North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramCNS Resources on North Korea's Ballistic Missile ProgramOverview of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program
Implications North Korea's Scud-C inventory gives it the capability of striking South Korea's rear areas and US staging areas around Pusan. This is a capability that North Korea did not have during the 1950-1953 Korean War, and which could substantially influence the course of future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. With its Nodong missiles, North Korea could also threaten Japan, as well as China, and the Russian Far East. North Korea's Taepodong has the range but not the accuracy to strike all parts of Japan and the US military bases there. Other long-range missiles now in the design stage, such as the Taepodong-2, could potentially allow North Korea to threaten the entire western Pacific region. If such missiles were transferred to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, or Libya, it could trigger off a regional missile race in the Middle East and South Asia. North Korea's continued development of long-range missiles could also lead to a strategic arms race in Northeast Asia. South Korea is already seeking to develop a 300km-range missile. Indeed, both South Korea and Japan could respond to this impetus by seeking to build a missile defense system. Given the unreliability of current missile defense systems, South Korea and Japan may also find it necessary to develop their own delivery systems to carry out deep strikes within North Korea. Furthermore, in the event of the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the emergence of a North Korean nuclear capability, South Korea, which had a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, may go nuclear as well. Despite the advances made by North Korea, it still has to cross several technical hurdles before it can field long-range ballistic missiles. The developmental leaps to successful multiple stage systems using large rocket motors cannot be achieved without external technological assistance. Some of this assistance is probably being provided by Russian specialists, both in North Korea and Russia. Russia may be able to stem the "brain-drain," but it is unable to completely halt the leakage of information. Despite concerns in the US Congress, a 1995 US National Intelligence Estimate concluded that North Korea was at least 15 years away from fielding ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States. Even if the threat posed by North Korea itself is controlled, the export of missile production equipment and the establishment of production facilities in Syria, Iran and Pakistan have already occurred. Thus, the effects of North Korea's production and proliferation of missiles and missile technology promise to extend well into the future. To better understand the technical and policy significance of the latest rocket test, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has compiled a detailed chronology of the North's ballistic missile programs. This chronology is compiled from a variety of open sources, which include periodicals, newspapers, and professional journals. A review of the data provided in the chronology leads to several general conclusions about North Korean missile trade and developments. Go to the First Page
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