North Korea Special Collection

IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections 1992

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6 January 1992

North Korean Ambassador Chon In-chan informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement before the end of January 1992.

Nuclear Engineering International, February 1992, pp.7-8.

6 January 1992

US President George Bush and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announce that they will cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercises if North Korea "fulfills its obligation" to the IAEA and South Korea for inspections of its nuclear facilities.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 7 January 1992, p.A6.

21 January 1992

US-North Korean high-level political meetings commence at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. The North Korean delegation is headed by Workers Party secretary for international affairs Kim Yong-sun. The US delegation is lead by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Kanter’s "talking points" have been approved in advance by a US State Department interagency committee, as well as by the South Korean and Japanese governments. These points include urging North Korea to permit IAEA inspections and to give up its nuclear weapons option. North Korea responds by agreeing to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.266-267.

30 January 1992

North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea’s Deputy Minister for the atomic energy industry Hong Gun-pyo says that North Korea will abide by the agreement fully. It should be noted however, that North Korea does not ratify nor implement the agreement at this time. North Korea’s director of the foreign ministry Chang Mun-son says that the process of ratification by the legislature could take as long as six months.

The IAEA inspections process comprises four distinct phases. The first requires North Korea to submit an official report of its existing nuclear facilities. During the second phase, the IAEA will conduct a series of ad hoc inspections to verify the aforementioned list, as well as gather some initial data about the nuclear program. Third, North Korea and the IAEA will sign various subsidiary agreements and attachments to the accord describing inspection procedures for specific facilities. And fourth, the IAEA will begin routine inspections designed to ensure that the nuclear facilities are not being used for military purposes.

Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.82; Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 31 January 1992, p.2; Washington Times, 3 February 1992, p.A10.

February 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents his three-year campaign to achieve "universal adherence to treaties blocking additional countries from obtaining nuclear weapons" to the UN Security Council.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 18 February 1992, p.A14.

Mid-February 1992

US officials meet with North Korean diplomats in Beijing. It is believed that the United States informs North Korea that it has until June 1992 to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 25 February 1992, p.A8.

18 February 1992

The North Korean Standing Committee agrees that the IAEA safeguards agreement should be ratified.

Gamini Senevirtne, Nucleonics Week, 27 February 1992, p.6.

24 February 1992

Senior advisor to US President George Bush, Douglas H. Paal, meets with South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s senior aide, Kim Chong-whi, to discuss North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program. He announces that the United States has set June 1992 as the deadline for North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections. US Congressman Stephen Solarz suggests that the United States may have to use force to coerce North Korea to allow international inspections.

Edward Neilan, Washington Times, 25 Febraury 1992, p.A8; International Herald Tribune (Paris), 25 February 1992.

25 February 1992

An IAEA official announces that the IAEA is close to reaching an agreement with North Korea to allow a team of experts to visit North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Although North Korea has not ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement, North Korean Foreign Minister O Chang-rim says that "there is no possibility that it will be rejected."

Rupert Cornwell, The Independent (London), 26 February 1992, p.10.

26 February 1992

The IAEA Board of Governors reaffirms its right to conduct special inspections of undeclared nuclear sites. It says that inspections will only occur on "rare occasions." The IAEA has not yet performed such an inspection. IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that the Board has agreed on a plan that requires all nations with full-scope safeguards agreements to begin submitting preliminary designs of nuclear facilities to the IAEA once the decision to construct them is made. At its next meeting in June 1992, the Board will discuss a plan for mandatory reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material and sensitive non-nuclear equipment.

Michael J. Wise, Washington Post, 27 February 1992, p.A33.

28 February 1992

According to North Korean Foreign Minister O Chang-rim, international inspectors may start examining North Korean nuclear facilities by May 1992. The United States believes that North Korea is removing items from its plutonium production facility.

R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 28 February 1992, p.A29.

9 March 1992

North Korea’s delay in ratifying the IAEA safeguards agreement creates suspicions that it is either buying time to produce weapons-grade plutonium or hiding plutonium before the inspections begin.

Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 1992, p.A10.

9 March 1992

North Korea announces that its parliament will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement in April 1992. North Korean Foreign Minister O Chang-rim says that international inspections will begin "most probably at the beginning of June 1992."

Newsweek, 9 March 1992; The Economist, 14 March 1992, p.47.

10 March 1992

North Korea’s ambassador to Russia, Son Song-pil says that North Korea is resisting inspection of its nuclear facilities because US nuclear weapons are still present at a secret storage depot in South Korea.

Proliferation Issues, 20 March 1992, pp.17-18.

18 March 1992

The United States informs North Korea that it will impose sanctions if North Korea does not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea believe that North Korea is stalling inspections in order to move its nuclear facilities underground. According to the United States, several convoys of trucks have left Yongbyon.

Daily Telegraph (London), 18 March 1992, p.A3.

24 March 1992

North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Ri Tcheul says that North Korea has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he says that North Korea will soon accept IAEA inspections.

Robert Evans, Reuters, 24 March 1992.

24 March 1992

According to South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, the issue surrounding international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities should be resolved through dialogue.

Reuters, 24 March 1992.

April 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs North Korea that if it does not declare its "radiochemical facility," he will request the UN Security Council to demand special inspections of the site.

Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, 7 May 1992, pp.8-9.

3 April 1992

North Korea’s envoy to the United Nations, Han Si-hae, informs Japanese reporters that North Korea’s Supreme Political Assembly will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement soon.

The Economist, 11 April 1992, pp.59-60.

9 April 1992

The North Korean parliament ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement. According to IAEA regulations, North Korea is required to allow international inspections of its facilities within 90 days. It is also required to list all of its nuclear facilities within 30 days of the last day of the month after it ratifies the safeguards agreement. William Dirks, IAEA Deputy Director General, says that the IAEA will go to the UN Security Council if North Korea fails to list all of its nuclear facilities for inspection.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1992, pp.15-16.; Reuters, 13 April 1992; David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 April 1992, p.A3.

10 April 1992

North Korea presents the safeguards agreement accord to IAEA Director General Hans Blix at the Agency’s headquarters in Vienna.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.267.

12 April 1992

North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that North Korea is willing to receive international inspectors at its nuclear facilities and all that needs to be arranged is the procedural formality of informing the IAEA.

Washington Times, 15 April 1992, p.A11.

14 April 1992

According to the head of the North Korean Ministry of Atomic Energy’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, Choe Chong-sun, three nuclear facilities in North Korea will be opened for international inspection. The facilities include a 5MW research reactor built in 1986, and the 50MW and 200MW reactors, which are currently under construction. Choe denies that North Korea has a reprocessing plant. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that if North Korea does not declare the facility, he will recommend to the IAEA Board of Governors at the 15 June 1992 meeting that the Agency request a UN-sanctioned inspection of the site.

Compuserve—Executive News Service, 14 April 1992; David E. Sanger, New York Times, 10 April 1992, p.A3.

4 May 1992

Twenty-five days before schedule, North Korea supplies the IAEA with a 150-page "initial report" declaring its nuclear facilities and materials. The report, however, does not list the actual amount of plutonium North Korea has reprocessed at Yongbyon. Rather, it depicts gram quantities of plutonium that were separated in 1990 at an industrial-scale reprocessing facility still under construction. North Korea says that the plutonium was acquired from damaged fuel assemblies from the 5MW research reactor.

Although the IAEA does not release the actual report, it does produce a report stating the facilities and materials North Korea admits to having. This includes: North Korean nuclear material and design information, a research reactor and critical assembly at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (under IAEA safeguards), a sub-critical facility at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, a fuel rod fabrication plant and storage facility at Yongbyon, a 5MW nuclear reactor and a radiochemical laboratory under construction at the Institute of Radiochemistry in Yongbyon, a 50MW nuclear plant under construction in Yongbyon, a 200MW plant under construction in Taechon (in North Pyongan Province), and three planned 635MW nuclear reactors. The radiochemical laboratory is reportedly for research on the separation of uranium and plutonium waste management. It also serves as a technical training center. Two uranium mines and two centers for uranium concentrate production are also listed. This list closely matches Western estimates of the scope of North Korea’s nuclear program.

IAEA Newbriefs, June-July 1992, p.3; Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.83.

7 May 1992

As a means of ensuring that the IAEA team does not "miss anything" during inspections, US officials provide IAEA Director General Hans Blix and his top aides intelligence briefings in September 1991, March 1992, and 7 May 1992. During the last briefing, Blix is given a "virtual reality" tour of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. US officials place a great deal of emphasis on the reprocessing facility, which North Korea has identified as a "radiochemical laboratory."

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.268-269.

11-16 May 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix arrives in Pyongyang prior to the IAEA inspection team to meet with North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun and first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju. He is reassured that the inspectors will be allowed access to any site in North Korea regardless if it is listed in the initial report submitted on 4 May 1992 to the IAEA.

In the course of the meetings, Blix visits the unfinished nuclear reprocessing laboratory at Yongbyon. After seeing the site, he reports that North Korea is building a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility capable of processing spent uranium into plutonium. He says that North Korea has already produced a "tiny quantity" of plutonium. However, the quantity is much less than what is required to build a nuclear weapon. According to the North Koreans, the reprocessing plant will be used to produce mixed-oxide fuel for future fast-breeder reactors. North Korea also expresses interest in building gas-graphite reactors because it can do so indigenously.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40; IAEA Newsbriefs, June-July 1992, p.3; Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, 21 May 1992, pp.7-8; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.79; T.R. Reid, Washington Post, 17 May 1992.

Mid-May 1992

Following a meeting between IAEA Director General Hans Blix and North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk and Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun, North Korea says that it is willing to consider eliminating certain elements of its nuclear program if foreign countries provide "the required assistance." Blix says that he is concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program and the possibility that it will develop a nuclear bomb with special emphasis on reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium. Yon denies that North Korea is interested in nuclear weapons. However, he says that North Korea is interested in using modern light-water reactors rather than the heavy-water reactors (whose by-products can be more easily reprocessed to produce plutonium).

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 20 June 1992.

13-15 May 1992

During North Korean-Japanese normalization talks, Japan demands that North Korea immediately implement IAEA inspections. A deadlock in the talks arises from Japanese demands over the reprocessing facility in North Korea. The talks are conducted by North Korean chief negotiator Li Sam-ro and Japanese Ambassador Noboru Nakahira.

Following the talks, IAEA Director General Hans Blix travels to Japan to prepare for the 25 May 1992 inspections of North Korea’s facilities. While in Japan, Blix informs officials that North Korea used hot cells to separate plutonium in 1990. He tells Japanese Science and Technology Minister Kanzo Tanigawa that the IAEA team will verify whether North Korea actually used the cells. North Korean officials have told Blix that the "radiochemical laboratory" was completed in 1987 and that a "very small amount" of plutonium had been separated there. According to Blix, the reprocessing lab that he saw during his earlier visit was missing some equipment. However, no facilities were under construction during his visit.

Naoaki Usui, Nuclear Fuel, 25 May 1992, pp.13-14; Sheryl Wudunn, New York Times, 17 May 1992.

25 May – 7 June 1992

Willi Theis leads the first IAEA inspection team to North Korea. During the inspections of Yongbyon, the team is able to verify the location of fissionable materials as stated in North Korea’s "initial report," which was submitted to the IAEA on 4 May 1992. In doing so, they visit the six-story building the size of two football fields designated as the "radiochemical laboratory." The team discovers that the building is only 80 percent complete, and that the equipment inside is only 40 percent ready for full-scale production. According to one IAEA official, "the works inside the building are ‘extremely primitive’ and far from ready to produce quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic weapons."

The IAEA team also inspects a 5MW research reactor that came online in 1986, and a 50 MW power plant scheduled to become operational by 1996. According to Blix, earlier reports, which stated that there is electrical equipment around the 200MW plant, are false. Rather, he saw "poles on which lines could be mounted." The North Koreans informed him that they are attempting to develop a civil nuclear power program using natural uranium and graphite.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.268-269; Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1992, pp.11-12.

June 1992

At the IAEA annual meeting, the North Korean representative informs the IAEA that North Korea’s reprocessing facility should be retained "for the sake of the country’s prosperity and economic growth."

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 20 June 1992.

11 June 1992

North Korea "responds favorably" to the IAEA’s proposal that it switch its nuclear program from graphite-moderated to light-water reactors.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1992.

13 June 1992

According to the IAEA, North Korea’s facilities’ designs, radiation shielding systems, cranes, protective devices, waste disposal sites and safety control systems are "seriously defective."

In support of this statement, North Korean defector, Kim Chol-ho (assumed name), attests that during his service with North Korea’s People’s Army, he personally witnessed evidence of leakage of radioactive material at Yongbyon. Dr. Sin Song-kim of South Korea’s Defense Research Institute confirms Kim’s statement. Kim says that he heard from workers at Yongbyon that a nuclear detonation device had been manufactured, but that nuclear warhead production had not been completed.

Choe Maeng-ho, Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 15 June 1992, p.1; Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 13 June 1992, p.1.

15 June 1992

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, member states discuss North Korea’s nuclear situation. The Board agrees that all nuclear-related facilities must be reported at least 180 days prior to construction. Previous regulations required 60 days prior notice.

Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7; Yonhap (Seoul), 10 July 1992.

15 June 1992

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the North Korean technology that the IAEA saw at Yongbyon was "30 years old." Therefore, the IAEA disagrees with CIA reports that North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the very near future. However, before making an accurate assessment, the IAEA must conduct additional inspections.

Reuters, 15 June 1992; Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7.

18 June 1992

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, O Chang-rim, head of the North Korean delegation, advocates continued bilateral negotiations between the North and South as stipulated by the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC). According to O, the major obstacle to the North-South talks is South Korea’s refusal to allow North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South. North Korea fears that these bases may house nuclear weapons. O also says that North Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA on inspections, but that construction of the Yongbyon radiochemical laboratory will continue despite international concern.

Kang Pyong-tae, Hanguk Ilbo (Seoul), 20 June 1992, p.1; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992.

19 June 1992

North Korea says that it intends to continue its present course of nuclear development, including research on a fast-breeder reactor, composite nuclear fuel, and completion of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. It insists that its "radiochemical laboratory" (reprocessing facility) will be used to produce fuel for a fast-breeder reactor. The IAEA considers the laboratory a "cause of grave threats to stability and peace" in the region. North Korea says that it must develop an indigenous fuel cycle because it cannot afford to import materials.

Choe Maeng-ho, Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul), p.1; Yonhap (Seoul), 19 June 1992.

19 June 1992

The IAEA announces that it plans to undertake special inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that North Korea has agreed to such inspections.

Proliferation Issues, 19 June 1992.

19 June 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix discusses North Korea’s possession of nuclear materials and nuclear policy with South Korean Ambassador Chang Kung-mo.

Proliferation Issues, 19 June 1992.

22 June 1992

It is alleged that North Korea has separated plutonium using Soviet equipment. This, however, was not included in the "initial report" given to the IAEA in May 1992. In separating the plutonium, North Korea used hot cells supplied to it in the 1960s, as well as acquired information on reprocessing and laboratories in the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Union supplied the hot cells to North Korea under the same agreement that allowed for the sale of the 2MW IRT-research reactor.

Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16.

30 June 1992

The European Union supports steps taken by North Korea towards full implementation of the safeguards agreement. It stresses the importance of the December 1992 North-South Korean agreement to establish a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The European Union hopes for full and early implementation of bilateral nuclear inspections.

Reuters, 30 June 1992.

July 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs a US congressional panel that IAEA inspectors have been unable to verify that North Korea has not been producing plutonium for weapons at Yongbyon.

Compuserve-Executive News Service, 16 September 1992.

6 July 1992

IAEA inspectors, led by Willi Theis, begin a second round of international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The inspections will focus on the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. The team will also investigate the status of North Korea’s plutonium production, storage operations, and reactor safety.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 6 July 1992.

10 July 1992

North Korea accepts a subsidiary arrangement to the April safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea has not yet approved attachments to the agreement. The purpose of the attachments is to specify the facilities that will be routinely inspected and the length and frequency of the inspections.

Yonhap (Seoul), 10 July 1992.

22 July 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the IAEA "would not have any hesitation" in identifying North Korea’s reported radiochemical laboratory as "a reprocessing plant in the terminology of the industrialized world."

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

August 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix testifies before the US Congress that North Korea has "emphatically denied" separating additional amounts of plutonium.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp.16-17

23 August 1992

South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok meets with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen in Beijing. According to Qian, China has repeatedly asked North Korea to allow IAEA inspections.

Kim Chin-su, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 August 1992.

31 August-15 September 1992

In preparation for the IAEA’s third inspection visit, North Korea hurriedly installs transmission lines and other related equipment at the 5MW reactor facility at Yongbyon.

The third IAEA inspection team arrives in North Korea on 31 August 1992. The inspections will last two weeks. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that the IAEA’s inspections will focus on North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing program.

During the inspection, the team is given limited access to two suspected nuclear-related sites at Yongbyon. North Korea had not declared the sites in the report submitted to the IAEA in May 1992. One of the sites is a two-story building that has been partly covered by large mounds of earth and landscaping prior to the inspectors arrival so as to appear as a one-story building. However, US overhead photography recorded the construction of the building prior to the inspection, which shows that the first-story of the building (which is covered up) contains thick-walled vaults made of reinforced concrete. Such construction is suitable for nuclear waste storage. When the IAEA inspection team requests access to this portion of the building, the North Koreans inform them that it does not exist. They are permitted limited access to the second-story of the building, which is found to house heavy weapons, including tanks and missiles on mobile carriages. The North Koreans refuse to allow a formal and thorough inspection of the building based on grounds that it is a military site and thus exempt from inspection. The IAEA, however, does not accept such exemptions.

During the inspection, the North Korean government denies some IAEA inspectors access to its facilities at Yongbyon. It also blocks direct communication between IAEA headquarters and its representatives in North Korea. The team is expected to return on 19 September to brief IAEA Director General Hans Blix.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p.78; Compuserve-Executive News Service, 31 August 1992; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 10 September 1992, pp.13-14; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.274-275.

17 September 1992

During an IAEA meeting, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia and other IAEA members condemn North Korea for limiting IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United Kingdom, Canada, France and Germany urge North Korea to open its facilities for inspections.

Yonhap (Seoul), 17 September 1992.

18 September 1992

According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Regardless, verification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be difficult to attain. The IAEA believes that construction at an alleged nuclear reprocessing plant has been stopped. However, the IAEA Board of Governors says that "suspicion of nuclear development remains."

Yonhap (Seoul), 19 September 1992.

November 1992

IAEA officials are unenthusiastic about the prospects of North and South Korean bilateral inspections. They fear that a mutual inspection regime could eventually be considered as an alternative to IAEA safeguards.

David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40.

4 November 1992

The North Korean foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea may stop IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities if South Korea and the United States do not terminate their joint Team Spirit military exercises.

Korea Times (Seoul), 4 November 1992, p.B7.

12 November 1992

During the fourth inspection, IAEA Director General Hans Blix telephones chief inspector Willi Theis (at the Yongbyon nuclear complex). According to Blix, the IAEA possesses indisputable evidence that a trench had been dug and later covered up between the reprocessing plant and the "one story building" whose basement is believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. (The structures mentioned are located at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.) He also informs Theis that there is clear evidence that North Korea has attempted to camouflage a nearby outdoor nuclear waste facility. He instructs Theis to inform the North Koreans that they must declare these sites as nuclear facilities and permit inspections. Theis immediately summons two senior nuclear officials at the Yongbyon facility and attempts to work with them on amending North Korea’s initial declaration to the IAEA. They cooperate with the intention of including the waste sites in the report with as little admission of error as possible.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.275.

13 November 1992

The North Korean senior nuclear officials who have been working with IAEA chief inspector Willi Theis accuse him of being "an agent of the CIA" and performing inspections "on the basis of instructions from the US state department." They then refuse to cooperate further with Theis.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.275.

December 1992

The IAEA team conducts its fifth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992.

1 December 1992

North Korean Minister of the Atomic Energy Agency Choe Hak-kun, Roving Ambassador O Chang-rim, and other North Korean officials meet with IAEA Director General Hans Blix to discuss North Korea’s implementation of the nuclear agreement. Blix is believed to have notified North Korea that it has not declared all of its nuclear facilities and asks it to "sincerely implement the nuclear agreement." It is also suspected that North Korea has hidden nuclear facilities because it refused to allow an IAEA special inspection team to enter the country right after it finished its fourth inspection.

KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 1 December 1992.

4 December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents the fourth inspection report to the Board of Governors. The report suggests that several nuclear sites in North Korea were not originally disclosed. The IAEA will send a fifth team, as well as a high-ranking official to North Korea to inspect the unreported bases. Blix discusses findings from the four previous inspections with North Korean Nuclear Industry Minister Choe Hak-kun. According to the South Korean envoy to Vienna, Yi Si-yong, Choe’s willingness to speak with Blix about the inspections is a positive sign.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992.

5 December 1992

IAEA experts believe that North Korea is capable of processing "much larger amounts of nuclear material" than it is currently admitting. The IAEA has requested samples of nuclear fuel from North Korea. North Korea, however, denies the request because it reportedly cannot provide nuclear fuel until 1993.

Yonhap (Seoul), 5 December 1992.

Late-December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix requests "visits" to clarify the nature of the two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon and to conduct tests.

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.276.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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