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January 1992

Kim Yong-sun, North Korea’s secretary of international affairs, reiterates in a meeting with US Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter that North Korea does not have a nuclear weapons program.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 1 July 1992.

January 1992

During a meeting, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Arnold L. Kanter gives North Korea’s Director of the International Department of the Communist Party, Kim Young-sun, a deadline for inspection of its nuclear facilities. Additionally, Kanter proposes that a US air base in South Korea be inspected simultaneously.

New York Times, 24 January 1992, p.A4.

6 January 1992

North Korea Ambassador Chon In-chan informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement before the end of January 1992.

Nuclear Engineering International, February 1992, pp.7-8.

6 January 1992

US President George Bush and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announce that they will cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercise if North Korea “fulfills its obligation” to the IAEA and South Korea for inspections of its nuclear facilities.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 7 January 1992, p.A6.

14 January 1992

North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk is expected to sign a pact establishing a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula and exchange signed copies with his South Korea counterpart. The pact requires that North and South Korea form the JNCC within a month.

Washington Times, 13 January 1992, p.A2.

15 January 1992

William A. Higinbotham, a consultant on nuclear materials management and a former executive of the Federation of American Scientists informs the US Senate’s Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs that North Korea has at least one new 5MW reactor that can produce 30 grams of plutonium a day. This reactor is not safeguarded.

Barbara Crossette, New York Times, 15 January 1992, p.A7.

20 January 1992

North and South Korea sign the Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula.

PPNN Newsbrief, Spring 1992, p.16.

21 January 1992

US-North Korean high-level political meetings commence at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. The North Korean delegation is headed by Workers Party secretary for international affairs Kim Yong-sun. The US delegation is lead by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Kanter’s “talking points” have been approved in advance by a US State Department interagency committee, as well as by the South Korean and Japanese governments. These points include urging North Korea to permit IAEA inspections and to give up its nuclear weapons option. North Korea responds by agreeing to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.266-267.

30 January 1992

North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea’s Deputy Minister for the atomic energy industry Hong Gun-pyo says that North Korea will abide by the agreement fully. It should be noted however, that North Korea does not ratify nor implement the agreement at this time. North Korea’s director of the foreign ministry Chang Mun-son says that the process of ratification by the legislature could take as long as six months.

The IAEA inspections process comprises four distinct phases. The first requires North Korea to submit an official report of its existing nuclear facilities. During the second phase, the IAEA will conduct a series of ad hoc inspections to verify the aforementioned list, as well as gather some initial data about the nuclear program. Third, North Korea and the IAEA will sign various subsidiary agreements and attachments to the accord describing inspection procedures for specific facilities. And fourth, the IAEA will begin routine inspections designed to ensure that the nuclear facilities are not being used for military purposes.

Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82; Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 31 January 1992, p.2; Washington Times, 3 February 1992, p.A10.

February 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents his three-year campaign to achieve “universal adherence to treaties blocking additional countries from obtaining nuclear weapons” to the UN Security Council.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 18 February 1992, p.A14.

February 1992

The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the West German intelligence agency, is investigating reports that the West German company, Leybold A.G. supplied North Korea with two electron beam furnaces, two “laboratory furnaces,” and a “small laboratory furnace.” It is suspected that the first four furnaces were shipped to North Korea via India or Pakistan and that the “small laboratory furnace” was shipped via former East Germany. The furnaces could be used in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The BND also suspects that a Leybold employee recently went to North Korea to work on a nuclear facility.

Nuclear Engineering International, February 1992, pp.7-8.

February 1992

According to US intelligence reports, North Korea has built deep tunnels around its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. The tunneling appears to be an effort to protect the facility from possible attacks by the United States and South Korea. It may also be a means of hiding nuclear weapons from international inspectors. South Korean reports published in 1991 say that North Korea built similar tunnels to protect a suspected nuclear site near Sinpo.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 21 February 1991, p.A9.

February 1992

North and South Korea agree to form the JNCC by 19 March 1992. The purpose of the committee is to oversee the mutual nuclear inspections.

Newsweek, 9 March 1992.

February – April 1992

The Russian security service denies allegations that 56kg of radioactive plutonium is smuggled via trains containing scrap metal from the Soviet Union to North Korea. It is suspected that nuclear material is being smuggled abroad via either officers dismantling nuclear warheads or from nuclear power stations.

Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television 1st Program Network (Moscow), 19 April 1992.

7 February 1992

China informs North Korean President Kim Il-sung that it will delay recognizing South Korea if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program.

Gerald Segal, International Herald Tribune (Paris), 7 February 1992.

14 February 1992

There is concern that North Korea may export nuclear technology, materials, or possibly weapons to countries including Iran, Libya and Syria.

Christian Science Monitor, 14 February 1992.

Mid-February 1992

US officials meet with North Korean diplomats in Beijing. It is believed that the United States informs North Korea that it has until June 1992 to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 25 February 1992, p.A8.

18 February 1992

North and South Korea sign accords ratifying the 31 December 1991 joint declaration.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

18 February 1992

The North Korean Standing Committee agrees that the safeguards agreement should be ratified. According to North Korean Ambassador O Chang-rim, North Korea will use and develop nuclear energy “in company with hydro and thermopower to meet increasing demand for electricity [and has] pursued necessary research and preparations for its realization.” He says that North Korea’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

Gamini Senevirtne, Nucleonics Week, 27 February 1992, p.6.

20 February 1992

South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik meets with North Korea Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk to exchange agreements on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. Chung indicates that it is necessary for North Korea to produce more evidence that its nuclear intentions are peaceful.

During the meeting North Korean President Kim Il-sung ignores the South Korean demand for mutual nuclear inspections to take place at an early date. Kim also dismisses Western reports that North Korea is close to constructing a nuclear bomb. (The reports that he is referring to say that North Korea may be able to produce weapons-grade nuclear material by summer 1992.) Kim says that North Korea does not intend to enter into a nuclear arms race with its neighbors and furthermore, that it is unimaginable for his country “to develop nuclear weapons that can wipe out the Korean people.” The matter will be discussed in greater detail during talks scheduled for the spring of 1992 between North Korean President Kim Il-sung and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo.

Sam Jameson, Los Angeles Times, 21 February 1992, p.A8; Kevin Rafferty, Guardian (London), 19 February 1992; Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 21 February 1992, p.A4.

24 February 1992

Senior advisor to US President George Bush, Douglas H. Paal, meets with South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s senior aide, Kim Chong-whi, to discuss North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program. He announces that the United States has set June 1992 as the deadline for North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections. US Congressman Stephen Solarz suggests that the United States may have to use force to coerce North Korea to allow international inspections.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 25 Febraury 1992, p.A8; International Herald Tribune (Paris), 25 February 1992.

25 February 1992

CIA Director Robert M. Gates testifies before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee that once North Korea has sufficient fissionable material, it will only be a matter of a few months before it will be capable of building a nuclear weapon. He also testifies that North Korea appears to be focused solely on building a reprocessing plant and producing weapons-grade plutonium. However, senior officials at the US State Department and Pentagon say that Gates’ prediction is too “harsh” and that North Korea would need at least two more years to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

B.J. Cutler, Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p.F3; Rupert Cornwell, Independent (London), 26 February 1992, p.10; Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 16 March 1992; Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 10 March 1992, pp.A1, A8.

25 February 1992

An IAEA official announces that the IAEA is close to reaching an agreement with North Korea to allow a team of experts to visit North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Although North Korea has not ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement, the North Korean Foreign Minister O Chang-rim says that “there is no possibility that it will be rejected.”

Rupert Cornwell, Independent (London), 26 February 1992, p.10.

26 February 1992

The IAEA Board of Governors reaffirms its right to conduct special inspections of undeclared nuclear sites. It says that inspections will only occur on “rare occasions.” The IAEA has not yet performed such an inspection. IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that the Board has agreed on a plan that requires all nations with full-scope safeguards agreements to begin submitting preliminary designs of nuclear facilities to the IAEA once the decision to construct them is made. At its next meeting in June 1992, the Board will discuss a plan for mandatory reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material and sensitive non-nuclear equipment.

Michael J. Wise, Washington Post, 27 February 1992, p.A33.

28 February 1992

According to North Korean Foreign Minister O Chang-rim, international inspectors may start examining North Korean nuclear facilities by May 1992. The United States believes that North Korea is removing items from its plutonium production facility.

R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 28 February 1992, p.A29.

28 February 1992

North Korea rejects South Korea’s deadline request for mutual trial inspections by 18 March 1992. North Korea also refuses to finalize the procedures for mutual inspections by 18 April 1992. South Korea’s assistant foreign minister Chang Man-soon says that, at the latest, North Korea will be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium by June 1992.

Sam Jameson, Los Angeles Times, 28 February 1992, p.A13.

Early-March 1992

According to the US State Department, North Korea is two or more years away from constructing a nuclear bomb.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 16 March 1992.

5 March 1992

South Korean Ambassador Hun Hong-choo announces that the United States would like to participate in inter-Korean inspections of the suspected nuclear facilities.

Washington Times, 6 March 1992, p.A2.

8 March 1992

According to a report in the German press, North Korea and Iran recently signed an agreement to jointly develop nuclear weapons.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 6 August 1992, pp.13-14.

9 March 1992

US Secretary of State James A. Baker convinces Russia, South Korea, and Japan to agree to pressure North Korea to cease all nuclear weapons development.

Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 1992, p.A10.

9 March 1992

North Korea’s delay in ratifying the IAEA safeguards agreement creates suspicions that it is either buying time to produce weapons-grade plutonium or hiding plutonium before the inspections begin. The United States is reluctant to seriously consider plans for a military strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities.

Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 1992, p.A10.

9 March 1992

North Korea announces that its parliament will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement in April 1992. North Korea’s Foreign Minister O Chang-rim says that international inspections will begin “most probably at the beginning of June 1992.”

Newsweek, 9 March 1992; The Economist, 14 March 1992, p.47.

10 March 1992

North Korea’s ambassador to Russia Son Song-pil says that North Korea is resisting inspection of its nuclear facilities because US nuclear weapons are still present at a secret storage depot in South Korea.

Proliferation Issues, 20 March 1992, pp.17-18.

14 March 1992

North and South Korea conclude an agreement to establish (1) the JNCC, and (2) inspections of nuclear facilities in early-June 1992. The inspections agreement, however, does not hold North Korea to a strict schedule, and does not mention specific nuclear facilities in North Korea (e.g., Yongbyon). According to Article 3 of the agreement, the JNCC’s first meeting will be held in Panmunjom on 19 March 1992. Article 4 states that the Koreas will “jointly try to adopt the necessary documents for verifying nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula within approximately two-months time” after 19 March 1992. Once this document has been signed, the Koreas agree that inspections will begin within 20 days.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993; David E. Sanger, International Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 March 1992, p.4.

15 March 1992

US Assistant Secretary of State of East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon arrives in Seoul to discuss North Korean demands to inspect US military bases in South Korea. The purpose of the inspections is to verify withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Lee Su-wan, Reuters, 16 March 1992.

16 March 1992

Japanese press reports quote a 14 March 1992 issue of the Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty, which states that North Korea developed a bomb trigger at the Yongbyon plant more than a year ago. The information was derived from a classified 8 February 1992 KGB document that was sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party by General Vladimir Kryuchkov, chair of the Committee for State Security. The information was also relayed to the Kremlin, which chose to take no action against North Korea. The report also states that North Korean President Kim Il-sung is personally in charge of North Korea’s nuclear program and wants to make North Korea a nuclear power. North Korea has not conducted any nuclear tests because it wants to keep its nuclear capability secret from the international community.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 16 March 1992.

16 March 1992

In reference to North and South Korean mutual inspections, as stipulated under the December 1991 nuclear-weapons-free-zone agreement, a South Korean unification ministry official says that, “If everything goes smoothly, mutual inspections will take place” around 10 June 1992.

Lee Su-wan, Reuters, 16 March 1992.

18 March 1992

The United States informs North Korea that it will impose sanctions if North Korea does not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea believe that North Korea is stalling inspections in order to move its nuclear facilities underground. According to the United States, several convoys of trucks have left Yongbyon.

Daily Telegraph (London), 18 March 1992, p.A3.

18 March 1992

South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok requests Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to pressure North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to inspection. Based on Russia’s desire to see the North and South refrain from developing nuclear weapons, Kozyrev agrees to assist South Korea. Kozyrev says that reports alleging that North Korea possesses nuclear detonators are false.

Maxim Yusin, Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 March 1992, p.3; Reuters, 18 March 1992.

19 March 1992

North and South Korea conduct the first JNCC meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to develop “a specific plan for proposed mutual inspections of suspected nuclear weapons sites.” However, little progress is made. North Korea says that the agreements signed with the South are merely statements of intent and are therefore not binding. Despite the announcement, South Korea advocates regular bilateral inspections of nuclear sites four times a year with twelve special inspections annually. Draft proposals for inspections plans will be considered before the next JNCC meeting, which is scheduled for 1 April 1992 in Panmunjom.

Clayton Jones, Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1992, pp.9-10; Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993; Reuters, 26 March 1992.

24 March 1992

North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Ri Tcheul says that North Korea has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he says that North Korea will soon accept IAEA inspections.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 24 March 1992.

24 March 1992

According to South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, the issue surrounding international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities should be resolved through dialogue.

Reuters, 24 March 1992.

31 March 1992

South Korea sets 8 June 1992 as the deadline for North Korea to open key nuclear sites to South Korean inspectors.

Clayton Jones, Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1992, pp.9-10.

April 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs North Korea that if it does not declare its “radiochemical facility,” he will request the UN Security Council to demand special inspections of the site.

Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, 7 May 1992, pp.8-9.

April 1992

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin visits Japan. During the visit, he downplays suggestions that North Korea is on the verge of producing nuclear weapons.

The Economist, 11 April 1992, pp.59-60.

1 April 1992

During the second JNCC meeting, North and South Korea fail to reach an agreement on inspections proposals. South Korea proposes that regular inspections be conducted on nuclear materials and facilities at least 16 times a year, and that special inspections be conducted on military bases at least 40 times a year. South Korea also requests that equal numbers of facilities be inspected by both parties. North Korea responds by saying that South Korea should allow inspections of all US bases, but that the only site it will allow to be inspected is the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

3 April 1992

North Korea’s envoy to the United Nations, Han Si-hae, informs Japanese reporters that North Korea’s Supreme Political Assembly will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement soon.

The Economist, 11 April 1992, pp.59-60.

6 April 1992

North and South Korea agree in principle to permit bilateral inspections on 10 June 1992.

Reuters, 6 April 1992.

9 April 1992

The North Korean parliament ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement. According to IAEA regulations, North Korea is required to allow international inspections of its facilities within 90 days. It is also required to list all of its nuclear facilities within 30 days of the last day of the month after it ratifies the safeguards agreement. William Dirks, IAEA Deputy Director General, says that the IAEA will go to the UN Security Council if North Korea fails to list all of its nuclear facilities for inspection.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1992, pp.15-16; Reuters, 13 April 1992; David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 April 1992, p.A3.

10 April 1992

North Korea presents the safeguards agreement accord to IAEA Director General Hans Blix at the Agency’s headquarters in Vienna.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.267.

12 April 1992

Korean Central Television (Pyongyang) broadcasts a report in which the deputy director of the Bureau of Scientific Guidance in the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, Yi Yong-ha is interviewed. He emphasizes that North Korea’s nuclear program is based upon peaceful purpose and self-reliance. The program focuses on exploration, development and manufacture of uranium ore concentrate and nuclear fuel rods. Tours of the test nuclear power station and the nuclear fuel rod production plant, and a visit to the Pyongyang Atomic Energy Research Institute are described. The report also mentions that North Korea has future plans of building larger, more powerful nuclear energy reactors.

Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 12 April 1992.

12 April 1992

North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons and has no intention of doing so given the large nuclear arsenal already held by the “big countries.” He says that North Korea is willing to receive international inspectors at its nuclear facilities and all that needs to be arranged is the procedural formality of informing the IAEA.

Washington Times, 15 April 1992, p.A11.

14 April 1992

According to the head of the North Korean Ministry of Atomic Energy’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, Choe Chong-sun, three nuclear facilities in North Korea will be opened for international inspection. The facilities include a 5MW research reactor built in 1986, and the 50MW and 200MW reactors, which are currently under construction. Choe denies that North Korea has a reprocessing plant. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that if North Korea does not declare the facility, he will recommend to the IAEA Board of Governors at the 15 June 1992 meeting that the Agency request a UN-sanctioned inspection of the site.

Compuserve—Executive News Service, 14 April 1992; David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 April 1992, p.A3.

14 April 1992

Choe Jong-sun, director for foreign affairs of the North Korean Atomic Energy Industry, officially announces that North Korea is researching “the nuclear reprocessing cycle.”

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 6 May 1992, p.A11.

15 April 1992

The North Korean government releases a video showing its 5MW, 30MW, and 200MW nuclear reactors. It is suspected that the 5MW nuclear reactor came on-line in 1986 and was produced indigenously. Officials in the Bush administration warn that North Korea may be months away from building a nuclear weapon. Some officials in Washington have discussed preemptive strikes against identified North Korean nuclear facilities.

T.R. Reid, Washington Post, 17 April 1992, p.A7.

19 April 1992

During the third JNCC meeting, North and South Korea attempt to discuss regulations for mutual inspections. However, no progress is made. South Korea insists that the number of sites inspected for both sides be equal and subject to mutual inspections based on the principle of reciprocity. North Korea, however, says that if Yongbyon is to be opened for inspection, all US military installations in South Korea must be opened for inspection. The two sides are unable to reach an agreement on the date of the next JNCC meeting.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

28 April-4 May 1992

Members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study group meet with the North Korean government and military leaders to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program.

North Korea initially claims that the Yongbyon reactor functioned occasionally. However, after viewing a US satellite picture that depicted the opposite, the North Koreans admit to the IAEA that the reactor has been in constant operation for six years. They also say that the same fuel rod has been used in the core of the reactor for the past six years. According to Leonard Spector, an expert from the Carnegie Endowment, the only way to get a “clear-cut answer” is to conduct a test of the fuel core.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Preliminary Report, 5 May 1992; Nayan Chand, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 1 October 1992, pp.8-10.

May 1992

An isotope processing plant is discovered in North Korea at Yongbyon.

Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 2, p.7.

4 May 1992

Twenty-five days before schedule, North Korea supplies the IAEA with a 150-page “initial report” declaring its nuclear facilities and materials. The report, however, does not list the actual amount of plutonium North Korea has reprocessed at Yongbyon. Rather, it depicts gram quantities of plutonium that were separated in 1990 at an industrial-scale reprocessing facility still under construction. North Korea says that the plutonium was acquired from damaged fuel assemblies at the 5MW research reactor.

Although the IAEA does not release the actual report, it does produce a report stating the facilities and materials North Korea admits to having. This includes: North Korean nuclear material and design information, a research reactor and critical assembly at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (under IAEA safeguards), a sub-critical facility at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, a fuel rod fabrication plant and storage facility at Yongbyon, a 5MW nuclear reactor and a radiochemical laboratory under construction at the Institute of Radiochemistry in Yongbyon, a 50MW nuclear plant under construction in Yongbyon, a 200MW plant under construction in Taechon (in North Pyongan Province), and three planned 635MW nuclear reactors. The radiochemical laboratory is reportedly for research on the separation of uranium and plutonium waste management. It also serves as a technical training center. Two uranium mines and two centers for uranium concentrate production are also listed. This list closely matches Western estimates of the scope of North Korea’s nuclear program.

IAEA Newsbriefs, June-July 1992, p.3; Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.83.

7 May 1992

As a means of ensuring that the IAEA team does not “miss anything” during inspections, US officials provide IAEA Director General Hans Blix and his top aides intelligence briefings in September 1991, March 1992, and 7 May 1992. During the last briefing, Blix is given a “virtual reality” tour of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. US officials place a great deal of emphasis on the reprocessing facility, which North Korea has identified as a “radiochemical laboratory.”

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.268-269.

11-16 May 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix arrives in Pyongyang prior to the IAEA inspection team to meet with North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun and first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju. He is reassured that the inspectors will be allowed access to any site in North Korea regardless if it is listed in the initial report submitted on 4 May 1992 to the IAEA.

In the course of the meetings, Blix visits the unfinished nuclear reprocessing laboratory at Yongbyon. After seeing the site, he reports that North Korea is building a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility capable of processing spent uranium into plutonium. He says that North Korea has already produced a “tiny quantity” of plutonium. However, the quantity is much less than what is required to build a nuclear weapon. According to the North Koreans, the reprocessing plant will be used to produce mixed-oxide fuel for future fast-breeder reactors. North Korea also expresses interest in building gas-graphite reactors because it can do so indigenously.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40; IAEA Newsbriefs, June-July 1992, p.3; Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, 21 May 1992, pp.7-8; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.79; T.R. Reid, Washington Post, 17 May 1992.

Mid-May 1992

Following a meeting between IAEA Director General Hans Blix and North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk and Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun, North Korea says that it is willing to consider eliminating certain elements of its nuclear program if foreign countries provide “the required assistance.” Blix says that he is concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program and the possibility that it will develop a nuclear bomb with special emphasis on reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium. Yon denies that North Korea is interested in nuclear weapons. However, he says that North Korea is interested in using modern light-water reactors rather than the heavy-water reactors (whose by-product can be more easily reprocessed to produce plutonium).

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 20 June 1992.

13-15 May 1992

During North Korean-Japanese normalization talks, Japan demands that North Korea immediately implement IAEA inspections. A deadlock in the talks arises from Japanese demands over the reprocessing facility in North Korea. The talks are conducted by North Korean chief negotiator Li Sam-ro and Japanese Ambassador Noboru Nakahira.

Following the talks, IAEA Director General Hans Blix travels to Japan to prepare for the 25 May 1992 inspections of North Korea’s facilities. While in Japan, Blix informs officials that North Korea used hot cells to separate plutonium in 1990. He tells Japanese Science and Technology Minister Kanzo Tanigawa that the IAEA team will verify whether North Korea actually used the cells. North Korean officials have told Blix that the “radiochemical laboratory” was completed in 1987 and that a “very small amount” of plutonium had been separated there. According to Blix, the reprocessing lab that he saw during his earlier visit was missing some equipment. However, no facilities were under construction during his visit.

Naoaki Usui, Nuclear Fuel, 25 May 1992, pp.13-14; Sheryl Wudunn, New York Times, 17 May 1992.

15 May 1992

Chief North Korean delegate to the North Korean-Japanese normalization talks, Li Sam-ro, admits that North Korea extracted a very small amount of plutonium for non-military purposes.

Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), 15 May 1992.

15 May 1992

During the fourth JNCC meeting, South Korea suggests that special inspections of nuclear facilities be conducted 24 hours after notification. South Korea demands that North Korea stop constructing its reprocessing facility.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

22 May 1992

China is reportedly working closely with North Korea to export nuclear technology to the Middle East.

Martin Sieff, Washington Times, 22 May 1992, pp.A1, A8.

25 May–7 June 1992

Willi Theis leads the first IAEA inspection team to North Korea. During the inspections of Yongbyon, the team is able to verify the location of fissionable material as stated in North Korea’s “initial report,” which was submitted to the IAEA on 4 May 1992. In doing so, they visit the six-story building the size of two football fields designated as the “radiochemical laboratory.” The team discovers that the building is only 80 percent complete, and that the equipment inside is only 40 percent ready for full-scale production. According to one IAEA official, “the works inside the building are ‘extremely primitive’ and far from ready to produce quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic weapons.”

The IAEA team also inspects a 5MW research reactor that came online in 1986, and a 50MW power plant scheduled to become operational by 1996. According to Blix, earlier reports, which stated that there is electrical equipment around the 200MW plant, are false. Rather, he saw “poles on which lines could be mounted.” The North Koreans informed him that they are attempting to develop a civil nuclear power program using natural uranium and graphite.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.268-269; Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1992, pp.11-12.

27 May 1992

During the fifth JNCC meeting, very little progress is made on the issue of mutual inspections. By delaying discussion on inspection guidelines, North Korea blocks any possibility of mutual inspections prior to July 1992. South Korea responds by warning North Korea that delaying talks further could lead to an impasse in inter-Korean exchanges in other areas.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

28 May 1992

According to South Korean spokesman Yi Tong-pok, it is suspected that North Korea may possess 130 to 180 tons of nuclear waste from its 5MW reactor, which is enough to produce 15kg of plutonium extract.

Yonhap (Seoul), 28 May 1992.

June 1992

At the IAEA annual meeting, the North Korean representative informs the IAEA that North Korea’s reprocessing facility should be retained “for the sake of the country’s prosperity and economic growth.”

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 20 June 1992.

June 1992

North Korea proposes giving the United States the nuclear-related information it gave the IAEA as a means of encouraging greater US participation in North-South nuclear inspections.

Yonhap (Seoul), 7 August 1992.

June 1992

During a summit meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and US President George Bush, Yeltsin mentions North Korea’s nuclear development program and expresses a desire to join with the United States to deter North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yeltsin and Bush issue a joint statement urging North Korea to accept inspections with South Korea and the IAEA.

Pak Chong-chan, Yonhap (Seoul), 18 June 1992.

June 1992

According to Ronald Lehman, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, North Korean nuclear technology is “very advanced.”

Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7.

1 June 1992

During a meeting with the United States, North Korea requests technical assistance from the United States and South Korea in constructing a light-water reactor.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1992.

7 June-8 October 1992

During a series of meetings, the United States and South Korea decide not to cancel the Team Spirit military exercises. They also decide to postpone reducing the number of US forces in South Korea. They do so based on “suspicion of nuclear development” in North Korea. North Korea, however, says that the suspicion is unfounded. Team Spirit military exercises were formerly suspended prior to IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korea claims that it is unjustifiable to resume the exercises during future inspections.

Nodong Sinmun (Seoul), 13 October 1992.

8 June 1992

According to US State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler, the United States may provide North Korea with access to advanced nuclear technology if it adheres to international nuclear agreements and safeguards. Tutwiler said she is unaware of reports of North Korea’s offer to stop producing plutonium in exchange for alternative nuclear power technologies from the IAEA, and therefore does not comment on the 1 January 1992 Beijing talks where the offer was allegedly made. The United States believes that it is unnecessary for North Korea to have reprocessing facilities. Furthermore, such facilities are outlawed under the Joint Agreement between North and South Korea.

Reuters, 8 June 1992.

11 June 1992

North Korea “responds favorably” to the IAEA’s proposal that it switch its nuclear program from graphite-moderated to light-water reactors.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1992.

11 June 1992

North Korea’s Ambassador to Geneva, Yi Chol says that North Korea will give up plutonium production if the United States or Japan provides it with a light-water reactor and uranium enrichment technology. According to another report, North Korea announced that it will give up its capability for “alternative” technology, including light water reactors and fuel supplied by the IAEA.

Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1992, pp.11-12; Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1992.

11 June 1992

The United States and South Korea consider North Korea’s request for technical assistance in constructing a light-water reactor. If they do decide to assist North Korea, it will only be on the grounds that North Korea accepts bilateral North-South inspections and abandons its reprocessing activities.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1992.

12 June 1992

US Secretary of State Department for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon says that North Korea’s willingness “to switch fuels in its nuclear power plants from plutonium to uranium” could alleviate international fears that North Korea is producing a nuclear weapon.

Washington Times, 12 June 1992, p.A9.

12 June 1992

South Korea claims that North Korea is breaking the nuclear-weapons-free zone agreement by building a reprocessing facility. North Korea, however, claims that the facility is a “radiochemical laboratory.” South Korea says that it will not take further reconciliatory measures with North Korea unless it opens its facilities to South Korean inspectors.

Reuters, 12 June 1992.

12 June 1992

South Korea, Japan, Canada and the United States continue to press North Korea to reveal its entire nuclear development program.

Yonhap (Seoul), 12 June 1992.

13 June 1992

According to the IAEA, North Korea’s facilities’ designs, radiation shielding systems, cranes, protective devices, waste disposal sites and safety control systems are “seriously defective.”

In support of this statement, North Korean defector, Kim Chol-ho (assumed name), attests that during his service with North Korea’s People’s Army, he personally witnessed evidence of leakage of radioactive material at Yongbyon. Dr. Sin Song-kim of South Korea’s Defense Research Institute confirms Kim’s statement. Kim says that he heard from workers at Yongbyon that a nuclear detonation device had been manufactured, but that nuclear warhead production had not been completed.

Choe Maeng-ho, Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 15 June 1992, p.1; Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 13 June 1992, p.1.

15 June 1992

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, member states discuss North Korea’s nuclear situation. The Board agrees that all nuclear-related facilities must be reported at least 180 days prior to construction. Previous regulations required 60 days prior notice.

Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7; Yonhap (Seoul), 10 July 1992.

15 June 1992

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the North Korean technology that the IAEA saw at Yongbyon was “30 years old.” Therefore, the IAEA disagrees with CIA reports that North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the very near future. However, before making an accurate assessment, the IAEA must conduct additional inspections.

Reuters, 15 June 1992; Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7.

18 June 1992

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, O Chang-rim, head of the North Korean delegation, advocates continued bilateral negotiations between the North and South as stipulated by the JNCC. According to O, the major obstacle to the North-South talks is South Korea’s refusal to allow North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South. North Korea fears that these bases may house nuclear weapons. O also says that North Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA on inspections, but that construction of the Yongbyon radiochemical laboratory will continue despite international concern.

Kang Pyong-tae, Hanguk Ilbo (Seoul), 20 June 1992, p.1; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992.

19 June 1992

North Korea says that it intends to continue its present course of nuclear development, including research on a fast-breeder reactor, composite nuclear fuel, and completion of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. It insists that its “radiochemical laboratory” (reprocessing facility) will be used to produce fuel for a fast-breeder reactor. The IAEA considers the laboratory a “cause of grave threats to stability and peace” in the region. North Korea says that it must develop an indigenous fuel cycle because it cannot afford to import materials.

Choe Maeng-ho, Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul), p.1; Yonhap (Seoul), 19 June 1992.

19 June 1992

The IAEA announces that it plans to undertake special inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that North Korea has agreed to such inspections.

Proliferation Issues, 19 June 1992.

19 June 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix discusses North Korea’s possession of nuclear materials and nuclear policy with South Korean Ambassador Chang Kung-mo.

Proliferation Issues, 19 June 1992.

21 June 1992

South Korean officials believe that North Korea is concealing key elements of its nuclear program. South Korean spokesman on inter-Korean reconciliation Lee Dong-bok says that US and South Korean intelligence observed “vehicle movements in and out of the reprocessing facility” at Yongbyon prior to inspections. US Assistant Secretary of Defense James Lilley says North Korea may “have been moving stuff out of Yongbyon into other areas.”

It is suspected that there is a secret nuclear site in the Yang Gang Do region near the Chinese border. Furthermore, according to former North Korean embassy official Ko Yong-hwan, there is a secret underground research site at Bakchon. Ko also says that North Korea tried to smuggle uranium into the country in the early 1980s.

Warren Strobel, Washington Times, 21 June 1992, pp.A1, A16.

22 June 1992

It is alleged that North Korea has separated plutonium using Soviet equipment. This, however, was not included in the “initial report” given to the IAEA in May 1992. In separating the plutonium, North Korea used hot cells supplied to it in the 1960s, as well as acquired information on reprocessing and laboratories in the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Union supplied the hot cells to North Korea under the same agreement that allowed for the sale of the 2MW IRT-research reactor.

Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16.

22 June 1992

North Korea demands that it be allowed to inspect all US military installations before it stops reprocessing. However, neither South Korea, nor the United States agree to such terms. North Korea then indicates that it will stop reprocessing in exchange for light-water reactor technology from the West.

Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16.

22 June 1992

The European Union makes North Korean acceptance of inspections as a precondition for improving bilateral ties.

Yonhap (Seoul), 22 June 1992.

24 June 1992

North Korean chairperson of the JNCC and deputy director of the Disarmament and Peace Institute, Choe U-chin, says that North Korea will halt construction of the Yongbyon “radiochemical laboratory.”

Kyonghyang Sinmun (Seoul), 25 June 1992, p.2.

26 June 1992

Negotiations during the sixth JNCC meeting come to a standstill when South Korea insists that its suspicion of North Korea’s nuclear program is greater than ever despite the fact that North Korea has said that all suspicion has been removed through IAEA inspections. South Korea says that North Korea may inspect US military bases in the South if the North reciprocates by opening its military bases to inspection. South Korea requests that mutual inspections begin before September 1992.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

27 June 1992

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl leads the G-7 nations in calling for mutual Korean nuclear inspections.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 27 June 1992.

30 June 1992

The European Union supports steps taken by North Korea towards full implementation of the safeguards agreement. It stresses the importance of the December 1992 North-South Korean agreement to establish a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The European Union hopes for full and early implementation of bilateral nuclear inspections.

Reuters, 30 June 1992.

30 June 1992

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev meets with South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok and expresses support for South Korea’s position on the North Korean nuclear issue. Both Russia and South Korea support a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula.

Yonhap (Seoul), 30 June 1992.

July 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs a US congressional panel that IAEA inspectors have been unable to verify that North Korea has not been producing plutonium for weapons at Yongbyon.

Compuserve-Executive News Service, 16 September 1992.

6 July 1992

IAEA inspectors, led by Willi Theis, begin a second round of international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The inspections will focus on the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. The team will also investigate the status of North Korea’s plutonium production, storage operations, and reactor safety.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 6 July 1992.

10 July 1992

North Korea accepts a subsidiary arrangement to the April safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea has not yet approved attachments to the agreement. The purpose of the attachments is to specify the facilities that will be routinely inspected or the length and frequency of the inspections.

Yonhap (Seoul), 10 July 1992.

18 July 1992

The South Korean government announces modifications to its policy on North-South bilateral inspections of mutual nuclear facilities. The modifications include 24-hour notice spot inspections. South Korea says that it will be flexible with regard to regular inspections.

Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 19 July 1992, p.2.

19 July 1992

North Korea praises US President George Bush for announcing that the United States will no longer produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. It says that, in support of the nonproliferation effort, it will soon follow suit.

Reuters, 19 July 1992.

21 July 1992

No progress is made during the seventh JNCC meeting. North Korea rejects the South’s proposal for 24-hour notice “challenge inspections” of military sites. South Korea reminds North Korea that no economic exchange can take place in the absence of a nuclear accord. South Korea also announces that IAEA inspections are not enough to deter North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 July 1992.

22 July 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the IAEA “would not have any hesitation” in identifying North Korea’s reported radiochemical laboratory as “a reprocessing plant in the terminology of the industrialized world.”

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

August 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix testifies before the US Congress that North Korea has “emphatically denied” separating additional amounts of plutonium.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp.16-17

8 August 1992

According to Arab, French and other unidentified sources, the Iranian government has allocated over $7 billion since 1988 to acquire nuclear technology, missiles, tanks and fighter jets from North Korea, Russia and China.

Youssef M. Ibrahim, New York Times, 8 August 1992.

9 August 1992

North Korea requests South Korea’s help in constructing nuclear power plants. However, South Korea refuses to do so based on North Korea’s reluctance to allow mutual inspections.

Reuters, 9 August 1992.

23 August 1992

South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok meets with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen in Beijing to establish diplomatic relations. According to Qian, China has repeatedly asked North Korea to allow IAEA inspections. He also says that if North and South Korea can agree to mutual inspections, China will support them. Qian expresses China’s support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Chin-su, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 August 1992.

25 August 1992

Chinese diplomatic sources say that prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, North Korea pledged to China that it would scrap its nuclear program.

Chon Taek-won, Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 26 August 1992, p.1.

28 August 1992

The South Korean Foreign Ministry announces that China has pledged to aid North Korea in any nuclear program. China denies providing North Korea with any prior assistance in building its nuclear facilities.

Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 28 August 1992.

31 August-15 September 1992

In preparation for the IAEA’s third inspection visit, North Korea hurriedly installs transmission lines and other related equipment at the 5MW reactor facility at Yongbyon.

The third IAEA inspection team arrives in North Korea on 31 August 1992. The inspections will last two weeks. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that the IAEA’s inspections will focus on North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing program.

During the inspection, the team is given limited access to two suspected nuclear-related sites at Yongbyon. North Korea had not declared the sites in the report submitted to the IAEA in May 1992. One of the sites is a two-story building that has been partly covered by large mounds of earth and landscaping prior to the inspectors arrival so as to appear as a one-story building. However, US overhead photography recorded the construction of the building prior to the inspection, which shows that the first-story of the building (which is covered up) contains thick-walled vaults made of reinforced concrete. Such construction is suitable for nuclear waste storage. When the IAEA inspection team requests access to this portion of the building, the North Koreans inform them that it does not exist. They are permitted limited access to the second-story of the building, which is found to house heavy weapons, including tanks and missiles on mobile carriages. The North Koreans refuse to allow a formal and thorough inspection of the building based on grounds that it is a military site and thus exempt from inspection. The IAEA, however, does not accept such exemptions.

During the inspection, the North Korean government denies some IAEA inspectors access to its facilities at Yongbyon. It also blocks direct communication between IAEA headquarters and its representatives in North Korea. The team is expected to return on 19 September to brief IAEA Director General Hans Blix.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p.78; Compuserve-Executive News Service, 31 August 1992; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 10 September 1992, pp.13-14; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.274-275.

31 August 1992

North and South Korea fail to make any progress on mutual inspections during the eighth JNCC meeting. They do, however, agree to prepare proposed inspection regulations for the next meeting. South Korean officials believe that there are “positive changes” in the North’s proposals.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 6 July 1992; Yonhap (Seoul), 1 September 1992.

September 1992

North Korean Ambassador O Chang-rim is asked whether North Korea’s reprocessing facility has been tested. He responds that the facility is “under construction.”

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

6 September 1992

North Korea proposes postponing JNCC meetings until 18 November 1992 due to the resumption of US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises. South Korea responds by demanding that it be allowed to inspect North Korea’s nuclear facilities before considering canceling the Team Spirit military exercises.

Reuters, 6 November 1992.

16 September 1992

During the ninth JNCC meeting North Korea demands that the United States and South Korea terminate their Team Spirit military exercises. South Korea had agreed to resume the exercises due to a lack of progress in the JNCC meetings to establish mutual inspections. North Korea accuses the United States of shipping nuclear weapons via submarines to the South Korean port of Chinhae. The two countries fail to reach an agreement on “challenge inspections” of military sites.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

17 September 1992

During an IAEA meeting, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia and other IAEA members condemn North Korea for limiting IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United Kingdom, Canada, France and Germany urge North Korea to open its facilities for inspections. In addition, South Korea’s Yi Si-yong asks North Korea to accept mutual inspections of its facilities. North Korean Ambassador O Chang-rim responds by announcing that North Korea will continue to construct its “radiochemical laboratory,” and that the nuclear inspections debate between the Koreas will not be resolved until the United States and South Korea agree to allow North Korean inspections of US installations. According to O, there are no nuclear weapons in North Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 17 September 1992.

18 September 1992

According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Regardless, verification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be difficult to attain. The IAEA believes that construction at an alleged nuclear reprocessing plant has been stopped. However, the IAEA Board of Governors says that “suspicion of nuclear development remains.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 19 September 1992.

18 September 1992

According to a US State Department spokesman, the United States believes that North Korea discontinued its nuclear weapons program once it signed the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 18 September 1992.

19 September 1992

North and South Korea conduct the tenth JNCC meeting in which they discuss mutual inspections of nuclear facilities. Due to the fact that the IAEA has conducted three non-regular inspections, North Korea says that its nuclear policy has been proven peaceful. North Korea continues to stress the urgency of it being allowed to inspect US nuclear weapons and bases. North and South Korea agree to speed up the process of drafting and discussing inspection regulations proposals. North Korea believes that all US nuclear weapons and bases should be included on the list of sites to be inspected. However, South Korea denies that any nuclear weapons or bases exist on its territory.

Proliferation Issues, 22 September 1992, p.7.

19 September 1992

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announces that while he still has suspicions about North Korea’s “nuclear intentions,” he believes now that its “determination to develop nuclear weapons has become weaker.”

David E. Sanger, International Herald Tribune (Paris), 19 September 1992.

28 September 1992

The Chinese government announces its policy to discourage nuclear weapons development in North Korea. China continues to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Yonhap (Seoul), 28 September 1992.

29 September 1992

South Korean Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s American Affairs Bureau Chong Tae-ik meets with US special presidential assistant on Asian Affairs Douglas Paal to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. During the meeting, South Korea and the United States decide to shorten the frequency and site designation of mutual nuclear inspections between North and South Korea if North Korea agrees to short-notice inspections. Short-notice inspections would open all of North Korea’s suspected nuclear sites to mutual inspections. North Korea demands that inspections be conducted once a year using ten to twenty teams.

Yonhap (Seoul), 29 September 1992.

October 1992

According to a senior US official, “the United States had overestimated North Korea’s [nuclear weapons] capability.” However, another senior official says that North Korea does not have peaceful intentions with its program, and therefore, “it’s very dangerous to start saying [North Korea] has stopped its weapons program.”

US intelligence sources report large explosions recorded in North Korea in 1991, which are suspected to be nuclear-related. The United States believes that North Korea has attempted to illegally acquire atomic weapons components and technology.

Nayan Chand, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 1 October 1992, pp.8-10.

October 1992

Reportedly, approximately twenty North Koreans are studying at the Russian nuclear research institute in Dubna. However, Russia says that the scientists are not involved in weapons-related studies.

Nayan Chand, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 1 October 1992, pp.8-10.

Early-October 1992

Due to concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the United States and South Korea announce that they will resume Team Spirit military exercises.

Peter Grior, Christian Science Monitor, 22 October 1992.

1 October 1992

China announces that North and South Korea should handle the nuclear issue on their own. Chinese President Yang Shangkun believes that South Korea should avoid putting international pressure on North Korea, suggesting that persuasion is better. China refuses to supply either North or South Korea with nuclear technology.

Andrew Steele, Reuters, 1 October 1992.

8 October 1992

US officials announce that due to North Korea’s refusal to accept mutual nuclear inspections with South Korea, the United States and South Korea will most likely postpone removing US troops from South Korea.

US Assistant Secretary of State William Clark announces preconditions that North Korea must fulfill in order to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. According to the preconditions, North Korea must: (1) cease missile exports, (2) terminate biochemical weapons development, and (3) accept North-South mutual nuclear inspections.

Washington Times, 8 October 1992, p.A11.

Mid-October 1992

North Korea withdraws from JNCC talks with South Korea. The United States responds by stating that it will not withdraw its troops from South Korea “until they are satisfied with Pyongyang’s openness on this issue.”

Peter Grior, Christian Science Monitor, 22 October 1992.

29 October 1992

Ronald F. Lehman, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency announces that “recent developments have ‘stopped’ the North Korean nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon and ‘blocked the ability for [North Korea] to have a sizeable number of nuclear weapons over time.’” US officials and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo believe that international pressure has dampened North Korea’s pursuit for a nuclear weapons program.

Washington Post, 1 November 1992.

November 1992

During a Russo-Japanese consultation on nuclear power, Russian officials reveal that North Korea is requesting a renewal of Russian assistance in constructing the 1760MW nuclear power plant. North Korea is also requesting “Russian cooperation in uranium mining and training of nuclear energy specialists.” According to Russian First Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energetics Vitaliy Konovalov, Russia might cooperate if: (1) the proposal yields “commercial benefit to Russia,” and (2) North Korea “scrupulously observes” all IAEA regulations. Also during the consultation, Russia conveys its desire for North Korea to agree to mutual nuclear inspections with South Korea.

Vycheslav Bantin, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 27 November 1992; Kyodo (Tokyo), 25 November 1992.

November 1992

IAEA officials are unenthusiastic about the prospects of North and South Korean bilateral inspections. They fear that a mutual inspection regime could eventually be considered as an alternative to IAEA safeguards.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

November 1992

With regard to North Korea, Germany announces that “both uranium enrichment and plutonium [separation and] recycling are legitimate civil nuclear activities,” and that placing these facilities under IAEA safeguards is sufficient. The Japanese government says that if North Korea is allowed to construct a plutonium separation facility under IAEA safeguards, it will not provide North Korea with financial compensation for its occupation of Korea during World War II. Japan initially announced that it would provide North Korea with compensation if it accepted IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities. Japan is advocating that North Korea terminate construction of its reprocessing plant and reassure South Korea that it will not reprocess nuclear fuel.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

4 November 1992

The North Korean foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea may stop IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities if South Korea and the United States do not terminate their joint Team Spirit military exercises.

Korea Times (Seoul), 4 November 1992, p.B7.

5-6 November 1992

Japanese Ambassador Noboru Nakahira and North Korean Vice Ministerial Level Ambassador Li Sam-ro meet. During the meeting, Japan demands that North Korea “eliminate any doubt” about its desire for a nuclear weapons program in order for normalization talks to commence. Japan says that North Korea could accomplish this by allowing inspections of its “radiochemistry laboratory” at Yongbyon. North Korea refuses the demand, stating that IAEA inspections are sufficient.

Naoaki Usui, Nuclear Fuel, 9 November 1992, p.12.

12 November 1992

North Korean ambassador to the United Nations, Ri Tcheul warns that failure on the part of the United States and South Korea to cancel Team Spirit military exercises could create obstacles to future international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 12 November 1992.

2-14 November 1992

During the fourth inspection, IAEA Director General Hans Blix telephones chief inspector Willi Theis (at the Yongbyon nuclear complex). According to Blix, the IAEA possess indisputable evidence that a trench had been dug and later covered up between the reprocessing plant and the “one story building” whose basement is believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. (The structures mentioned are located at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.) He also informs Theis that there is clear evidence that North Korea had attempted to camouflage a nearby outdoor nuclear waste facility. He instructs Theis to inform the North Koreans that they must declare these sites as nuclear facilities and permit inspections. Theis immediately summons two senior nuclear officials at the Yongbyon facility and attempts to work with them on amending North Korea’s initial declaration to the IAEA. They cooperate with the intention of including the waste sites in the report with as little admission of error as possible.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.275.

13 November 1992

The North Korean senior nuclear officials who have been working with IAEA chief inspector Willi Theis accuse him of being “an agent of the CIA” and performing inspections “on the basis of instructions from the US state department.” They then refuse to cooperate further with Theis.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.275.

18 November 1992

North Korea protests the Team Spirit military exercises. It reiterates that all channels of inter-Korean dialogue will be terminated unless South Korea ends the exercise by the end of November 1992. South Korea responds by stating that it will cancel the exercises if North Korea is willing to adopt guidelines for mutual inspections by the end of November 1992 and allow the first inspections to commence by 20 December 1992.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

19 November 1992

During a summit meeting in Seoul, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agree that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is “not desirable for peace and security.” They promise to work together to encourage North Korea to “adopt openness and reform.” According to Yeltsin, Russia has stopped supplying nuclear technology and materials to North Korea.

Andrew Pollack, New York Times, 21 November 1992, p.4; Yonhap (Seoul), 19 November 1992.

27 November 1992

During the eleventh JNCC meeting, inter-Korean dialogue collapses. North Korea repeats its demand for the cancellation of Team Spirit military exercises. South Korea responds by demanding that North Korea allow a minimum of one inspection before it halts the exercises. South Korea says that the exercises will resume unless substantial progress is made with at least one mutual inspection before the next Prime Ministers meeting in Seoul on 21 December 1992. North Korea uses the Team Spirit military exercise as justification for suspending further joint committee dialogue with South Korea, excluding JNCC meetings.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

December 1992

The IAEA team conducts its fifth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992.

1 December 1992

North Korean Minister of the Atomic Energy Agency Choe Hak-kun, Roving Ambassador O Chang-rim, and other North Korean officials meet with IAEA Director General Hans Blix to discuss North Korea’s implementation of the nuclear agreement. Blix is believed to have notified North Korea that it has not declared all of its nuclear facilities and asks it to “sincerely implement the nuclear agreement.” It is also suspected that North Korea has hidden nuclear facilities because it refused to allow an IAEA special inspection team to enter the country right after it finished its fourth inspection.

KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 1 December 1992.

2 December 1992

Western and South Korean sources believe that recent US satellite photographs reveal a concealed site outside of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. According to one source, the camouflaged construction site may be a weapons-grade plutonium plant.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 2 December 1992.

4 December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents the fourth inspection report to the Board of Governors. The report suggests that several nuclear sites in North Korea were not originally disclosed. The IAEA will send a fifth team, as well as a high-ranking official to North Korea to inspect the unreported bases. Blix discusses findings from the four previous inspections with North Korean Nuclear Industry Minister Choe Hak-kun. According to the South Korean envoy to Vienna, Yi Si-yong, Choe’s willingness to speak with Blix about the inspections is a positive sign.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992.

5 December 1992

IAEA experts believe that North Korea is capable of processing “much larger amounts of nuclear material” than it is currently admitting. The IAEA has requested samples of nuclear fuel from North Korea. North Korea, however, denies the request because it reportedly cannot provide nuclear fuel until 1993.

Yonhap (Seoul), 5 December 1992.

9 December 1992

No progress is made during the tenth JNCC meeting. South Korea reiterates that it will not cancel the Team Spirit military exercises until North Korea agrees to mutual inspections of nuclear facilities prior to the North and South Korean Prime Ministers meeting in December 1992.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

Late-December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix requests “visits” to clarify the nature of the two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon and to conduct tests.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.276.

20 December 1992

Russian special forces prevent a plane, carrying 36 senior Russian weapons scientists intending to work on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, from departing. The scientists were reportedly offered salaries of $1,500 to $3,000 monthly to work in North Korea.

Sergey Mostovshchikov, Izvetiya (Moscow), 22 December 1992, p.2; Matthew Campbell, Sunday Times (London), 20 December 1992.

21 December 1992

A second group consisting of ten Russian nuclear experts are prevented from moving to North Korea where they were reportedly going to work on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia “[will] not furnish any nuclear development know how to North Korea.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 21 December 1992.

25 December 1992

A Russian Security Ministry spokesperson denies British, Western, and South Korean media reports that Russian nuclear experts were arrested while attempting to flee to North Korea.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 25 December 1992.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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