North Korea Special Collection

North Korea: Nuclear Infrastructure

Yongbyon

Nuclear Reactors

2MWt IRT-2000 research reactor

Activities: Operating. North Korea received this reactor from the former Soviet Union in May/June 1965. The reactor became operational in 1967.

IAEA safeguards: Covered by the Type-66 IAEA safeguards agreement (signed in 1977), and the 1992 IAEA-North Korea safeguards agreement.

0.1MWt critical facility

Activities: Operating. The facility was obtained from the former Soviet Union in the early 1960s.

IAEA safeguards: Covered by the Type-66 IAEA safeguards agreement (signed in 1977), and the 1992 IAEA-North Korea safeguards agreement.

Gas-graphite, natural uranium, 5MWe reactor

Construction is believed to have started in 1980 and completed in 1986.

Status: Operations frozen under terms of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework. North Korea has promised not to refuel the reactor. Packing of the approximately 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods began in April 1996 and the entire operation is expected to be completed in 1999.

IAEA Safeguards: IAEA monitoring freeze in operations

Proliferation Concern:

• North Korea has stated that the 5MWe reactor was charged in 1986 and shut down for 100 days in 1989 to replace some damaged fuel rods. North Korea has also admitted to reprocessing some damaged fuel rods in 1990 to produce "gram sized" quantities of plutonium.
• Subsequent IAEA analysis on the basis of plutonium samples and isotopic analysis of high-level radioactive waste from North Korea showed that North Korea reprocessed spent fuel on at least three occasions (in 1989, 1990, and 1991). Western intelligence agencies suspect that North Korea probably reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two atomic bombs.
• North Korea says that the discrepancies between its report and the IAEA’s findings occurred due to contamination by material that was reprocessed in 1975.
• North Korea removed approximately, 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor in May 1994. IAEA inspectors were allowed to observe the removal of the spent fuel rods; but the IAEA’s requests for a sample of 300 fuel rods from the reactor core to determine its past operating history were denied. North Korea offered the IAEA a sample of 40 fuel rods. The IAEA rejected this offer on grounds that it was insufficient to determine the reactor’s history.

Gas-graphite, natural uranium, 50MWe reactor

Status: Construction began in 1984 and was halted in 1994 under terms of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework.

IAEA Safeguards: IAEA monitoring construction freeze

Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities

Reprocessing / Radiochemical Laboratory*

Status: Partially completed. Construction began in 1987 and was halted in 1994 under terms of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework.

IAEA safeguards: IAEA monitoring construction freeze.

Proliferation Concern:

• In 1992, IAEA inspectors found the facility 80 percent constructed with 40 percent of the equipment installed. An IAEA official described the building as "extremely primitive" and far from ready to produce plutonium on an industrial scale.

*North Korea maintains that the 600ft-long facility is a radiochemical laboratory because it has never been fully tested and when first inspected by the IAEA in 1992, was only partially completed. However, the IAEA insists that it is a spent fuel reprocessing facility.

Isotope Processing Facility

Activities: Located at the Atomic Energy Research Center (AERC) in Yongbyon. North Korea says that the facility produces isotopes for medical purposes. The facility has Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale "hot cells" that may have been used to extract "gram sized quantities" of plutonium from the damaged fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor in 1990.

Nuclear Waste Facilities

There are three nuclear waste storage sites at Yongbyon. The first site is located northwest of the Reprocessing/Radiochemical laboratory. Completed in 1976, it probably served as the AERC’s primary nuclear waste facility until 1990.

A second facility, designated "Building 500" by the CIA, became operational in 1990. This is one of North Korea’s suspect undeclared nuclear facilities.

Proliferation Concern:

• "Building 500" has two levels. The uppermost floor comprises a warehouse filled with military equipment. The bottom floor is believed to store nuclear waste. US overhead imagery, which recorded the construction of the building prior to the IAEA inspections, showed that the first-story of the building contains thick-walled vaults made of reinforced concrete. Such construction is suitable for nuclear-waste storage. US satellite imagery also reveals that North Korea undertook construction activities to conceal this nuclear waste storage facility from IAEA inspectors. In 1991, pipes connecting the Reprocessing/Radiochemical Laboratory and "Building 500" were buried. Subsequently, in 1992, North Korea concealed the lower part of the building by covering it with mounds of earth and landscaping it. North Korea has denied IAEA inspectors access to this building on grounds that it is not nuclear-related.

Uranium Enrichment and Fuel Fabrication

Fuel-fabrication facility

Status: Operations frozen

IAEA safeguards: IAEA monitoring freeze

Uranium purification facility

Status: Operating

IAEA safeguards: IAEA monitoring operations

Nuclear Weapons-Related Facilities

Explosive test site

Activities: Probably used to test high-explosive triggering devices for use in nuclear weapons.

Sources:
CNS Nuclear Database*
*Full citations will be available in the expanded version

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