North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramSelected Missile Abstracts: 1995
Doc. Code: 4878
ABSTRACT: On 10 January 1995, in testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director James Woolsey stated, "We are moving from an era of Scuds of single stage missiles into an era of Taepdong-1 and -2s with ranges in the few thousands of kilometers - not quite intercontinental yet, but the path is clear. And the direction with respect to potential longer range ballistic missile proliferation, particularly with regard to North Korea as the source is I think extremely troubling." Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) head Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper added, Ultimately, the [Scud] follow-on, the Taep'o-dong 1 and 2, would give them [North Korea], as best as we can assess right now in the absence of testing, it could pose a threat potentially to Alaska but not the continental United States. We are talking about something they haven't fielded yet." In written testimony, Clapper said that, while many countries might be able to mate an NBC warhead to a 500-1,000km-range missile by the year 2000, none is interested in or capable of developing a missile which could strike the US within the next 10 years. In a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 January 1995, Clapper further stated, in response to a question about the possible export of North Korea's Taep'o-dong-1 and -2 missiles, "We have no indication these weapons will be up for sale." <<>> Doc. Code: 4915
ABSTRACT: On 19 February 1995, Iranian official Hassan Taherian stated, "There are [sic] no missiles cooperation between Iran and North Korea whatsoever. We deny this...[F]or lack of need and also for self-sufficiency in military productions, our military cooperation is very limited. It is about zero." Taherian is director general for the Far East in the Iranian Foreign Ministry. <<>> Doc. Code: 5174
ABSTRACT: On 13 March 1995, the US Embassy released a statement from US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Lynn Davis, which said that the United States would not normalize relations with North Korea unless it stopped exporting missiles to countries like Iran and Syria. <<>> Doc. Code: 5184
ABSTRACT: On 5 April 1995, in an unclassified report as follow-on to testimony presented on 10 January 1995 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA stated, "We have good reason to believe that North Korea has recently transferred at least four Scud Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) to Iran." The TELs were transferred in late 1994 and can launch Scud-B and -C missiles, but not the No-dong-1. The report noted that, while the transfer does not represent an upgrade in technology, it is important in that it "indicates a continuing arms transfer relationship." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Director Henry Sokolski, commenting on the transfer, noted, "The bad news is it shows that North Korea and Iran are still in cahoots. The good news is that it suggests Iran can't make the equipment on its own." Commenting on other North Korean missiles systems, the report stated,
"While it is difficult to predict the exact state of the Taep'o-dong missile
development process, our understanding of North Korea's earlier Scud development
leads us to believe that it is unlikely Pyongyang could
In 1994, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv estimated the number of TELs in the Iranian inventory was about 10; the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London estimated six or more. Supporting Sources: [1] Barbara Starr, Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 5, "Iran Gets `Scud' TELs From North Korea." [2] The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), 2 May 1995, p. 6; in FBIS-NES-95-084, 2 May 1995, "Clinton Line On Iran Seen As `Perfectly Correct.'" [3] Adel Darwish, The Independent (London), 2 May 1995, p. 10; in FBIS-NES-95-085, 2 May 1995, "Israel Claims Government Received DPRK Missiles." <<>> Doc. Code: 5182
ABSTRACT: On 18 June 1995, an unidentified Japanese government source stated that the US government informed the Japanese government that a US reconnaissance satellite had spotted cranes and trucks transporting missiles for test-launch likely to take place by the end of June 1995. The North Koreans may wish to take advantage of the fair weather conditions over the Sea of Japan as they have in the past. There is speculation the North Koreans may only conduct jet-propulsion tests rather than full-scale test-launches to avoid complicating negotiations with the US over supply of nuclear reactors to North Korea. However, one Japanese Foreign Ministry source noted, "It will not be surprising if the [North Korean] military carries out test firing as usual, based on its own line of reasoning." Supporting Sources: [1] Yonhap (Seoul), 19 June 1995; in FBIS-EAS-95-117, 19 June 1995, "North Plans To Test Missiles in 'East Sea.'" <<>> Doc. Code: 5272
ABSTRACT: In August 1995, according to Israeli sources, North Korea halted development of the No-dong surface-to-surface missile (SSM), either due to technical difficulties or intense pressure from the US North Korea began its No-dong missile program in the mid-1980s and conducted its first test-firing in May 1993. North Korea intended to export the No-dong, which has a range exceeding 1,000km, to Iran. North Korea has allegedly supplied some of the No-dong technology to Iran. North Korea is now reported to be helping Iran build a production facility for Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. China is also said to be selling missile technology to Iran. <<>> Doc. Code: 5273
ABSTRACT: On 10 September 1995, a South Korean intelligence official cited Russian intelligence which indicated that North Korea could deploy the Taep'o-dong-2 SSM by the year 2000. According to US Defense Intelligence Agency computer simulations, the Taep'o-dong-2 might have a range between 4,300 and 6,000km. Russian sources say, however, that North Korea could extend the range of the Taep'o-dong-2 to beyond 9,600km, enough to reach the US, after the resolution of technical difficulties with the inertial navigation system, the warhead weight, and the fuel injection device. The Taep'o-dong-2 is said to have two stages, using a 16.2m thruster with a 16m Taep'o-dong-1 to carry a 1,000kg warhead. North Korea recently tested the missile's engine at its Sanumtong test site, where it is conducting research and development of Taep'o-dong-1 and Taep'o-dong-2 missiles. According to a South Korean official, North Korea wants to use the long-range missiles to "block the support from the neighboring countries in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula." <<>> Doc. Code: 5527
ABSTRACT: By the year 2000, North Korea could extend its Taep'o-dong-2 ballistic missile range to target the western US The Taep'o-dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) could carry nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads. US intelligence officials describe North Korean missiles as Scuds with simple guidance and control systems. Other intelligence officials said that China is assisting North Korea with a long-range missile project and training up to 200 North Korean missile engineers in China. The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated the range of the Taep'o-dong-2 at 4,650 miles or up to 6,200 miles with a smaller payload. A DIA computer simulation showed that the range of the Taep'o-dong-2 ICBM is between 2,666 miles and 3,720 miles. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said that the ranges of the two types of Taep'o-dong missiles are less than 1,860 miles and greater than 1,860 miles, respectively. US analysts said that the Taep'o-dong-2 is so inaccurate that its only purpose would be to carry weapons of mass destruction. <<>> Doc. Code: 5285
ABSTRACT: In 1994, according to Yonhap news agency, North Korea finished developing its No-dong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and is already moving to deploy it. By December 1995, North Korea will complete development of the more powerful No-dong-2 IRBM. The No-dong-series IRBMs have primary components almost identical to those of the Chinese CSS-2 missile. North Korea planned to ship the first No-dong-1 missiles to Iran in late 1993, according to intelligence reports. However, the shipment was reportedly held up. By December 1996, North Korea will be capable of mass-producing its Taep'o-dong-1 missile, which has a longer range than the No-dong-series. The Taep'o-dong-2 missile will be operational by the year 2000. The Taep'o-dong-series missiles are based on the Chinese Dong Feng missile design, test-fired in July 1995 from China's Jilin province toward Taiwan. China's Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics Industry and the Chinese State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense have reportedly trained 50 to 200 North Korean missile engineers. Chinese defense and technology companies have also provided technical support to North Korea. <<>> Doc. Code: 5569
ABSTRACT: According to a report published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), missile technology controls are the most effective way to constrain the spread of missiles, although they do not guarantee that missile proliferation will cease. The IISS also asserts that the security concerns of states in regions where missile proliferation is a problem must be addressed before they can be expected to agree to a regional ban, or a limitation regime, for missile delivery systems. The report suggests that greater transparency should be pursued through arrangements such as the UN Conventional Arms Register. According to the IISS, the 1973 armistice between Syria and Israel did not restrict the deployment of SSMs within the zone that extends 20km on either side of their border. The armistice did prohibit surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and restricted the number of troops, tanks, and artillery pieces that could be deployed in the border zone. The IISS report states that 300km-range SSMs based in Iran could be used to target the cities of Al Jubayl and Dharhan in Saudi Arabia and San'a in Yemen, as well as sites in Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Muscat. On the Subcontinent, the IISS reports that Pakistan is probably producing a 600km-range Hatf-3 missile. India's 200kg-capable Lakshya cruise missile will most likely be used as a reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle. According to most analysts, North Korea's 1,000km-range No-dong-1 missile has a circular error probable (CEP) of between 2,000 and 4,000m. An unverified report states that North Korea has approximately six operational mobile No-dong missile launchers. The IISS asserts that the continuation of North Korea's missile program and China's plans to produce new missiles could force other East Asian countries to respond by developing their own missiles. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the technological capacity to produce missiles, and Taiwan and South Korea already have operational short-range missiles in service. Taiwan is reported to be developing the Tien Ma missile, which has a range of between 600 and 950km. According to the IISS, several Soviet-manufactured missile systems are possessed by the following nations: the 70 km-range FROG-7 missile is possessed by Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Yemen, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the Bosnian Serbs; Syria and Yemen possess the 120km-range SS-21 missile; 300km range Scud-B missiles are possessed by Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine; and 500km-range SS-23 missiles are possessed by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. Iran possesses the Chinese-built, 150 km-range M-7/CSS-8 missile. Supporting Sources: [1] Michael J. Witt, Defense News, 16 October 1995-10/22/95, p. 74, "Report Cites Global Threat Of Ballistic Missiles." <<>> Doc. Code: 5541
ABSTRACT: In early November 1995, CIA Director John Deutch said North Korea may begin to deploy the No-dong-1 by the end of 1996. The CIA says North Korea may still be working on fitting the No-dong and Taep'o-dong missiles with nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads. According to Deutch, North Korea continues to sell the Scud-B and the Scud-C to Iran. Iran reportedly would also like to buy the No-dong from North Korea. <<>> Doc. Code: 5806
ABSTRACT: In early 1996, North Korea and the US will begin talks concerning North Korea's foreign sales of Scud missiles. The Scud talks are considered a continuation of the recently completed effort to negotiate a nuclear agreement with North Korea. North Korea and the US are still conferring about the time and place of the Scud negotiations. According to the South Korean government, North Korea may be increasing its Scud sales to alleviate the current food shortage. On 30 December 1995, a South Korean government official said North Korea is "actively developing overseas markets" for Scud missiles. North Korea mainly sells Scuds to Iran, Pakistan, and Central and South American nations. North Korea also recently bought anti-air guns from Kazakstan to use for parts. On 14 December 1995, John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, held talks with South Korean officials about curbing North Korea's sales of conventional weapons, including Scuds. On 9 January 1996, North Korean and US officials intend to meet in Hawaii, possibly to discuss the Scud issue. The South Korean government has billed the US-DPRK meeting as working-level negotiations on North Korea's return of US soldiers' remains. <<>> Acknowledgements:
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