North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramSelected Missile Abstracts: 1996
Doc. Code: 5995
ABSTRACT: On 8 February 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord reaffirmed the US commitment to South Korea, and said that he hopes North Korea will take the necessary steps to reduce tension on the peninsula. He made note of the threats posed by North Korea's chemical and biological weapons capability, as well as its missile systems. Lord said that the easing of sanctions on the DPRK and normalization of economic relations would depend on North Korea's constructive behavior on a range of issues, including missile proliferation. "We seek to demonstrate to Pyongyang the benefits of acting in accordance with international norms in areas such as missile proliferation and terrorism," he said. <<>> Doc. Code: 5997
ABSTRACT: In January 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Thomas Hubbard contacted North Korea by mail and requested a meeting to discuss missile proliferation issues. North Korea's Foreign Ministry agreed in principle, but said that US economic sanctions would have to be loosened if Pyongyang was to agree on a date for the talks. Progress on missile proliferation is only one of many factors being taken into account by the State Department regarding possible relaxation of economic sanctions, but the State Department believes growing US business contacts and the recent granting of emergency funds to North Korea will increase the enthusiasm in Pyongyang for such talks. North Korea relies on the hard currency that ballistic missile sales provide; its primary customers are Iran and Syria. Both Iran and Syria have imported not only complete missile systems, but also the production facilities necessary to develop their own long-range missiles. <<>> Doc. Code: 6295
ABSTRACT: On 22 February 1996, CIA Director John Deutch told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Iraq is attempting to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Deutch said that following the defection of Husayn Kamel in August 1995, Iraq gave the U.N. 147 crates of new documentation on Iraq's WMD efforts. Deutch added that Kamel's return to Baghdad on 20 February 1996 had done nothing to alter "the damage he had inflicted on Iraq's programs to develop WMD and his exposure of Iraq's blatant disregard for United Nations resolutions and weapons inspections." Deutch also said that at least 20 countries had or were currently working on ballistic missile systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. According to Deutch, China, North Korea, and private entities in Europe and South America are supplying ballistic missile technology to states in the developing world. Deutch said North Korea has exported 300 km-range Scud B and 500 km-range Scud C surface-to surface missiles (SSM) to Iran, Libya, Syria, and other nations. North Korea is currently developing the 1,000km No-dong SSM and the Taepo-dong SSM, "which could reach as far as Alaska" and "could be operational" by early next century. Nations like North Korea and Iran can speed up their military modernization by using advanced conventional weapons and stealth, propulsion, and sensor technology. These developments could pose a threat to the US and its allies in the future. Such programs are assisted by indigenous research and development and
the illegal sale of sensitive equipment, dual-use technology, and supplies.
Deutch said the intelligence community must focus on uncovering secret
weapons programs before they have to be confronted. According to Deutch,
the US should focus on stopping North Korea from acquiring guidance-and-control
technology that could make its long-range missiles more accurate
<<>> Doc. Code: 5985
ABSTRACT: On 6 April 1996, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said South Korea and the US will seek limits on the transfer and indigenous development of North Korean missile technology in negotiations between the US and North Korea scheduled for late April 1996. Citing the threat posed by missile transfers to the Middle East and the 1993 500 km No-dong surface-to-surface missile test in the Sea of Japan, the official underscored the importance of arresting North Korea's development of long-range missiles. Intimating that South Korea may offer incentives to North Korea, the official said that "we can give them something in exchange for refraining from developing long-range missiles." <<>> Doc. Code: 5987
ABSTRACT: In mid-4/96, negotiators from the US and North Korea will meet in Berlin to discuss North Korea's production and export of chemical and biological agents and ballistic missile systems. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs Robert Einhorn will head the US delegation, while the director-general of the American Affairs Bureau at the North Korean Foreign Ministry Yi Hyong-chol will represent North Korea. This first round of talks is not expected to address detailed issues, merely to outline basic positions. The government of South Korea will not send representatives to the talks-- which are a product of the US's desire to stem the flow of missile exports to the Middle East--as it does not want to be obligated to compensate North Korea for any concessions made at the bargaining table. South Korea has, however, requested the US to focus on efforts being made by North Korea to improve its existing missile forces [1]. Supporting Sources: [1] Korea Times (Seoul), 14 April 1996, p. 2; in FBIS-EAS-96-073, 14 April 1996, "US-DPRK Talks Seen Levying Heavy Financial Burden On ROK." <<>> Doc. Code: 5998
ABSTRACT: On 21 April 1996, US negotiators in Berlin, Germany described their first round of discussions with a North Korean delegation as "a good beginning." The discussions, which were to focus on the development and sale of long-range missiles by North Korea, lasted two days. North Korean officials described the talks as "comprehensive," although both delegations refused to offer any more details. Supporting Sources: [1] Reuters (Tokyo), 23 April 1996; in Executive News Service, 23 April 1996, "N. Korea Says Missile Talks With US To Continue." <<>> Doc. Code: 6345
ABSTRACT: On 8 May 1996, a senior director for defense policy and arms control at the White House, Robert G. Bell, said that a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that no new strategic missile system will threaten the continental US within the next 15 years, reflected a consensus within the US intelligence community. Bell made the comments at a Capitol Hill breakfast seminar sponsored by the National Defense University and the American Defense Preparedness Association. The NIE assumes a 12-year development cycle for new weapons systems, and consequently set its timetable for 15 years. Bell added that the probability of a new system threatening Hawaii and Alaska within the next five years is "very low." Although the acquisition of an existing missile system by a desirous nation is possible, Bell said the chances of that were "very remote." Bell admitted, however, that the intelligence community's knowledge of North Korea's Taepo-dong 2 ballistic missile is incomplete, adding that, "I don't believe we know a lot about" the system and that "we've only gathered glimpses of it." He cited a letter that CIA Director John Deutch sent to the US Senate saying that the chances that North Korea will have an operational Taepo-dong-2 in the next five years are "very low," but that beyond five years the analysis "is much of a guess." <<>> Doc. Code: 6399
ABSTRACT: On 4 June 1996, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Winston Lord announced that the US is willing to lift sanctions imposed on North Korea for its alleged support of international terrorism, provided North Korea terminates its missile production and export programs. According to Lord, the US made North Korea aware of this policy in April 1996 while the two countries conducted their first round of missile talks in Berlin. Lord said that the US "would like to see essentially a freeze or a ceiling on both" development of ballistic missiles and their export, goals supported by Japan and South Korea as well. During the talks, which ended 22 April 1996, North Korea demonstrated greater flexibility concerning missile exports than missile development, Lord said. Besides producing modified Russian Scuds, North Korea is developing the No-dong, a 620-mile-range missile now in its final stages, and the longer- range Taepo-dong. North Korea has exported missiles to Syria, and exported missiles and the technology to produce them to Iran. <<>> Doc. Code: 6346
ABSTRACT: On 22 May 1996, Syria offered North Korea 100,000 tons of food, according to the 17 June 1996 South China Morning Post. North Korea, unable to exchange any other goods for the food, may offer Syria weapons such as missiles, according to a Western diplomat. <<>> Doc. Code: 6400
ABSTRACT: In March 1996 and April 1996, North Korea delivered at least seven shipments of Scud-C missile materials to Egypt, according to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report acquired by the Washington Times. The shipments included steel sheets and support equipment, and gave Egypt everything it would need to produce 310-mile-range Scud-C missiles. The missile shipment was part of a 1980s licensing agreement between Egypt and North Korea. According to a 1992 Pentagon report on missile proliferation, Egypt is using technology acquired while working on the Condor missile project in the 1980s to develop a new missile called Vector, with a possible range of 744 miles. According to US officials, Egypt may have acquired the missile materials in order to manufacture longer-range Scud missiles. [1]. In response, Washington sent a diplomatic protest to Cairo concerning the missile shipments to North Korea, which may violate the MTCR and result in sanctions. According to State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns, expert opinions differ as to the true purpose of the North Korean shipments, making sanctions unlikely until a final conclusion has been reached [2]. Burns said the US did not take the reports lightly, adding "We'll look into this" [3]. On 26 June 1996 at a press conference in Cairo with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa would neither confirm nor deny reports that North Korea had shipped Scud missile materials to Egypt. [4]. Supporting Sources: [1] Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 21 June 1996; in Executive News Service, 21 June 1996, "US Probing Reports of Egypt-N. Korea Deal." [2] Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 22 June 1996, p. A2, "US Starts Probe Of Egypt's Missile Buy." [3] International Herald Tribune, 22 June 1996, "US Checking Sale Of Missiles." [4] Reuters, 26 June 1996; in Executive News Service, 26 June 1996, "Egypt Dismisses Flap Over Missile Reports." [5] Siona Jenkins, Washington Times, 26 June 1996, p. A9, "Egypt Visit Touchy After Scud Buy, Netanyahu Criticism." [6] Washington Times, 12 June 1996, p. A17, "Report Numbers Scuds N. Korea Sold To Iran." <<>> Doc. Code: 6569
ABSTRACT: On 12 June 1996, the US published its imposition of sanctions against North Korea and Iran for violation of the US Arms Export Control Act and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The sanctions, effective on 24 May 1996, prohibit US businesses and government entities from engaging in missile-technology-related exports, or contracts to export, with: Changgwang Credit Company (North Korea), the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (Iran), and the State Purchasing Office of Iran. Supporting Sources: [1] Pak Tu-sik, Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 30 June 1996, p. 1; in FBIS-EAS-96-127, "ROK: Daily On US Government [Publishes] Notice Of Sanctions Against DPRK." <<>> Doc. Code: 6677
ABSTRACT: On 25 September 1996, South Korea's Unification Ministry issued a statement saying that North Korea produces approximately 100 Scud-B and -C ballistic missiles annually, and has exported approximately 400, primarily to the Middle East. According to the statement, between 1980 and 1993, arms exports accounted for approximately 30 percent ($20.4 billion) of all North Korean exports, and Scud sales are now about $500 million annually. The ministry also says that North Korea has exported missile production facilities and technology to Syria and Iran. <<>> Doc. Code: 6641
ABSTRACT: North Korea's No-dong-1 (or Rodong-1) is an indigenously-developed, road-mobile, 1,000-km range, 1,000-kg payload ballistic missile. Its launcher is a copy of the Russian MAZ 543P TEL vehicle. The No-dong-1 uses the same three-gyroscope inertial guidance package as the Scud-B, with a circular error probable of approximately 700 m. However, "it is believed that North Korea has obtained commercial Global Positioning System satellite navigation packages which it will attempt to integrate into the No-dong's guidance system," which would make the missile much more accurate. The No-dong-1 was first tested in the Sea of Japan on 29 April 1993 along with Scud-Cs, and series production and deployment were scheduled for 1996. North Korea was preparing for a test in late October, but cancelled it due to US pressure.[1] Exports of the No-dong-1 to Iran (who co-funded the program), Libya, and Syria seem likely. Although the briefing mentions that Japanese pressure may keep Iran from purchasing the missile. A 1,500 km test on 20 February 1995 confirmed development of the longer-range No-dong-2. With the same payload as the No-dong-1, North Korea increased the range by using an aluminum-magnesium alloy for the main booster structure instead of steel, reducing the overall weight of the missile by at least 1 ton. North Korea may be working to arm the No-dong series missiles with nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. The briefing reports that: "South Korean sources believe that the No-dong could carry either a small nuclear warhead or a VX chemical warhead, information apparently corroborated in August 1994 when a Chinese military journal, Modern Weapons, reported that the No-dong could deliver either a 50 kt nuclear warhead or nerve gas." Supporting Sources: [1] Sid Baldman, Jr. "North Korea Cancels Missile Test," United Press International, 8 November 1996; in Executive News Service, 12 November 1996. <<>> Doc. Code: 6675
ABSTRACT: In 1996, Hong Kong and Taiwanese Customs officials each seized a shipment of ammonium perchlorate (an oxidizer for solid rocket propellant) that was destined for Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Commission ( Suparco'). On 29 April 1996, customs authorities seized 200 boxes (enough to fuel about 25 missiles) originating in Xian, China, and bound for Suparco. The shipper, China Ocean Shipping, will appear in court in December 1996 when the case that began on 16 September 1996 reopens. In March 1996, 200 barrels of ammonium perchlorate shipped from North Korea were detained in Taiwan en route to Suparco. <<>> Doc. Code: 6561
ABSTRACT: Japanese news agency Jiji and NHK television reported that North Korea is planning to test-launch a 1,000 km-range No-dong-1 missile into the Sea of Japan. According to Jiji, representatives from the Iranian military were present at the proposed launch site, apparently to observe the missile's performance prior to purchase. [1] There are reports that Iran assisted North Korea with the funding of its No-dong program, and expects to receive 150 No-dong-1s, along with manufacturing equipment, when the program is finished. [2] In March 1996, Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command General Binford Peay stated that Iran was building tunnels along its coast for either the storage or launching of No-dong-1 missiles. [2] Clues that a test-launch was imminent were provided by a US satellite, which tracked the movement of a No-dong-1 launch platform from an assembly plant to a position on the country's east coast. [1] Defense officials in Japan noted that all preparations for the launch have been made, including the prepositioning of North Korean vessels in the Sea of Japan to monitor the missile in its terminal phase. [1] Although similar indications were picked up in July 1996 without an ensuing launch, the US responded to these new developments by sending an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa to monitor the region. [1] The No-dong-1 has been under development since 1993, and "some experts believe that it will be deployed in the coming months." [3] Supporting Sources: [1] Reuters (Tokyo), 16 October 1996, "US Plane To Check Possible N Korea Missile Launch." [2] CDISS, 16 October 1996, http://www.cdiss.org/96oct1.htm, "North Korea To Test No-dong Missile." [3] Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 22 October 1996, p. A11, "North Korea May Be Set To Test-Fire Missile Able To Reach Japan." <<>> Doc. Code: 7017
ABSTRACT: North Korea's state-run Lyongaksan General Trade Corporation is reportedly responsible for the April 1996 shipment of 200 barrels of ammonium perchlorate from Nampo, North Korea, through China, to Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Commission (SUPARCO). In 1992, the US State Department twice imposed sanctions on Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corp. for engaging in missile proliferation activities-- involving Iran and Syria. Lyongaksan (or Yongaksan) is part of North Korea's External Economic General Bureau, responsible for North Korea's international trade in munitions. The April 1996 shipment is related to the March 1996 shipment of ammonium perchlorate from North Korea seized in Taiwan en route to SUPARCO. Lyongaksan is probably also responsible for the shipment of artillery parts seized [on 12 September 1996] in Hong Kong en route to Syria. <<>> Acknowledgements:
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