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3 January 1994

US officials announce that North Korea has agreed to permit IAEA inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities once North Korea agrees with the Agency on “the exact procedures.” US state department Undersecretary Lynn Davis says that the “agreement in principle” reached between North Korea and the United States to allow IAEA inspections is one of the “interim steps” before the United States will agree to a third round of talks with North Korea. Other steps involve the resumption of a North Korean dialogue with South Korea in exchange for cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise. North Korean United Nations Ambassador Ho Jong confirms the agreement and says that IAEA inspections will be permitted in order to “keep continuity” of international safeguards. Ho says that the United States and North Korea have made “some very substantial progress” during negotiations in December 1993 in New York.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p.A11; John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p.A8.

4 January 1994

US officials say that they are likely to make the important concession of accepting North Korea’s proposal of a complete one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear facilities, in the hope that additional inspections can be agreed upon in the future.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p.A11; John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p.A8.

6 January 1994

US intelligence agencies are divided as to whether North Korea has completed the construction of a nuclear weapon. Based on a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), one report says that North Korea has already built one or two nuclear devices. However, a White House official says that the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are “protecting themselves by openly suggesting that North Korea has already built a bomb,” after failing to do so in the case of Iraq.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 6 January 1994, pp.8-9.

10 January 1994

The IAEA and North Korea hold a second round of “working-level” discussions on the scope and content of inspections. The IAEA submits a “check list” for inspections at North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Items on the “check list” include examining the fuel rods at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, taking samples, and checking seals and surveillance equipment. During the first round of “working-level” discussions held on 7 January 1994, the IAEA and North Korea disagreed on the details of implementing the safeguards.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 January 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 8 January 1994; Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 January 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994.

17 January 1994

CIA Director James Woolsey makes a secret visit to Seoul to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue.

UPI, 19 January 1994.

27 January 1994

The Japanese weekly Sukan Bunsun, citing a confidential Russian General Staff report, alleges that North Korea has succeeded in creating one or two nuclear warheads, accumulated 10-12kg of uranium-235 and 20kg of plutonium-239. According to the report, 160 Russian nuclear experts have worked for North Korea during the last several years and nine nuclear scientists are currently working in North Korea.

Sergey Agafonov, Izvestiya (Moscow), 27 January 1994, pp.1,4.

31 January 1994

A South Korean defense ministry source says that South Korea and the United States will proceed with the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise unless North Korea allows international inspections of its nuclear-related facilities.

David Brunnstrom, Reuters, 31 January 1994.

4 February 1994

North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin says that “conflicting positions” between the IAEA and North Korea “cannot be merged at the moment” and that “no immediate prospect” exists for allowing the IAEA to administer unconditional inspections of the North’s nuclear sites. According to Yun, North Korea “will not accept to clarify everything” and that it has “offered enough to prove the continuity of knowledge [about North Korea’s nuclear activities].”

Reuters, 5 February 1994.

19 February 1994

China reportedly reveals that North Korea may possess one or more nuclear bombs. In January 1994, Chinese officials told a visiting delegation from the US War College that “North Korea may already possess nuclear arms.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 19 February 1994

28 February 1994

According to Western intelligence sources, the design of North Korea’s reprocessing complex being built at Yongbyon is intended specifically for the use of plutonium separation technologies developed by a consortium of 13 European counties called the European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (Eurochemic). However, IAEA officials from the Department of Safeguards believe that the plutonium extraction process is “no mystery.” Similarly, Russian officials claim that the former Soviet Union furnished North Korea with the reprocessing technology.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 28 February 1998, pp.6-7.

22 March 1994

During a news conference in Seoul, North Korean defector Sgt. Lee Chung-guk discloses that he has learned that North Korea is secretly developing nuclear weapons in a facility hidden inside a mountain. Lee, who previously worked at a chemical-warfare unit of the Peoples Armed Forces, says that he learned this information from a senior North Korean army official.

Washington Times, 25 March 1994, p.A16.

23 March 1994

IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that it appears that North Korea will complete the construction of its 50MW gas-graphite reactor in Yongbyon on schedule by the end of 1994. Kyd says it appears that North Korea is constructing a third nuclear reactor in Taechon, which is scheduled for completion in early 1996.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 March 1994.

24 March 1994

According to US and European officials, North Korea may be reprocessing spent fuel through an unsafeguarded second reprocessing line at the Yongbyon reprocessing complex. The revelation comes after IAEA inspections of the Yongbyon reprocessing plant during which inspectors were prevented from examining points that may connect the existing reprocessing line to the suspected second line. The existing line was placed under safeguards in 1993. It is believed that the existence of an unsafeguarded second line can allow North Korea to divert “plutonium-laden material in solution from the safeguarded line without detection.” US officials say that the existence of a new reprocessing line can double North Korea’s plutonium production capacity.

Nucleonics Week, 24 March 1994, pp.1-2; New York Times, 3 April 1994, p.4.

1 April 1994

North Korea’s foreign ministry states that the nuclear inspection dispute can be settled in direct talks with the United States, and declines a Russian proposal to resolve the matter at a world conference.

Reuters, 1 April 1994.

1 April 1994

After meeting with US defense secretary William Perry, South Korean foreign minister Han Sung-joo says that the United States and South Korea have delayed the decision on whether to conduct joint Team Spirit military exercises. The United States and South Korea made this decision in order to give North Korea sufficient time to respond to a UN Security Council statement issued on 31 March 1994 requesting IAEA inspections of its nuclear plants.

Art Pine, Los Angeles Times, 2 April 1994, p.A10.

3 April 1994

US defense secretary William Perry warns North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons program or face “substantial pressures,” including possible economic sanctions. Although Perry does not rule out the use of pre-emptive military strikes, he says that diplomacy will be the United States’ preferred policy and grants six months to try the diplomatic approach.

Washington Post, 4 April 1994.

7 April 1994

North Korea’s legislature calls for a “large-scale” nuclear power program to address the problem of electricity shortages.

Reuters and AP, 8 April 1994.

13 April 1994

Speaking at the annual conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that it is critical that the IAEA have complete access to the two undeclared sites in North Korea suspected of being nuclear waste dump-sites in order to determine whether any nuclear materials have been diverted for nuclear weapons production. Blix stresses that gaining access to the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is also necessary to learn whether the lab has been used since February 1993. According to Blix, the IAEA is concerned that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has reported. In the spring of 1993, it was concluded that North Korea had more plutonium than it had declared. Blix disclosed that North Korea is working on constructing a second [reprocessing] production line in the radiochemical lab, which is expected to be completed in the near future.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 15 April 1994, p.A4; Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), 14 April 1994; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 13 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p.42.

20 April 1994

The United States and South Korea issue a statement announcing that they will resume planning for the Team Spirit military exercises, which will take place in November 1994, if North Korea persists in rejecting IAEA inspections.

Robert Burns, Washington Times , 21 April 1994, p.A12.

22 April 1994

Following trips to South Korea and Japan, US defense secretary William Perry says that if North Korea does not allow IAEA inspection of the planned retrieval of nuclear spent fuel from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, the United States will “request the [United Nations] to impose sanctions” on North Korea as early as May 1994. If the United Nations does not agree on sanctions, the United States, along with Japan and South Korea will “seek a way of imposing some sort of multinational sanctions” on North Korea.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post , 23 April 1994.

27 April 1994

North Korea announces that it will not accept full IAEA inspections. Although IAEA inspectors will be permitted to witness the removal of the nuclear spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, they will not be allowed to take samples of the rods or to measure their radioactivity.

Washington Post, 28 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p.44.

30 April 1994

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells a Japanese delegation led by House of Councilors President Bubei Hara that although China has close ties with North Korea, it does not know why the latter is seeking to develop nuclear facilities. He further adds that China does not know if North Korea intends to use the facilities peacefully or for nuclear weapons development. China also does not know if North Korea is using the nuclear issue as a means to improve relations with the United States.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 30 April 1994.

1 May 1994

The IAEA sends a letter to North Korea reiterating its demand that North Korea allow full inspection of the refueling of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. IAEA Director General Hans Blix in a letter to North Korean foreign minister Kim Yong-nam warns that North Korea’s failure to agree to IAEA inspections will be seen as evidence of North Korean efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and will compel the IAEA to take the issue to the UN Security Council.

JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p.44.

3 May 1994

A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman says that IAEA’s demand to set aside and measure spent fuel from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is “unreasonable,” adding that North Korea will allow “the observation of the fuel rod replacement, containment and surveillance over all replaced fuel and other sufficient inspections for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.” The spokesman adds that “selective” fuel rod sampling “can never be allowed because it means routine and ad hoc inspections that ignore North Korea’s unique status” under the NPT following the “temporary suspension” of its withdrawal from the NPT.

United Nations Security Council, Document S/1994/540, 5 May 1994.

3 May 1994

Senior US officials indicate that the United States will offer improved economic and political ties to North Korea if the latter allows full inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Reuters, 3 May 1994.

10 May 1994

North Korea and the United States hold a working-level meeting to discuss the nuclear impasse.

AFP (Paris), 11 May 1994.

11 May 1994

South Korean officials say that North Korea has backed off from its threat to replace fuel rods in its 5MW gas-graphite reactor without international inspectors being present and has responded positively in negotiations with the United States.

AFP (Paris), 11 May 1994.

13 May 1994

The IAEA announces that it will shortly send an inspection team to North Korea to service cameras and check safeguard seals at the reprocessing plant and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea will also conduct working-level talks with the IAEA on the removal of the fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor. IAEA inspectors will be allowed to set aside fuel rod samples for future measurement. Inspectors will also complete some steps blocked during the March 1994 inspections, including the measurement of radioactivity and search for radioactive particles at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant, but will not be able to sample “liquids from tanks used to dissolve spent fuel.” The inspection team will also not be allowed to conduct formal inspections of the removal of spent fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor.

United Nations Press Release, Document IAEA/1268, 13 May 1994; Washington Post, 14 May 1994.

14 May 1994

North Korea starts unloading spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors.

New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp.A1, A3.

16 May 1994

US state department officials announce that if North Korea has removed or “emptied” the spent fuel from the rods, the United States will seek sanctions in the UN Security Council. US Defense Secretary William Perry characterizes the situation as a “very substantial near-term crisis.”

New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp.A1, A3.

23 May 1994

North Korean defector Kim Dai-ho, who was formerly an official at a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in North Korea, tells Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun that although North Korea has publicly denied reprocessing spent fuel in 1988, it, in fact, secretly removed 12kg of plutonium at that time.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 24 May 1994, p.2.

31 May 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that due to continued North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections, North Korea is “no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards.” The IAEA makes a final appeal to North Korea, asking it to stop withdrawing fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to allow international inspections to proceed. IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered “vital to future measurement.” In a telex to North Korea, the IAEA reiterates that it will accept two other methods of measuring the rods that remain, but according to Blix, North Korea has not accepted the proposals due to political constraints. North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin announces that the refueling will continue. Yun says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site “pending an inspection agreement.”

Washington Post, 1 June 1994; Guardian (London), 1 June 1994.

3 June 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the UN Security Council that the Agency is unable to verify whether North Korea has used the plutonium extracted from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor to make nuclear weapons. According to Blix, North Korea has removed the 300 fuel rods of the “core fuel element” and mixed them up without marking their exact location in the reactor, thus making it impossible to determine the past activities of the reactor. There is no “technical way of knowing whether North Korea secretly removed fuel from the reactor in 1989 when it was shut down for 100 days and ...if plutonium [was extracted] from it.” However, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci says that although the IAEA’s capability to substantiate the extent of North Korea’s plutonium diversion has been “seriously eroded,” it has not been destroyed.

Paul Lewis, New York Times, 4 June 1994, p. A3; Thomas Lippman, Washington Post, 4 June 1994, p.A14.

3 June 1994

US President Bill Clinton announces plans to seek UN economic sanctions against North Korea. North Korea warns that it will leave the NPT if UN sanctions are implemented, and accuses the IAEA of engaging in “sinister” politics tantamount to an act of war that will “bring devastating consequences.”

China and Japan say that they do not support UN sanctions on North Korea as these will lead to heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Washington Post, 3 June 1994, pp. A1, A28; International Herald Tribune (Paris), 3 June 1994, pp.1,4; Reuters, 3 June 1994.

4 June 1994

After two days of talks, Japan, South Korea and the United States issue a joint statement declaring that the North Korean nuclear situation “demands that the international community, through the UN Security Council, urgently consider an appropriate response, including sanctions.”

Washington Post, 5 June 1994, pp.A1, A34.

7 June 1994

North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin declares that the North Korean government “will never allow inspections” of two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. One of the reasons for not allowing inspections is because the United States discovered the two nuclear sites using spy satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that inspecting the two sites “is even more important” for determining if North Korea has diverted plutonium, in light of the fact that North Korea has removed spent fuel from the core of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process. According to Blix, in removing the rods without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process, North Korea’s “intention must have been to destroy the possibility of the [IAEA] obtaining information about the history of the core through independent measurements and thereby maintain uncertainty about the amount of nuclear material, specifically plutonium that may be present.” However, North Korea’s Department of Atomic Energy Director Pak Yong-nam says that the IAEA can still determine whether North Korea has diverted material from the nuclear reactor because North Korea is “preserving the technical possibility for later measurements of the fuel rods.”

Washington Post, 8 June 1994.

8 June 1994

North Korean foreign minister Kim Yong-nam says North Korea will “guarantee [IAEA] inspections...testing, measuring, and the preservation of nuclear fuel,” if the United States agrees to a third round of bilateral talks. The United States declines the offer and instead asks North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections before the United States will consider reopening bilateral talks.

Reuters, 8 June 1994; in Executive News Service, 8 June 1994.

8 June 1994

IAEA officials announce that North Korea will have discharged all of the spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor by 10 June 1994. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the fuel removal at Yongbyon “has now been 90 percent completed.” The fuel unloading has been faster than anticipated due to North Korea’s possession of more unloading equipment than was previously indicated by IAEA inspections. IAEA officials claim that North Korea now has the ability to reprocess the spent fuel rods and separate out the weapons-grade plutonium by early August 1994. Kyd says that the IAEA has been unable to accept North Korea’s proposal to supply the IAEA with a sample of 40 of the reactor’s 8,000 fuel rods, instead of the 300 that are sought by the Agency. The proposal has been rejected because 40 fuel rods are insufficient to trace the 5MW gas-graphite reactor’s history.

Washington Times, 9 June 1994, p.A13; Reuters, 8 June 1994.

9 June 1994

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea has removed 6,500 of the original 8,000 fuel rods from the core of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. Two IAEA inspectors are monitoring the fuel rods in the cooling pond. North Korea is not allowing the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the rods. According to a Western diplomat, the ability to reconstruct North Korea’s nuclear history “is now lost.”

Nucleonics Week, 9 June 1994, pp. 3-4.

10 June 1994

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea.

Adrian Pontieri, UPI, 10 June 1994.

10 June 1994

The United States prepares to present its position to the UN Security Council on sanctions against North Korea. According to US national security officials, sanctions will involve two phases. The first phase will involve preventing the flow of money from North Koreans living abroad to their families in North Korea, stopping arms sales to North Korea, and terminating North Korea’s reliance on the United Nations for economic and nuclear cooperation. The second phase will consist of a full trade embargo. China and Japan oppose the two-stage plan. Chinese President Jiang Zemin says that the use of sanctions against North Korea is unnecessary “since there is still room for dialogue.” Japan also offers its own three-stage plan: “a warning, sanctions on arms sales and technical cooperation, and then sanctions that include financial remittances.” Russia proposes an international conference to resolve the matter.

Washington Times, 11 June 1994, pp.A1, A4; Executive News Service, 10 June 1994; Reuters, 10 June 1994.

13 June 1994

North Korea submits a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 June 1994.

13 June 1994

The Director of South Korea’s Agency for National Security Planning, Kim Deok, tells parliament that North Korea’s “ultimate aim is to develop nuclear weapons and that [North Korea] is employing delaying tactics to earn time.” Kim adds that by end of 1998, North Korea will have produced over 220kg of plutonium.

Reuters, 13 June 1994.

15 June 1994

South Korea’s defense minister Yi Pyong-tae reveals that there are indications that North Korea is testing nuclear bomb detonators. This shows that North Korea has developed at least an elementary stage of a nuclear device.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 June 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, pp. 20-21.

15 June 1994

The head of Russia’s counterintelligence agency, Sergey Stepashin, says that three North Koreans have been arrested in Russia’s Primorskoye territory for trying to obtain nuclear weapon components. According to Stepashin, several smuggling incidents suggest that North Koreans are “shopping” for Russian missile and nuclear technologies. US intelligence says that there is no evidence that North Korea has been successful in acquiring bomb-making equipment from Russia. US officials continue to question whether North Korea has the technology to build a nuclear bomb.

Daily Telegraph (London), 16 June 1994.

15 June 1994

Former US President Jimmy Carter arrives in North Korea in an attempt to open up dialogue with North Korea that will help to end the possible threat of war provoked by North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program.

Reuters, 15 June 1994.

15 June 1994

The IAEA inspectors leave North Korea because they can no longer account for the 8,000 fuel rods. US Pentagon officials say that although the “diplomatic path” is not ruled out, the United States is considering air strikes on North Korea’s nuclear fuel reprocessing facility.

Executive News Service, 16 June 1994.

16 June 1994

US safeguards experts propose that the IAEA use alternative techniques to measure the plutonium in the 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korea from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. According to one Western safeguards official, it is still “theoretically possible” to recreate an inventory of North Korea’s fissile material “within a 90-95 percent confidence level” with North Korean cooperation.

Nucleonics Week, 16 June 1994, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1994

North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, offers to freeze the operation of North Korea’s nuclear reprocessing plant and the construction of the 200MW gas-graphite reactor in return for foreign technology and financing for the construction of a light-water reactor. Carter announces that Kim Il-sung has agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and promised that the IAEA’s monitoring equipment will stay in good condition. Carter says that the “whole resolution of this matter peacefully depends upon the resumption of talks between the United States and North Korea.” US President Bill Clinton asks Kim Il-sung to elaborate on his promises made to Carter and says that sanctions will be dropped and a third round of talks can take place if North Korea is prepared to put a “freeze on any nuclear activity.” Clinton announces that the United States is prepared to help North Korea convert its nuclear program from graphite-moderated to light-water reactors.

UPI, 16 June 1994; Washington Times, 17 June 1994, pp. A1, A16.

20 June 1994

The Clinton administration announces that the United States will not respond to North Korean President Kim Il-sung’s demand for a formal no-first–strike promise.

Washington Times, 21 June 1994, pp. A1, A10.

21 June 1994

Experts from Russia’s Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering tell a news conference that they are confident that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons. Vladislav Kotlov from the ministry says that North Korea does not have enough plutonium to build a nuclear bomb, though it has produced “several dozens or hundreds of grams of plutonium.”

ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 21 June 1994; in FBIS-SOV-94-120, 22 June 1994, p.7.

23 June 1994

North Korea confirms that it will fully comply with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, maintain IAEA monitoring equipment in compliance with the NPT, and halt its nuclear activities. US President Bill Clinton responds by declaring an end to efforts for UN sanctions against North Korea and confirming that the United States and North Korea will hold high-level talks in Geneva in early July 1994.

Yonhap (Seoul), 23 June 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p.20.

24 June 1994

North Korea confirms that it has reached a deal with former US President Jimmy Carter in which it will freeze its nuclear program.

Financial Times (London), 24 June 1994; New York Times, 28 June 1994, p.A4.

27 June 1994

US State Department spokesman Michael McCurry says that it is the United States’ understanding that North Korea has frozen “the major elements” of its nuclear program.

New York Times, 28 June 1994, p.A4.

July 1994

According to a US government source, North Korea may be barring access to international inspections of its nuclear plants because its nuclear weapons capability is “relatively small.” This may explain China’s lack of concern over the North Korean nuclear threat. China has suggested a more tactful and less direct method of dealing with North Korea that would create a dose of “Eastern medicine” which would be more effective than “Western radical surgery” of confrontation with North Korea.

International Defense Review, July 1994, p.5.

8 July 1994

North Korean President Kim Il-sung dies.

AFP (Paris), 9 July 1994.

12 July 1994

North Korea’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Kim Su-man announces that the government of Kim Jong-il will maintain the freeze on its nuclear program as a condition for negotiations with the United States, as promised by the late Kim Il-sung. He states that IAEA inspectors can remain at the nuclear plant at Yongbyon, and that the recently removed fuel rods will not be processed; neither will the 5MW gas-graphite reactor be refueled. Talks with the United States will reconvene after 17 July 1994.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 13 July 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 12 July 1994.

18 July 1994

CIA Director James Woolsey states at a conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington that the fuel rods extracted from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon in June 1994 contain enough plutonium for North Korea to build about five nuclear bombs. The CIA has also concluded that the 5MW gas-graphite reactor was shut down for an estimated 75 days in 1989, rather than the 100 days as previously believed, which means that North Korea was probably only able to extract enough plutonium at that time to construct at most one bomb. Woolsey believes that North Korea has the “technical competence” to produce at least one nuclear weapon. However, experts are more confident that North Korea has enough material to build such a weapon, rather than North Korea’s ability to build one.

AFP (Paris), July 1994; Frank Ching, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 14 July 1994, p.32.

21 July 1994

South Korea and the United States repeat an offer to provide economic aid and political recognition to North Korea if the latter halts in nuclear weapons program.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 22 July 1994.

27 July 1994

North Korean defector Kang Myong-do announces in Seoul that prior to 1994, North Korea developed five nuclear bombs and currently has plans to complete another five by the end of the year. According to Kang, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il wants the bombs built in order to secure his political career. Kang, who claims to be the son-in-law of North Korean Prime Minister Kang Song-nam, says that an operations chief at the Yongbyon nuclear plant informed him of North Korea’s nuclear plans. However, US and South Korean officials discount Kang’s press presentation and stand by intelligence appraisals, which assert that North Korea has built a maximum of two bombs.

Washington Times, 28 July 1994, pp. A1, A12.

5 August 1994

North Korea and the United States resume talks in Geneva on full inspections of North Korea’s nuclear program. There is increasing pressure to find a solution because North Korea claims that it must start reprocessing the 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods by the end of August 1994 to avoid radiological contamination of the storage site.

North Korea opposes the US government’s suggestion that the nuclear fuel be transported to a third country, such as China, for reprocessing. However, North Korea offers to reprocess the spent fuel rods and accept outside control over the extracted plutonium. North Korea also offers to accept international supervision over the reprocessing in exchange for diplomatic ties with the United States and a new reactor to replace the 2MW IRT-research reactor.

The United States insists that in order to receive concessions, North Korea must allow IAEA inspections of two sites suspected to be nuclear waste dumps to determine if North Korea has extracted plutonium from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor in the past. The United States is also likely to insist that diplomatic ties with North Korea be linked to improvement in inter-Korean relations.

Peter James Spielman, Washington Times , 5 August 1994, p.A13; John Burton, Financial Times (London), 5 August 1994, p.3.

5 August 1994

During a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, Russia offers to replace North Korea’s old gas-graphite reactors with a Russian VVER reactor, which is considered more efficient for civil use.

Izvestiya (Moscow), 5 August 1994, p.3.

6 August 1994

A high-ranking South Korean government official says that North Korea probably extracted 22 to 27kg of plutonium, enough for three to four nuclear warheads, from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. Reactor operations were suspended for 71 days in 1989, 30 days in 1990, and for another 51 days in 1991. However, according to another senior South Korean official, US surveillance satellites revealed that North Korea suspended operations of the reactor three times in 1989-1991. It is not clear whether North Korea replaced and reprocessed the nuclear fuel rods in 1990 or 1991.

Kyong Yong-won, Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 7 August 1994, p.1.

8 August 1994

North Korea’s first deputy foreign minister Kang Sok-ju says that if North Korea is provided with a light-water reactor and “proper and appropriate” economic compensation, it will stop its graphite-moderated reactor program. North Korea says that it has invested over $5 billion to develop its nuclear energy program. Kang also offers a plan for dealing with the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor. US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci comments that the proposals are “certainly worthy of study and consideration.” North Korea and the United States, however, disagree on when the North should discontinue construction of its graphite-moderated reactors.

Washington Times, 9 August 1994, p.A15.

12 August 1994

North Korea and the United States reach an agreement to end the nuclear stalemate. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea will stop the construction of its graphite-moderated reactor in exchange for a light-water reactor. In return, the United States will supply North Korea with an alternative source of energy during the estimated six years it will take to build the light-water reactor. Although the accord does not stipulate the model of the reactor, North Korea does not oppose the idea of a South Korean reactor. The United States and North Korea also agree to normalize political and economic relations by establishing a liaison office in Washington and Pyongyang and reducing barriers to trade and investment. The United States agrees to offer assurances that it will not threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul); in FBIS-EAS-94-157, 15 August 1994, p.30; Washington Times, 13 August 1994, p.A1.

15 August 1994

South Korean President Kim Yong-sam offers North Korea “the necessary capital and technology” to build light-water reactors “if and when the North guarantees the transparency of its nuclear facilities.”

Andrew Pollack, New York Times, 15 August 1994, p.A1.

17 August 1994

A South Korean official tells the Seoul-based Yonhap News Agency that the United States will not contribute towards the cost of building the light-water reactor in North Korea as US law prohibits transactions with countries categorized as “hostile.” Further, US public opinion is heavily opposed to any financial contribution in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear program.

Washington Times, 18 August 1994, p.A13.

18 August 1994

South Korean President Kim Yong-sam says that any nuclear reactor provided to North Korea under a bilateral US-North Korea agreement must be a South Korean-style light-water reactor built with the South’s capital and technology.

Reuters, 18 August 1994.

20 August 1994

North Korea rejects South Korea’s proposed exchange of a light-water reactor for full IAEA inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

New York Times, 21 August 1994.

31 August 1994

North Korea’s ambassador to Austria, Kim Gwang-sop says that full inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities shall be forthcoming following the accord reached between North Korea and the United States in Geneva. Kim admits that North Korea has produced plutonium in the past but that its use has been restricted to civilian purposes.

Reuters, 31 August 1994.

10 September 1994

North Korean and US officials meet in Berlin to discuss technical issues of replacing the graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 10 September 1994.

13 September 1994

The IAEA states in a confidential report that inspections of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since 1993. The conclusion is reached by analyzing nuclear samples taken from the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] at Yongbyon in March and May 1994. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed. The report confirms that North Korea has not permitted inspections of two major nuclear facilities.

Neue Zuericher Zeitung (Zuerich), 15 September 1994.

14 September 1994

US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci warns that if North Korea does not halt construction of the 50MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon and the 200MW gas-graphite reactor at Taechon, it will be able to produce “hundreds and hundreds” of pounds of plutonium. Gallucci says that such levels of plutonium production will make North Korea a strategic threat to South Korea and Japan.

Washington Times, 15 September 1994, pp.A1, A14.

15 September 1994

North Korea rejects the proposed South Korean aid to replace its graphite-moderated reactors. It expresses preference for a modern reactor design with improved safety features, possibly three reactors of the Russian VVER-650 type or the joint French-German design European pressurized-water reactor under development by Framatome and Siemens. North Korea also demands financing of $4 billion to build the reactors as well as $1.2 billion to cover the investment it has made in the indigenous development program.

Nuclear News, October 1994, pp.18,75.

16 September 1994

IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer says that as a result of the nuclear accord reached with North Korea, the IAEA will broaden its inspection activities to include all seven of North Korea’s declared nuclear sites. IAEA inspectors will verify that the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon are not reprocessed until definite steps are taken to freeze the nuclear program. The IAEA announces that its inspectors have begun replacing the batteries and videotapes in surveillance equipment in all seven declared nuclear facilities.

AFP (Paris), 16 August 1994; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 16 August 1994.

20 September 1994

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov travels to Pyongyang and offers to participate in the replacement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors. Russia proposes to supply 640MW VVER reactors financed by an international consortium.

Itar-Tass (Moscow), 22 September 1994; in FBIS-SOV-94-185, 23 September 1994, p.14; Kommersant Daily (Moscow), 2 September 1994, p.4; in FBIS-USR-94-105, 2 September 1994.

5 October 1994

US defense secretary William Perry says that North Korea has demanded that the United States provide additional funds of $2 billion to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 7 October 1994.

6 October 1994

North Korea and the United States resume high-level bilateral talks.

Yonhap (Seoul), 7 October 1994; in FBIS-EAS-94-195, 7 October 1994.

11 October 1994

South Korean President Kim Yong-sam urges the United States not to use excessive haste in its negotiations with North Korea. According to Kim, North Korea is desperate to come to a quick resolution of the nuclear issue and is using the threat of a nuclear war to win concessions.

Robert Evans, Washington Times, 12 October 1994, p.A13.

13 October 1994

US diplomats say that North Korea and the United States are moving closer to a nuclear agreement.

UPI, 13 October 1994.

20 October 1994

US President Bill Clinton writes to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, assuring him that if international financing for the light-water reactors cannot be provided, he will take all possible steps to obtain congressional approval for US provision of the new reactors.

North Korea announces that it will sign the US-North Korean nuclear agreement reached on 17 October 1994.

Steven Greenhouse, New York Times, 27 October 1994, p.A4; Eugene Moosa, Reuters, 20 October 1994.

21 October 1994

The United States and North Korea sign an accord (Agreed Framework), which specifies the actions that both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light-water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT and by allowing the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement.

US-Korea Review, December 1994, p.9.

21 October 1994

US defense secretary William Perry and South Korean defense minister Rhee Byoung-tae declare that the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise between the United States and South Korea will be cancelled.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 21 October 1994.

22 October 1994

A high-ranking official from the Russian Foreign Ministry announces that Russia is interested in participating in the international consortium to provide light-water reactors to North Korea.

Itar-Tass (Moscow), 25 October 1994.

1 November 1994

A spokesman for North Korea’s foreign ministry says that North Korea is taking “practical steps” to implement the Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea’s Administration Council has ordered the cessation of construction on the 50MW and 200MW gas-graphite reactors. The Council has also decided to halt operation of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to take measures to withdraw fuel rods that were intended for refueling it. In addition, North Korea will continue to cease operations at its radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and other nuclear facilities.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 1 November 1994.

1 November 1994

South Korea develops a financing plan to raise $3 billion for the construction of the two 1,000MW light-water reactors in North Korea. The funds will be a raised from a two or three percent levy on the revenues of the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) over a 10-year period while the reactors are being built. An international consortium will provide the remaining $1 billion necessary to build the light-water reactors.

Nuclear News, November 1994, p.41.

3 November 1994

China agrees to play a role to ensure that North Korea carries out its nuclear agreement with the United States. On 2 November 1994, South Korean foreign minister Han Sung-joo says that South Korea does not foresee Chinese participation in financing the light-water reactors for North Korea. However, South Korea hopes that China will play a part in the removal of the spent fuel rods from North Korea.

Washington Times, 4 November 1994, p.A16.

4 November 1994

The UN Security Council endorses the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October 1994. It approves North Korea’s voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea rejects the statement on the ground that it only emphasizes North Korea’s responsibilities under the framework agreement.

UN Weekly, 8 November 1994.

5 November 1994

South Korea indicates that it will not supply heavy-fuel oil to North Korea as part of the US-North Korean nuclear agreement.

Newsreview, 5 November 1994, p.11.

11 November 1994

The IAEA holds a closed-door board meeting and decides to send a small inspection team to North Korea to monitor the nuclear freeze.

Steve Pagani, Reuters, 11 November 1994.

14-18 November 1994

US and North Korean experts discuss safe storage and final disposition of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. The Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang) describes the talks as “useful and constructive” and says that the experts will meet again in December 1994 to resolve “technical and operational matters.”

Reuters, 19 November 1994.

18 November 1994

North Korea announces that it has frozen its nuclear program in accordance with its agreement with the United States. It promises to comply with its obligation to dismantle the components of its suspected nuclear weapon sites, but makes no mention of inspections of its two suspected nuclear waste dumps. North Korea requests the United States to fulfill its promises under the bilateral accord.

Washington Times, 19 November 1994, p.A7.

18 November 1994

The United States, South Korea, and Japan agree to set up an international consortium to raise $4 billion to build light-water reactors in North Korea. The consortium will also be responsible for disposing of North Korea’s nuclear spent fuel and for providing an interim supply of heavy-fuel oil to North Korea.

Reuters, 18 November 1994.

28 November 1994

The IAEA confirms that North Korea has frozen operations at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel fabrication facility. It also confirms that construction has been stopped at the 50MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon and the 200MW gas-graphite reactor at Taechon.

Reuters, 28 November 1994.

30 November-2 December 1994

US and North Korean negotiators meet in Beijing to discuss the light-water reactor project under the Agreed Framework. North Korea demands that it be allowed to choose who builds the reactors as it is paying for them. It also rejects the South Korean light-water reactor model as it has never been exported before and its safety features are uncertain.

Reuters, 2 December 1994.

December 1994

In response to US requests, Germany starts exploring ways in which German companies can help carry out the US-North Korea nuclear agreement. According to German officials, Germany will “most likely” contribute a portion of the annual supply of heavy-fuel oil to North Korea as required under the Agreed Framework. German federal officials say that German nuclear companies such as Siemens AG will face export controls and third party liability problems before they can begin supplying equipment for the light-water reactors promised to North Korea.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 15 December 1994, pp.9-10.

1 December 1994

The Clinton administration uses $5 million from approved US Department of Defense discretionary funds to ship approximately 50,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil to North Korea to immediately start implementing the US-North Korean Agreed Framework. US officials propose using $5-10 million from the Department of Energy’s discretionary funds for the long-term storage of North Korea’s nuclear spent fuel rods.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 1 December 1994, p.A44.

3 December 1994

South Korea’s KEPCO reaches an agreement with the US-based Combustion Engineering (CE) under which KEPCO will not be required to pay royalties to CE if the Ulchin No. 3 and 4 light-water reactors are built in North Korea. In return, KEPCO promises CE a share in manufacturing parts for the reactors if KEPCO is chosen as the primary contractor for the project.

Yonhap (Seoul), 3 December 1994.

16 December 1994

The United States, Japan, and South Korea agree to form an international consortium to fund the construction of the two light-water reactors in North Korea. The consortium will temporarily be called the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). KEDO will be headquartered in New York and its first meeting will be held in February 1995.

According to a joint statement issued by the parties, whereas South Korea will play a primary role, Japan will have an “appropriate role” in financing construction of the 1,000MW light-water reactors in North Korea. In addition, attempts will be made to gain support for the project from other G-7 countries.

Foreign Report, 8 December 1994; Reuters, 19 December 1994.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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