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DPRK Flag North Korea Special Collection

Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility: The Kumchang-ri Controversy

"...there is strong information that makes us suspicious but we lack conclusive evidence that the intended purpose of the underground site is nuclear related."

--US Ambassador Charles Kartman, 21 November 1998 [1]

  1. What is Kumchang-ri?

    Kumchang-ri is an underground site located northwest of Yongbyon, North Korea's frozen nuclear complex. It has been speculated that the site housed, or was intended to house a nuclear reactor or reprocessing facility.[2] Construction of Kumchang-ri is estimated to be complete within two to six years, depending on the amount of foreign assistance received.[3] North Korea continues to deny reports that the site is nuclear-related or intended to be, rather it says that Kumchang-ri is a civilian site.[4]

  2. When did press reports about this facility first surface?

    There exist varying reports estimating when US intelligence sources first identified Kumchang-ri. Some of the earliest reports appeared in January 1998 following the release of a classified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report discussing "an underground site" in North Korea.[5] However, it was not until mid-August 1998 that information, or rather speculation about the site began to be featured in the US media.

  3. What did press releases allege about Kumchang-ri?

    The earliest press releases spoke about "thousands of North Korean workers tunneling in the side of a mountain."[6] It was alleged that the site housed, or was intended to house nuclear reactors or a nuclear reprocessing plant.[7] Then, in mid-November 1998 reports surfaced, which stated that samples of bark, leaves, soil, and waste water one centimeter deep had been collected from around the site. The samples tested positive for traces of radioactive plutonium, thereby leading to further speculation that the site contained or produced plutonium.[8]

  4. What issues did Kumchang-ri raise?

    1. Is North Korea undermining the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework?

      Critics of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework in the US Congress, Pentagon, and the intelligence community argued that North Korea must submit Kumchang-ri to inspections; that if it did not, it would be in direct violation of the Agreed Framework. In short, they insisted that the agreement provided the United States with the right to inspect the facility.[9] However, according to Kenneth Quinnones, former director of North Korean affairs at the US Department of State, it is false to assume that the Agreed Framework gives the United States the right to inspect any facilities at Kumchang-ri or elsewhere. Rather, he said that when US Ambassador Robert Gallucci negotiated the Agreed Framework, he established a two-stage inspection process (found in the "confidential minute" to the agreement).

      First-stage inspections are to be conducted ONLY at specified facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Since the agreement was negotiated, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and US inspectors have had free access to these facilities and have been able to verify North Korea's compliance. Second-stage inspections will verify North Korea's compliance with its pledge not to build any other nuclear-related facilities. They will also be used to establish and verify how much spent nuclear fuel North Korea possesses. However, second-stage inspections will become mandatory for North Korea once the bulk of the construction work on the light-water reactor project is complete and before key nuclear components for the light-water reactor are delivered. Thus, according to the Agreed Framework, the only inspections North Korea must adhere to are IAEA inspections at specified facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Thus, North Korea is not obligated to permit inspections of Kumchang-ri and is not in violation of the agreement.[10] Furthermore, the United States cannot charge North Korea with undermining the Agreed Framework unless it is found to be constructing nuclear reactors or related equipment, or restarts its frozen nuclear program.

    2. Is US policy towards North Korea effective?

      The discovery of Kumchang-ri and the 31 August 1998 Taep'o-dong-1 missile launch caused many US officials to question the viability of the Agreed Framework. With regard to opposition to the Agreed Framework, this was not a new phenomenon, nor a perspective that arose with the discovery of Kumchang-ri. Rather, US officials in Congress, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community have been opposed to the agreement since it was signed in 1994. The discovery of Kumchang-ri provided them with further evidence suggesting that North Korea was violating the agreement, and that it could not be verified. In turn, the discovery led both houses of Congress to adopt restrictions on further US funding to implement the Agreed Framework.[11]

      Critics of the Agreed Framework urged the Clinton administration to adopt a tougher line towards North Korea. In order to resolve the issue, US President Bill Clinton appointed former defense secretary William Perry as US Policy Coordinator for North Korea. Perry was tasked to evaluate current US policy towards North Korea and make recommendations on future policy. His report will be released in the latter-part of 1999, following his analysis of the Kumchang-ri inspection and North Korea's official response to US proposals for the normalization of political and economic relations. Despite Perry's undertaking, some US officials continue to advocate a stricter policy towards North Korea. One example is US Congressman Benjamin Gilman's (R-NY) recommendation on 19 May 1999 to implement the "North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999" (HR 1835).[12]

  1. US President Bill Clinton's November 1998 visit to South Korea:

    US President Bill Clinton traveled to Japan and South Korea in November 1998 to discuss economic and security issues. His meeting with South Korean officials focused primarily on their engagement policies toward North Korea. It was at this time that both he and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung reaffirmed their commitment to resolving the nuclear question on the Korean Peninsula, specifically calling for North Korea to allow US inspections of Kumchang-ri.[13]

  2. Summation of US-North Korean Kumchang-ri talks:

    Upon discovering activity at Kumchang-ri, the United States began demanding access to the site. North Korea initially rejected the demands, saying to do so would violate its sovereignty. Yet it soon altered its stance, saying that it would allow the United States to have access, but that it would have to pay $300 million to do so. The United States, however, refused to pay any compensatory fee.

    In order to resolve differences concerning Kumchang-ri, the United States and North Korea agreed to hold a series of meetings. The US delegation was lead by US special envoy for Korean nuclear affairs, Ambassador Charles Kartman. The North Korea delegation was lead by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Gye-gwan.

    1. 21, 24-25 August 1998 talks:

      • North Korean position: Refuses to grant the United States access to the site; insists that the purpose of Kumchang-ri is civilian-related.[14]

      • US position: Opposes Kumchang-ri construction; intends to continue implementing the Agreed Framework (reconsidering sanctions against North Korea and heavy-fuel oil deliveries); [15] requests access to inspect site.

      • Progress made: None

    2. 16-18 November 1998 talks:

      • North Korean position: Requests that Kumchang-ri and the Agreed Framework not be linked; offers the United States access in return for $300 million in compensation; [16] insists that the site is intended for civilian use;[17] threatens to abandon Agreed Framework if the United States does. [18]

      • US position: Insists that US-North Korean diplomatic ties will improve ONLY if access to Kumchang-ri is granted;[19] demands that the IAEA be given access or North Korea will be breaking the Agreed Framework;[20] refuses to pay compensatory fee for access.[21]

      • Progress made: None

    3. 4-5; 7-8; 10-11 December 1998 talks:

      • North Korean position: Offers the United States access in return for $300 million.[22]

      • US position: Refuses to pay compensatory fees for access; threatens to halt the light-water reactor project if not granted access. [23]

      • Progress made: None. However, both sides begin to understand one another's position and agree to reach a common understanding to find a solution to their differences.[24]

    4. 16-17; 23-24 January 1999 talks:

      • North Korean position: Demands $300 million in return for US access;[25] changes to demand one million tons of grain (as opposed to $300 million) in return for allowing the United States one "visit" to site.[26]

      • US position: Demands multiple on-site inspections of site;[27] suggests offering food and economic assistance in return for access;[28] threatens to halt heavy-fuel oil shipments if site not opened for inspections by 1 June 1999; threatens to halt the light-water reactor project.[29]

      • Progress made: Both sides consider the option of food assistance (through the UN World Food Programme) in return for US access.[30]

    5. 27 February-15 March 1999 talks:

      • North Korean position: Demands one million tons of grain in return for US access;[31] refuses to grant the United States regular access to the site;[32] agrees to grant US access to the entire site and follow-up visits in return for 700,000 tons of food assistance and bilateral food programs.[33]

      • US position: Offers 500,000 tons of food assistance through the UN World Food Programme in return for multiple inspections of Kumchang-ri; requests to announce the amount of food assistance following the first inspection and relaxing sanctions after the second;[34] demands regular access to site if it proves necessary or if suspicions of other uses or developments at the site arise;[35] suggests donating 700,000 tons of food assistance and supporting a series of bilateral programs with North Korea in return for access to the entire site and follow-up visits.[36]

      • Progress made: The United States agrees to provide North Korea with food assistance.[37] In return, North Korea agrees to grant the United States access to the entire site, and follow-up visits.[38]

    6. 31 March-3 April 1999, Informal Negotiations: Kumchang-ri Inspections:

      • Details of negotiations: According to the Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), these discussions focused on "details and methods of the on-site visit to the facility," as well as the equipment the US inspectors would be allowed to carry. Also according to this source, US officials would "visit," not inspect the site because a US "inspection" of the facility would violate North Korea's sovereignty.[39] Further specifics of the discussions, however, were not immediately released to the press.

        On 27 April 1999, following the informal negotiations, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan announced that US inspectors would be given access to Kumchang-ri in mid-May 1999 (later defined as 18 May 1999). According to a senior US official, the United States and North Korea had discussed the date and other access issues. The agreement reached between the parties included details relating to the timing of visits, frequency and travel schedule.[40]

    7. Late-March-17 April 1999, Informal Negotiations:

      • Bilateral Food Program:

        The US negotiating team included a team of officials from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and private voluntary organizations. The North Korean team included the same individuals involved in the formal talks.

      • Agreement: 1,000 tons of seed potatoes will be exported to North Korea for planting, and 100,000 tons of commodity food assistance will be exported for food-for-work projects supporting the potato production project.[41]

  3. 16 March 1999 Agreement

    1. US provisions to North Korea:

      • Donate food through the UN World Food Programme.[42] (NOTE: The amount of food assistance was not agreed upon until the day the US inspection team left for Kumchang-ri. It was at this time that both parties agreed that the United States would provide North Korea with 400,000 tons of food--worth approximately $177 million--through the UN World Food Programme.[43]

      • Institute bilateral food programs (a.k.a potato production program).[44]

      • Take steps to improve political and economic relations with North Korea.[45]

    2. North Korean provisions to the US:

      • Permit multiple site visits by a US team to the entire site. (The first site visit is scheduled for May 1999, with follow-up visits continuing as long as US concerns about the site remain.)[46]

    3. US-North Korean joint provisions:

      • Reaffirm commitments to the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework in its entirety.

      • Reaffirm commitment to the principles of US-North Korean bilateral relations as expressed in the 11 June 1993 US-North Korean Joint Statement.

      • Agree to meet on 29 March 1999 to discuss North Korea's missile export and development programs.[47]

  1. Results of US delegation's visit to Kumchang-ri:

    According to a 25 June 1999 statement issued by US Department of State spokesman James Rubin, the 15-member team, consisting of nuclear scientists and members of the US state and defense departments inspected Kumchang-ri from 18-24 May 1999. North Korea cooperated fully with the US team. As stipulated in the 16 May 1999 agreement, the team was allowed to measure the dimensions of all underground areas at the main complex, and videotape, and photograph agreed above-ground facilities.[48] The team was also allowed to take soil and water samples to be analyzed for radioactive substances.[49]

    Rubin stated that the delegation witnessed no efforts by North Korea to conceal the facility. He said that construction at the site was incomplete and that there was no equipment present during the US inspectors' visit. Furthermore, additional work remained to be completed, as almost all of the tunnels were still bare rock. Rubin dismissed allegations that nuclear equipment could have been removed prior to the inspectors' arrival. Rather, he stated that Kumchang-ri was at a stage of construction at which no other equipment other than construction equipment would be expected to be present.[50]

    Conclusions: Rubin announced that Kumchang-ri does not contain a plutonium-production reactor or reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction. Given the size and configuration of Kumchang-ri and the type of graphite-moderated reactor North Korea previously built at Yongbyon, the site is unsuitable to install a plutonium-production reactor. The site is also not suitable for a reprocessing plant.[51]

    However, despite the team's findings, the United States continues to remain suspicious that Kumchang-ri may be intended for other nuclear-related uses. Rubin said that the site is a large underground area, which could support such a facility in the future given substantial modifications. At present, however, Kumchang-ri does not violate the Agreed Framework (new construction of graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities would have constituted a violation).

    The next US team visit is scheduled for May 2000. The purpose of the second visit will be to examine the feasibility of Kumchang-ri being utilized for commercial purposes.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani,
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Notes:

[1] "Clinton Shows Muscle But Backs Off Claims On North Korean Nuclear Research," CNN World News, 21 November 1998, <www.cnn.com>.

[2] Dana Priest, "US Warns N. Korea On Nuclear Facility," Washington Post, 26 August 1998, p.16.

[3] David E. Sanger, "North Korea Site An A-Bomb Plant, US Agencies Say," New York Times, 17 August 1998, p.1.

[4] "North Korea Denies Building Of Secret Nuclear Facility," Reuters, 19 September 1998.

[5] "US Fears N. Korea Has Nuke Plant," Reuters, 2 January 1998, <www.msnbc.com>.

[6] "US Move Over Site Rejected As ‘Insult,'" South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 10 November 1998, <www.scmp.com>.

[7] Dana Priest, "US Warns N. Korea On Nuclear Facility," Washington Post, 26 August 1998, p.16.

[8] "US Concerned About Reports Of Plutonium In North Korea," CNN, 19 November 1998, <www.cnn.com>.

[9] Selig S. Harrison, "The Korea Showdown That Shouldn't Happen," Washington Post, 22 November 1998, p.C2.

[10] Selig S. Harrison, "The Korea Showdown That Shouldn't Happen," Washington Post, 22 November 1998, p.C2.

[11] Thomas W. Lippman, "US Sets Accords With N. Korea, Aiming To Defuse Tensions," Washington Post, 11 September 1998, p.25.

[12] "Gilman Introduces Bipartisan North Korea Bill, Says Policy Is ‘In Need Of An Overhaul,'" NAPSNet Special Report, 19 May 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[13] "Clinton Visit To ROK," NAPSNet Daily Report, 23 November 1998, <www.nautilus.org>.

[14] Philip Shenon, "North Korea Said To Drop Demand On Atom Inspection," New York Times International, 15 December 1998, <www.nytimes.com>.

[15] Dana Priest, "US Warns N. Korea On Suspect Facility," Washington Post, 26 August 1998, p.A16.

[16] "DPRK Will Not Cooperate With UN Agency," Korea Times (Seoul), 5 November 1998; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 5 November 1998, <www.nautilus.org>.

[17] "Obuchi Hopes For Success In US-DPRK Talks," Kyodo (Tokyo), 4 December 1998.

[18] "Foreign Ministry Spokesman On Pyongyang Negotiation About Underground Facility," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 24 November 1998, <www.kcna.co.jp>.

[19] "US To Press DPRK To Open Up Yongbyon Facility," Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 11 November 1998; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 11 November 1998, <www.nautilus.org>.

[20] Jane A. Morse, "Underground Site Threatens US-North Korea Pace," United States Information Agency, 10 November 1998; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 10 November 1998, <www.nautilus.org>.

[21] "South Korean Report Details Intelligence Gathering On North Korea Nuclear Facility," Yonhap (Seoul), 20 November 1998.

[22] "Moscow Radio To Korea Reviews US-DPRK Talks," Moscow Voice of Russia World Service, 15 December 1998.

[23]"Moscow Radio To Korea Reviews US-DPRK Talks," Moscow Voice of Russia World Service, 15 December 1998.

[24] "US-DPRK Talks On Facility End Without Progress," Yonhap (Seoul), 12 December 1998.

[25] "US Request Close Inspection Of Disputed Site," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 15 January 1999, <www.scmp.com>.

[26] "US-DPRK Talks On Kumchang-ri Enter Final Day," KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 January 1999.

[27] "Doubts Continue To Plague Framework Agreement," Disarmament Diplomacy, December 1998/January 1999, pp.56-57

[28]"North Korea Renews Demands For Compensation For Nuclear Inspection," AP, 11 January 1999.

[29] "US And North Korea Begin Nuclear Talks," CNN, 16 January 1999, <www.cnn.com>.

[30] "US Says N.Korea Brought Constructive Approach To Nuclear Talks," CNN, 25 January 1999, <www.cnn.com>.

[31] "US-NK Talks To Last Over One Week," Korea Times (Seoul), 2 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 2 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[32] "US Commits To NK Grain Donation," Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 5 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 5 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[33] Edith M. Lederer, "US Gets Access To N.Korea Site," AP, 16 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 16 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[34] "N Korea Tells US It Will Accept Arms Inspections-Kyodo," Dow Jones Newswires, 3 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 3 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[35] "US Commits To NK Grain Donation," Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 5 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 5 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[36] "USA Are To Inspect DPRK Nuclear Facilities," Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 13 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[37] "USA Are To Inspect DPRK Nuclear Facilities," Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 13 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[38] Edith M. Lederer, "US Gets Access To N.Korea Site," AP, 16 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 16 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[39]"Report: US, N.Korea Talked Nukes," AP, 5 April 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 5 April 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[40] Kang Hyo-sang, "US-NK Agree On Inspection Timing," and "US To Inspect NK Nuke Site In May," Chosun Ilbo (Seoul) and Korea Times (Seoul), 28 April 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 28 April 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[41] "Agreement Reached On Bilateral Assistance Project For North Korea," United States Information Agency, 22 April 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 22 April 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[42] "USA Are To Inspect DPRK Nuclear Facilities," Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 13 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[43] "American Arrested In North Korea," AP, 25 June 1999.

[44] "USA Are To Inspect DPRK Nuclear Facilities," Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 13 March 1999, <www.nautilus.org>.

[45] "US-DPRK Joint Press Statement," US Department of State, 16 March 1999.

[46] "Statement By Secretary Of State Madeleine K. Albright," US Department of State, 16 March 1999.

[47] "US-DPRK Joint Press Statement," US Department of State, 16 March 1999.

[48] "US Concludes North Korea Underground Site Not Nuclear," United States Information Agency, 25 June 1999.

[49] "North Korea Gets Nuclear All Clear," BBC, 28 May 1999, <www.bbc.co.uk>.

[50] "US Concludes North Korea Underground Site Not Nuclear," United States Information Agency, 25 June 1999.

[51] "US Concludes North Korea Underground Site Not Nuclear," United States Information Agency, 25 June 1999.


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