Next page: 1992 Chronology.
Previous page: 1990 Chronology.

1991

The US Department of Defense estimates that North Korea has the capability to build a crude plutonium-based nuclear device that could fit on a railway wagon or in a military transport aircraft.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 9, p.11.

23 January 1991

South Korea’s Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku says that North Korea would be able to acquire nuclear weapons after 1995 because it is “expected to secure lots of plutonium in one or two years.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 24 January 1991.

February 1991

The US-South Korean Relations Committee meets, in which South Korean and US scholars and former South Korean Ambassador to the United States Kim Kyong-won propose the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Paee Chong-kun, Hanguk Ilbo (Seoul), 3 May 1991, p.5.

February 1991

The United States announces that it plans to scale down the 1991 Team Spirit military exercise.

Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Arms Control Today, March 1991, p.12.

5 March 1991

South Korean Prime Minister No Chae-pong criticizes former Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru for offering to mediate between the United States and North Korea over the issue of inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. He also criticizes North Korea for attempting to link the “nuclear question” with demands that the United States withdraw its troops from South Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 5 March 1991.

11 March 1991

A North Korean mission led by Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol rejects a Japanese request that North Korea implement the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1991, p.5.

April 1991

After warning North Korea to accept full-scope safeguards, the Soviet Union halts exports of nuclear equipment and technology to North Korea.

George Leopold and Naoaki Usui, Defense News, 27 May 1991, pp. 4, 37.

1 April 1991

US intelligence and satellite photographs reveal that North Korea may be able to mass produce nuclear weapons by 1995 or 1996.

Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 1 April 1991.

12 April 1991

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku announces that South Korea will attack North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon if it does not sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that the announcement is a “virtual declaration of war.”

Charles Lane, Newsweek, 29 April 1991, pp.38-40.

14 April 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo asks Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Developments, 20 May 1991, p.5.

16 April 1991

Vladlen A. Martynof of the Soviet Academy of Sciences announces that all Soviet supplies to North Korea will be cut if IAEA inspections continue to be denied. The Soviet Union recently supplied North Korea with a small amount of 10 percent uranium-235 enriched fuel to be used in North Korea’s 2MW IRT-research reactor at Yongbyon.

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 18 April 1991, pp.8-9; David A. Sanger, New York Times, 16 April 1991, p.A3.

16 April 1991

At the Soviet Union’s request, China urges North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 16 April 1991.

29 April – 6 May 1991

During the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting held in North Korea, North Korean President Kim Il-sung advocates the abolition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Nucleonics Week, 30 May 1991, pp.18-19.

14 May 1991

At 3 a.m., South Korea’s National Fisheries Research and Development Agency notes a temperature increase from the normal 10-15 degrees Celsius to 35 degrees Celsius at Yongbyon, where North Korea’s nuclear facilities are located. It is suspected that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion test. The temperature rise could also have been caused by a nuclear accident.

Korea Times (Seoul), 17 May 1991, p.3.

20–22 May 1991

During Japanese-North Korean talks held in China, Japanese special ambassador, Noboru Nakahira says that North Korea must accept full-scope safeguards before Japan will normalize relations. Japan withholds $600 million in economic assistance and possible payment of war reparations for its occupation of Korea during the Second World War. The North Korea delegation, which includes Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol, rejects Japan’s demand. According to Chon, diplomatic relations between the two countries are necessary before North Korea will consider inspections of its nuclear facilities.

George Leopold and Naoaki Usui, Defense News, 27 May 1991, pp.4, 37.

24 May 1991

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Taizo Watanabe repeats Japan’s demands that North Korea accept IAEA safeguards.

Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 30 May 1991, pp.17-18.

31 May 1991

According to Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh, the Soviet Union would like North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement as soon as possible. It is also at this time that Gremitskikh denies that the Soviet Union delivered plutonium to North Korea or to any other country.

Sergey Postangov and Sergey Nikisho, Tass (Moscow), 18 April 1991.

June 1991

Radio Moscow reports that North Korean scientists have participated in nuclear research projects at the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute in the Soviet Union since 1956. From 1956-1991, 200 North Korean scientists were reportedly trained at the facility. At this point in time, there are 30 North Korean scientists working at Dubna. Joint North Korean-Soviet Union nuclear research projects are also conducted at the North Korean Nuclear Fusion Research Center and the North Korean Science Institute. Scientists working at the two latter institutes travel to Dubna to use its facilities.

Also at this time, board members at Dubna meet with Kim Dong-bin, president of the North Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, Li Cha-hae, bureau director of Nuclear Power, and Li Dong-su, member of the Scientific Research Bureau at the Nuclear Power Center of North Korea to discuss research projects and international cooperation for 1992.

Vantage Point, June 1991, pp.18-19.

June 1991

A US delegation arrives in Pyongyang to discuss nuclear safety. Retired General Richard Stilwell leads the delegation.

Proliferation Issues, 24 July 1991, pp.27-28.

1 June 1991

A researcher at South Korea’s National Defense Intelligence Headquarters, So Yong-ha, estimates that North Korea could produce a nuclear weapon by the mid-1990s. He says that this time frame would allow North Korea 3 years to produce 20kg of plutonium from the 5MW reactor, one to two years to process it, and one year to build a nuclear bomb for testing.

Andrew Mack, Foreign Policy, Summer 1991, pp.87-104.

7 June 1991

A delegation of senior North Korean diplomats, led by Chon Chung-kuk meets with IAEA Director General Hans Blix in Vienna. North Korea says it will sign the safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of all of its facilities, (including installations at Yongbyon that the United States suspects are being used to build nuclear weapons). Officials from both sides are scheduled to meet in July 1991, and the agreement should be ready for approval by September 1991. According to IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer, North Korea will sign an inspection agreement as soon as technical matters, such as inspections scheduling and procedures are negotiated. North Korea continues to demand that the United States remove its nuclear weapons and troops from South Korea before it will consider international inspections.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 9 June 1991, p.10; Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 13 June 1991, pp.14-15.

8 June 1991

North Korea insists on altering some of the wording in the standard IAEA safeguards agreement before signing it.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 8 June 1991.

11 June 1991

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announces that the United States will not use nuclear arms against North Korea or any other NPT signatory state. North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam welcomes the statement, but demands a written guarantee.

Dan Oberdorfer and T. R. Reid, Washington Post, 21 June 1991, p.A19.

11 June 1991

The North Korean delegation abruptly leave an IAEA meeting after Japanese Ambassador Tetsuya Endo begins questioning why North Korea has been so reluctant to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. Representatives from Australia, Canada and other countries support Ambassador Endo’s line of questioning.

Yim Tong-myong, Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 11 June 1991, p.2.

14 June 1991

The Japanese government welcomes North Korea’s announcement that it will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe says that it remains unclear whether North Korea will sign the safeguards agreement unconditionally.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 14 June 1991.

20 June 1991

According to North Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yong-nam, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement soon. However, North Korea will not allow actual inspections until: (1) inspections are conducted to verify the removal of US nuclear weapons allegedly stationed in South Korea, and (2) North Korea receives “legal assurances” that the United States will not pose a nuclear threat against it.

Dan Oberdorfer and T. R. Reid, Washington Post, 21 June 1991, p.A19.

27 June 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo says that he has new evidence that during the past two months, North Korea has been conducting tests of nuclear weapon detonators. The tests were conducted at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Gus Constantine, Washington Times, 28 June 1991, p.A7.

July 1991

According to Iranian exile sources, an Iranian scientific and technical delegation travels to China and North Korea to negotiate an increase in the transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies.

Kenneth R. Timmerman, Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1991, p.A10.

6 July 1991

US Assistant Secretary of State for international organization affairs John Bolton says that the United States will not link the IAEA safeguards agreement to North Korea’s membership in the United Nations.

San Francisco Chronicle, 6 July 1991, p.A7.

10 July 1991

North Korea says that it wants an additional clause in the IAEA safeguards agreement that will release it from mandatory inspection if: (1)there are nuclear weapons in South Korea, and (2) there is a nuclear threat against North Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 18 June 1991.

10 July 1991

According to South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku, if North Korea accepts international inspections of its facilities and proves that it has abandoned its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will consider simultaneous inspections of both countries’ military facilities.

Milavnews, July 1991, pp.19-20.

10-14 July 1991

North Korea holds talks with the IAEA to determine the terms of the safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 18 June 1991.

16 July 1991

North Korea initials the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Nuclear News, August 1991, p.116.

16 July 1991

According to a North Korean delegate to the IAEA, the United States poses a “nuclear threat” to North Korea, which could create problems in implementing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Andrew Mack, Pacific Research, August 1991, p.14.

30 July 1991

North Korea proposes to South Korea that the two countries establish a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula with China, the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors.

Financial Times, 2 August 1991, p.4.

1 August 1991

South Korea says that it will consider talks on nuclear non-proliferation with North Korea if North Korea accepts full international inspections of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

Financial Times, 2 August 1991, p.4.

4 August 1991

South Korea reportedly considers asking North Korea to sign a joint declaration to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. If such a declaration is signed, North Korea will have to stop developing nuclear weapons and open all of its nuclear facilities, including a nuclear-fuel reprocessing installation, to IAEA inspections. The proposal may suggest simultaneous IAEA inspections, or a system by which the two Koreas may inspect one another’s facilities.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 August 1991.

15 August 1991

Japan links financial assistance to North Korea with completion of the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 15 August 1991, pp.14-16.

24 August 1991

South Korean experts say that North Korea does not possess the plutonium needed to construct nuclear weapons.

Proliferation Issues, 12 September 1991, p.24.

24 August 1991

A Soviet military specialist who had worked in North Korea says that North Korean nuclear facilities are probably hidden in the mountains or otherwise disguised. He also says that North Korea did not have plans to produce a nuclear bomb at one time, but is now bluffing. North Korean defector, Choe Sang-kya, who was the “highly placed functionary of the security service,” confirms that North Korea does have a nuclear weapons program.

A. Platkovski, Komsomolskaya Pravada (Moscow), 24 August 1991, p.5.

September 1991

IAEA Director General Hans Blix meets with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to suggest plans to pursue more aggressive inspections of nuclear states suspected of violating the NPT. He says that he intends to order inspection of such sites even if a country has not declared or placed them under IAEA safeguards. During the meeting, US energy secretary James Watkins says that the United States supports a more aggressive inspection regime to uncover clandestine nuclear weapons programs as sanctioned by the NPT. The Soviet Union and the European Union support the proposal.

Paul Lewis, New York Times, 11 October 1991, p.A; Michael Z. Wise, Washington Post, 21 September 1991, p.A19.

September 1991

Twenty-three IAEA member states adopt a strong resolution to allow the IAEA to conduct “special” inspections (inspections on demand) in addition to ones regularly scheduled. The resolution is partially aimed at North Korea, whose continued refusal to allow IAEA inspections is causing real concern at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. North Korea calls the resolution a hostile act and delays efforts to cooperate with the IAEA.

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on North Korea to quickly ratify the safeguards agreement as well as facility-specific accords. In response to this resolution, North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, O Chang-rim refuses to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

According to North Korean defector, Ko Young-hwan, the North Korean government never had any intention of allowing international inspections; rather it only signed the NPT to buy time for its nuclear weapons program.

Mark Hibbs, Anne Maclachlan and N. Usui, Nucleonics Week, 19 September 1991, p.14; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.81; Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 17 September 1991, p.A10; Paul Shin, Monterey Herald, 14 September 1991, p.18A.

17 September 1991

South Korean Science and Technology Minister Kim Chin-hyon announces in a keynote speech to the 35th General Meeting of the IAEA that South Korea is willing to transfer nuclear technology to North Korea, despite North Korea’s reluctance in accepting outside inspections of its nuclear facilities. He says that South Korea could offer technologies relating to the construction and operation of atomic power plants and safeguards on nuclear materials.

Yonhap (Seoul), 17 September 1991.

26 September 1991

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Wu Jianmin denies reports that North Korea informed China that it would develop nuclear weapons.

AFP (Paris), 26 September 1991.

27 September 1991

US President George Bush announces that the United States will withdraw all short-range land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. According to North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk and Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol, North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement after all nuclear weapons are removed from South Korea.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 19 October 1991, pp.A1, A19; Yonhap (Seoul), 23 October 1991.

29 September 1991

According to a North Korean official, Kim Yong-sun, in order for North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States should guarantee that it will never use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku warns that military action may be necessary if North Korea does not stop its nuclear program. He announces that North Korea will be able to produce 50kg of plutonium by 1993.

Clayton Jones, Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 1991, p.8.

October 1991

US President George Bush adds to his 27 September 1991 statement by announcing that all nuclear weapons will be removed from South Korea. This will also include the removal of air-delivered nuclear weapons. North Korean President Kim Il-sung is later advised by the Chinese to give credence to Bush’s announcement that US tactical nuclear weapons are being withdrawn from South Korea and to resolve international concern over North Korea’s nuclear program as soon as possible.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 261; Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 19 October 1991, pp.A1, A19.

October 1991

French satellite photographs reveal evidence of a second nuclear installation in North Korea used for nuclear weapons development. The newly discovered nuclear complex is located at Pakchon, approximately 38 miles north of Pyongyang. This evidence supports claims made by Ko Yong-hwan, former first secretary of the North Korean embassy in the Congo who defected from North Korea in May 1991. According to Ko, Pakchon is the site of “underground nuclear facilities” which contain nuclear equipment obtained from Austria, France and other countries in the mid-1960s.

Washington Times, 30 October 1991, p.A11.

October 1991

The director of Japan’s Tokai University’s Information Center, Toshibumi Sakada, announces that there are indications of a nuclear installation near Pakchon in North Korea. According to Sakada, photographs taken in September 1991 by France’s Aeronautical Research Center’s earth observation satellite show a mountain nuclear facility that “extended about one kilometer.” He suspects that the facility contains equipment capable of “splitting plutonium.” It is suspected that when North Korea allows international inspections of its facility at Yongbyon, it might transfer the plutonium and plutonium processing facilities to Pakchon.

Yonhap (Seoul), 29 October 1991.

October 1991

According to a South Korean official, North Korea is likely to sign the safeguards agreement in February 1992.

Yonhap (Seoul), 21 October 1991.

2 October 1991

North Korean President Kim Il-sung announces that North Korea will accept IAEA inspections of its facilities if US facilities in South Korea are also inspected. (This is the first time that Kim Il-sung has spoken personally about international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.)

KBS-1 Television Network Broadcast (Seoul), 2 October 1991.

4 October 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo warns North Korea that if it continues with its nuclear weapons program and refuses international inspections, international sanctions may be imposed on North Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 October 1991.

4 October 1991

South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha says that the United States and South Korea will soon hold talks to discuss a schedule for the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 October 1991.

15 October 1991

US and Israeli intelligence suspect that North Korea is recruiting Soviet nuclear specialists.

Pravda (Moscow), 15 October 1991, p.4.

22 October 1991

North Korea informs the United Nations that all nuclear weapons must be removed from South Korea before it can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. The European Union, Australia, United States, Poland, Austria, Japan, Romania, New Zealand, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria and South Korea agree that North Korea should immediately sign the agreement and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. South Korean Ambassador No Chang-hui expresses “serious concern” that North Korea is delaying signing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 23 October 1991.

23 October 1991

In a meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk presents a new set of conditions that must be met in order for North Korea to allow international inspections of its facilities. These conditions include: (1) South Korea’s renunciation of the US “nuclear umbrella,” and (2) discontinuation of US flights over Korea and port calls to South Korea by planes and ships containing nuclear weapons.

Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 24 October 1991, p.A3.

30 October 1991

The South Korean Defense Minister issues a white paper which states that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “must be stopped at any cost.”

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 November 1991, pp.1, 6.

30 October 1991

According to Kim Chong-min, a former Deputy Director Supply Section of the third Engineering Bureau of North Korea’s Ministry of Public Security who defected from North Korea on 1 May 1988, North Korea’s Yongbyon facility was to begin the “operation of a nuclear reprocessing plant and was to be capable of separating and extracting around 15kg of plutonium annually.” He believes that North Korea may have already developed a small-scale nuclear weapon. This information leads South Korea to issue the second warning in two months to North Korea declaring that “…at worst, military action must be taken” against nuclear installations if North Korea does not halt development of its nuclear weapons program.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 October 1991, p.653; Sekye Ilbo (Seoul), 30 October 1991, p.1.

Late-1991

After consulting his advisors, US President George Bush secretly decides to remove the last US nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. He also decides to allow North Korea to inspect the US base at Kunsan where the nuclear weapons had been stored. Later in a meeting at the United Nations, Bush privately informs South Korean President Roh Tae-woo that the United States will continue to provide it with a nuclear umbrella.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.259-260.

November 1991

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku says that intelligence reports indicate that North Korea will be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium within a year, and of building a bomb one to two years thereafter.

Damon Darlin, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 1991, p.A8.

November 1991

At a UN Security Council meeting, the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, France and China agree to work separately to get North Korea to abandon pursuit of its nuclear weapons program. China rejects a US proposal to take joint action against North Korea.

Dan Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 27 November 1991, p.A19.

November 1991

North Korea sets up a ring of anti-aircraft guns around its nuclear facility at Yongbyon for protection.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 21 February 1992, p.A9.

November 1991

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says that a nuclear weapons program on the Korean Peninsula is not in China’s best interest. However, China does not want international pressure applied on North Korea to force it to halt its weapons program.

George D. Moffett and Peter Grier, Christian Science Monitor, 29 April 1992, p.3.

8 November 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announces that South Korea will become a part of the nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula and that it will not “manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.”

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 15 November 1991, p.A36; David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 November 1991, pp.1, 6.

8 November 1991

China tells North Korea that it opposes North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Warren Strobel and Gus Constantine, Washington Times, 8 November 1991, pp.A1, A8.

10 November 1991

North Korea rejects South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s proposal for North Korea to cooperate in establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Peninsula. North Korea says that the proposal is “insignificant.”

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 11 November 1991, pp.A1, A12.

10 November 1991

Leis Engineering GmbH, an East German company, is suspected of selling a special steel alloy to North Korea that can be used for containing radioactive materials. North Korea may have also sold Scud-B missiles to some Arab countries in return for nuclear expertise.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 November 1991, pp.1, 6.

13 November 1991

Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa informs North Korea that if it wants to normalize relations with Japan and receive economic assistance, it must dismantle “a key part of its secret nuclear center.”

New York Times, 14 November 1991, p.A6.

14 November 1991

According to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, “dialogue,” not pressure, is the way to get North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program.

Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 15 November 1991, p.A7.

20 November 1991

There is growing evidence that China is selling nuclear technology to North Korea.

William Rusher, Washington Times, 20 November 1991, p.F3.

25 November 1991

North Korea’s foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States begins to remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea. North Korea proposes a direct meeting with the United States to discuss simultaneous inspections of North Korean facilities and US nuclear sites in South Korea. North Korea also proposes to meet directly with South Korea to discuss establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Dan Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 27 November 1991, p.A19; Washington Times, 29 November 1991, p.A2.

27 November 1991

North Korean Ambassador to China Chu Chang-jun reiterates the proposal initially made on 25 November 1991, which stated that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement following the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.

David Holley, Los Angeles Times, 28 November 1991, pp.A1, A13.

27 November 1991

The United States demands that North Korea refrain from nuclear fuel enrichment.

John Ridding and Steven Butler, Financial Times, 27 November 1991, p.4.

28 November 1991

The United States begins removing its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. It is expected that all weapons will be withdrawn by the end of 1991. Another report says that South Korea and the United States plan to complete the removal of weapons by April 1992.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 27 November 1991, p.A19; Washington Times, 29 November 1991, p.A2.

28 November 1991

Katsumi Sato, a Japanese expert on North Korea, says that the increase in air defense surrounding North Korea’s nuclear facility at Yongbyon indicates that North Korea will probably not allow international inspections. North Korea is also building tunnels for protection purposes around the nuclear facility near Sinpo.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 28 November 1991, p.A3.

December 1991

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Director General Hans Blix suggests that the IAEA create a separate agency or department to collect and analyze intelligence data from member states to help monitor undeclared nuclear activities. His suggestion is met with little enthusiasm. In the past, the United States has refused to give the IAEA intelligence information for security reasons. The IAEA prepares to make another request for intelligence information at the next Board of Governors meeting scheduled for 24 February 1992. If the request is granted, only two IAEA staff members will have access to the information.

During the meeting, South Korean representatives reportedly ask the Agency to cease technical support for North Korea’s nuclear program. Support for the North’s nuclear program was granted in connection with ongoing IAEA inspections of the small reactor at Yongbyon. The IAEA currently has plans to spend more than $300,000 in North Korea on five major projects in 1992, and will assist North Korean scientists in areas ranging from uranium ore exploitation to finding industrial uses for radioactive isotopes.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1992, pp.14-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82.

December 1991

After the last US nuclear weapons have been removed from South Korea, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo makes the announcement, “…as I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea.”

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.260.

December 1991

US officials inform the North Koreans that a high-level meeting between the two countries could be held if North Korea agrees to meet is nuclear inspections obligations.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.265.

11 December 1991

South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik suggests “pilot simultaneous inspections” of North Korean and US nuclear facilities. He says that “[South Korea] wishes to choose Sunchon airfield and the facilities in Yongbyon for pilot inspection. [North Korea] may choose Kunsan air base or other military and civilian facilities.”

Paul Blusein, Washington Post, 12 December 1991, pp.A43, A51.

11 December 1991

North and South Korea present proposals to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries also discuss mutual inspections of their respective nuclear facilities. The United States decides to allow North Korea to inspect its military sites in South Korea.

Leslie Helm and Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times, 12 December 1991, pp.A1, A8.

12 December 1991

During talks, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk and South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik fail to produce a formal agreement to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Leslie Helm, Los Angeles Times, 13 December 1991, p.A1.

13 December 1991

North and South Korea adopt and initial the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggresion and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.” North Korea refuses to address the issue of its nuclear program in this agreement, but promises to work on a separate North-South accord before the end of 1991.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.261-262.

14 December 1991

Han Sung-joo, a professor at Seoul National University, says that by signing a non-aggression and reconciliation pact with North Korea on 13 December 1991 without first formulating a nuclear accord, South Korea is providing North Korea with an excuse to delay international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Paul Blustein, Washington Post, 14 December 1991, p.A19.

14 December 1991

North Korean officials tell South Korean officials that North Korea is not opposed to South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik’s proposal to scrap reprocessing facilities and hold mutual simultaneous inspection of their respective nuclear facilities.

Yonhap (Seoul), 14 December 1991.

Mid-December 1991

North Korea informs visiting US Congressman Stephen Solarz that it is ready to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

New York Times, 28 December 1991, p.12.

17 December 1991

North and South Korea issue a joint statement promising to work to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Kelly Smith Tunney, Washington Times, 17 December 1991, p.A8.

18 December 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announces that South Korea is nuclear-weapons-free. Responding to Roh’s declaration, US President George Bush says that he has “heard what Roh said and [is] not about to argue with him.”

Los Angeles Times, 26 December 1991, p.B4; Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 20 December 1991.

18 December 1991

During high-level US-North Korean talks, North Korean President Kim Il-sung declares to US Congressman Stephen Solarz that North Korea does not have any nuclear reprocessing facilities.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.264.

19 December 1991

North Korean President Kim Il-sung announces that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as it is assured that US nuclear weapons have been removed from South Korea, and that inspections of North Korean facilities will be conducted simultaneously with those of US facilities in South Korea.

Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 20 December 1991.

23 December 1991

North Korea announces that it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Kelly Smith Tunney, Washington Times, 25 December 1991, p.A7.

24 December 1991

During a meeting of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party, party clearance is reportedly given for international inspections of the North Korean nuclear program as well as a bilateral nuclear accord to be negotiated with the South. Selig Harrrison of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is later told by observers of the meeting that hard-line members of the Party agreed to inspections of North Korea’s nuclear program, but not to terminate it as a means of receiving economic benefits and normalizing relations with the United States and Japan.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.262-263.

26 December 1991

According to North Korean UN Ambassador Ho Jong, North Korean officials have begun negotiating with the IAEA on the nature and timing of inspections. Ho indicates that North Korea believes ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement is inevitable. However, if the IAEA adopts more condemnatory resolutions, as it did in the September 1991 Board of Governors meeting, “this issue will be ruined.”

Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82.

26 December 1991

South Korean spokesman Lee Dong-bok says that during North-South Korean talks, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and permit international inspections of its nuclear facility “at an early date.” South Korea demands that the North do so by 15 January 1992. North Korea is no longer demanding that the US officially confirm the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

New York Times, 27 December 1991, p.A3.

26 December 1991

North Korea agrees to “scrap its nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”

Washington Times, 31 December 1991, p.A8.

27 December 1991

North Korea’s chief delegate to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission talks with South Korea, Choe U-jin, comments on the South’s demand that it sign the safeguards agreement by 15 January 1992, saying that the “imposition of a timetable on [North Korea] is an interference with [its] national integrity.”

C.W. Lim, Washington Times, 27 December 1991, p.A7.

31 December 1991

North and South Korea agree to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea will withdraw its demand that joint US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises be ended permanently. In return, South Korea will announce that it is willing to cancel the joint Team Spirit military exercise with the United States scheduled for 1992. South Korea will also withdraw its demand that North Korea sign the IAEA safeguards agreement by 31 January 1992. North Korea is expected to later make a statement committing itself to signing the safeguards agreement.

The nuclear-weapons-free zone agreement allows North and South Korea to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and prohibits the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, storing or deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it prohibits construction of nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. The agreement, expected to be signed by the Korean Prime Ministers in a meeting in February 1992, will establish the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC). The JNCC’s function will be to conduct talks detailing the implementation of nuclear facility inspections to verify the absence of nuclear weapons. The documents establishing the JNCC’s role must be signed by 18 March 1993.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

31 December 1991

North Korea reportedly supplies Iran with “nuclear technology for military use.”

Amir Tahiri, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 31 December 1991, p.1.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Next page: 1992 Chronology.
Previous page: 1990 Chronology.

Return to the North Korea Special Collection.