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1A) Encouraging the Government of Ukraine to Ensure Democratic Elections

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this resolution, which urges the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process leading up to the March 31, 2002, parliamentary elections.

I would first like to thank my colleague, Louise Slaughter, for her hard work in initializing the development of this important resolution. I am appreciative of her leadership on issues relating to Ukraine, and I am pleased to have worked so closely with her in crafting this legislation. I would also like to thank my House International Relations Committee colleagues, Elton Gallegly and Chris Smith, for their contributions to this resolution, and to acknowledge their commitment to a meaningful democratization process in Ukraine.

The importance of Ukraine's March 31, 2002 parliamentary elections--the third parliamentary elections since gaining independence over ten years ago--should not be underestimated.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has worked to achieve a more western, democratic approach in its governance, and the upcoming elections mark an historical crossroads for a country undergoing dramatic democratic transformation. Significant challenges remain--restrictions on basic democratic freedoms are alarming; its nuclear plants are in need of clean-up; the media suffers from blatant harassment and government corruption runs rampant.

Ukraine has also come a long way in just a decade. Its economy grew more than six percent last year. It not only voluntarily gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, but has also consistently, with the U.S. assistance, sought to eliminate its stockpile of strategic missiles. Basic political reforms have begun in earnest.

The resolution we have introduced today acknowledges the democratic reforms that Ukraine has achieved, but it also sheds light on the vast improvements Ukraine must make in order to become a full-fledged democracy. The resolution encourages the Government of Ukraine to implement basic tools in order to ensure free and fair elections including a transparency of election procedures, access for international election observers, multiparty representation on election commissions and equal access to the media for all election candidates.

Now more than ever, as Ukraine strives to realize a more robust democracy, it needs the encouragement of the United States as well as its scrutiny. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important resolution when it comes before them on the House floor.

1B) Chinese Military Use of Foreign Technology

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a recent article in the Far Eastern Economic Review on China's use of foreign technology to modernize its military explains the far-reaching impact of China's purchase of foreign technology on that country's military capabilities. For example, it describes Rolls Royce's recent sale to China of 90 Spey jet engines, some of which will likely be used for the Chinese military's JH-7 fighter bombers. The technology used in these engines is admittedly dated; but some are concerned that the sale may represent the beginning of a larger relationship between Rolls Royce and China. The article also details China's growing reliance on Russian-designed aircraft, missiles, and navy destroyers and submarines. A February 2001 article in Jane's Intelligence Review described the relationship further, stating:

   Between 1991 and 1996 Russia sold China an estimated $1 billion worth of military weapons and related technologies each year. That figure doubled by 1997. In 1999 the two governments increased the military assistance package for a second time. There is now a five-year program (until 2004) planning $20 billion worth of technology transfers.

   Perhaps of even greater concern is that, according to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, the United States approved $15 billion in ``strategically sensitive exports'' to China during the 1990s. These exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, build weapons components, improve missile designs, and build missile components. And it is important to remember China's primary objective in acquiring these and other military technologies, to be able to defeat our long-standing, democratic ally Taiwan in a conflict quickly enough to prevent American military intervention.

   Last September, the Senate passed S. 149, the Export Administration Act of 2001. S. 149 was approved despite serious concerns of some, including myself, that the U.S. export control process is ineffective in stopping the export of militarily sensitive technologies to countries, like China, that pose a potential military threat to the United States or to U.S. interests abroad. S. 149, if enacted into law, would allow China to import even more sensitive technology than it has in the past. It would decontrol a number of dual-use technologies, including items used to make nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

   I urge my colleagues to take a moment to read the Far Eastern Economic Review article, and to consider the impact on China's military capabilities of foreign technology purchases and, more importantly, the potential long-term ramifications of further weakening the U.S. export control process.

   I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   China--Arms

   Buying Some Major Muscle: The People's Liberation Army is shopping for foreign arms and the latest military technology with a vengeance; Costing tens of billions of dollars a year, this drive will change the face of its forces at war and is unsettling some foreign governments.

   In the field of frustration and broken dreams that for many foreign firms is the China market, arms dealers and suppliers of technology to boost military firepower have discovered their El Dorado.

   International arms-trade monitors estimate that China is now the world's biggest arms importer as it steps up a drive to re-equip the People's Liberation Army so that, if necessary, it has the strength to recover Taiwan by force and can deter intervention by the United States in a cross-strait conflict.

   From supersonic fighters and missiles to computer-aided-design software the PLA and its associated civilian agencies are filling order books across the world.

   ``In my view, practically every area of PLA modernization is affected by the acquisition, utilization, absorption or development of foreign technology,'' says PLA watcher Richard Fisher of the Jamestown Foundation in Washington.

   The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 2001 yearbook noted that China had become the world's biggest importer of arms in 2000, mainly through deliveries of ships and combat aircraft from Russia. These imports were valued at close to $3 billion, more than twice any other buyer's tally. In the secretive world of the international arms trade, the true value of Chinese offshore orders is difficult to uncover. Defence experts estimate up to half of Russia's $4 billion in military sales last year went to China. When combined with imports of so-called dual-use technology--equipment and know-how with military as well as civilian applications--most analysts expect the total to be much higher.

   To pay for what Fisher described as its international military ``spending spree,'' Beijing announced in March last year that its published defence budget was jumping more than 17% to $17.2 billion. Real annual spending, including payments for foreign weapons and technology, is estimated by many analysts at more than $60 billion. The government is already signalling that it plans further defence-budget increases this year.

   The main beneficiaries of Chinese spending: Russia and Israel, since the West imposed an arms embargo in retaliation of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. U.S. and European makers of nonlethal military hardware and dual-use technology are, however, eager suppliers.

   The independent U.S. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control calculates that Washington approved some $15 billion in strategically sensitive exports to China in the decade up to 1999. These included advanced computers needed to design and test nuclear weapons, machine tools for making missile parts and specialized equipment used for making military semiconductors.

   Some key customers for U.S. technology are the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp., a maker of anti-ship missiles, the National University of Defense Technology, which designs weapons, and Huawei Technologies--accused by Washington of helping Iraq improve its air-defense system.

   In recent years, much international attention has focused on sensational allegations of Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear -arms laboratories. But far from having to steal much of the latest military technology, Beijing is simply buying it.

   ``Western companies want to get into this market,'' says Taipei-based PLA analyst Tsai Min-yen of the Taiwan Research Institute. ``The way they can build contacts with China is to sell these dual-use or nonlethal technologies.''

   Even such top Western firms as British engine-maker Rolls-Royce are looking for a piece of the action. It sells defense equipment as part of its broader aerospace, marine and energy business in China--though it is reluctant to give details of its military sales.

   Rolls-Royce confirmed to the REVIEW that it recently supplied up to 90 Spey jet engines and spares to China that defence analysts believe the PLA intends to fit on to its JH-7 fighter-bombers--also being modified with modern radar and long-range missiles.

   Rolls-Royce spokesman Martin Brodie says that the company first supplied this engine type to China in the 1970s and continues to support that original deal. ``The details of our support are, as with most companies, a matter of commercial confidence,'' he says.

   The PLA needs more of the reliable Spey engines because it failed to copy those it received earlier and hasn't designed a local replacement. Rolls-Royce argues its Spey engines incorporate 1960s technology, implying they will not significantly boost PLA power. In contrast, Asia-based Western defense officials say the Pentagon objected to the latest deal on the grounds that it would enhance the PLA's capabilities.

   Rolls-Royce indicates more defense-related business is on its mind. On a visit in October, Chief Executive John Rose discussed ``current cooperation and opportunities for the future'' with officials from China's Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, according to a company statement.

   Earlier British technology sales proved a boost to the PLA. In 1996, Racal Corp., now part of the French Thales Group, sold up to eight Skymaster long-range airborne radars to be fitted on PLA Navy Y-8 aircraft. Britain at the time justified the sale by saying it would help Beijing against rampant smuggling. Since then, the specialist defence press has reported that these aircraft are used to assist Chinese missile warships locate distant targets.

   Other British sales are aimed at civilian use but seem to offer clear military advantages. Surrey Satellite Technology, perhaps the world's leading micro-satellite maker, has played a major role developing China's infant micro-satellite industry with technology transferred to China through a joint venture with Beijing's elite Qinghua University. Specialists have warned that this type of technology is vitally important for the Chinese military to mount combined air and sea operations in the Taiwan Strait.

   Company spokeswoman Audrey Nice rejects any link between Surrey's technology and the Chinese military. ``The PLA does not exist as far as Surrey is concerned,'' she says. ``There are no defence applications whatsoever.'' However, she is unable to rule out Chinese military access to data from satellites launched as a result of the joint-venture collaboration. ``The satellite is owned by Qinghua University,'' says Nice, adding that any questions should be directed to the university.

   To reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers, China is investing heavily in research and development to build a military industrial base. In the meantime, the PLA armoury resembles an overflowing shopping trolley at an international arms bazaar--with imported arms and technology ordered before the Tiananmen embargo being gradually introduced and combined with the newer purchases.

   Should China go to war in the near future over Taiwan, its air force will rely on front-line Russian-designed strike aircraft alongside locally built fighters based on an Israeli design partially funded by the U.S.

   Other Chinese-made aircraft will carry Russian and Israeli missiles and find their targets with British and Israeli radar and electronics. The navy will deploy a combination of powerful new Russian warships and submarines alongside locally built ships fitted with U.S. and Ukrainian engines and Italian torpedoes. French companies have supplier air-warfare missiles, tactical command-and-control systems and helicopters.

   On land, the PLA will field modern Russian tanks and artillery. Many armoured vehicles will be protected with advanced Israeli-designed armour cladding. Older Chinese tanks have Israeli gun and gunsight systems.

   Overhead, satellites built with British and German help will keep watch on the battlefield, fix positions for ground forces and feed target data to ships and aircraft. Meanwhile China's nuclear deterrent will be mounted on launchers improved with assistance supplied by the U.S.

   Beijing isn't shy about its growing power. When one of the PLA navy's latest class of warship, the sleek 8,000-tonne guided-missile destroyer Shenzhen, berthed in Hong Kong in November after visiting Europe, it was touted as an example of how China was capable of building world-class warships.

   That may be an exaggeration with most Western counterparts. But by regional standards, the Shenzhen's Ukrainian gas turbines, French Crotale air-defense missiles, Russian YJ-2 anti-ship missiles and two Russian Ka-28 anti-submarine-warfare helicopters make it formidable vessel.

   While the arms merchants pile in, there are clear signs of unease in some foreign capitals about the scale of China's arms-buying bonanza and the danger to regional security. For the U.S. and regional governments, the main concern is that short-term corporate greed is overpowering Western fears of arming a potential enemy of the future to the teeth.

   Reflecting such official unease, New York-based satellite-maker Loral Space & Communications agreed with the U.S. Justice Department this month to pay a record $14 million fine to settle charges that it may have illegally given satellite know-how to Beijing.

   Hughes Electronics of California is also expected to settle with Washington over its role in similar technology leaks.

   A U.S. Congressional committee in 1999 accused both companies of helping overcome serious shortcomings in Chinese rocket launchers following an expensive series of failed satellite launches in the mid-1990s. Since then, China launched more than 30 satellites without a hitch. There are strong suspicions in Washington that the PLA's nuclear missiles carried on the same launchers and aimed at the U.S. are now more reliable because of information from U.S. firms.

   At the same time as the probes into Hughes and Loral, Washington forced Israel to cancel a $1.25 billion sale of up to five Russian-built aircraft equipped with Israeli-made Phalcon early warning radar to the PLA. Such aircraft would be crucial in coordinating large-scale operations over the Taiwan Strait.

   Anxious to keep its good relations as an arms supplier with Beijing, Tel Aviv is now negotiating to pay compensation to China for backing out of the deal. Diplomats say that discussions between both sides earlier this month in Beijing also covered what other hardware may be supplied by Israel.

   But regardless of international pressure on sellers, tension across the Taiwan Strait is likely to prolong the feast for arms makers. As China's power grows, so does Taiwan's demand for yet more weapons to ensure parity. The Bush administration last year agreed to supply Taipei with its biggest arms package in decades, including a group of up to eight submarines that alone will cost more than $4 billion.

   Watching the arms race, some analysts are questioning the wisdom of China buying hardware from such a range of suppliers. For a start, the logistical and technical support needed to maintain so many different weapons systems is a major challenge. And it takes more than just advanced hardware to be a military power. Training, military doctrine and the integration of weapons and sensors are also vital. There is also the danger that in trying to keep pace with Western firepower, China might overextend itself financially--as the Soviet Union did.

   Nevertheless, analysts such as Tsai in Taipei believe that the sheer pace of its spending is allowing China to close the military gap with the U.S. and the rest of the West fast enough to pose a real security threat for Taiwan. ``It is unnecessary for China to catch up with the West in all fields,'' he says. ``They just need enough to deter the U.S. from becoming involved in the Taiwan Strait.''

1C) In Commemoration of India's Republic Day

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, it is an honor for me to rise today in commemoration of India's Republic Day. As the adoption of our constitution and declaration of Independence in the 18th Century are among the most important days in the history of the United States, so too is January 26, 1950 in India. In the Central Hall of Parliament in New Delhi, India joined the community of democratic nations by adopting its Constitution that embodied many of the principles, including equality and secularism, put forth by our own founding fathers.

It gives me great pleasure to celebrate this event, as this is not simply a day for Indians, but for Indian-Americans as well. The streets of my district in Jackson Heights, New York will be filled tonight with thousands of my constituents honoring this important day.

The bond that India and the United States share is not simply rooted in the democratic foundations, but also in democratic practices. Allying the world's oldest democracy with the world's largest democracy is a natural fit. I believe that India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said it best when he spoke of the adoption of India's Constitution: ``There is one great test for a Constitution, for any system of Governance. It must deliver and it must be durable. Our Constitution has stood this test. And one reason it has been able to do so is that it embodies a mastery balance: between the rights of the individual and the requirements of collective life; between the States and the Union; between providing a robust structure and flexibility. Our Constitution has served the needs of both India's diversity and her innate unity. It has strengthened India's democratic traditions.''

The shared history and common conception for the future of our relationship has allowed our nations to cooperate in times of prosperity and assist each other in times of tragedy. This year's Republic Day is bitter-sweet as it also commemorates the one-year anniversary of the devastating earthquake that struck India on January 26, 2001. The earthquake, centered in India's state of Gujarat and measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale, killed more than 20,000 people. During those difficult times, we were there for India both in spirit and in practice. Shortly after the earthquake, the United States Congress adopted a Resolution expressing condolences for the victims and support for providing assistance. I am proud to report that Congress also responded to my efforts in increasing the funding for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, specifically targeting the efforts in India.

Just as we came to the aid of India, they were among the first to condemn the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Since that horrific day, high-level contacts between the U.S. and India have increased, reflecting the close cooperation between the world's two largest democracies in the struggle against international terrorism. Unfortunately, the scrouge of terrorism is another characteristic that our countries now have in common.

The December 13, 2001 attack on India's Parliament hit very close to home. As nine police officers and a Parliament worker were killed we were forced, once again, to redefine the scope and definition of the war on terrorism. This attack sought to destroy the heart of India's democracy, but will fail in that endeavor.

The common interests of the United States and India transcend the boundaries of the international war on terrorism. There has been ever-increasing cooperation in dealing with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, preserving stability and growth in the global economy, protecting the environment, combating infectious diseases and expanding trade.

As a member of the Indian Caucus with a growing Indian constituency, my interest in the region has grown exponentially during my time in Congress. I have to say, however, that nothing was more eye-opening than my visit to India a few weeks ago. To get a true sense of the interests of the people and the government on the ground was invaluable, and will surely help me represent the views of my constituents more completely in the future.

With that, I wish to salute India for fifty-one years of work in pursuit of preserving democracy. It is my honor to join you as you continue that journey into the new millennium.

Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, tomorrow evening President Bush will be giving his State of the Union speech. He will undoubtedly review the actions of the past year and talk about his plans for this current year. It seems to me appropriate to focus a little bit on what I believe is one of the most important decisions he made in the last year and to reflect a little bit upon what that decision will mean for the United States in the years to come. It was made at a time when Congress was not in session and the country, frankly, was primarily thinking about the Christmas season. There was not a lot of media attention paid to the decision.

For reasons I will discuss in some subsequent speeches, it seems to me one of the most fundamental and important decisions of any President in recent years and certainly of President Bush during his first term. I refer to his decision on behalf of the United States to give notice to Russia of the withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty. As I said, I am going to discuss different aspects of this decision in some subsequent remarks.

For example, I will discuss the President's legal authority to withdraw. Some have suggested action by the Senate should take place or that somehow the President doesn't necessarily have the authority to withdraw from the treaty. That is not true; he does. I will be discussing that. I also want to address in subsequent remarks how I think this decision changes the geopolitical relationships and, frankly, reflects a 21st century view of the world, especially the relationship between the United States on one hand and Russia on the other hand, a view far different from that of the adversarial cold war relationship between the two superpowers, and how this ABM decision is probably the most dramatic recognition of that new relationship.

I will discuss what that means both in terms of the relationship between the two countries in the future but also what it means in terms of a change in the direction of the philosophy of this country with respect to national security issues, especially how it relates to the question of how we protect ourselves. Is it through a combination of ideas that are premised on peace through strength, going back to the Reagan days, or more of a focus on arms control agreements, reflecting more of the Clinton administration view?

Clearly, the Bush administration has decided defending the United States depends first and foremost upon our ability to defend ourselves through missile defense, for example, and less on arms control agreements. I will be discussing what I think are the important ramifications of that decision.

Today, I will first of all commend the President for his decision, made on December 13 of last year, of the intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and, secondly, discuss the reasons I believe this was the right decision for the President to make. Let me note those two reasons in summary.

It is highly questionable whether the ABM Treaty ever served U.S. interests. It did not stop an arms race, its purpose, as proponents claims. It was the product of a bipolar international structure, as I said before, that no longer exists and no longer reflects the relationship we should have with Russia as a result. It remains a serious obstacle to U.S. ability to defend itself against the long-range threat of ballistic missiles. The President's decision was a necessary step forward in addressing that threat. The future national security of the United States requires the construction of ballistic missile defenses that were flatly prohibited by the treaty.

Let me discuss those items in turn. First, with respect to the purpose of the treaty, the premise of the ABM Treaty back in 1972 was that if neither the United States nor the Soviet Union took steps to protect itself against a devastating nuclear strike, then both nations would feel confident in their ability to retaliate against each other, secure in the knowledge that each possessed that capability, and neither would find it necessary to increase the size of their nuclear arsenals. An accompanying agreement, SALT I, was intended to limit the size and shape of the arsenals in order to enhance strategic stability.

Proponents of the ABM Treaty--and their numbers are many --have for the 30 years or so since the treaty's ratification considered it the cornerstone of strategic stability. They view the treaty not just as the guiding document in United States-Soviet and now United States-Russian relations but as the principal constraint on all countries considering developing missile forces with which to threaten neighbors and argue that the absence unleashes a destabilizing arms buildup around the world, including in Russia.

Well, what of this?

The central premise of the ABM Treaty, that the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals would be restrained by the absence of missile defenses, is refuted through the simplest quantitative analysis. In the 15 years since the treaty's ratification, the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads in the inventory of the Soviet Union grew from around 2,000 to 10,000. The U.S. level grew from around 3,700 in 1972 to about 8,000 in 1987. In fact, strategic nuclear forces expanded not just quantitatively but qualitatively as well. The decade following the ABM Treaty signing witnessed introduction into the Soviet arsenal of entire generations of new long-range missiles, not just in contradiction to the intent of the ABM Treaty but in contravention of the accompanying SALT I accord as well.

The post-cold-war picture similarly argues against the treaty's effectiveness at restraining offensive forces. China has been exceedingly belligerent in its use of warlike rhetoric targeted against the concept of a regional missile defense plan encompassing the island of Taiwan. Yet in the absence of missile defenses, it has been deploying missiles opposite Taiwan at the rate of 50 a year. China made the decision and embarked on a modernization of its long-range missile force targeted against the United States long before the United States made a decision to deploy missile defense systems.

Similarly, India and Pakistan missile developments which, combined with each country's nuclear weapons programs, create the most dangerous region on Earth right now, occur without reference to missile defenses. And of course missile programs of countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have been restrained at times by technological factors but never by the presence of missile defenses in countries they might target.

The point is that missile forces are not a response to missile defenses. They are the result of national perceptions of threat and political and military requirements. As the new National Intelligence Estimate on foreign ballistic missiles states:

The ballistic missile remains a central element in the military arsenals of nations around the globe and almost certainly will retain this status over the next 15 years.

In other words, ballistic missiles are not being built as a result of missile defenses being built. Those missile forces are already occurring, are already being built, and it is the defenses which now need to restrain them.

Another point: The bipolar world structure that I referred to no longer exists. The problem of proliferation here has to be addressed.

The ABM Treaty was negotiated between two countries, one of which no longer exists. At its signing, little consideration was given to a post-Cold War world. The developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s were simply not foreseen. Nuclear and missile proliferation, while certainly acknowledged as issues, took a backseat in the two superpowers' thinking to direct bipolar considerations back in 1972.

Proliferation is today, however, one of our principal national security challenges. Roughly two dozen countries have or are developing ballistic missiles. These weapons have also become a common feature of modern warfare. Used but once between 1945 and 1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired in at least six conflicts since 1980, and their range and sophistication are growing. In fact, despite the promised reductions in Russian strategic forces, the threat from other countries seeking to target the United States with long-range missiles has grown since the end of the Cold War.

Let me give some examples of this trend:

China is actively modernizing and expanding its long-range missile force. The newly released National Intelligence Estimate states that, by 2015, ``the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold.''

Despite difficulties it has experienced in developing its Shahab-3 medium-range missile--and it should be pointed out that all countries, including the United States, experience developmental problems with new missile programs--Iran continues to place much emphasis on its missile activities. With considerable Russian assistance, it is developing missiles capable of striking Central Europe. The new NIE concludes that ``Teheran's longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile programs ..... is unlikely to diminish.''

Iraq is believed to covertly possess a stockpile of banned missiles. While Iraq's missile programs have been constrained by sanctions in effect since the Persian Gulf War, the gradual but steady erosion of those sanctions could result in its being able to reconstitute its long-range missile programs. Iraq's ability to surprise us in the past with the scale of its missile and nuclear, chemical and biological programs should serve as a warning of what can happen should the sanctions regime collapse completely.

North Korea has extended its moratorium on testing its intercontinental-range Taepo-dong missiles, but its surprise August 1998 test flight over Japan of one such missile should similarly temper any enthusiasm about that regime's capabilities and intentions. The National Intelligence Estimate pointed out that North Korea has not abandoned the the Taepo-dong 2, and that it could reappear ``as a [space-launch vehicle] with a third stage to place a small payload into the same orbit the North Koreans tried to achieve in 1998.''

If the National Intelligence Estimate is nebulous in its description of the threat to the continental United States of long-range ballistic missiles, it is emphatic in its description of the threat from shorter-range missiles:

The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature . . . (T)he missile threat will continue to grow, in part because missiles have become important regional weapons in the arsenals of numerous countries. Moreover, missiles provide a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that nonmissile means do not.

What this tells us is that missiles remain an extremely important component of the arsenals of the very regimes that represent our greatest foreign policy challenges. Yet, the NIE suggests that the threat from medium-range missiles is not likely to be matched by a commensurate threat from long-range missiles in the next 15 years, in spite of the fact that the very same arguments for medium-range missiles exists in the case of longer-range ones.

Fortunately, we have today a Secretary of Defense who understands intimately the weaknesses of intelligence estimates that seek to predict foreign technological developments. As chairman of the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld led an effort to assess the threat of foreign ballistic missiles and the ability of the intelligence community to accurately estimate the scale of that threat. The commission's unanimous conclusion was that the missile threat to the United States ``is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community,'' and a rogue nation could acquire the capability to strike the United States with a ballistic missile in as little as 5 years.

That analysis was accepted by the Congress, by the President, and by a majority of the intelligence community. The Rumsfeld Commission turned out to be more prescient than anybody anticipated. Within months of the completion of its report, North Korea shocked the intelligence community with its launch of the Taepo-dong.

Indeed, for all of its successes--and they have been both numerous and vital to our security--it does not disgrace the intelligence community to point out that either it or its political overseers have, at times, missed important developments. A recent article in Jane's Intelligence Review describes the three times during the 1990s that North Korea alone surprised the United States within the realm of missile programs:

The first was in 1990 with the testing of the No-dong IRBM . . . The second surprise was in 1994, when aerial photographs revealed mock-ups of two new two-stage ballistic missiles, named Taepo-dong 1 and 2. The third surprise came in August 1998 with the test launch of Taepo-dong 1. . . .

President Bush recognized the changed post-Cold War security environment typified by the ballistic missile programs of numerous real or potentially hostile countries, when he stated in his December 13 announcement of his intent to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty:

. . . as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

The President's announcement was the culmination of a period of negotiations intended to convince Russia of the need to amend or scrap an outdated treaty. He did this because he believes that the appropriate response to the threat from foreign missile programs must include defenses against those missiles, and that the ABM Treaty prevents the United States from developing and deploying those defenses.

What of that latter point? Some have argued maybe we could stretch our research time and testing time and still not be in direct violation of the treaty. In fact, the previous administration sought to deal with the threat of ballistic missile attack primarily by relying on treaties or agreements as articulated in 1994 by Under Secretary of State John Holum:

The Clinton Administration's policy aims to protect us first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing the development of theater defenses for those cases where arms control is not yet successful.

Arms control, first and foremost; only secondarily by pursuing the development--not deployment--of theater defenses, not defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and only in those cases where arms control is not yet successful. That is an entirely different paradigm, that we can rely upon arms control to protect the people of the United States.

There are no arms control agreements with rogue states, and they don't prevent nuclear blackmail. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice noted this problem in her July 13 speech before the National Press Club: We must deal with today's world and today's threats, including weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the hands of states that would blackmail us from coming to the aid of friends and allies.

Nor do I think it is a good idea to rely principally on deterrence. One problem with deterrence is that it does fail. We acknowledge that fact when applied regionally. We support the Israeli Arrow missile program because we know that Israel's adversaries may not be deterred by threat of retaliation. In fact, in the case of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, such retaliation was invited.

When the subject becomes the safety of American cities, however, such acknowledgements disappear. The fact remains, though, that deterrence does fail, and we ought not be left with massive retaliation as the only response to an attack on the United States.

It has always been of concern to me that we would rely on deterrence against a largely innocent population of a country headed by a tyrant. The best deterrence is the ability to defeat an attack. The principal impediment to our ability to develop the means to actually defend against missile attack is not technology. It is the ABM Treaty, as I said before. As the President stated in his December 13 announcement:

We must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.

Despite the failure of the ABM Treaty to slow the growth in nuclear arms, it was remarkably successfully at preventing the development of missile defenses. We cannot develop, let alone deploy, a national missile defense system under the constraints of the ABM Treaty. That was its whole purpose. But times have changed, and, as the President has pointed out, the treaty has become an unacceptable restraint on our ability to defend ourselves against the threat of ballistic missile attack.

To repeat, we cannot develop, let alone deploy, a national missile defense system under the constraints of the ABM Treaty. Both its letter and its intent are very clear on this point. Let me just take a moment to explain why.

Article I, Section 2, states:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty.

Additionally, under the terms of the treaty, specifically Article III, we can only build one treaty-permissible site around either Washington, D.C., or around an ICBM field. The treaty prevents the defense of any other part of the United States. That is why the Fort Greely, AK, site under the terms of the treaty, cannot be an operational missile defense site.

Critics of the President argue that the decision to withdraw from the treaty is premature, and that the treaty does not really prevent the development of the capability to build a nationwide defense.

For example: The Union of Concerned Scientists concludes, on the basis of its own examination of the issue, that ``there is no compelling reason for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least the next several years.'' One of our colleagues from the State of Florida, Senator NELSON, stated at a hearing in June:

We need, for the sake of defense of our country, to proceed with robust research and development, but you can't deploy something that's not developed.

The fact is, we cannot develop a nationwide system under the constraints of the ABM Treaty. That was the efficacious thing about the treaty: it effectively prevented the development of such a system.

Furthermore, we cannot even research the kind of layered defense necessary to maximize the prospects of a successful intercept.

Article V of the treaty states:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Article VI states:

Each Party undertakes not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their element in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode.

It is critical. That is why the Secretary of Defense was forced in October to alter the most recent missile-flight test. It would have violated the treaty had we used a U.S. Navy ship to track the target missile in flight--precisely, by the way, what we want to do in developing a successful missile defense system. Because the sea-based option remains among the most promising for a secure, flexible missile tracking capability, we should be actively integrating the AEGIS system into these flight tests, but under Articles V and VI of the treaty that is prohibited.

Similarly, use of a Multiple Object Tracking Radar at Vandenberg Air Force Base, which was going to be used to track the target missile, is prohibited. An administration official was quoted in the Washington Post as noting: This shows that the ABM Treaty is already constraining us in a very material way. These are aspects of tests that we canceled, and they need to be done at some point.

Similarly, how can we exploit the capabilities that may emerge from development of the Airborne Laser Program, a system designed to shoot down enemy missiles early in their ascent phase when they are larger and hotter and therefore easier to target? The Airborne Laser won't necessarily know whether it is shooting at a short-range missile, or one with intercontinental range. The former would be permissible under the treaty, but not the latter.

In short, the treaty, as it was designed to do, prevents us from even developing let alone deploying a national missile defense system that exploits the most promising technologies.

In conclusion, the ABM Treaty was signed in a vastly different strategic environment than exists today. It can hardly be said to have been a success during the cold war, the geopolitical context in which it was written. Today, it serves only to prevent us from addressing the post-cold war challenges that confront us from a number of other countries. A treaty that failed in a strictly bipolar structure to restrain nuclear weapons developments, it is even more ill-suited to the security environment of today's multipolar world.The President's decision to withdraw the United States from its provisions should be commended. We cannot predicate the defense of the American people on a theory of deterrence that assumes hostile regimes make decisions in the same manner as do we, and that leaves us vulnerable to a particular type of threat we know is on the horizon.

We have a fundamental responsibility to the American public to defend it against all threats. The threat from the ballistic missile programs of foreign countries is real, and it can be expected to grow. We cannot address that threat within the confines of the ABM Treaty. The decision to move beyond it was the right decision, and I applaud President Bush's leadership on this issue of tremendous importance to all Americans.

As I said, he probably will be too modest to address this much in his State of the Union speech tomorrow evening, but I believe it to be one of the most important decisions he made last year, and its ramifications will be felt and be defined by greater security for the American people for decades to come.

I commend him for that decision.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. END

3A) Introduction of Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002

   By Mr. EDWARDS:

   S. 1900. A bill to protect against cyberterrorism and cybercrime, and for other purposes; the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

   By Mr. EDWARDS:

   S. 1901. A bill to authorize the National Science Foundation and the National Security Agency to establish programs to increase the number of qualified faculty teaching advanced courses conducting research in the field of cybersecurity, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

   Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. president, since the horrifying events of September 11, our country's number one priority has been to secure our families against the scourge of terrorism.

   First, in our hearts, of course, are the men and women on the frontlines of the fight: the soldiers fighting for freedom half a world away; the firefighters and police officers in New York; the postal workers here in Washington.

   Those of us elected to serve in Washington have a special responsibility to protect our security. To discharge that duty, I have been working with my colleagues here in the Senate. We have made a great deal of progress, but there's a lot more work to do.

   After a long debate, Congress passed and the President signed important legislation, based partly on a bill I introduced, to tighten security in our airports. But we have to do more.

   There are several bills that I have helped author that are working their way through Congress. Two of these bills, to tighten security at seaports and to protect against bioterrorism, have already passed the Senate and are awaiting action in the House. Another bill, to tighten our border security, should reach the Senate floor soon. All three should be enacted quickly. You can be sure our enemies are not waiting for us to act.

   One of the greatest challenges in the struggle for security is to prepare for the next attack, not just the last one. We have seen how vicious thugs can destroy innocent life with airplanes, how they can terrorize ordinary people with biological weapons. We are responding to those threats. But what about threats whose awful consequences we haven't yet felt?

   Today I want to talk about one of those threats: the threat of ``cyberterrorism'', an attack against the computer networks upon which our safety and economy now depend. Computers have become a foundation of our electricity, oil, gas, water, telephones, emergency services, and banks, not to mention our national defense apparatus.

   Computer networks have brought extraordinary improvements in the way we live and work. We communicate more often, more quickly, more cheaply. With the push of a button in a classroom or a bedroom, our children can get more information than most libraries have ever held.

   Yet there is a dark side to the internet, a new set of dangers. Today, if you ask an expert quietly, he or she will

   tell you that cyberspace is a very vulnerable place. Terrorists could cause terrible harm. They might be able to stop all traffic on the internet. Shut down power for entire cities for extended periods. Disrupt our phones. Poison our water. Paralyze our emergency services--police, firefighters, ambulances. The list goes on. We now live in a world where a terrorist can do as much damage with a keyboard and a modem as with a gun or a bomb.

   Already, one hacker has broken into a computer-controlled waste management system and caused millions of gallons of raw sewage to spill into parks, rivers, and private property. You probably haven't heard about this attack because it occurred in Australia. But imagine if terrorists launched calculated, coordinated attacks on America.

   Our enemies are already targeting our networks. After September 11, a Pakistani group hacked into two government web services, including one at the Department of Defense, and declared a ``cyber jihad'' against the United States. Another series of attacks, known as ``Moonlight Maze,'' assaulted the Pentagon, Department of Energy, and NASA, and obtained vast quantities of technical defense research. To date, we can be thankful that these attacks have not been terribly sophisticated. But that could change soon. As the Defense Science Board recently stated, the U.S. will eventually be attached ``by a sophisticated adversary using an effective array of information warfare tools and

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   In addition, cybercrime is already a billion-dollar drain on our economy, a drain growing larger each year. In 1955, one survey reported that losses from FBI-reported computer crime had already reached $2 billion. Last year, the ``ILOVEYOU'' virus alone caused $8.7 billion in damage worldwide, much of it here. Cyberattacks have shut down major web sites like Yahoo! and eBay, not to mention the FBI. According to a recent survey, 85 percent of large corporations and government agencies detected computer security breaches over the prior 12 months. Two thirds suffered financial losses as a result.

   So the danger is clear, and the only question is how we address it. I think we need to address it in many ways. Today I want to focus on just two that are especially critical.

   The first is to encourage computer users to take proven measures to protect themselves. In the industry, these proven measures are known as ``best practices''--steps like using customized passwords, not the ones that come with software, or promptly installing known ``patches'' to keep intruders out.

   The National Academy of Sciences recently reported that cybersecurity today is far worse than what known best practices can provide. As a result, viruses have shut down tens of thousands of machines even after patches to block them were widely available. Because the password protections on some systems are so weak, intruders have taken the ``routers'' that control Internet traffic hostage. And the government is as guilty as anyone. According to the report card issued by a member of the House of Representatives, most government agencies rate between a ``D'' and an ``F'' on cybersecurity. Improving our security by implementing existing best practices is our first big task.

   Our second challenge is to train more researchers, teachers, and workers to fight cyberthreats. Today the private sector engages in some short-term R&D on cybersecurity. But broader research and knowledge needs aren't being met. In addition, our workforce in cybersecurity is woefully inadequate, especially in academia. Each year, American universities award Ph.D.'s in computer science to about one thousand people each year. But less than one-half of one-percent specialize in cybersecurity, and fewer still go on to train others in the discipline. As Dr. Bill Chu, Chairman of the Software and Information Systems Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and one of the country's leading experts on cybersecurity puts it: ``The weakest link ...... is the lack of qualified information security professionals. The majority of information technology professionals in this country have not been trained in the basics of information security. Information technology faculty in most universities do not have sufficient background to properly train students.''

   As a whole, the challenge of cybersecurity is not unlike the challenge of a terrible disease like cancer. First, we have to encourage everyone to do what they can to reduce the risk of disease--don't smoke, eat right, exercise. That is what cybersecurity ``best practices'' like changing passwords are all about. Second, we have to make sure we have got top-notch scientists working to find new medicines to prevent and fight the disease. And that is why we need more cyber teachers and researchers.

   To tackle these two challenges, I'm proud today to introduce two new bills that will support an intensive, $400 million cybersecurity effort over the next five years. The first bill is called the Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002.

   That bill's first step is to establish a new, nonprofit, nongovernment, consortium of academic and private sector experts

   to lay out a clear set of ``best practices'' that protect against cyberattack. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology have all recommended a new, nonprofit cybersecurity consortium. Such a consortium can work closely with the private sector, unfettered by bureaucracy, in a way that all the country can see and learn from.

   The goals of the consortium are simple: first, the establishment of ``best practices'' that are tailored to different computer systems and needs; second, the widest possible dissemination of those practices; and third, long-term, multi-disciplinary research on cybersecurity-research that isn't occurring now.

   The second part of the Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act will implement ``best practices'' for government systems. The government has a duty to lead by example, something we aren't doing right now. And so, within 6 months after this Act passed, the National Institute of Standards and Technology would immediately begin the process of implementing best practices for government agencies, beginning with small-scale tests and concluding with government-wide adoption of the recommended best practices.

   The last part of my bill will assess the issue of best practices for the private sector. While the bill doesn't impose new mandates beyond the government, it does require careful consideration of how to encourage the widest possible use of known best practices. There's a particular focus on entities that do business with the Federal Government as grantees or contractors. Government agencies should not be exposed to security vulnerabilities in the products supplied by these companies. And Federal dollars should not be flowing to firms that expose America to cyberterrorism. So the new consortium would be required to study whether and how government could condition grants and contracts on the adoption of cybersecurity best practices. The President is authorized to implement recommendations from that study.

   The Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act will address the first goal of cybersecurity--making sure we're taking the steps we already know to improve our security. The second bill I am introducing today--the Cybersecurity Research and Education Act--focuses on our second task: ``training the trainers'' and increasing the number of researchers, teachers, and workers committed to cybersecurity.

   First, the bill establishes a Cybersecurity Graduate

   Fellowship Program at the National Science Foundation. Individuals selected to participate in the program will receive a loan that covers the full tuition and fees as well as a living stipend for 4 years of doctoral study. Upon graduation, these loans will be forgiven at 20 percent per year for each year that the individual teaches at a college or university. After only 5 years of teaching, the entire loan will be paid off. That way, we can ensure that the money we invest in these promising young scientists will be used to train others interested in cybersecurity.

   Second, my bill also establishes a competitive sabbatical for Distinguished Faculty in Cybersecurity. Under the program, a qualified faculty member will receive a stipend to spend a year working and researching at the Department of Defense, a university specializing in cybersecurity, or some other appropriate facility. Universities sending faculty on sabbatical will receive funding to hire a temporary replacement instructor. In addition, when the faculty member returns, the university will get a generous grant to enhance its cybersecurity infrastructure needs. For example, the university could purchase advanced computing equipment and hire graduate research assistants. Participants in this program will have a unique opportunity to engage in cutting-edge research with some of the best minds in the country. When they return to their schools, these faculty will be even better equipped to advance the state of cybersecurity education.

   Third, this bill will create a Cybersecurity Awareness, Training, and Education Program at the National Security Agency. NSA has a strong history of supporting cybersecurity education, as exemplified through initiatives such as the Centers of Excellence program and the National Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education. The program I propose would build on NSA's expertise and would enable the agency to make grants to universities specializing in cybersecurity. The grants could be used for projects like teaching basic computer security to K-12 teachers, or for the development of a ``virtual university.'' Students who don't

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   All of these programs are critical in our fight against cyberterrorism. A strong and vibrant academic community is essential for building the trained workforce of tomorrow. We must be committed to funding long-term research. And we must vigilantly maintain basic cybersecurity protections in government, while promoting them in the private sector.

   When it comes to the threat of a sophisticated, coordinated cyberterrorist attack, the question most likely is not whether such an attack will come. The question is when. And so we must be prepared to fight against a ``cyberjihad,'' and we must be prepared to win.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of my two bills be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bills were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. GRANT FOR PROGRAM FOR PROTECTION OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST DISRUPTION.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology shall, using amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 5, award a grant to a qualifying nongovernmental entity for purposes of a program to support the development of appropriate cybersecurity best practices, support long-term cybersecurity research and development, and perform functions relating to such activities. The purpose of the program shall be to provide protection for the information infrastructure of the United States against terrorist or other disruption or attack or other unwarranted intrusion.

    (b) QUALIFYING NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.--For purposes of this section, a qualifying nongovernmental entity is any entity that--

    (1) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental consortium composed of at least three academic centers of expertise in cybersecurity and at least three private sector centers of expertise in cybersecurity;

    (2) has a board of directors of at least 12 members who include senior administrators of academic centers of expertise in cybersecurity and senior managers of private sector centers of expertise in cybersecurity and of whom not more than one third are affiliated with the centers comprising the consortium;

    (3) is operated by individuals from academia, the private sector, or both who have--

    (A) a demonstrated expertise in cybersecurity; and

    (B) the capacity to carry out the program required under subsection (g);

    (4) has in place a set of rules to ensure that conflicts of interest involving officers, employees, and members of the board of directors of the entity do not undermine the activities of the entity;

    (5) has developed a detailed plan for the program required under subsection (g); and

    (6) meets any other requirements established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology for purposes of this Act.

    (c) APPLICATION.--Any entity seeking a grant under this section shall submit to the National Institute of Standards and Technology an application therefor, in such form and containing such information as the National Institute for Standards and Technology shall require.

    (d) SELECTION OF GRANTEE.--The entity awarded a grant under this section shall be selected after full and open competition among qualifying nongovernmental entities.

    (e) DISPERSAL OF GRANT AMOUNT.--Amounts available for the grant under this section pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 5 shall be dispersed on a fiscal year basis over the five fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 2003.

    (f) CONSULTATION.--In carrying out activities under this section, including selecting an entity for the award of a grant, dispersing grant amounts, and overseeing activities of the entity receiving the grant, the National Institute of Standards and Technology--

    (1) shall consult with an existing interagency entity, or new interagency entity, consisting of the elements of the Federal Government having a substantial interest and expertise in cybersecurity and designated by the President for purposes of this Act; and

    (2) may consult separately with any such element of the Federal Government.

    (g) PROGRAM USING GRANT AMOUNT.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The entity awarded a grant under this section shall carry out a national program for the purpose of protecting the information infrastructure of the United States against disruption. The program shall consist of--

    (A) multi-disciplinary research and development to identify appropriate cybersecurity best practices, to measure the effectiveness of cybersecurity best practices that are put into use, and to identify sound means to achieve widespread use of appropriate cybersecurity best practices that have proven effective;

    (B) multi-disciplinary, long-term, or high-risk research and development (including associated human resource development) to improve cybersecurity; and

    (C) the activities required under paragraphs (3) and (4).

    (2) CONDUCT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), research and development under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) shall be carried out using funds and other support provided by the grantee to entities selected by the grantee after full and open competition among entities determined by the grantee to be qualified to carry out such research and development.

    (B) CONDUCT BY GRANTEE.--The grantee may carry out research and development referred to in subparagraph (A) in any fiscal year using not more than 15 percent of the amount dispersed to the grantee under this Act in such fiscal year by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

    (3) RECOMMENDATIONS ON CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES.--

    (A) RECOMMENDATIONS.--Not later than 18 months after the selection of the grantee under this section, the grantee shall prepare a report containing recommendations for appropriate cybersecurity best practices.

    (B) UPDATES.--The grantee shall update the recommendations made under subparagraph (A) not less often than once every six months, and may update any portion of such recommendations more frequently if the grantee determines that circumstances so require.

    (C) CONSIDERATIONS.--In making recommendations under subparagraph (A), and any update of such recommendations under subparagraph (B), the grantee shall--

    (i) review the most current cybersecurity best practices identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 3(a); and

    (ii) consult with--

    (I) the entities carrying out research and development under paragraph (1)(A);

    (II) entities employing cybersecurity best practices; and

    (III) a wide range of academic, private sector, and public entities.

    (D) DISSEMINATION.--The grantee shall submit the report under subparagraph (A), and any update of the report under paragraph (B), to the bodies and officials specified in paragraph (5), and shall widely disseminate the report, and any such update, among government (including State and local government), private, and academic entities.

    (4) ACTIVITIES RELATING TO WIDESPREAD USE OF CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Not later than two years after the selection of the grantee under this section, the grantee shall submit to the bodies and officials specified in paragraph (5) a report containing--

    (i) an assessment of the advisability of requiring the contractors and grantees of the Federal Government to use appropriate cybersecurity best practices; and

    (ii) recommendations for sound means to achieve widespread use of appropriate cybersecurity best practices that have proven effective.

    (B) REPORT ELEMENTS.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall set forth--

    (i) whether or not the requirement described in subparagraph (A)(i) is advisable, including whether the requirement would impose undue or inappropriate burdens, or other inefficiencies, on contractors and grantees of the Federal Government;

    (ii) if the requirement is determined advisable--

    (I) whether, and to what extent, the requirement should be subject to exceptions or limitations for particular contractors or grantees, including the types of contractors or grantees and the nature of the exceptions or limitations; and

    (II) which cybersecurity best practices should be covered by the requirement and with what, if any, exceptions or limitations; and

    (iii) any other matters that the grantee considers appropriate.

    (5) SPECIFIED BODIES AND OFFICIALS.--The bodies and officials specified in this paragraph are as follows:

    (A) The appropriate committees of Congress.

    (B) The President.

    (C) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

    (D) The National Institute of Standards and Technology.

    (E) The interagency entity designated by the President under subsection (f)(1).

    (h) GRANT ADMINISTRATION.--

    (1) USE OF GRANT COMPETITION AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology may permit the entity awarded the grant under this section to utilize the grants competition system and grants management system of the National Institute of Standards and Technology for purposes of the efficient administration of activities by the entity under subsection (g).

    (2) RULES.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology shall establish any rules and procedures that the National Institute of Standards and Technology considers appropriate to further the purposes of this section. Such rules may include provisions relating to the ownership of any intellectual property created by the entity

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    (i) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology shall take appropriate actions to ensure that activities under this section supplement, rather than supplant, other current governmental and nongovernmental efforts to protect the information infrastructure of the United States.

   SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

    (a) NIST RECOMMENDATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall submit to the bodies and officials specified in subsection (e) a report that--

    (A) identifies appropriate cybersecurity best practices that could reasonably be adopted by the departments and agencies of the Federal Government over the 24-month period beginning on the date of the report; and

    (B) sets forth proposed demonstration projects for the adoption of such best practices by various departments and agencies of the Federal Government beginning 90 days after the date of the report.

    (2) UPDATES.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology may submit to the bodies and officials specified in subsection (e) any updates of the report under paragraph (1) that the National Institute of Standards and Technology consider appropriate due to changes in circumstances.

    (3) CONSULTATION.--In preparing the report under paragraph (1), and any updates of the report under paragraph (2), the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall consult with departments and agencies of the Federal Government having an interest in the report and such updates, and with academic centers of expertise in cybersecurity and private sector centers of expertise in cybersecurity.

    (b) DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Commencing not later than 90 days after receipt of the report under subsection (a), the President shall carry out the demonstration projects set forth in the report, including any modification of any such demonstration project that the President considers appropriate.

    (2) UPDATES.--If the National Institute of Standards and Technology updates under subsection (a)(2) any recommendation under subsection (a)(1)(A) that is relevant to a demonstration project under paragraph (1), the President shall modify the demonstration project to take into account such update.

    (3) REPORT.--Not later than nine months after commencement of the demonstration projects under this subsection, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the demonstration projects. The report shall set forth the following:

    (A) An assessment of the extent to which the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity best practices by departments and agencies of the Federal Government under the demonstration projects has improved cybersecurity at such departments and agencies.

    (B) An assessment whether or not the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity best practices by departments and agencies of the Federal Government under the demonstration projects has affected the capability of such departments and agencies to carry out their missions.

    (C) A description of the cost of the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity best practices by departments and agencies of the Federal Government under the demonstration projects.

    (D) A description of a security-enhancing missions-comparable, cost-effective program, to the extent such program is feasible, for the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity best practices government-wide.

    (E) Any other matters that the President considers appropriate.

    (c) ADOPTION OF CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES GOVERNMENT-WIDE.--The President shall implement a program for the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity best practices government-wide commencing not later than six months after the date of the report.

    (d) INCORPORATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS.--If during the development or implementation of the program under subsection (c) the President receives any recommendations under paragraph (3) or (4) of section 3(g), the President shall modify the program in order to take into account such recommendations.

    (e) SPECIFIED BODIES AND OFFICIALS.--The bodies and officials specified in this subsection are as follows:

    (1) The appropriate committees of Congress.

    (2) The President.

    (3) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

    (4) The interagency entity designated by the President under section 3(f)(1).

   SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:

    (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

    (A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

    (B) the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives.

    (2) CYBERSECURITY.--The term ``cybersecurity'' means information assurance, including information security, information technology disaster recovery, and information privacy.

    (3) CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICE.--The term ``cybersecurity best practice'' means a computer hardware or software configuration, information system design, operational procedure, or measure, structure, or method that most effectively protects computer hardware, software, networks, or network elements against an attack that would cause harm through the installation of unauthorized computer software, saturation of network traffic, alteration of data, disclosure of confidential information, or other means.

    (4) APPROPRIATE CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICE.--The term ``appropriate cybersecurity best practice'' means a cybersecurity best practice that--

    (A) permits, as needed, customization or expansion for the computer hardware, software, network, or network element to which the best practice applies;

    (B) takes into account the need for security protection that balances--

    (i) the risk and magnitude of harm threatened by potential attack; and

    (ii) the cost of imposing security protection; and

    (C) takes into account the rapidly changing nature of computer technology.

   SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the National Institute of Standards and Technology for purposes of activities under this Act, amounts as follows:

    (1) For fiscal year 2003, $70,000,000.

    (2) For each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2007, such sums as may be necessary.

--

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity Research and Education Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--

    (1) critical elements of the Nation's basic economic and physical infrastructure rely on information technology for effective functioning;

    (2) increased reliance on technology has left our Nation vulnerable to the threat of cyberterrorism;

    (3) long-term research on practices, methods, and technologies that will help ensure the safety of our information infrastructure remains woefully inadequate;

    (4) there is a critical shortage of faculty at institutions of higher education who specialize in disciplines related to cybersecurity;

    (5) a vigorous scholarly community in fields related to cybersecurity is necessary to help conduct research and disseminate knowledge about the practical application of the community's findings; and

    (6) universities in the United States award the Ph.D. degree in computer sciences to approximately 1,000 individuals each year, but of those awarded this degree, less than 0.3 percent specialize in cybersecurity and still fewer become employed in faculty positions at institutions of higher education.

   SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:

    (1) CYBERSECURITY.--The term ``cybersecurity'' means information assurance, including scientific, technical, management, or any other relevant disciplines required to ensure computer and network security, including, but not limited to, a discipline related to the following functions:

    (A) Secure System and network administration and operations.

    (B) Systems security engineering.

    (C) Information assurance systems and product acquisition.

    (D) Cryptography.

    (E) Threat and vulnerability assessment, including risk management.

    (F) Web security.

    (G) Operations of computer emergency response teams.

    (H) Cybersecurity training, education, and management.

    (I) Computer forensics.

    (J) Defensive information operations.

    (2) CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE.--The term ``cybersecurity infrastructure'' includes--

    (A) equipment that is integral to research and education capabilities in cybersecurity, including, but not limited to--

    (i) encryption devices;

    (ii) network switches;

    (iii) routers;

    (iv) firewalls;

    (v) wireless networking gear;

    (vi) protocol analyzers;

    (vii) file servers;

    (viii) workstations;

    (ix) biometric tools; and

    (x) computers; and

    (B) technology support staff (including graduate students) that is integral to research and education capabilities in cybersecurity.

    (3) DIRECTOR.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of the National Science Foundation.

    (4) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a)

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    (5) OTHER RELEVANT DISCIPLINE.--The term ``other relevant discipline'' includes, but is not limited to, the following fields as the fields specifically relate to securing information infrastructures:

    (A) Biometrics.

    (B) Software engineering.

    (C) Computer science and engineering.

    (D) Law.

    (E) Business management or administration.

    (F) Psychology.

    (G) Mathematics.

    (H) Sociology.

    (6) QUALIFIED INSTITUTION.--The term ``qualified institution'' means an institution of higher education that, at the time of submission of an application pursuant to any of the programs authorized by this Act--

    (A) has offered, for not less than 3 years prior to the date the application is submitted under this Act, a minimum of 2 graduate courses in cybersecurity (not including short-term special seminars or 1-time classes offered by visitors);

    (B) has not less than 3 faculty members who teach cybersecurity courses--

    (i) each of whom has published not less than 1 refereed cybersecurity research article in a journal or through a conference during the 2-year period preceding the date of enactment of this Act;

    (ii) at least 1 of whom is tenured; and

    (iii) each of whom has demonstrated active engagement in the cybersecurity scholarly community during the 2-year period preceding the date of enactment of this Act, such as serving as an editor of a cybersecurity journal or participating on a program committee for a cybersecurity conference or workshop;

    (C) has graduated not less than 1 Ph.D. scholar in cybersecurity during the 2-year period preceding the date of enactment of this Act; and

    (D) has not less than 3 graduate students enrolled who are pursuing a Ph.D. in cybersecurity.

   SEC. 4. CYBERSECURITY GRADUATE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) PURPOSE.--The purpose of this section is--

    (1) to encourage individuals to pursue academic careers in cybersecurity upon the completion of doctoral degrees; and

    (2) to stimulate advanced study and research, at the doctoral level, in complex, relevant, and important issues in cybersecurity.

    (b) ESTABLISHMENT.--The Director is authorized to establish a Cybersecurity Fellowship Program (referred to in this section as the ``fellowship program'') to annually award 3 to 5-year graduate fellowships to individuals for studies and research at the doctoral level in cybersecurity.

    (c) CYBERSECURITY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM ADVISORY BOARD.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Cybersecurity Fellowship Program Advisory Board (referred to in this section as the ``Board'').

    (2) MEMBERSHIP.--The Director shall appoint members of the Board who shall include--

    (A) not fewer than 3 full-time faculty members--

    (i) each of whom teaches at an institution of higher education; and

    (ii) each of whom has a specialty in cybersecurity; and

    (B) not fewer than 2 research scientists employed by a Federal agency with duties that include cybersecurity activities.

    (3) TERMS.--Members of the Board shall be appointed for renewable 2-year terms.

    (d) APPLICATION.--Each individual desiring to receive a graduate fellowship under this section shall submit an application to the Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Director, in consultation with the Board, shall require.

    (e) AWARD.--The Director is authorized to award graduate fellowships under the fellowship program that shall--

    (1) be made available to individuals, through a competitive selection process, for study at a qualified institution and in accordance with the procedures established in subsection (h);

    (2) be in an amount that is sufficient to cover annual tuition and fees for doctoral study at a qualified institution for the duration of the graduate fellowship, and shall include, in addition, an annual living stipend of $20,000; and

    (3) be for a duration of 3 to 5-years, the specific duration of each graduate fellowship to be determined by the Director in consultation with the Board on a case-by-case basis.

    (f) REPAYMENT.--Each graduate fellowship shall--

    (1) subject to paragraph (f)(2), be subject to full repayment upon completion of the doctoral degree according to a repayment schedule established and administered by the Director;

    (2) be forgiven at the rate of 20 percent of the total amount of graduate fellowship assistance received under this section for each academic year that a recipient is employed as a full-time faculty member at an institution of higher education for a period not to exceed 5 years; and

    (3) be monitored by the Director to ensure compliance with this section.

    (g) ELIGIBILITY.--To be eligible to receive a graduate fellowship under this section, an individual shall--

    (1) be a citizen of the United States;

    (2) be matriculated or eligible to be matriculated for doctoral studies at a qualified institution; and

    (3) demonstrate a commitment to a career in higher education.

    (h) SELECTION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Director, in consultation with the Board, shall select recipients for graduate fellowships.

    (2) DUTIES.--The Director, in consultation with the Board, shall--

    (A) establish criteria for a competitive selection process for recipients of graduate fellowships;

    (B) establish and promulgate an application process for the fellowship program;

    (C) receive applications for graduate fellowships;

    (D) annually review applications and select recipients of graduate fellowships; and

    (E) establish and administer a repayment schedule for recipients of graduate fellowships.

    (3) CONSIDERATION.--In making selections for graduate fellowships, the Director, to the extent possible and in consultation with the Board, shall consider applicants whose interests are of an interdisciplinary nature, encompassing the social scientific as well as technical dimensions of cybersecurity.

    (i) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005, and such sums as may be necessary for each succeeding fiscal year.

   SEC. 5. SABBATICAL FOR DISTINGUISHED FACULTY IN CYBERSECURITY.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--The Director is authorized to award grants to institutions of higher education to enable faculty members who are teaching cybersecurity subjects to spend a sabbatical from teaching working at--

    (1) the National Security Agency;

    (2) the Department of Defense;

    (3) the National Institute of Standards and Technology;

    (4) a research laboratory supported by the Department of Energy; or

    (5) a qualified institution.

    (b) APPLICATION.--Each institution of higher education desiring to receive a grant under this section shall submit an application to the Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Director shall require.

    (c) GRANT AWARDS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall award a grant under this section only if the National Science Foundation and the agency or institution where the faculty member will spend the sabbatical approve the sabbatical placement.

    (2) NUMBER AND DURATION.--For each fiscal year, the Director shall award grants for not more than 25 sabbatical positions that will each be for a 1-year period.

    (3) AMOUNT OF AWARD.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Each institution of higher education that is awarded a grant under this section shall receive $250,000 for each faculty member who will spend a sabbatical pursuant to the grant.

    (B) USE OF AWARD.--The Director shall award a grant under this section in 2 disbursements in the following manner:

    (i) FIRST DISBURSEMENT.--The first disbursement shall be made upon selection of a grant recipient and shall consist of the following:

    (I) $20,000 to provide a stipend for living expenses to each faculty member awarded a sabbatical under this section.

    (II) An amount sufficient for the grant recipient to hire a qualified replacement for the faculty member awarded a sabbatical under this section for the term of the sabbatical, if such a replacement is possible.

    (ii) SECOND DISBURSEMENT.--The second disbursement shall be made at the conclusion of the sabbatical, only if the faculty member completes the sabbatical in its entirety, and shall be used for the grant recipient's cybersecurity infrastructure needs, including--

    (I) acquiring equipment or technology;

    (II) hiring graduate students; or

    (III) supporting any other activity that will enhance the grant recipient's course offerings and research in cybersecurity.

    (d) ELIGIBILITY.--To be eligible to receive a grant under this section, an institution of higher education shall submit an application under subsection (b) that--

    (1) identifies the faculty member to whom the institution of higher education will provide a sabbatical and ensures that the faculty member is a citizen of the United States;

    (2) ensures that the faculty member to whom the institution of higher education will provide a sabbatical is tenured at that institution of higher education and meets general standards of excellence in research or teaching; and

    (3) explains how the faculty member to whom the institution of higher education will provide a sabbatical will--

    (A) integrate into the faculty member's course offerings knowledge related to cybersecurity that is gained during the sabbatical; and

    (B) in conjunction with the institution of higher education, use the second disbursement of funds available under subsection (c)(3)(B)(ii).

    (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $8,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005.

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   SEC. 6. ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE.

3B) State of the Union Address

To the Congress of the United States:

   Mr. Speaker, Vice President CHENEY, Members of Congress, distinguished guests, and fellow citizens:

   As we gather tonight, our Nation is at war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the state of our Union has never been stronger.

   We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our Nation has comforted the victims ..... begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon; rallied a great coalition; captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists; destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps; saved a people from starvation; and freed a country from brutal oppression.

   The American flag files again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own.

   America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror ..... we will be partners in rebuilding that country ..... and this evening we welcome the distinguished interim leader of a liberated Afghanistan: Chairman Hamid Karzai.

   The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new government, and we welcome the new Minister of Women's Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar.

   Our progress is a tribute to the spirit of the Afghan people, to the resolve of our coalition, and to the might of the United States military. When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete confidence in their courage and skill--and tonight, thanks to them, we are winning the war against terror. The men and women of our armed forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the

   United States: Even seven thousand miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves--you will not escape the justice of this Nation.

   For many Americans, these four months have brought sorrow, and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired firefighter returns to Ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a memorial in new York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: ``Dear Daddy, Please take this to Heaven. I don't want to play football until I can play with you again someday.'' Last month, at the grave of her husband, Micheal, a CIA officer and Marine who died in Mazar-e Sharif, Shannon Spann said these words of farewell: ``Semper Fi, my love.'' Shannon is with us tonight.

   Shannon, I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just, and our country will never forget the debt we owe Micheal and all who gave their lives for freedom.

   Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and show us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.

   What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that--far from ending there--our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September 11th were trained in Afghanistan's camps--and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs--set to go off without warning.

   Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested. Yet tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk--and America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it.

   Our Nation will continue to be steadfast, and patient, and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. Second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.

   Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld--including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-i-Mohammed--operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.

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   While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines helping to train that country's armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American, and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia.

   My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries, and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the leadership of President Musharraf. But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake: If they do not act, America will.

   Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.

   Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

   Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

   Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens--leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections--then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

   States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

   We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation's security.

   We will be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

   Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch--yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch.

   We cannot stop short. If we stopped now--leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked--our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight.

   Our first priority must always be the security of our Nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war, we will protect our homeland, and we will revive our economy.

   September 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress, and I join the American people in applauding your unity and resolve. Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home. I am a proud member of my party--yet as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America, we must act first and foremost not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans.

   It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month--over 30 million dollars a day--and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace aging aircraft and make our military more agile to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely. Our men and women in uniform deserve the best weapons, the best equipment, and the best training--and they also deserve another pay raise. My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades, because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high--whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay it.

   The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our Nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of September 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

   My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We will increase funding to help states and communities train and equip our heroic police and firefighters. we will improve intelligence collection and sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States.

   Homeland security will make America, not only stronger, but in many ways better. Knowledge gained from bioterrorism research will improve public health, stronger police and fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods, stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs.

   And as government works to better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens. A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by al-Qaida, and was armed with explosives. The people on that airplane were alert, and as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives--and tonight we welcome and thank flight attendants Hermis Moutardier and Christina Jones.

   Once we have funded our national security and our homeland security, the final great priority of my budget is economic security for the American people. To achieve these great national objectives--to win the war, protect the homeland, and revitalize our economy--our budget will run a deficit that will be small and short term so long as Congress restrains spending and acts in a fiscally responsible way. We have clear priorities and we must act at home with the same purpose and resolve we have shown overseas: We will prevail in the war, and we will defeat this recession.

   Americans who have lost their jobs need our help and I support extending unemployment benefits, and direct assistance for health care coverage. Yet American workers want more than unemployment checks--they want a steady paycheck. When America works, America prospers, so my economic security plan can be summed up in one word: jobs.

   Good jobs begin with good schools--and here we've made a fine start. Republicans and Democrats worked together to achieve historic education reform so no child in America will be left behind. I was proud to work with Members of both parties--Chairman JOHN BOEHNER and Congressman GEORGE MILLER, Senator JUDD GREGG--and I was so proud of our work I even had nice things to say about my friend TED KENNEDY. The folks at the Crawford coffee shop couldn't quite believe it--but our work on this bill shows what is possible if we set aside posturing and focus on results.

   There is more to do. We need to prepare our children to read and succeed in school with improved Head Start and early childhood development programs. We must upgrade our teacher colleges and teacher training and

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   Good jobs also depend on reliable and affordable energy. This Congress must act to encourage conservation, promote technology, build infrastructure, and it must act to increase energy production at home so America is less dependent on foreign oil.

   Good jobs depend on expanded trade. Selling into new markets creates new jobs, so I ask Congress to finally approve Trade Promotion Authority. On these two key issues, trade and energy, the House of Representatives has acted to create jobs--and I urge the Senate to pass this legislation.

   Good jobs depend on sound tax policy. Last year, some in this hall thought my tax relief plan was too small--and some thought it was too big. But when those checks arrived in the mail, most Americans thought tax relief was just about right. Congress listened to the people and responded by reducing tax rates, doubling the child credit, and ending the death tax. For the sake of long-term growth and to help Americans plan for the future, let's make these tax cuts permanent.

   The way out of this recession, the way to create jobs, is to grow the economy by encouraging investment in factories and equipment, and by speeding up tax relief so people have more money to spend. For the sake of American workers, let's pass a stimulus package.

   Good jobs must be the aim of welfare reform. As we re-authorize these important reforms, we must always remember the goal is to reduce dependency on government and offer every American the dignity of a job.

   Americans know economic security can vanish in an instant without health security. I ask Congress to join me this year to enact a Patients' Bill of Rights, to give uninsured workers credits to help buy health coverage, to approve an historic increase in spending for veterans' health, and to give seniors a sound and modern Medicare system that includes coverage for prescription drugs.

   A good job should lead to security in retirement. I ask Congress to enact new safeguards for 401(k) and pension plans, because employees who have worked hard and saved all their lives should not have to risk losing everything if their company fails. Through stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements, corporate America must be made more accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest standards of conduct.

   Retirement security also depends upon keeping the commitments of Social Security--and we will. We must make Social Security financially stable and allow personal retirement accounts for younger workers who choose them.

   Members, you and I will work together in the months ahead on other issues: productive farm policy; a cleaner environment; broader home ownership, especially among minorities; and ways to encourage the good work of charities and faith-based groups. I ask you to join me on these important domestic issues in the same spirit of cooperation we have applied to our war against terrorism.

   During these last few months, I have been humbled and privileged to see the true character of this country in a time of testing. Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil.

   The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people.

   And I hope you will join me in expressing thanks to one American for the strength, and calm, and comfort she brings to our Nation in crisis: our First Lady, Laura Bush.

   None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September 11th, yet after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror, and saw our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate, and more about the good we can do.

   For too long our culture has said, ``If it feels good, do it.'' Now America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ``Let's roll.'' In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a Nation that serves goals larger than self. We have been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass.

   My call tonight is for every American to commit at least two years--four thousand hours over the rest of your lifetime--to the service of your neighbors and your Nation.

   Many are already serving and I thank you. If you aren't sure how to help, I've got a good place to start. To sustain and extend the best that has emerged in America, I invite you to join the new USA Freedom Corps. The Freedom Corps will focus on three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home, rebuilding our communities, and extending American compassion throughout the world.

   One purpose of the USA Freedom Corps will be homeland security. America needs retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major emergencies, volunteers to help police and fire departments, transportation and utility workers well-trained in spotting danger.

   Our country also needs citizens working to rebuild our communities. We need mentors to love children, especially children whose parents are in prison, and we need more talented teachers in troubled schools. USA Freedom Corps will expand and improve the good efforts of AmeriCorps and Senior Corps to recruit more than 200,000 new volunteers.

   And America needs citizens to extend the compassion of our country to every part of the world. So we will renew the promise of the Peace Corps, double its volunteers over the next five years, and ask it to join a new effort to encourage development, and education, and opportunity in the Islamic world.

   This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity--a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know: We can overcome evil with greater good.

   And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace. All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated and live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

   If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic ``street'' greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration. Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history--with its centuries of learning, and tolerance, and progress.

   America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture--but America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance.

   America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world--including the Islamic world--because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.

   In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia, China, and India in ways we never have before to achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from Europe to Asia, from Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom.

   The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've

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   In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty--that we have been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential.

   Our enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice--made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life.

   Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom's price. We have shown freedom's power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom's victory.

   Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

   GEORGE BUSH.

   THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 2002.

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   The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:
To the Congress of the United States:

   Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246) (the ``Act''), and as President of the United States, I hereby report to the Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to terminate the suspensions under section 902 of the Act insofar as such suspensions pertain to the export of defense articles or defense services in support of efforts by the Government of Japan to destroy Japanese chemical weapons abandoned during World War II in the People's Republic of China. License requirements remain in place for these exports and require review and approval on a case-by-case basis by the United States Government.

   George W. Bush.

   The White House, January 25, 2002.

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