North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramSelected Missile Abstracts: 1997
Doc. Code: 6727
ABSTRACT: Former CIA Director Robert Gates testified that North Korea is having problems developing its Taep'o-dong class of ballistic missiles. Gates testified before the Senate intelligence Committee on the results of his panel's review of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on emerging missile threats, which said that an emerging missile threat to the US was 10-15 years away. Gate's panel generally agreed with the NIE assessment. Regarding North Korea, John McLaughlin, vice chair of the US National Intelligence council, said that to complete the Taep'o-dong missiles, North Korea needs to develop a new propulsion system, and improved guidance and controls, and that it will also need to test the missile. He noted that economic, technical, and manufacturing problems in North Korea's infrastructure makes such developments unlikely. "The intelligence community is confident that the first flight test would provide at least five years' warning before deployment," McLaughlin added. <<>> Doc. Code: 7094
ABSTRACT: In August 1996, South Korea's National Defense Ministry reported that since 1994, North Korea has been building three Scud bases near its southern border. Upon completion of the bases, the number of missiles and launchers North Korea could deploy in this area would double or triple. Also in August 1996, it was reported that Syria had shipped a Soviet-made 70 km-range, highly accurate SS-21 to North Korea. If North Korea is able to reverse-engineer the SS-21's sophisticated guidance package, it could use the technology to improve the accuracy of its Scud missiles. The article notes, however, that the technical sophistication of the SS-21's guidance package would make reverse engineering difficult for North Korea. Regarding the 1,000km-range No-dong-1, the article says that two developments may increase its capabilities. First, according to at least one report, North Korea has acquired global positioning system satellite navigation packages, whose incorporation would greatly improve the No-dong-1's accuracy. Second, North Korea could theoretically deliver a nuclear warhead on the 1,000kg-payload capacity No-dong-1 if it manages to develop a small enough nuclear warhead. Because of the lack of available information, the status of North Korea's longer-range, multistage ballistic missile program is far more uncertain. The further development of the Taepo-dong-1 and the Taepo-dong-2 will depend upon how well North Korea overcomes several major design hurdles. Multi-staging, advanced guidance, and re-entry shielding developments require technical sophistication and expertise that North Korea will need to acquire from abroad. <<>> Doc. Code: 7076
ABSTRACT: According to an unidentified Japanese source, North Korea has deployed three No-dong-1 ballistic missiles along the coast of the Sea of Japan, and has prepared them for test firing. Information about the missile deployment was obtained through US reconnaissance satellites monitoring North Korea's military movements. Japan and South Korea have already been notified. North Korea will deploy seven more No-dong-1 missiles shortly. North Korea made similar preparations in October 1996 but canceled the test. <<>> Doc. Code: 7155
ABSTRACT: Based on US intelligence observations made in March 1997 of North Korea's No-dong-1 missile launchers, officials have categorized the missile "as a weapon of terror rather than an effective strike system." Three launchers were observed deployed along North Korea's coastline, and seven more were observed at a site near Pyongyang. The officials concluded that North Korea deployed the missile prematurely, and that it lacks a reliable guidance system. The observations also provided specifications that are more accurate for the No-dong-1. It is 15.2 m in length, 1.2 m in diameter, has a 770kg warhead, and is classified as 1,300 km in range. The missile's guidance is a weak point in the system, giving the missile an estimated circular-error-probable of three to four km. The No-dong-1 can be fitted with conventional high explosive or chemical warheads. The missile's transporter-erector launch (TEL) vehicle is based on a modified Russian MAZ-543, lengthened with a fifth axle. US officials also believe that the major difference between the No-dong-1 and the No-dong-2 is the fuel supply system. The No-dong-2 may employ a redesigned system to allow longer burning of stored fuel. <<>> Doc. Code: 7125
ABSTRACT: On 6 May 1997, US military sources said North Korea had upgraded the warhead section of its No-dong-1 ballistic missile, and was therefore closer to re-testing the medium-range missile. The US sources said that the missile's payload had been reduced from 1,000kg capacity to several hundred kilograms, making the missile less likely to break up on re-entry. The reduced payload would still allow the missile to carry a chemical warhead, but not a nuclear one. However, also on 6 May 1997, a Japanese defense official cast doubt on the US information, saying that the United States may have provided it in order to persuade Japan to participate in a project with the United States to develop a tactical missile-defense system. <<>> Doc. Code: 7173
ABSTRACT: According to South Korea, North Korea is capable of producing 100 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles per year, and so far has exported approximately 400 missiles to the Middle East. From 1980 and 1993, weapons exports accounted for 30 percent of North Korea's total exports, amounting to $20.4 billion. Of this, North Korea exports about $500 million worth of Scud missiles per year. Experts say that North Korea has also been exporting Scud missile production plants, machinery, and technological expertise to Iran and Syria. <<>> Doc. Code: 7538
ABSTRACT: The Japanese daily "Yomiuri Shimbum" reported on 22 September 1997 that a US military satellite has detected the deployment of North Korean No-dong ballistic missiles for a possible test. The satellite monitored the missiles as they were being mounted onto mobile launchers at a northeastern military base in North Korea. <<>> Doc. Code: 7567
ABSTRACT: Note: The article refers to the No-dong-1, a 1,300 km-range ballistic missile. North Korea has begun deploying military units with equipment designed to transport the No-dong missile. US Pacific Command Adm. Joseph Prueher said the preparations indicated either deployment of the missile, training exercises, or exercises for deception. Prueher said that no missiles have been sighted, only troops and trucks. <<>> Doc. Code: 7588
ABSTRACT: The following is the structure of North Korea's military-industrial complex. The General Bureau - responsible for planning, procurement, budget compilation, and distribution of materials for the Second Economic Committee (SEC) and its subsidiaries. The SEC is an influential organization that exercises overall responsibility for the planning, financing, production, and distribution of defense-related equipment. The First Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for the development and production of ammunition, general military equipment, and conventional small arms. Most of the factories subordinate to the First Machine Industry Bureau are located in the large industrial areas of North Korea such as Pyongyang, Chongijin, Kanggye, and Sinuiju. Some of the small arms factories are in Chinchon, Chagang province. Engineering equipment comes from the four factories in Tokchon, South Pyongan province and Hamhung, South Hamgyong province. The Second Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for the development and production of armored vehicles and tanks. Third Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for the development and production of artillery, self-propelled (SP) artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems. Activities are coordinated with the Ministry of People's Armed Forces Artillery Command. During the past 20 years, the bureau worked on producing the 122mm SP MRL M-1985, 122mm SP MRL BM-11, 240mm SP MRL M-1985, and the 240mm SP MRL M-1991. Some of these systems were exported to the Middle East, including Iran and Syria. The Fourth Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for the procurement, development, and production of missile systems. It is probably divided into sections based on the system type. This bureau is responsible for the development of the SCUD B and C, No-dong, and Taep'o-dong-1 and -2 ballistic missiles. The missile-related test and production facilities that are controlled by the Fourth Bureau are: the January 18th [or No. 118] Machinery Factory, the January 25th [or No. 125] Machinery Factory, the Kanggye No. 26 General Plant, Changang province, the Yakjun Machinery Factory, the Maritime Missile Factory, and the Hwadaegun Missile Test Facility, North Hamgyong province. The Kanggye No. 26 General Plant is reportedly the largest underground facility in North Korea, employing 20,000 people and producing surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-surface missiles, as well as rockets, torpedoes, mines, and depth charges. The Fifth Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for developing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. North Korea's NBC program is administered by the Bureau and the Atomic Energy Industry Ministry and Academy of Sciences. The Sixth Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for development and production of ships, submarines, and naval equipment. Within the last few years, some of the hovercraft have been armed with the Styx anti-ship missile. The Seventh Machine Industry Bureau - responsible for procuring, developing, and producing communications equipment and aircraft. <<>> Doc. Code: 7584
ABSTRACT: In the section on North Korea's ballistic missiles, the report says: "Despite economic and political problems, Pyongyang continues to attach a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology...." "North Korea produces two variants of the... SCUD [missile], the SCUD B and SCUD C. It has a production capacity of four to eight SCUDs monthly, both for export and for its own armed forces. Pyongyang has hundreds of SCUDs in its inventory and available for use by its missile forces. It also has developed the No-dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on SCUD technology, likely for its own use as well as export. North Korea has two additional ballistic missile systems in the early stages of development, the Taep'o-dong 1 and Taep'o-dong 2. Both missiles are two-stage systems and likely would employ separating warheads. Both systems appear to represent a logical evolution of the experience gained through work of the SCUD and No-dong systems. Taep'o-dong 1 flight-testing could begin at any time. However, both
Taep'o-dong missiles represent a significant technological departure from
the proven SCUD designs. North Korea has little experience flight testing
its missiles and no experience testing multistage ballistic missiles or
Regarding cruise missiles and other means of delivery, the report says: "North Korea has several types of short range land- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. In the past, North Korea has produced two versions of cruise missiles based on Soviet and Chinese designs; these have ranges of about 100 kilometers. North Korea also has a variety of fighters, bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets, mortars, and sprayers available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons." Regarding North Korea's role as a supplier, the report says: "North Korea operates a complex, integrated network of trading companies, brokers, shippers, and banks that facilitate NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapon and ballistic missile-related trade. This trade involves complete systems, components, manufacturing and test equipment, and technology. Since the late 1980s, North Korea has used its networks to locate and acquire technologies as well as to pursue a sales program, selling missiles to countries such as Iran and Syria. North Korea provided material and know-how for domestic missile production programs in both Iran and Syria. Should these or other states acquire longer range North Korean missiles currently being developed, these states could pose a threat far beyond their neighbors. North Korea is not a member of the MTCR and is not expected to join, at least for the immediate future, but is engaged in missile talks with the United States." <<>> Doc. Code: 7591
ABSTRACT: In response to questions from the US Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency said that they stand by estimates in the 1995 National Intelligence Assessment that North Korea is 15 years from deploying its long-range Taep'o-dong-2 missile. The CIA added that most agencies now believe the Taep'o-dong-2 will be developed even more slowly. <<>> Acknowledgements:
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