>> Doc. Code: 4857
ABSTRACT: In October 1994, a reconnaissance satellite captured three No-dong-class missiles being assembled at an assembly site 25 miles north of Isfahan, Iran. According to an unidentified US official, the No-dong program with North Korea was halted in 1994 due to financial problems. According to the "intelligence community," this suspension was only temporary, and preparations for full-scale production and deployment of the No-dong continue. <<>> Doc. Code: 4632
ABSTRACT: On 15 December 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated that North Korea had equipped Iran and Syria with 500km-range Scud surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and that he "understood" that North Korea, with Iranian financing, was developing a 1300km range 'Rodong' missile. During a four-day visit to South Korea, Rabin stated, "North Korea has supplied Scud missiles to Iran and Syria ... North Korea has started upon itself, financed by Iran, to develop a longer-range missile. Iran and Syria have launchers of Scud missiles and at least one of the two countries is beginning production by means supplied by North Korea." On 13 December 1994, speaking to journalists at the Japan Press Club, Rabin expressed his belief that North Korea was supplying Iran with nuclear and missile technology, stating, "It is true that North Korea has supplied ground-to-ground missiles to Syria and Iran, but it has also helped them to produce such missiles as well."[1] Rabin and South Korean President Kim called on the international community to work toward breaching the military "cooperation" between North Korea and the Middle Eastern countries.[2] As a condition to establish diplomatic relations, the US has told North Korea it must stop overseas missile supplies. In 1962, Israel and South Korea established diplomatic relations; bilateral trade between the two countries has dramatically increased in recent years. Supporting Sources: [1] Peter Kenny, UPI, 14 December 1994, in NNN News, 14 December 1994, "Israel Accuses N.Korea Of Supplying Missiles To Iran." [2] Times, 26 December 1994, "Warning By Rabin On Korea." [3] Michael Sheridan, Independent, 16 December 1994, "Israel And Syria Move Closer To Peace Deal." << >> Acknowledgements:
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