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January 1993

North Korea responds to the IAEA’s requests for “visits” of the two suspected nuclear waste sites. It says that “a visit by officials could not be turned into an inspection,” and furthermore, that inspections of non-nuclear military facilities “might jeopardize the supreme interests” of North Korea.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.276.

5 January 1993

South Korea announces that it will resume dialogue with North Korea when Team Spirit military exercises conclude in April 1993.

Jonah Kaplan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 April 1993.

13 January 1993

According to the Information Director of the IAEA, North Korea will shut down its 5MW reactor around the middle of 1993 to change the core. IAEA inspectors are expected to be there when the reactor is shut down. If they are given access to the natural uranium core of the reactor, it might be possible to determine whether any material has been removed.

Compuserve-Executive News Service, 13 January 1993.

18 January 1993

Japanese and South Korean delegations discuss North Korea’s nuclear development program during a meeting of the joint nuclear consultative committee. Cho Won-il, the director general of the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Bureau leads the South Korean delegation, and Takaya Sato, ambassador for science and technology, leads the Japanese delegation.

Yonhap (Seoul), 19 January 1993.

20 January 1993

North Korea accepts South Korea’s proposal to restart talks concerning mutual nuclear inspections. South Korea and its allies believe that North Korea could have the capability to construct nuclear weapons. North Korea denies the charge, but remains reluctant to agree to proposals for mutual inspections.

Reuters, 20 January 1993.

22 January 1993

North Korean representative to the United Nations, Ri Tcheul, says that the dispute with the IAEA jeopardizes the 1992 safeguards agreement, and that “if the IAEA blocks the way to negotiation or dialogue with [North Korea] with coercive actions,” North Korea will be justified in taking “self-defensive” measures. Furthermore, the IAEA “has consistently violated its commitment to the agreement” by acting on third-party information and by revealing confidential information to the United States and South Korea.

Washington Times, 23 January 1993, p.A8.

25 January 1993

The twelfth round of JNCC talks between North and South Korea break down when the North refuses to discuss any type of negotiations until the US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises are cancelled. South Korea announces that the exercises will commence this year because the mutual nuclear inspections issue has not been resolved. According to a South Korean spokesperson, no date is set for the next JNCC meeting.

Reuters, 25 January 1993; UPI, 25 January 1993.

26 January-6 February 1993

The IAEA team conducts its sixth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The purpose of the inspection is to clarify inconsistencies found in plutonium samples that were taken at an earlier date. One of the inconsistencies identified was that between “the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA” (obtained from melting fuel rods) and the IAEA’s test results. The second discrepancy was between the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory and liquid waste samples. Prior to the inspection, North Korea said that the latter inconsistency occurred when “the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory.”

“Letter And Memorandum From The UN Permanent Representative Of The DPRK To The President Of The UN Security Council” (United Nations Security Council Document), 17 March 1993, pp.1-10.

27 January 1993

The North Korean Foreign Affairs Ministry announces that it will take “necessary self-defensive measures” if the Team Spirit military exercises continue. The exercises are to be held from January-April 1993.

Kensuke Ebata, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 February 1993, p.12.

28 January 1993

The Russian Intelligence Service publicly reveals its “black list” of sixteen countries suspected of having or developing any type of weapon of mass destruction. Included on the list is North Korea.

Proliferation Issues, 5 February 1993, pp.34-35.

29 January 1993

North Korea’s ambassador to Russia, Son Song-pil, warns that the US and South Korean Team Spirit military exercise scheduled for March 1993 may force North Korea to close its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. He says that North Korea views the exercises as preparation for a potential nuclear war and that they are incompatible with the basic clauses of the NPT. Additionally, the situation does not allow North Korea “to normally fulfill its commitments” to IAEA inspections.

Vazin Kavayev, Radio Moscow, 30 January 1993; Aleksa Valiyev, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 January 1993.

Early-February 1993

It is revealed that in October 1992, the North Korean government offered 60 Russian nuclear scientists up to $4,000 a month to work on its nuclear program. Ten Russian scientists have since visited North Korea on a “feasibility survey.” Russian officials have stopped additional scientists from leaving for North Korea.

Terry McCarthy, Independent (London), 17 February 1993.

2 February 1993

Western diplomatic sources announce that US intelligence suspects that the two undeclared sites in North Korea, which the IAEA visited in 1992 are key sites in North Korea’s nuclear program. The sixth IAEA inspection team in North Korea requests access to the sites; the request is denied. According to one source, if the team returns with no new information on the sites, the United States will apply pressure to obtain the IAEA Board of Governors authorization for special inspections. The United States will take such a course of action because “no better rationale could be imagined [than for] a country suspected of clandestine non-peaceful (nuclear) activities [to deny] access to a non-declared site to the IAEA.”

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 4 February 1993, p.18.

4 February 1993

According to Japanese Research Institute for Peace and Security executive director and retired general, Katsuichi Tsukamoto, North Korea is three years from being “nuclear capable.” According to a Japanese military expert, remote sensing data of nuclear sites near Yongbyon have provided evidence of small-scale detonations.

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 4 February 1993, p.18.

8 February 1993

North Korea publicly states that it might take “countermeasures of self-defense” if the United States and other countries press for inspections of certain facilities in North Korea. During the week of 1 February 1993, North Korea denies IAEA inspectors access to several of its facilities that are suspected to be part of its nuclear program. North Korea states that the sites are “non-nuclear.” The denial of access marks a change in North Korea’s policy towards the IAEA in which it formerly stated that IAEA inspectors could “travel anywhere in the country.”

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 9 February 1993, p.A5.

11 February 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix formally requests North Korea to open two undeclared sites for special inspections. In early February 1993, the IAEA’s sixth inspection team was denied access to the sites. According to North Korea, the team was denied access because the United States and South Korea decided to resume Team Spirit military exercises. North Korea is told that it must respond to the request by 18 February 1993. If North Korea refuses the request, the IAEA will call an extraordinary session of the Board of Governors before the regularly scheduled meeting set for 21 February 1993.

According to US intelligence, it is believed that one of the sites houses drums of reprocessed waste that was separated at a date later than what North Korea has told the IAEA. If true, this will mean that North Korea has not declared its entire stock of separated plutonium to the IAEA.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 11 February 1993, p.15; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp.16-17.

11 February 1993

South Korean Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong announces that South Korea will cancel the scheduled Team Spirit military exercises with the United States if North Korea agrees to the special inspections demanded by the IAEA.

Reuters, 11 February 1993.

16 February 1993

The IAEA announces that the analysis of plutonium samples from North Korea has revealed discrepancies and that the separation had, in fact, taken place later than 1990. Western intelligence believes that North Korea separated additional amounts of plutonium in the late 1960s using Soviet expertise. Western intelligence also believes that the hot-cell separation of plutonium took place at a different location than was declared by North Korea.

According to diplomatic sources in New York, IAEA Director General Hans Blix is facing opposition from China and Russia on conducting a special inspection in North Korea. However, the remaining three members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom and France) strongly support Blix’s proposal. The special inspection will be conducted in an attempt to resolve the plutonium separation issue. After hearing objections and concerns from Brazil and India, Blix decides to “pursue persuasion” with North Korea and therefore, delay special inspections.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp.16-17.

20-21 February 1993

IAEA officials use isotopic analysis of a small batch of high-level waste provided by North Korea to determine that North Korea reprocessed spent fuel from its indigenous 5MW reactor in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Officials find three different levels of americium-241 in a plutonium sample which indicates that material has been separated in each of the three aforementioned years. North Korea previously said that it separated plutonium only once in 1990. However, following the IAEA’s test results, North Korea admits that it had also reprocessed “a small quantity” of plutonium in 1975.

During IAEA meetings, North Korea reportedly claims that the discrepancies between its report and the IAEA’s findings occurred due to contamination by material that was reprocessed in 1975. However, experts do not believe this to be an adequate explanation for the discrepancy.

Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 1 March 1993, pp.8-9.

21 February 1993

North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will not allow special inspections of the two sites suspected of storing nuclear waste.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 25 February 1993, pp.16-17.

22 February 1993

North Korean President Kim Il-sung announces that North Korea “faces an ‘unprecedented’ political and economic crisis” as it confronts growing international pressure over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

David Holley, Los Angeles Times, 23 February 1993, p.A9.

22 February 1993

Nearly one dozen US intelligence satellite photographs of North Korean installations and attempts at deception at the facilities at Yongbyon are presented to a closed session of the IAEA Board of Governors. The senior North Korean representative at the meeting, Ho Jin-yun, says that the photographs are fake.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.277.

22 February 1993

North Korea’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ri Tcheul, states that North Korea has the right to “tear up” the IAEA safeguards agreement if inspectors continue to demand access to the two disputed sites in North Korea.

Reuters, 22 February 1993.

22-29 February 1993

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the North Korean representatives are shown US surveillance photographs and chemical evidence proving that North Korea had been producing plutonium from nuclear waste for a minimum of three years beginning in 1989. The photographs depict a Soviet-style nuclear waste dump for both liquid and solid waste. The chemical evidence shows impurities in the plutonium samples, which suggests that the plutonium had been produced in three separate amounts over three years. Diplomatic officials believe that North Korea now has enough plutonium to build at least one nuclear weapon.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 13 March 1993, pp.1, 3.

24 February 1993

The IAEA passes a resolution stating that North Korea has one month to grant inspectors access to two sites suspected of being part of its nuclear weapons program. The IAEA says that access to the sites is “essential and urgent.” As a concession to Chinese requests, the Board provides a one-month grace period for North Korea’s compliance on the inspection. The Board makes it clear that if North Korea does not act, it will take the issue to the UN Security Council for international sanctions or other actions.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.278; Steve Paga, Reuters, 26 February 1993; Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 25 February 1993, p.A24; Teruaki U, Reuters, 26 February 1993.

24 February 1993

According to CIA Director James Woolsey, there is a strong possibility that North Korea has enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon. Russian sources support Woolsey’s statement, citing a 1990 KGB report as proof. In addition, the report, which was published in Stern (Hamburg), stated the North Korea secretly acquired 56kg of plutonium from Russian in 1992.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 2 March 1993; New York Times, 25 February 1993, p.A5.

25 February 1993

According to Japanese Foreign Ministry sources, North Korea extracted 16-24kg of plutonium from its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. Ministry experts’ calculations reflect that the amount of plutonium extracted would be enough to produce 2-3 nuclear weapons.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 10 March 1993.

26 February 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix sends a telex to the North Korean foreign ministry requesting that IAEA inspectors be permitted to travel to Yongbyon on 16 March 1993 to examine the two suspected sites. Blix also notifies the UN Security Council of the telex.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.279.

March 1993

According to South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang, North Korea has possibly extracted enough plutonium to construct a “Nagasaki-class” nuclear weapon. South Korean Defense Minister Kwon Young-hae says that North Korea carried out 70 detonation tests during the 1980s and continues to develop detonating technology.

Reuters, 31 March 1993.

8 March 1993

In light of the Team Spirit military exercise, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il places North Korea on a “semi-war status.” He calls Team Spirit a “nuclear war test aimed at a surprise, preemptive strike at the northern half of the country.”

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.279; Reuters (Tokyo), 17 March 1993.

8 March 1993

In a message to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, North Korea refuses once again to accept special inspections of its suspected sites. Its reason for doing so is the Team Spirit military exercises and the “state of semi-war” in the country. IAEA Director General Hans Blix rejects North Korea’s “excuses” and repeats the inspection demand.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.279.

12 March 1993

North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. It cites the treaty’s escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea’s two reasons for withdrawing are: (1) the Team Spirit “nuclear war rehearsal” military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites.

North Korea attaches a statement to its withdrawal notice that is sent to the three NPT depository states and the 154 NPT member states, in which it accuses the IAEA of violating its sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs, attempting to stifle its socialism, and of being a “lackey” of the United States. According to North Korea, the United States influenced officials of the IAEA Secretariat and member states at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 25 February 1993 to adopt a resolution requiring North Korea to open military sites to inspection that are not nuclear-related.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.280; Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p.10; “Letter from Kim Yong-nam, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs,” 12 March 1993; Reuters, 11 March 1993.

12 March 1993

Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa expresses concern over North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT and requests that the North Korean government reconsider its decision. Miyazawa reiterates Japan’s policy that relations between it and North Korea cannot be normalized until North Korea allows international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 12 March 1993.

12 March 1993

According to Japanese intelligence sources, it appears that North Korea has extracted between 35-50 pounds of plutonium from its facility at Yongbyon. The Yongbyon facility allegedly began producing plutonium in 1986, however the reactor was shut down in 1990. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suspects that North Korea will acquire enough plutonium by the end of 1995 to produce 4-7 nuclear weapons.

Gus Constantine, Washington Post, 12 March 1993, p.A1.

15 March 1993

During South Korea’s National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee’s hearings, Dr. Kim Tae-u, senior research associate at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis testifies that North Korea possesses 6-7 nuclear weapons. He says that North Korea appears to have extracted approximately 14-15kg of plutonium since October 1986 and could currently have 40-50kg of plutonium.

Hanguk Ilbo (Seoul), 16 March 1993, p.1.

17 March 1993

The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends the president of the UN Security Council a letter regarding IAEA inspections. The letter states that North Korea has made “sincere efforts” to implement the IAEA safeguards agreement by providing “the IAEA with lists of those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of scientific research institutes.” In 1992, North Korea invited the IAEA to inspect both safeguarded nuclear facilities, “facilities exempt from the safeguards as well as other non-nuclear-related facilities.” When requested, North Korea compiled samples of highly radioactive liquid waste at the radiochemical laboratory and the measurements of the damaged fuel at the experimental nuclear power station.

With regard to the recent analysis of plutonium samples, the IAEA secretariat has stated that “inconsistencies in principle” exist between its measurements and those included in North Korea’s initial report. According to North Korea, discrepancies exist because of “the IAEA’s own disregard of our conditions for the operation of facilities and the characteristic features of our nuclear activities and also from the artificial fabrication by some officials of the IAEA secretariat of the result of the inspection.” North Korea says that the IAEA should take into consideration the fact that the nuclear facilities “were still at the experimental stage, [and] not in regular operation.”

The letter also comments on the official IAEA-North Korean talks conducted before the fourth inspection from 2–14 November 1992. North Korea claims that during the meeting, the IAEA “attempted to ‘threaten’ us, saying that ‘more nuclear material should be declared,’ that this would be ‘the last chance to modify the initial report’ and that ‘a tragic consequence would follow if the chances were passed up.’” During the IAEA inspections in November 1992, North Korea offered the team scientific and technological explanations of how the facilities operated. It also offered the team “detailed consultations with the operators.”

The sixth IAEA inspection team, which was in North Korea from 26 January-6 February 1993, has said that “two inconsistencies in principle” were found in plutonium samples that required “urgent clarification.” According to the IAEA secretariat, the first discrepancy was that “the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA” (obtained from melting fuel rods) did not correspond to the IAEA results. The second discrepancy was that the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory that did not correspond to the liquid waste. North Korea says that the inconsistency occurred when “the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory.”

With regard to the two undeclared facilities, North Korea says that they are not nuclear-related. The IAEA only wants to inspect the site in order “to confirm the espionage information provided by a third country.” Despite the fact that the facilities were not nuclear-related, North Korea allowed inspections of the site since it was the first request IAEA Director General Hans Blix had made of North Korea. According to North Korea, the two sites are “a shop producing daily necessities” and “a military installation.” After the IAEA conducted the inspection, it declared that the sites were not nuclear-related. Blix has requested additional inspections of the sites. North Korea, however, will not allow Blix to return to the sites for “formal” or “informal” visits. When North Korea requested further clarification of the legal grounds under which the IAEA may use information from a third country, the IAEA avoided the question by saying that “it takes too much time to explain it on a legal basis.” North Korea objects and says that according to a “relevant article…the IAEA is not legally entitled to use ‘intelligence information’ from a third country in the implementation of the safeguards agreement. The IAEA is not the police and such an attempt by the IAEA is a breach of its own statue, the safeguards agreement, the spirit of the December 1991 meeting and the February 1992 resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, etc.” According to North Korea, a member of the IAEA mission admitted that “the use of espionage information from a third country is not stipulated explicitly in the basic documents of the IAEA.”

“Letter And Memorandum From The UN Permanent Representative Of The DPRK To The President Of The UN Security Council” (United Nations Security Council Document), 17 March 1993, pp.1-10.

17 March 1993

During a US-North Korean meeting at the US embassy in Beijing, the United States makes a direct appeal to North Korea to reconsider withdrawing from the NPT. The purpose of the meeting is to “defuse an emerging confrontation over nuclear inspections.” It is the 30th “low level” meeting in a series that began in 1988.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 18 March 1993.

17 March 1993

According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, “it is in the common interest of the countries in the region to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, properly deal with the current question and promote the situation in the Korean Peninsula to continue to move toward stability.”

China Daily (Beijing), 18 March 1993, p.1.

17 March 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors meets to discuss North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, as well as the line of action it should now take.

Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p.10.

18 March 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors meets to review a resolution adopted at the 25 February 1993 meeting regarding IAEA inspections in North Korea. The resolution requests that North Korea grant the IAEA access to and information on two additional undeclared sites and that it implement the May 1992 IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403). Based on the fact that North Korea has announced it will withdraw from the NPT “at a time when the IAEA is seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material submitted by [North Korea],” the Board of Governors approves the Secretariat’s implementation of the resolution per internal document GOV/INF/683. The Board of Governors reaffirms and supports IAEA Director General Hans Blix and the Secretariat’s attempt to persuade North Korea to implement the Safeguards Agreement. The Board also confirms that under document INFCIRC/403, the safeguards agreement implemented with North Korea “remains in force.”

IAEA Press Release (PR 1906), 18 March 1993.

18 March 1993

Russia requests an emergency meeting with the United States, China, Japan and North and South Korea to discuss North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.

Reuters, 17 March 1993.

22 March 1993

Newly appointed South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo leaves for talks with UN and US officials about North Korea’s announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT. North Korea claims that the two suspected sites are “non-nuclear military installations” and charges the IAEA of spying on it for the United States. The IAEA sets 31 March as the deadline for North Korea to comply with inspections.

Reuters, 22 March 1993.

23 March 1993

An official from the Japanese Foreign Ministry announces that Japan, the United States and South Korea are prepared to take North Korea’s refusal of IAEA inspections to the UN Security Council.

Reuters, 23 March 1993.

25 March 1993

North Korea ignores the deadline for IAEA inspections of two of its undeclared sites. According to North Korea, the sites are military facilities, which are unrelated to its nuclear program. The IAEA says that it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

Laura King, Washington Times, 8 April 1993, p.A7.

27 March 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister, Han Sung-joo announces that South Korea will consider ending Team Spirit military exercises permanently if North Korea will reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

Reuters, 28 March 1993.

31 March 1993

North Korea refuses to allow inspections of two suspected sites at Yongbyon. According to the North Korean envoy in Vienna, Kim Gwang-sop, North Korea cannot accept the resolution because “it is too prompt and unreasonable” and it “cannot but take far stronger and more effective self-defense measures.” The IAEA Board of Governors approves a resolution to call for the UN Security Council to intervene. China, however, does not believe that the United Nations should become involved and insists that a compromise can be reached with North Korea given more time. After the Board’s vote, the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom issue statements asking to North Korea to comply with the safeguards agreement.

Reuters, 1 April 1993.

31 March 1993

According to former US ambassador to China, Winston Lord, the United States is seeking China’s assistance in convincing North Korea not to withdraw from the NPT. China prefers not having nuclear weapons in North Korea, and does not approve of North Korea’s announcement to withdraw from the NPT. However, China does not want to involve the UN in the matter, nor does it support the imposition of sanctions against North Korea. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, “patient consultation” should be used with North Korea. Furthermore, he announces that the NPT does not state that punitive measures are to be taken against countries choosing to opt out of the treaty.

William Scally, Reuters, 31 March 1993.

1 April 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors meets to discuss developments in North Korea. The Board concludes that North Korea is not complying with the terms of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and calls upon North Korea to grant access to two suspected sites without delay. In accordance with Article 19 of the agreement, the Board also decides to report North Korea’s non-compliance to the UN Security Council.

IAEA Press Release, 1 April 1993.

5 April 1993

The Sunday Times (London), using classified Western intelligence documents, reports that North Korea is building a secret underground nuclear weapons plant 60 miles northwest of Yongbyon and is closer to building a nuclear weapon than Iraq was prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War. Satellite photography shows pipes laid and fitted with other equipment, such as concrete slabs used as radiation shields, in a manner characteristic of a weapons plant.

Reuters, 3 April 1993.

8 April 1993

China says that there is no evidence that North Korea is producing nuclear weapons and warns that threats of sanctions against North Korea are useless.

Reuters, 8 April 1993.

21 April 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen discuss North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Bangkok. Han requests that China take a more active role in persuading North Korea to resolve the issue of inspections. Qian asks South Korea to avoid “strong reactions” towards North Korea as there is still a possibility of reaching a peaceful resolution to the issue through dialogue.

Reuters, 21 April 1993.

30 March 1993

South Korea and the United States agree on a stick and carrot approach to coax North Korea back into the NPT. The United States considers applying Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which addresses threats to international peace and security, to deal with North Korea. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher tells Congress that the United States will seek sanctions and “enforcement action” if North Korea again rejects IAEA inspections. South Korea says that it has no “strong objections” to applying Chapter 7, however, a “package” of incentives should be offered to the North in return for permitting IAEA inspections.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 30 March 1993.

24 August 1993

North Korean defector Im Young-sun alleges that a nuclear accident occurred at Yongbyon when the North attempted to move a reactor to a hidden site so that international inspectors would not discover it. Im says that scientists and engineers have died from radiation exposure while working on a nuclear bomb.

US-Korea Review, September 1993, p.3.

25 August 1993

The IAEA announces that bilateral talks between the Agency and North Korea will resume in Pyongyang on 31 August 1993. Between 3-10 August 1993, the IAEA is permitted to inspect “containment and surveillance activities” in some North Korean nuclear facilities.

IAEA Press Release, 25 August 1993.

September 1993

US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci announces that North Korea is willing to “abandon its graphite-moderated reactors and associated facilities in favor of light-water reactors.”

Jon B. Wolfsthal, Arms Control Today, September 1993, p.21.

1 September 1993

Representatives from the United States and North Korea convene in Geneva for a second round of talks to discuss solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. Both countries agree that it is desirable that North Korea obtain light-water reactors with the help and support of the United States. North Korea also agrees that the “full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear nonproliferation regime.” An agreement to continue a third round of nuclear talks is reached.

US-Korea Review, September 1993, p.6.

1 September 1993

North Korean spokesman for inter-Korean affairs An Byung-su calls for urgent talks with South Korea concerning the long-standing dispute over inspections of nuclear facilities.

Lee Su-wan, Reuters, 2 September 1993.

3 September 1993

South Korea agrees to North Korea’s proposal to resume dialogue on nuclear issues through the exchange of envoys.

Washington Post , 3 September 1993, p.A33

3 September 1993

North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations Yi Chol expresses North Korea’s “full support” for immediate initiation of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty at the UN Conference on Disarmament. Yi reiterates North Korea’s offer to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 3 September 1993.

6 September 1993

The CIA suspects that North Korea has dumped liquid plutonium waste on the grounds of its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The liquid plutonium waste is believed to have been stored underground in unsuitable storage tanks which could leak. The CIA believes that North Korea used these containers in an effort to hide the plutonium waste from IAEA inspectors.

Newsweek, 6 September 1993.

8 September 1993

The IAEA and North Korea hold consultations on nuclear safeguards as part of an agreement reached earlier between the United States and North Korea in Geneva. North Korea says the inspection issue will be resolved once the partiality question is overcome.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 8 September 1993; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 14 September 1993.

14 September 1993

The IAEA informs North Korea that if it does not allow ad hoc inspections, the IAEA will report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 14 September 1993.

16 September 1993

North Korean President Kim Il-sung tells visiting Chinese communist party official Wang Hanbin that North Korea has “no capability, no technology, no funds to develop nuclear arms.”

Reuters, 16 September 1993.

25 September 1993

North Korean Atomic Energy Minister Choe Hak-kun informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea is rejecting the IAEA’s offer to restart consultations in October 1993 due to efforts to put North Korea’s nuclear program on the agenda of the IAEA’s General Conference.

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 30 September

1993, pp.1-2.

1 October 1993

The IAEA General Assembly passes a resolution that calls on North Korea to “cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” The resolution notes the IAEA’s “grave concern that North Korea has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance by not accepting scheduled Agency ad hoc and routine inspections as required by the safeguards agreement.” The resolution receives 72 votes in favor, 11 abstentions, and negative votes by Libya and North Korea.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 7 October 1993, pp.1, 10-11.

10 October 1993

South Korean officials announce that South Korea, Japan, and the United States have agreed in principle to form a consortium to help North Korea import a light-water reactor. The consortium will arrange financing and technical support to aid North Korea. However, before North Korea can receive any kind of aid, it will have to accept special inspections by the IAEA and mutual inspections with South Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 10 October 1993.

13 October 1993

South Korea’s Defense Ministry reports that North Korea has successfully tested detonators and is now closer to producing nuclear weapons by 1995. It also reports that North Korea is building a “facility capable of reprocessing 200 tons of spent fuel a year to produce plutonium.”

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 14 October 1993.

15 October 1993

A US official states that there are indications that North Korea may complete the construction of a 200MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon by 1995. A 200MW gas-graphite reactor would enable North Korea to produce enough plutonium for 10 nuclear warheads annually. Although construction of the 200MW gas-graphite reactor has been suspended as a result of Western pressure, the US official said that a 50MW gas-graphite reactor within the Yongbyon complex is likely to be completed within several months. According to two North Korean defectors, there is a secret, underground nuclear complex in the Chagang-do province.

Yonhap (Seoul), 12 October 1993; Yonhap (Seoul), 15 October 1993.

15 October 1993

US state department spokesman Michael McCurry says that the United States will push the United Nations for sanctions against North Korea if does not allow IAEA inspections of two suspected sites and that dialogue with the United States will depend on the progress the North Koreans make on the inspection issue with the IAEA. McCurry added that if this does not occur within “a couple of weeks,” and “if the IAEA determines that safeguards have been breached, the United States would feel compelled [to] end its dialogue with North Korea.”

Reuters, 16 October 1993.

16 October 1993

North Korea’s Deputy Chairman of the Reunification Policy Committee Kim Yong-sun says that “if the light-water reactor issue is solved successfully, then [North Korea] will stay in the NPT. If not, then we have no alternative but to develop our own nuclear technology.”

Peter Hayes, Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), 29 October 1993, pp.1,3.

17 October 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that since North Korea has continued to delay IAEA access to check monitoring equipment, any assurance that North Korea is not diverting nuclear materials to weapons purposes has been diminishing. In the spring of 1993, the IAEA’s main concern was the presence of undeclared plutonium and North Korea’s non-acceptance of special inspections. The concern now is that the declared facilities and materials could also be diverted from peaceful purposes.

Korea Herald (Seoul), 20 October 1993.

21 October 1993

North Korea and the United States allegedly hold secret talks to discuss the resumption of IAEA’s ad hoc inspections. North Korea agrees to negotiate on the nuclear issue in exchange for US diplomatic recognition. The United States hints that it may consider suspending Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea if North Korea “shows a positive attitude” and accepts IAEA inspections before the end of October 1993.

Yonhap (Seoul), 22 October 1993.

27 October 1993

North Korea tells the United States that it will submit to regular IAEA inspections only if the United States cancels Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea.

Mainichi Shimbun (Nagano), 3 November 1993.

29 October 1993

The IAEA announces that North Korea will allow inspectors to conduct routine maintenance of surveillance equipment but that it continues to block more thorough inspections of its suspected nuclear facilities.

Tim Weiner, New York Times, 30 October 1993, p.A3.

November 1993

US Defense Secretary Les Aspin says that North Korea has not unloaded a significant amount of plutonium-rich irradiated fuel from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon since 1989. US intelligence sources believe that this is largely a consequence of the poor quality of the refueling equipment used by North Korea. The process of removing the fuel rods would take three months, and outages of more than several days “would be detected by surveillance.” North Korea’s 5MW gas-graphite reactor, which began operating in 1986, was “shut down for a 100-day outage” in 1989. US intelligence suggests that the 100-day outage in 1989 may have provided North Korea with 15kg of plutonium. US agencies further believe that the fuel irradiated since 1989 could provide North Korea with enough weapons-grade plutonium for four to five nuclear devices.

Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 20 December 1993, pp.6-7.

November 1993

The United States offers to assist North Korea with monitoring personnel and technical support for the upcoming refueling of the North Korean 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. It also offers to replace North Korea’s gas-cooled reactors with US light-water reactors if the latter provides the IAEA with blanket access to its nuclear facilities.

Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 8 November 1993, pp.1, 14-15.

1 November 1993

The UN General Assembly passes a nine-point resolution urging North Korea to “cooperate immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” The resolution is passed with 140 in favor, North Korea voting against, and nine abstentions.

Korea Times (Seoul), 3 November 1993.

2 November 1993

The IAEA announces that the Agency will not send an inspection team to North Korea following the latter’s refusal to permit full-scope inspections. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that a country “cannot pick and choose which aspects of inspection programs it would permit to go ahead.” He informs the UN General Assembly that “it remained possible that [North Korea] was trying to build a nuclear bomb.”

AFP (Paris), 3 November 1993.

2 November 1993

A high-ranking US official says that the Team Spirit military maneuvers will continue in 1994 if North Korea does not submit to regular IAEA inspections.

Mainichi Shimbun (Nagano), 3 November 1993.

3 November 1993

During US Defense Secretary Les Aspin’s visit to Tokyo and Seoul, Japan and South Korea emphasize the need to avoid placing sanctions on North Korea for fear that it could spark a military attack if North Korea “feels cornered.”

David E. Sanger, New York Times , 4 November 1993, p.A4.

11 November 1993

North Korea’s first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju says that there is a “definite prospect for the [nuclear] settlement.” However, the United States will have to abandon its “hostile policy of stifling” North Korea, withdraw the threat to use nuclear weapons, and accept a “package solution” in which both sides define actions to be taken simultaneously.

UPI, 11 November 1993.

17 November 1993

Russia confirms that it has expelled North Korean General Nam Gae-wok for recruiting Russian missile and space technology experts to work on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. However, North Korea denies that it is trying to recruit Russian experts.

Anne McElvoy and Wolfgang Munchau, The Times (London), 17 November 1993.

19 November 1993

Spy satellite images reveal a large North Korean nuclear reactor capable of producing 100-pounds of plutonium annually. According to CIA Director James Woolsey, “North Korea is willing to sell [its nuclear weapons and missiles] to anyone.”

Robert Jastrow and Max Kampelman, Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1993, p. A16.

30 November 1993

North Korea’s foreign ministry suggests that North Korea will withdraw from the NPT if the United States does not agree to third round of negotiations on the nuclear issue.

John Burton, Financial Times (London), 1 December 1993, p.A5.

2 December 1993

Joongang Ilbo (Seoul) reports that North Korea has six demands to settle the nuclear issue. These include: (1) a written guarantee from the United States that no nuclear weapons will be used against it, (2) that no US nuclear weapons be deployed in South Korea, (3) a permanent cancellation of the US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises, (4) an official peace treaty to replace the Korean armistice, (5) the removal of North Korea from the US list of terrorist states, and (6) a proposal seeking the reunification of the two Koreas.

Executive News Service, 2 December 1993.

2 December 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the IAEA’s Board of Governors that unless North Korea permits the IAEA to inspect the 40 seals affixed in 1992, the Agency will be unable to verify that North Korea’s nuclear materials have not been modified or removed. Photographic records of activities at the Yongbyon complex are incomplete, as the surveillance cameras have run out of film. The IAEA tells North Korea that it needs to verify the complete physical inventory, reconcile the discrepancies, put new film in cameras, count the number of fuel rods, and design a method for safeguarding the refueling of the core of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 23 December 1993, pp.2-3.

2 December 1993

White House officials say that US President Bill Clinton will continue to push for a “slow diplomatic approach” towards North Korea.

Barbara Opall, Defense News, 6-12 December 1993,pp.3, 28.

3 December 1993

North Korea offers the IAEA unlimited access to five of its seven declared nuclear facilities and limited access to the other two – a 5MW gas-graphite reactor and a reprocessing facility. North Korea says that the IAEA can replace the film and batteries in the cameras but not check the seals at these facilities.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 23 December 1993, pp.2-3.

3 December 1993

Following a report by IAEA Director General Hans Blix, the IAEA Board of Governors announces the “need for urgent action” to resolve the problems associated with North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA Yun Ho-jin says that the nuclear issue can be resolved if the United States agrees with North Korea on a package involving an improvement in bilateral relations.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 December 1993.

6 December 1993

South Korean and US officials warn of escalation in tensions if North Korea removes the nuclear spent fuel from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor without the presence of IAEA inspectors.

Barbara Opall, Defense News, 6-12 December 1993,pp.3, 28.

6 December 1993

US President Bill Clinton and the IAEA announce that North Korea’s offer to allow the IAEA access to some of its nuclear sites is inadequate and unacceptable. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that “there must be unrestricted access to all declared sites” and that “restrictions on the two facilities are not negotiable.”

Ruth Marcus and R. Jeff Smith, Washington Post , 7 December 1993, p.A19.

8 December 1993

The United States and South Korea accept North Korea’s offer to allow the expansion of inspections beyond the replacement of maintenance and surveillance equipment in return for a third round of nuclear talks.

Hangyore Sinmum (Seoul), 17 November 1993, p.2.

10 December 1993

US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis reports that US intelligence sources suspect that scientists from the former Soviet Union have gone to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea where they may be assisting in the development of nuclear weapons.

Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 10 December 1993.

12 December 1993

US Defense Secretary Les Aspin tells NBC’s “Meet the Press” program that US intelligence sources believe that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs and there “is the possibility that they at this moment possess a single nuclear device.”

Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 13 December 1993, p.A3.

19 December 1993

According to two European diplomats, North Korea has the capacity to enrich natural uranium and graphite and has built “several kilo-sized bombs.” The diplomats further state that North Korea has successfully perfected the ignition mechanisms used in nuclear weapons and that its short-range Scud-B ballistic missiles have been modified to deliver weapons of mass destruction. They cite a “secret crater-like test site on the banks of the Kuryong River” as evidence that North Korea has tested explosive devices and triggering mechanisms.

South China Sunday Morning Post (Hong Kong), 19 December 1993, pp.1,9.

21 December 1993

A US official says that differences between the United States and North Korea in secret talks being held at New York over the nuclear inspections’ issue are steadily narrowing.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 22 December 1993.

26 December 1993

Chinese Premier Li Peng tells UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that China does not support the use of economic sanctions against North Korea to resolve the issue of international inspections of nuclear facilities.

Steven Mufson, Washington Post, 27 December 1993, p.A13.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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