North Korea Special Collection

North Korea: A Second Taep’o-dong Test?

On 16 June 1999, Japanese news media reported that North Korea is planning to test a Taep’o-dong-2 ballistic missile with a potential range of 4,000-6,000km. The Kyodo News Agency, quoting Japanese defense officials, said that a North Korean ballistic missile test was expected within a month or two.(1) Reports of an impending Taep’o-dong-2 test were corroborated by news reports in the US media which alleged that US intelligence has uncovered evidence that North Korea might be planning the launch of a Taep’o-dong-2 or a second test of the Taep’o-dong-1 later in the summer.(2)

The test is expected to be made from North Korea’s rocket launch site in Musudan-ri, Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province. The site is apparently the same one that was used to launch a Taep’o-dong-1 on 31 August 1998.(3) According to media reports, North Korea is refurbishing the launch pad in preparation for a test. The height of the launch pad has been raised from 20m to 60m, adding to speculation that North Korea might be preparing to launch a missile with a longer range. South Korean intelligence sources suggest that in light of the increased height of the launch pad, the new missile could have a range of 6,000km.(4) Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported on 23 June 1999 that a US reconnaissance satellite detected heat signatures from a static test for a rocket engine in early May 1999. The purpose of the test was to ensure that the engine would generate enough thrust to achieve the intended range and speed.(5)

Despite South Korean and Japanese efforts to downplay reports of the impending test, the United States has hinted that North Korea has showed no signs of backing down from preparations.(6) US Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said on 7 July 1999 that “we have the same evidence last week that we had this week, which is signs of preparations.”(7) In response, the United States has deployed the surveillance ship USNS Invincible near Korean waters to monitor the anticipated Taep’o-dong test.(8)

Earlier reports

After the launch of the Taep’o-dong-1 in August 1998, a steady stream of media reports suggested that North Korea was planning a second test. In September 1998, US reconnaissance satellites detected activity at a North Korean launch site. This activity, coupled with a North Korean maritime warning to naval traffic in the Sea of Japan, led to speculation that another rocket test was in the offing.(9) Both Russian and Japanese media and intelligence services released information that North Korea was planning a second Taep’o-dong test on either 5 September or 9 September 1998.(10) However, no test occurred.

Following initial reports about an impending North Korean rocket launch, the furor died down until November 1998, with only an occasional report in open-source literature about the North’s rocket program. In November 1998, US intelligence sources alleged that North Korea was constructing two new launch facilities for the Taep’o-dong (at Yongodong and Chiha-ri) and that another test was planned for December 1998.(11) US intelligence sources also indicated that Pyongyang was moving parts of a Taep’o-dong from a storage facility to the launch pad.(12)

On 11 December 1998, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan stated that North Korea would not test another missile, but that it would attempt to launch another satellite. Kim declined to specify when the launch would occur.(13) Kim’s statement was followed by a second North Korean warning on 25 December 1998, that it was preparing to launch another rocket.(14) However, US threats to cancel foreign aid appear to have persuaded North Korea to defer that decision. On 31 December 1998, US intelligence sources reported that North Korea had postponed the test of a Taep’o-dong possibly due to unfavorable weather and political conditions.(15)

In January and February 1999, Japan, South Korea, and the United States released several statements denying that North Korea was preparing for a rocket launch. But Japanese intelligence sources alleged that Pyongyang had made significant progress in developing the Taep’o-dong-2 and that it would be tested before the end of 1999.(16)

Taep’o-dong-1 and 2

North Korea is believed to have initiated development of the Taep’o-dong series in the early 1990s. Although both projects might have been conceived independently, Western observers often regard them as variants of the same project. Analysts believe that the Taep’o-dong-1 has been designed to deliver a 1,000-1,500kg warhead at a range of 1,500-2,500km; the Taep’o-dong-2 could conceivably deliver the same payload at ranges between 4,000-6,000km.(17)

The name “Taep’o-dong” comes from the geographical area where a mock up of the new missile was first detected in February 1994.(18) According to open-source literature, the Taep’o-dong-1 uses the No-dong-1 for its first-stage and the Scud-C (Hwasong-6) as the second-stage. The Taep’o-dong-2, on the other hand, is believed to incorporate an entirely new design for the first-stage and a No-dong variant for the second-stage. Some media reports suggest that the first-stage of the Taep’o-dong-2 draws on the Chinese Dongfeng-3 ballistic missile.(19)

North Korea first tested the Taep’o-dong-1 on 31 August 1998. US intelligence tracked the rocket’s flight path over the Pacific Ocean. The first-stage of the rocket fell into international waters roughly 300km east of the launch site (Musudan-ri Launch Facility). The rocket flew over the Japanese island of Honshu and the second-stage fell roughly 330km away from the Japanese port city of Hachinohe after flying for approximately 1,320km. Initial media reports characterized the Taep’o-dong-1 as a two-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile. However, a more detailed analysis of data from radar tapes suggested that the Taep’o-dong had a small solid-fuel third-stage that failed. What was thus initially believed to be a two-stage ballistic missile with a range of 1,600km is now believed to be a multi-stage rocket with a potential range of 3,800-5,900km.(20)

The existence of a solid-fuel third-stage was entirely unexpected. Earlier, North Korea was suspected of developing a two-stage rocket. The existence of a third-stage suggests that North Korea is further along the path of developing and acquiring an intercontinental ballistic missile capability than previously expected.(21) The August 1998 test also revealed that North Korean scientists had crossed other important thresholds such as multi-staging, guidance, and multi-fuel systems. It is still unclear why the Taep’o-dong’s solid-fuel third-stage failed and whether that failure could delay the Taep’o-dong program. However, US intelligence agencies suspect that since North Korea appears reconciled to lower reliability and readiness criteria, the Taep’o-dong could become operational soon.(22)

North Korea may also use a variant of the Taep’o-dong as a space launch vehicle (SLV) to place small satellites in orbit. Although Western media, analysts, and intelligence agencies are more prone to view the Taep’o-dong as a ballistic missile program, North Korea regards it as part of its efforts to develop a space launch vehicle for the peaceful use of space. Indeed, the North Korean Central News Agency challenged the Western characterization of the Taep’o-dong as a ballistic missile in the aftermath of the August 1998 test. North Korea said that it had launched a satellite, the Kwangmyongsong 1 (Bright Lodestar).(23) However, no North Korean satellite was detected in orbit. Analysts suspect that although the Taep’o-dong did probably carry a small satellite, North Korea’s ultimate objective is to acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction at an intercontinental range.(24)

Western analysts and agencies suspect that North Korea is receiving assistance from China, Russia, and Ukraine for its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs. Indeed, North Korea may have received design and engineering assistance in areas of multi-staging, engine design, clustering, and airframe design.(25) Recently, the Washington Times, citing US intelligence reports, claimed that North Korea has not only received assistance from China’s Academy of Launch Technology for its satellite program, but that China may have also assisted North Korea’s ballistic missile program by supplying accelerometers, gyroscopes, specialty steel, and high-technology machinery.(26)

US-North Korea Missile Talks

To date, the United States has had four rounds of negotiations with North Korea between 1996 and 1999 with the objective of freezing North Korea’s ballistic missile program and halting the export of North Korean ballistic missiles and missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East and South Asia.

• The first two rounds of missile talks were held in April 1996 and June 1997. Negotiations focused on North Korea’s deployment of the No-dong-1 ballistic missile and its sales of the Scud-B and –C ballistic missiles, production plants, and other missile-related technology to Iran and Syria. The United States urged North Korea to stop ballistic missile production, halt missile exports, and join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). North Korea rejected these proposals but agreed to continue negotiating.(27)
• The third round of talks, originally scheduled for August 1997, was cancelled when the United States granted asylum to two North Korean defectors.(28) Although both countries agreed in March 1998 to continue negotiations, it took North Korea’s Taep’o-dong-1 test on 31 August 1998 to bring them back to the negotiating table.(29)
• During the third round of negotiations in October 1998, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn offered to relax US economic sanctions against North Korea in return for an end to North Korea’s development and export of ballistic missiles. North Korea rejected the offer on the ground that the United States was already required under the 1994 Agreed Framework to relax economic sanctions. (30) North Korea insisted that its missile program was strictly for self-defense and that it had a sovereign right as a state to develop missiles. The third round of talks ended with no substantial progress other than pledges by both countries to hold another round of discussions.(31)
• A fourth round of talks was held in March 1999. North Korea offered to suspend missile exports over a three-year period for annual cash payments of $1 billion from the United States. The United States rejected the North Korean proposal, but renewed the offer to lift economic sanctions in successive stages in exchange for cooperation on missile-related issues.(32) North Korea rejected this offer and reiterated that it was unwilling to compromise its position on developing, testing, producing, and deploying ballistic missiles. However, North Korea agreed to continue discussions on missile exports.(33)
• In late-May 1999, US North Korea Policy Coordinator William J. Perry visited Pyongyang and made a proposal to North Korea, the details of which remain undisclosed. The proposal reportedly dealt with freezing North Korean missile and nuclear programs in exchange for economic assistance, normalization of US-North Korea political ties, and the lifting of economic sanctions by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. An official North Korean response is expected.(34)
• In June 1999, US envoy Charles Kartman proposed a fifth round of missile talks in a secret meeting with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan in Beijing. No dates for these talks have been announced.(35)

Regional Reactions

South Korea, Japan, and the United States are coordinating their North Korea policy through the high-level Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group to deter North Korea from conducting another rocket test.(36) Japan and South Korea have also held bilateral talks and appealed to China to pressure North Korea to forego the anticipated test.(37)

South Korea:

A second Taep’o-dong test would increase pressure on the Kim-Dae-jung administration to reappraise its “Sunshine” or engagement policy with North Korea. Already, conservatives in Seoul have characterized Kim’s relaxed and benevolent posture toward Pyongyang as naïve and insist that there exist structural limits on the success of any potential engagement with North Korea.(38) In early July 1999, President Kim Dae-jung clarified that Seoul would maintain the existing framework of the engagement policy toward North Korea, including funding to construct the two light-water nuclear reactors, even if North Korea test-fired another ballistic missile.(39) On 12 July 1999, South Korean Foreign Affairs-Trade Minister Hong Soon-young warned North Korea against testing a ballistic missile, noting that in the event of a launch, the Kim Jong-il regime would face grave sanctions from Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, including a possible end to economic cooperation. Hong, however, reiterated Seoul’s commitment to the 1994 Agreed Framework.(40)

Progress in North Korea’s ballistic missile program would likely spur Seoul’s efforts to develop short-range ballistic missiles (300-500km-range), which would give it the technical capability to strike targets across North Korea and deter any potential North Korean missile strikes. In April 1999, South Korea tested a ballistic missile (Hyonmu) that flew only 40km. However, US intelligence sources suspect that the missile was not completely fueled and that its actual maximum range is 300km. South Korea and the United States have agreed in principle that South Korea should be allowed to develop ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 300km with a payload of 500kg. During his July 1999 summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung insisted that South Korea be allowed to develop its own ballistic missiles with a 500km-range.(41) Nevertheless, Seoul remains opposed to participation in the US-led theater missile defense (TMD) development program.(42)

Japan

Japan has threatened to halt its $1 billion contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The Obuchi government stopped funding for KEDO’s light-water nuclear reactor project after North Korea tested the Taep’o-dong-1 in August 1998.(43) Although funding resumed after much persuasion from Washington and Seoul, a second rocket test could lead to an adverse reaction in Tokyo. The Japanese government is also contemplating the imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea in the event of a second Taep’o-dong test. Sanctions would theoretically cover the “flow of money, people and goods.” Specific measures being debated include refusals to grant travel certificates to North Koreans seeking to visit Japan, stronger export-import controls, stricter luggage inspections, and a ban on fund remittances from Japan to North Korea.(44)

After the Taep’o-dong-1 test on 31 August 1998, the Japanese government approved a program to deploy four reconnaissance satellites to provide Japan an independent space-based information-gathering capability.(45) The North Korean rocket test also increased pressure to participate in the US-led TMD. In June 1999, Japan and the United States pledged to jointly study the design of a TMD system for Asia. Japan committed to designing warheads for missiles to be used in the first-phase of the TMD program. Japan has also expressed interest in developing a high-altitude interceptor for the second-phase of the TMD.(46) During his July 1999 summit meeting with Chinese leaders, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi sought China’s help in persuading North Korea against conducting another rocket test.(47)

China

China has stated that it is “not desirable for North Korea to develop weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula.” Beijing is concerned that North Korea’s ballistic missile program is fueling US and Japanese collaborative efforts to build a TMD system in Asia.(48) China fears that a TMD system in Asia coupled with a US-based National Missile Defense (NMD) could degrade its strategic deterrent and spur an arms race in Asia. However, China has been reluctant to address the missile issue with Pyongyang directly. Beijing insists that Washington and Tokyo overestimate its ability to influence the Kim Jong-il regime. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said in March 1999 that China could not intervene directly, as it was a matter of North Korean sovereignty.(49)

United States

The United States has warned that North Korea would suffer “very serious consequences” if it follows its August 1998 test of a long-range rocket with another test launch in 1999.(50) In May 1999, US North Korea Policy Coordinator William J. Perry told North Korean leaders in Pyongyang that the United States would not tolerate another rocket launch.(51) Perry was appointed US North Korea Policy Coordinator in November 1998 to re-appraise the US’ North Korea policy and make a detailed report including policy recommendations on modifying US policy toward North Korea.(52) Perry is expected to propose a comprehensive plan for engaging North Korea including a package of economic and political incentives if North Korea abandons its nuclear and missile programs. The forthcoming Perry report is likely to recommend that the United States should engage North Korea vigorously for a short-period of time during which it should offer the possibility of normalizing political-economic relations with North Korea in order to achieve US foreign policy objectives, including the curtailing of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. However, if engagement fails, the United States should adopt a stringent containment policy toward North Korea.(53) However, the United States is likely to remain committed to the 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO even in the event of a second Taep’o-dong launch. A US official said on 1 July 1999 that the United States acknowledges the impending threat of a second missile launch, and it would be wrong for the US and its allies to overreact to it.(54) Nevertheless, advances in North Korea’s rocket program would increase pressure on the Clinton administration from conservatives in Congress to press ahead with a TMD and NMD.

View from Pyongyang

North Korea has responded to pressure from South Korea, Japan, and the United States by arguing that it is primarily interested in civilian space exploration. On 15 July 1999, a spokesman for the North Korean government stated that the “satellite launch belongs to the legitimate right of an independent sovereign state..., we neither launch a satellite at anybody’s dictate nor stop it at anybody’s advice.”(55) Moreover, North Korea has repeatedly said that as a sovereign state, it has the right to protect itself by “developing, testing, and deploying ballistic missiles for defensive purposes.”

Although the United States and North Korea have had four rounds of missile talks, North Korea has not budged from its position that it has the right to build rockets and missiles to ensure its national security.(56) On 31 March 1999, a North Korean government spokesman said that, “we will never bargain with anyone about our development, production, test, and deployment of missiles, because this belongs to our sovereignty from A to Z.”(57)

A separate issue is North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and missile subsystems to countries such as Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. North Korea says that it has a right to earn hard currency by exporting its products, including ballistic missiles and related technologies.(58) The export of ballistic missiles has assumed greater importance for North Korea as it is on the midst of economic collapse and can no longer bank on aid and subsidies from China and the successor states of the Soviet Union. With few other products to trade, ballistic missile sales constitute lucrative exports. South Korean sources estimate that North Korea may have earned nearly $1 billion annually from missile exports during the late 1980s and the early 1990s; earnings from annual sales of missiles are now estimated at $500 million.(59)

During the fourth round of the US-North Korea missile talks in March 1999, North Korea offered to halt missile exports for three years in exchange for annual payments of $1 billion as “compensation” for lost sales. Describing the offer as blackmail, the United States rejected it.(60) Instead, the United States offered to lift economic sanctions against North Korea gradually, and normalize political relations. Despite the failure to arrive at an agreement, North Korea’s offer is an indicator that it may be willing to accept some curbs on its missile program.

North Korea has criticized South Korea, Japan, and the United States for linking the ballistic missile issue to the heavy-fuel oil shipments and the construction of the two light-water nuclear reactors as agreed under the 1994 Agreed Framework, when in fact there is no linkage between the two.(61) Pyongyang further argues that the United States is exaggerating its ballistic missile capabilities and the threat posed by such capabilities in order to justify its own theater missile and national missile defense programs.(62) North Korea has also been critical of South Korea’s ballistic missile program and has accused the United States of having double standards by allowing Seoul to test ballistic missiles while pressurizing Pyongyang to curb its missile program.(63)

Sources Cited

(1) “Defense Agency Sources Confirm DPRK Missile Preparations,” Tokyo Kyodo, 17 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990617000922, 17 June 1999.

(2) Calvin Sims, “North Korea, Ignoring Warnings, Proceeds With Plans to Test-Fire Missile,” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>, 22 July 1999.

(3) Joseph Bermudez, “North Koreans Test Two-Stage IRBM Over Japan,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 September 1998, p.26.

(4) “NK Set to Launch New Missile In Late August,” Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>, 11 June 1999.

(5) “DPRK Conducted Combustion Test for Rocket Engine,” Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 24 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990623001649, 24 June 1999.

(6) “Seoul sees no sign that North Korea will test another long-range missile,” Korea Herald (Seoul), <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, 22 June 1999; “Japan Skeptical of North Korea Launch,” AP (Tokyo), 5 July 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, <http://www.nautilus.org>, 6 July 1999.

(7) “’NK’s Preparations for Missile Fire Unchanged’, US Says,” JoongAng Ilbo English News (Seoul), <http://english.joongang.co.kr/>, 7 July 1999.

(8) Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Missile Watch,” Washington Times, <http://www.washtimes.com>, 16 July 1999.

(9) Steven Lee Meyers, “North Koreans May be Preparing Another Missile Test,” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>, 4 September 1998.

(10) “North to Launch Second Missile or Rocket,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), <http://www.scmp.com>, 8 September 1998; “North Korea Reportedly Plans New Missile Launch for Saturday,” Interfax-Eurasia, 4 September 1998.

(11) Dana Priest and Thomas W. Lippman, “N. Korea Expanding Missile Programs,” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 20 November 1998.

(12) “Another N. Korean Missile Launch Near, Says USA,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 December 1998; “North Tells of Fresh Rocket Plans,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), <http://www.scmp.com>, 12 December 1998.

(13) “N. Korea Planning Satellite Launch,” Times of India (New Delhi), <http://www.timesofindia.com>, 12 December 1998.

(14) David E. Sanger, “North Korea Warns US it Can Launch Another Missile,” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>, 26 December 1998.

(15) Bill Gertz, “North Korea Postpones Testing of New Long-Range Missile,” Washington Times, 31 December 1998, p.A4.

(16) “No Signs of NK Preparing Missile Launch, Prueher Says,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 20 January 1999, p.1; “Successful Launch of NK Satellite Imminent,” JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), <http://www.joongang.co.kr>, 6 February 1999; “No Sign of Second N. Korean Missile Launch,” Washington Post, 9 February 1999, p.10.

(17) Joseph Bermudez, “The rise and rise of North Korea’s ICBMs,” Jane’s International Defense Review, July 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

(18) Barbara Starr, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p.1.

(19) Bermudez, “The rise and rise of North Korea’s ICBMs.”

(20) Bermudez, “North Koreans Test Two-Stage IRBM Over Japan.”

(21) Robert Walpole, “North Korea’s Taep’o-dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” Speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 1998.

(22) James Risen, “CIA Sees a North Korean Missile Threat,” New York Times, 3 February 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Walpole, “North Korea’s Taep’o-dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.”

(23) Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 4 September 1998.

(24) Bill Gertz, “N. Korean Missile Seen Posing Risk to US,” Washington Times, 16 September 1998, p.1.

(25) Bermudez, “The rise and rise of North Korea’s ICBMs.”

(26) Bill Gertz, “Missile Parts sent to North Korea by Chinese Companies; Response to Embassy Bombing Seen,” Washington Times, <http://www.washtimes.com>, 20 June 1999.

(27) “U.S., DPRK Officials Produce No Agreement at Missile Talks, Yonhap (Seoul), 14 June 1997; in FBIS-TAC-97-164, 13 June 1997; “US, N. Korea Hold Missile Talks in NYC, Reuters, 11 June 1997.

(28) “N. Korea Pulls Out of Missile Talks with US,” Reuters, 27 August 1997.

(29) “N. Korea, U.S. Agree to Resume Missile Talks,” Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), <http://www.kyodo.co.jp>, 14 March 1998.

(30) Howard Diamond, “US, North Korea Meet on Missiles; Japan, South Korea Press on Defenses,” Arms Control Today, October 1998, pp.24, 28.

(31) Chris Michaud, “Little Progress in U.S.-North Korea Missile Talks,” Inquisit, <http://www.inquisit.com>, 2 October 1998.

(32) “Bill Tarrant, “U.S. Warns N. Korea Against Further Missile Tests,” Reuters, 31 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily News, <http://www.nautilus.org>, 31 March 1999.

(33) “DPRK on 4th DPRK-U.S. Missile Negotiations,” Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 31 March 1999.

(34) Son Key-young, “Perry’s 4-Day NK Visit Focuses on Peace Initiatives,” Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>, 21 May 1999.

(35) Jun Kwan-woo, “U.S., North Korea May Resume Talks on Missile Nonproliferation in July,” Korea Herald (Seoul), 28 June 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, <http://www.nautilus.org>, 29 June 1999.

(36) Jang-soo Seo, “Tripartite Policy Coordination Group on NK Policy to be Formed,” JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), 27 April 1999, <http://www.english,joongang.co.kr>; “Joint plan to ground missile test launch,”South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), <http://www.scmp.com>, 28 June 1999; David Sanger, “Clinton and South Korean Leader Warn the North Against Testing Missile,” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>, 2 July 1999.

(37) Japan’s Obuchi to Ask China To Help Stop North Korean Missiles,” Inside China Today, <http://www.insidechina.com>, 25 June 1999.

(38) Jongchul Park, “Seoul’s Engagement Policy towards Pyongyang: Setting, Framework, and Conditions,” Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1999, pp.22-23.

(39) Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “S. Korea’s Kim Defends Policy Toward North,” Washington Post, 24 June 1999; Son Key-young, “N.Korean Missile Test Will Not Derail Engagement Policy: Kim,” Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>, 7 July 1999.

(40) Son Key-young, “NK Missile Launch Will Lead to End From Aid: Min. Hong,” Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>, 12 July 1999.

(41) “Seoul’s missile development gains momentum,” Korea Herald (Seoul), <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, 13 July 1999.

(42) Jun Kwan-woo, “Seoul Reaffirms No Plan to Join US-Led Theater Missile Defense,” Korea Herald (Seoul), <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, 4 May 1999.

(43) “Angry Japan Sets Measures Against North Korea,” Reuters, 9 September 1998; in NAPSNet Daily Report, <http://www.nautilus.org>, 9 September 1998.

(44) “Govt. Considering Steps in Case of Missile Launch,” Daily Yomiuri Online (Tokyo), 16 July 1999, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>; “Tepodon Saihassha Nara Kitachosen he Soukin Chushi,”Yomiuri Online (Tokyo), <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>.

(45) “Article Views Tokyo’s Spy Satellite Plan,” Nihon Kezai Shimbun (Tokyo), 7 November 1998, p.3; in FBIS-EA-98-316, 12 November 1998; “Space Industry Gears Up for Spy Satellite,” Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun (Tokyo), 23 October 1998, p.15; in FBIS-EAS-98-319, 15 November 1998.

(46) Akinori Uchida, “Japan Agrees to Design TMD System Warhead,” Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>, 18 June 1999.

(47) Japan’s Obuchi to Ask China To Help Stop North Korean Missiles.”

(48) “China Changes Position on DPRK Missile, Weapons Program,” Seoul Chungang Ilbo, 28 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990629000027, 28 June 1999.

(49) Ibid.

(50) “US Warns of Consequences if North Korea Tests Missile,” Reuters, 24 June 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, <http://www.nautilus.org>, 28 June 1999.

(51) Elizabeth Becker, “US Says Photos Show North Korea Preparing for Missile,” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>, 18 June 1999.

(52) "State Dept. 11/12 on New North Korea Policy Coordinator," NAPSNet Daily Report, <http://www.nautilus.org/>, 12 November 1998.

(53) Ricks, Thomas E. and Michael Schuman, "US Review of North Korea Policy Sets the Stage for Harsher Stance," 25 February 1999, Wall Street Journal, p.2.

(54) “US Wants KEDO Preserved Even if 2nd Missile Launched,” Tokyo Kyodo, 2 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990702000113, 2 July 1999.

(55) "DPRK FM Spokesman Clarifies Its Stand on Satellite Launch," Korean

Central News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 15 July 1999.

(56) "Intention to Continue to Develop, Produce, Test, and Deploy Missiles," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 9 April 1999.

(57) "DPRK on 4th DPRK-U.S. Missile Negotiations," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 31 March 1999.

(58) Michaud, "Little Progress in U.S.-Korea Missile Talks."

(59) “DPRK To Continue Development of Long-Range Missiles,” Yonhap (Seoul), 31 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990331000150, 31 March 1999.

(60) Tarrant, "U.S. Warns N.Korea Against Further Missile Tests."

(61) "U.S. Stand on DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework Flayed," Korean Central News

Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 31 May 1999.

(62) "Intention to Continue to Develop, Produce, Test, and Deploy Missiles," Korean Central News Agency, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 9 April 1999.

(63) "U.S. Double Standard as Regards 'Missile Issue' Flailed," Korean Central

News Agency (Pyongyang), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, 26 April 1999.

Acknowledgements:
Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani,
Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies