North Korea Special Collection

IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections 1991

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11 March 1991

A North Korean mission led by Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol rejects a Japanese request that North Korea implement the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1991, p.5.

12 April 1991

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku announces that South Korea will attack North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon if it does not sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that the announcement is a "virtual declaration of war."

Charles Lane, Newsweek, 29 April 1991, pp.38-40.

16 April 1991

Vladlen A. Martynof of the Soviet Academy of Sciences announces that all Soviet supplies to the North Korean facility at Yongbyon will be cut if IAEA inspections continue to be denied.

David A. Sanger, New York Times, 16 April 1991, p.A3.

16 April 1991

At the Soviet Union’s request, China urges North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 16 April 1991.

20-22 May 1991

During Japanese-North Korean talks held in China, Japan’s special ambassador, Noboru Nakahira says that North Korea must accept full-scope safeguards before Japan will normalize relations. Japan withholds $600 million in economic assistance and possible payment of war reparations for its occupation of Korea during the Second World War. The North Korean delegation, which includes Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol, rejects Japan’s demand. According to Chon, diplomatic relations between the two countries are necessary before North Korea will consider inspections of its nuclear facilities.

George Leopold and Naoaki Usui, Defense News, 27 May 1991, pp.4, 37.

24 May 1991

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Taizo Watanabe reiterates Japan’s demand that North Korea accept IAEA safeguards.

Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 30 May 1991, pp.17-18.

31 May 1991

According to Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh, the Soviet Union would like North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

Sergey Postangov and Sergey Nikisho, Tass (Moscow), 18 April 1991.

7 June 1991

A delegation of senior North Korean diplomats, led by Chon Chung-kuk meets with IAEA Director General Hans Blix in Vienna. North Korea says it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of all of its facilities, (including installations at Yongbyon that the United States suspects are being used to build nuclear weapons). Officials from both sides are scheduled to meet in July 1991, and the agreement should be ready for approval by September 1991. According to IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer, North Korea will sign an inspection agreement as soon as technical matters, such as inspections scheduling and procedures are negotiated. North Korea continues to demand that the United States remove its nuclear weapons and troops from South Korea before it will consider international inspections.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 9 June 1991, p.10; Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 13 June 1991, pp.14-15.

8 June 1991

North Korea insists on altering some of the wording in the standard IAEA safeguards agreement before signing it.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 8 June 1991.

11 June 1991

The North Korean delegation abruptly leaves an IAEA meeting after Japanese Ambassador Tetsuya Endo begins questioning why North Korea has been so reluctant to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. Representatives from Australia, Canada and other countries support Endo’s line of questioning.

Yim Tong-myong, Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 11 June 1991, p.2.

14 June 1991

The Japanese government welcomes North Korea’s announcement that it will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe says that it remains unclear whether North Korea will sign the safeguards agreement unconditionally.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 14 June 1991.

20 June 1991

According to North Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yong-nam, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement soon. However, North Korea will not allow actual inspections until: (1) inspections are conducted to verify the removal of US nuclear weapons allegedly stationed in South Korea, and (2) North Korea receives "legal assurances" that the United States will not pose a nuclear threat against it.

Don Oberdorfer and T.R. Reid, Washington Post, 21 June 1991, p.A19.

6 July 1991

US Assistant Secretary of State for international organization affairs John Bolton says that the United States will not link the IAEA safeguards agreement to North Korea’s membership in the United Nations.

San Francisco Chronicle, 6 July 1991, p.A7.

10 July 1991

North Korea says that it wants an additional clause in the IAEA safeguards agreement that will release it from mandatory inspection if: (1) there are nuclear weapons in South Korea, and (2) there is a nuclear threat against North Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 18 June 1991.

10 July 1991

According to South Korean Defense Minister, Lee Jong-ku, if North Korea accepts international inspections of its facilities and proves that it has abandoned its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will consider simultaneous inspections of both countries’ military facilities.

Milavnews, July 1991, pp.19-20.

10-14 July 1991

North Korea holds talks with the IAEA to determine the terms of the safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 18 June 1991.

16 July 1991

North Korea initials the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Nuclear News, August 1991, p.116.

16 July 1991

According to a North Korean delegate to the IAEA, the United States poses a "nuclear threat" to North Korea, which could create problems in implementing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Andrew Mack, Pacific Research, August 1991, p.14.

1 August 1991

South Korea says that it will consider talks on nuclear non-proliferation with North Korea if North Korea accepts full international inspections of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

Financial Times, 2 August 1991, p.4.

4 August 1991

South Korea reportedly considers asking North Korea to sign a joint declaration to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. If such a declaration is signed, North Korea will have to stop developing nuclear weapons and open all of its nuclear facilities, including a nuclear-fuel reprocessing installation, to IAEA inspections. The proposal may suggest simultaneous IAEA inspections, or a system by which the two Koreas may inspect one another’s facilities.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 August 1991.

15 August 1991

Japan links financial assistance to North Korea with completion of the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 15 August 1991, pp.14-16.

September 1991

IAEA Director General Hans Blix meets with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to suggest plans to pursue more aggressive inspections of nuclear states suspected of violating the NPT. He says that he intends to order inspection of such sites even if a country has not declared or placed them under IAEA safeguards. During the meeting, US energy secretary James Watkins says that the United States supports a more aggressive inspection regime to uncover clandestine nuclear weapons programs as sanctioned by the NPT. The Soviet Union and European Union also support the proposal.

Paul Lewis, New York Times, 11 October 1991, p.A; Michael Z. Wise, Washington Post, 21 September 1991, p.A19.

September 1991

Twenty-three IAEA member states adopt a strong resolution to allow the IAEA to conduct "special" inspections (inspections on demand) in addition to ones regularly scheduled. The resolution is partially aimed at North Korea, whose continued refusal to allow IAEA inspections is causing real concern at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. North Korea calls the resolution a hostile act and delays efforts to cooperate with the IAEA.

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on North Korea to quickly ratify the safeguards agreement as well as facility-specific accords. In response to this resolution, North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, O Chang-rim, refuses to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

According to North Korean defector, Ko Young-hwan, the North Korean government never had any intention of allowing international inspections; rather it only signed the NPT to buy time for its nuclear weapons program.

Mark Hibbs, Anne Maclachlan and N. Usui, Nucleonics Week, 19 September 1991, p.14; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.81; Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 17 September 1991, p.A10; Paul Shin, Monterey Herald, 14 September 1991, p.18A.

27 September 1991

US President George Bush announces that the United States will withdraw all short-range land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. According to North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk and Vice Foreign Minister Chon In-chol, North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement after all nuclear weapons are removed from South Korea.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 19 October 1991, pp.A1, A19; Yonhap (Seoul), 23 October 1991.

29 September 1991

According to a North Korean official, Kim Yong-sun, in order for North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States should guarantee that it will never use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

Clayton Jones, Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 1991, p.8.

October 1991

According to a South Korean official, North Korea is likely to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement in February 1992.

Yonhap (Seoul), 21 October 1991.

2 October 1991

North Korean President Kim Il-sung announces that North Korea will accept IAEA inspections of its facilities if US facilities in South Korea are also inspected. (This is the first time that Kim Il-sung has spoken personally about international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.)

KBS-1 Television Network Broadcast (Seoul), 2 October 1991.

4 October 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae-woo warns North Korea that if it continues with its nuclear weapons program and refuses international inspections, international sanctions may be imposed on North Korea.

Yonhap (Seoul), 4 October 1991.

22 October 1991

North Korea informs the United Nations that all nuclear weapons must be removed from South Korea before it can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. The European Union, Australia, United States, Poland, Austria, Japan, Romania, New Zealand, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria and South Korea agree that North Korea should immediately sign the agreement and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. South Korean Ambassador No Chang-hui expresses "serious concern" that North Korea is delaying signing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Yonhap (Seoul), 23 October 1991.

23 October 1991

In a meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk presents a new set of conditions that must be met in order for North Korea to allow international inspections of its facilities. These conditions include: (1) South Korea’s renunciation of the US "nuclear umbrella," and (2) discontinuation of US flights over Korea and port calls to South Korea by planes and ships containing nuclear weapons.

Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 24 October 1991, p.A3.

25 November 1991

North Korea’s foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States begins to remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea. North Korea proposes a direct meeting with the United States to discuss simultaneous inspections of North Korean facilities and US nuclear sites in South Korea.

Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 27 November 1991, p.A19; Washington Times, 29 November 1991, p.A2.

27 November 1991

North Korean Ambassador to China Chu Chang-jun reiterates the proposal initially made on 25 November 1991, which stated that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement following the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.

David Holley, Los Angeles Times, 28 November 1991, pp.A1, A13.

December 1991

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Director General Hans Blix suggests that the IAEA create a separate agency or department to collect and analyze intelligence data from member states to help monitor undeclared nuclear activities. His suggestion is met with little enthusiasm. In the past, the United States has refused to give the IAEA intelligence information for security reasons. The IAEA prepares to make another request for intelligence information at the next Board of Governors meeting scheduled for 24 February 1992. If the request is granted, only two IAEA staff members will have access to the information.

During the meeting, South Korean representatives reportedly ask the Agency to cease technical support for North Korea’s nuclear program. Support for the North’s nuclear program was granted in connection with ongoing IAEA inspections of the small reactor at Yongbyon. The IAEA currently has plans to spend more than $300,000 in North Korea on five major projects in 1992, and will assist North Korean scientists in areas ranging from uranium ore exploitation to finding industrial uses for radioactive isotopes.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1992, pp.14-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82.

Mid-December 1991

North Korea informs visiting US Congressman Stephen Solarz that it is ready to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

New York Times, 28 December 1991, p.12.

19 December 1991

North Korean President Kim Il-sung announces that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as it is assured that US nuclear weapons have been removed from South Korea, and that inspections of North Korean facilities will be conducted simultaneously with those of US facilities in South Korea.

Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 20 December 1991.

23 December 1991

North Korea announces that it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Kelly Smith Tunney, Washington Times, 25 December 1991, p.A7.

26 December 1991

According to North Korean UN Ambassador Ho Jong, North Korean officials have begun negotiating with the IAEA on the nature and timing of inspections. Ho indicates that North Korea believes ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement is inevitable. However, if the IAEA adopts more condemnatory resolutions, as it did in the September 1991 Board of Governors meeting, "this issue will be ruined."

Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82.

26 December 1991

South Korean spokesman Lee Dong-bok says that during North-South Korean talks, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and permit international inspections of its nuclear facilities "at an early date." South Korea demands that the North do so by 15 January 1992. North Korea is no longer demanding that the US officially confirm the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

New York Times, 27 December 1991, p.A3.

27 December 1991

North Korea’s chief delegate to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission talks with South Korea, Choe U-jin, comments on the South’s demand that it sign the safeguards agreement by 15 January 1992, saying that the "imposition of a timetable on [North Korea] is an interference with [its] national integrity."

C.W. Lim, Washington Times, 27 December 1991, p.A7.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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