North Korea Special Collection

IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections 1994

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Previous page: 1993 Chronology.

3 January 1994

US officials announce that North Korea has agreed to permit IAEA inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities once North Korea agrees with the Agency on "the exact procedures." US state department Undersecretary Lynn Davis says that the "agreement in principle" reached between North Korea and the United States to allow IAEA inspections is one of the "interim steps" before the United States will agree to a third round of talks with North Korea. Other steps involve the resumption of a North Korean dialogue with South Korea in exchange for cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise. North Korean United Nations Ambassador Ho Jong confirms the agreement and says that IAEA inspections will be permitted in order to "keep continuity" of international safeguards. Ho says that the United States and North Korea have made "some very substantial progress" during negotiations in December 1993 in New York.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p.A11; John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p.A8.

4 January 1994

US officials say that they are likely to make the important concession of accepting North Korea's proposal of a complete one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear facilities, in the hope that additional inspections can be agreed upon in the future.

Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p.A11; John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p.A8.

10 January 1994

The IAEA and North Korea hold a second round of "working-level" discussions on the scope and content of inspections. The IAEA submits a "check list" for inspections at North Korea's nuclear facilities. Items on the "check list" include examining the fuel rods at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, taking samples, and checking seals and surveillance equipment. During the first round of "working-level" discussions held on 7 January 1994, the IAEA and North Korea disagreed on the details of implementing the safeguards.

Yonhap (Seoul), 11 January 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 8 January 1994; Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 January 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994.

4 February 1994

North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin says that "conflicting positions" between the IAEA and North Korea "cannot be merged at the moment" and that "no immediate prospect" exists for allowing the IAEA to administer unconditional inspections of the North's nuclear sites. According to Yun, North Korea "will not accept to clarify everything" and that it has "offered enough to prove the continuity of knowledge [about North Korea's nuclear activities]."

Reuters, 5 February 1994.

28 February 1994

According to Western intelligence sources, the design of North Korea's reprocessing complex being built at Yongbyon is intended specifically for the use of plutonium separation technologies developed by a consortium of 13 European counties called the European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (Eurochemic). However, IAEA officials from the Department of Safeguards believe that the plutonium extraction process is "no mystery." Similarly, Russian officials claim that the former Soviet Union furnished North Korea with the reprocessing technology.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 28 February 1998, pp.6-7.

23 March 1994

IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that it appears that North Korea will complete the construction of its 50MW gas-graphite reactor in Yongbyon on schedule by the end of 1994. Kyd says it appears that North Korea is constructing a third nuclear reactor in Taechon, which is scheduled for completion in early 1996.

KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 March 1994.

24 March 1994

According to US and European officials, North Korea may be reprocessing spent fuel through an unsafeguarded second reprocessing line at the Yongbyon reprocessing complex. The revelation comes after IAEA inspections of the Yongbyon reprocessing plant during which inspectors were prevented from examining points that may connect the existing reprocessing line to the suspected second line. The existing line was placed under safeguards in 1993. It is believed that the existence of an unsafeguarded second line can allow North Korea to divert "plutonium-laden material in solution from the safeguarded line without detection." US officials say that the existence of a new reprocessing line can double North Korea's plutonium production capacity.

Nucleonics Week, 24 March 1994, pp.1-2; New York Times, 3 April 1994, p.4.

1 April 1994

North Korea's foreign ministry states that the nuclear inspection dispute can be settled in direct talks with the United States, and declines a Russian proposal to resolve the matter at a world conference.

Reuters, 1 April 1994.

13 April 1994

Speaking at the annual conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that it is critical that the IAEA have complete access to the two undeclared sites in North Korea suspected of being nuclear waste dump-sites in order to determine whether any nuclear materials have been diverted for nuclear weapons production. Blix stresses that gaining access to the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is also necessary to learn whether the lab has been used since February 1993. According to Blix, the IAEA is concerned that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has reported. In the spring of 1993, it was concluded that North Korea had more plutonium than it had declared. Blix disclosed that North Korea is working on constructing a second [reprocessing] production line in the radiochemical lab, which is expected to be completed in the near future.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 15 April 1994, p.A4; Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), 14 April 1994; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 13 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p.42.

27 April 1994

North Korea announces that it will not accept full IAEA inspections. Although IAEA inspectors will be permitted to witness the removal of the nuclear spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, they will not be allowed to take samples of the rods or to measure their radioactivity.

Washington Post, 28 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p.44.

1 May 1994

The IAEA sends a letter to North Korea reiterating its demand that North Korea allow full inspection of the refueling of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. IAEA Director General Hans Blix in a letter to North Korean foreign minister Kim Yong-nam warns that North Korea's failure to agree to IAEA inspections will be seen as evidence of North Korean efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and will compel the IAEA to take the issue to the UN Security Council.

JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p.44.

3 May 1994

A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman says that the IAEA's demand to set aside and measure spent fuel from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is "unreasonable," adding that North Korea will allow "the observation of the fuel rod replacement, containment and surveillance over all replaced fuel and other sufficient inspections for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards." The spokesman adds that "selective" fuel rod sampling "can never be allowed because it means routine and ad hoc inspections that ignore North Korea's unique status" under the NPT following the "temporary suspension" of its withdrawal from the NPT.

United Nations Security Council, Document S/1994/540, 5 May 1994.

13 May 1994

The IAEA announces that it will shortly send an inspection team to North Korea to service cameras and check safeguard seals at the reprocessing plant and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea will also conduct working-level talks with the IAEA on the removal of the fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor. IAEA inspectors will be allowed to set aside fuel rod samples for future measurement. Inspectors will also complete some steps blocked during the March 1994 inspections, including the measurement of radioactivity and search for radioactive particles at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant, but will not be able to sample "liquids from tanks used to dissolve spent fuel." The inspection team will also not be allowed to conduct formal inspections of the removal of spent fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor.

United Nations Press Release, Document IAEA/1268, 13 May 1994; Washington Post, 14 May 1994.

14 May 1994

North Korea starts unloading spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors.

New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp.A1, A3.

16 May 1994

US state department officials announce that if North Korea has removed or "emptied" the spent fuel from the rods, the United States will seek sanctions in the UN Security Council. US defense secretary William Perry characterizes the situation as a "very substantial near-term crisis."

New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp.A1, A3.

31 May 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that due to continued North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections, North Korea is "no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards." The IAEA makes a final appeal to North Korea, asking it to stop withdrawing fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to allow international inspections to proceed. IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered "vital to future measurement." In a telex to North Korea, the IAEA reiterates that it will accept two other methods of measuring the rods that remain, but according to Blix, North Korea has not accepted the proposals due to political constraints. North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin announces that the refueling will continue. Yun says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site "pending an inspection agreement."

Washington Post, 1 June 1994; Guardian (London), 1 June 1994.

3 June 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the UN Security Council that the Agency is unable to verify whether North Korea has used the plutonium extracted from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor to make nuclear weapons. According to Blix, North Korea has removed the 300 fuel rods of the "core fuel element" and mixed them up without marking their exact location in the reactor, thus making it impossible to determine the past activities of the reactor. There is no "technical way of knowing whether North Korea secretly removed fuel from the reactor in 1989 when it was shut down for 100 days and ...if plutonium [was extracted] from it." However, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci says that although the IAEA's capability to substantiate the extent of North Korea's plutonium diversion has been "seriously eroded," it has not been destroyed.

Paul Lewis, New York Times, 4 June 1994, p. A3; Thomas Lippman, Washington Post, 4 June 1994, p.A14.

7 June 1994

North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin declares that the North Korean government "will never allow inspections" of two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. One of the reasons for not allowing inspections is because the United States discovered the two nuclear sites using spy satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that inspecting the two sites "is even more important" for determining if North Korea has diverted plutonium, in light of the fact that North Korea has removed spent fuel from the core of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process. According to Blix, in removing the rods without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process, North Korea's "intention must have been to destroy the possibility of the [IAEA] obtaining information about the history of the core through independent measurements and thereby maintain uncertainty about the amount of nuclear material, specifically plutonium that may be present." However, North Korea's Department of Atomic Energy Director Pak Yong-nam says that the IAEA can still determine whether North Korea has diverted material from the nuclear reactor because North Korea is "preserving the technical possibility for later measurements of the fuel rods."

Washington Post, 8 June 1994.

8 June 1994

North Korean foreign minister Kim Yong-nam says North Korea will "guarantee [IAEA] inspections...testing, measuring, and the preservation of nuclear fuel," if the United States agrees to a third round of bilateral talks. The United States declines the offer and instead asks North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections before the United States will consider reopening bilateral talks.

Reuters, 8 June 1994; in Executive News Service, 8 June 1994.

8 June 1994

IAEA officials announce that North Korea will have discharged all of the spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor by 10 June 1994. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the fuel removal at Yongbyon "has now been 90 percent completed." The fuel unloading has been faster than anticipated due to North Korea's possession of more unloading equipment than was previously indicated by IAEA inspections. IAEA officials claim that North Korea now has the ability to reprocess the spent fuel rods and separate out the weapons-grade plutonium by early August 1994. Kyd says that the IAEA has been unable to accept North Korea's proposal to supply the IAEA with a sample of 40 of the reactor's 8,000 fuel rods, instead of the 300 that are sought by the Agency. The proposal has been rejected because 40 fuel rods are insufficient to trace the 5MW gas-graphite reactor's history.

Washington Times, 9 June 1994, p.A13; Reuters, 8 June 1994.

9 June 1994

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea has removed 6,500 of the original 8,000 fuel rods from the core of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. Two IAEA inspectors are monitoring the fuel rods in the cooling pond. North Korea is not allowing the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the rods. According to a Western diplomat, the ability to reconstruct North Korea's nuclear history "is now lost."

Nucleonics Week, 9 June 1994, pp. 3-4.

10 June 1994

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea.

Adrian Pontieri, UPI, 10 June 1994.

13 June 1994

North Korea submits a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.

Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 June 1994.

15 June 1994

The IAEA inspectors leave North Korea because they can no longer account for the 8,000 fuel rods.

Executive News Service, 16 June 1994.

16 June 1994

US safeguards experts propose that the IAEA use alternative techniques to measure the plutonium in the 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korea from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. According to one Western safeguards official, it is still "theoretically possible" to recreate an inventory of North Korea's fissile material "within a 90-95 percent confidence level" with North Korean cooperation.

Nucleonics Week, 16 June 1994, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1994

North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, reportedly agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and promises that the IAEA's monitoring equipment will stay in good condition.

UPI, 16 June 1994; Washington Times, 17 June 1994, pp. A1, A16.

23 June 1994

North Korea confirms that it will fully comply with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, maintain IAEA monitoring equipment in compliance with the NPT, and halt its nuclear activities.

Yonhap (Seoul), 23 June 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p.20.

12 July 1994

North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Kim Su-man announces that IAEA inspectors can remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, and that the recently removed fuel rods will not be processed; neither will the 5MW gas-graphite reactor be refueled.

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 13 July 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 12 July 1994.

31 August 1994

North Korea's ambassador to Austria, Kim Gwang-sop says that full inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities shall be forthcoming following the accord reached between North Korea and the United States in Geneva. Kim admits that North Korea has produced plutonium in the past but that its use has been restricted to civilian purposes.

Reuters, 31 August 1994.

13 September 1994

The IAEA states in a confidential report that inspections of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since 1993. The conclusion is reached by analyzing nuclear samples taken from the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] at Yongbyon in March and May 1994. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed. The report confirms that North Korea has not permitted inspections of two major nuclear facilities.

Neue Zuericher Zeitung (Zuerich), 15 September 1994.

16 September 1994

IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer says that as a result of the nuclear accord reached with North Korea, the IAEA will broaden its inspection activities to include all seven of North Korea's declared nuclear sites. IAEA inspectors will verify that the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon are not reprocessed until definite steps are taken to freeze the nuclear program. The IAEA announces that its inspectors have begun replacing the batteries and videotapes in surveillance equipment in all seven declared nuclear facilities.

AFP (Paris), 16 August 1994; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 16 August 1994.

21 October 1994

The United States and North Korea sign an accord (Agreed Framework), which specifies the actions that both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light-water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT. It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities.

US-Korea Review, December 1994, p.9.

1 November 1994

A spokesman for North Korea's foreign ministry says that North Korea is taking "practical steps" to implement the Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea's Administration Council has ordered the cessation of construction on the 50MW and 200MW gas-graphite reactors. The Council has also decided to halt operation of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to take measures to withdraw fuel rods that were intended for refueling it. In addition, North Korea will continue to cease operations at its radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and other nuclear facilities.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 1 November 1994.

4 November 1994

The UN Security Council endorses the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October 1994. It approves North Korea's voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea rejects the statement on the ground that it only emphasizes North Korea's responsibilities under the framework agreement.

UN Weekly, 8 November 1994.

11 November 1994

The IAEA holds a closed-door board meeting and decides to send a small inspection team to North Korea to monitor the nuclear freeze.

Steve Pagani, Reuters, 11 November 1994.

14-18 November 1994

US and North Korean experts discuss safe storage and final disposition of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. The Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang) describes the talks as "useful and constructive" and says that the experts will meet again in December 1994 to resolve "technical and operational matters."

Reuters, 19 November 1994.

28 November 1994

The IAEA confirms that North Korea has frozen operations at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel fabrication facility. It also confirms that construction has been stopped at the 50MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon and the 200MW gas-graphite reactor at Taechon.

Reuters, 28 November 1994.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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