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1A) U.S. Policy Towards Iraq

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I came to the floor last week to talk about Iraq. I indicated that U.S. forces enforcing the no-fly zone since 1992 were fired on for the second time this year. Of course, our forces responded by destroying an Iraqi air defense group north of Baghdad. This is a continuing commitment we have had to enforce a no-fly zone under the U.N. proclamation over Iraq.

   The inconsistency is that, on one hand, we are enforcing this no-fly zone; on the other, we are importing oil from Iraq. Even on September 11, when the attack on the Trade Centers occurred, we were importing a little over 1 million barrels of oil a day from Iraq. Today we import some 875,000 barrels. We are enforcing a no-fly zone, putting the lives of our men and women at risk, yet we are becoming even more dependent on that part of the world for our oil supply.

   As I indicated, this is the second time this year we have bombed Iraq, taking out targets. We are off to a troubling start. Last year, Iraq shot at U.S. forces enforcing the no-fly zone some 400 times. We responded with a like force some 25 times. On one hand, we make a fist at Iraq; on the other, we want to take their oil.

   As I indicated, in September there was more than a million barrels.

   This is a point that I think has been lost to some extent, but it has not been lost on the brave men and women who enforce this no-fly zone each day.

   I would like to read a passage I found in today's National Journal. It quoted BG Edward Ellis, Commander, Northern Watch, Combined Task Forces. He says very eloquently:

   I know the rules of engagement are sometimes frustrating for my pilots, whose natural reaction when they get shot at is to want to do some leveling, leveling of something. But anyone who thinks that military action shouldn't be governed by political constraints is naive. The political reality is we're not at war with Iraq at this point, and if we reacted harshly, we could force the hand or limit the options of U.S. policymakers who are trying to figure out what to do about Saddam Hussein.

   Having said that, I do think there is merit to the argument that the policy makers might want to address this issue sooner than later, because of the inherent jeopardy of this mission.

   Saddam has put a bounty on our heads.

   The bottom line is, we continue to fly and the Iraqis continue to shoot at us. Nobody should be especially surprised if eventually they happen to hit something.

   That comes from BG Edward Ellis, Commander of the Northern Watch, Combined Task Forces.

   Our Nation was built on the premise that statesman and soldier are two different professions. But in this instance, I hope my colleagues will make a note of the warning of General Ellis from the front lines, that perhaps his wisdom will guide us to make the right choices for dealing with Iraq and certainly the right choices about our dependence on Iraq; that is, to substantially eliminate that dependence and reduce our dependence on imported oil through the Mideast.

   I was also struck by a Gallup Poll that came out the other day. It was in USA Today and a number of our national periodicals. I am told it was the most comprehensive poll on Muslim countries and their views with regard to America. They polled people in Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. I don't know about you, Mr. President, but when I read those results they were frightening, and they should give us pause. Residents of these countries viewed America unfavorably by a 2-to-1 margin. Some of these countries are supposed to be good friends of ours, but their views and their people's attitude towards us certainly doesn't show it.

   Friends or not, we get a lot of energy from this area, and I think we have become dangerously reliant upon them. Let's look at the numbers: 61 percent of the residents of those countries, in polling information from Gallup, suggest that the Arabs were not responsible for 9-11. In other words, those who carried citizenship from those countries, they bear no responsibility. Only 18 percent of the people in these countries believe that Arabs were even involved in the terrorism that took place on September 11.

   In Kuwait, 36 percent said the attacks were justifiable, the highest number of any country. That is rather troubling to me because we only have to go back to 1992 when we fought a war to keep Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait and going on into Saudi Arabia. Here is Kuwait, 36 percent of the people say the attacks were justifiable. If it were not for our action, Saddam Hussein would be in Saudi Arabia today; he would have taken over Kuwait.

   Only 9 percent say U.S. military action in Afghanistan is justified. Let me say that again. Only 9 percent, according to the Gallup Poll, say U.S. military action is justified even though the people of Afghanistan were happy, in our view at least, to throw off the yoke of the Taliban and al-Qaida that was strangling them to death, certainly, in our opinion, using that country as a clubhouse for gangsters and terrorists.

   I am appalled by these figures. I am worried and I think it should bother all Members of this body. Why? Because we are too dependent on these countries that clearly have a different view of the United States. The poll shows the United States has a 16-percent approval rating in Saudi Arabia. I hope that irony is not lost, that we also get 16 percent of our oil from Saudi Arabia.

   What are we going to do about it? The governments of some of these countries are friends of ours, but what about the people? The Gallup Poll shows that, despite our money, our aid, our support, they either don't like us or they don't trust us, or both.

   What really concerns all of us is the manner in which this lack of trust, this hatred, is fostered within these countries. We know that fundamentalist schools in some of the Muslim countries do not necessarily preach democracy. We have heard about these schools, where they teach youngsters to hate western ideas, western democracy, and especially America. The real concern is they are teaching some of these young people who are going to be the leaders of tomorrow. These are youngsters who might grow up believing that dying while killing an American is a great thing. These are the young people who will not forever be satisfied with their government's sending them to schools. They will want to take the power themselves from what they learned. As we know, children are very impressionable.

   What I am concerned with today is what this leadership could become. I am also concerned at the lack, in this body, of a concentrated effort to reduce our dependence on oil from that part of the world. We are sending money to Saddam Hussein every day for oil--somewhere in the area of $15 million every day.

   Our President has taken a strong stance for energy independence, against terrorism, recognizing that we can't eliminate that dependence but we can reduce it.

   I think the Gallup Poll numbers are so true. I think it is also true that we should reflect, at this crucial time, on our relationship with Iraq, particularly our knowledge that Saddam Hussein has been able to evade the monitoring activities of the United Nations within Iraq, particularly recognizing that we have not had any inspectors there under the U.N. for nearly 4 years, particularly in view of the fact that we have evidence that shows he has a missile capability, a delivery capability, and that he may be working towards a biological and/or nuclear warhead.

   Where is he aiming? We know Israel is one of the countries within his sights. The question is, When do we address and resolve, if you will, what this threat might become? Do we initiate, through a mandate, inspections that occur immediately? And what kind of reaction can we expect from Saddam Hussein? Clearly, the U.N. is unable to do its job, but this threat is increasing. It is being fostered by dollars from the United States that we pay Saddam Hussein for his oil at the same time we are bombing him and taking out his targets. He is using the money to keep his Republican Guard alive. He is obviously using the money to develop his missile capability.

   The question is, How do we begin to unwind Iraq? What is it going to take? Do we wait for an action that costs American lives? This is a very sobering question, but I cannot stand in this body and condone our continued dependence on oil from a neighbor such as Saddam Hussein.

   I challenge the leader, who has previously given me his assurance that we would be able to address in this session an action that would be initiated against Iraq, Senate action expressing not only our displeasure but setting up the mechanics to ensure that we did not purchase any more oil from Saddam Hussein.

   We can do that, just as we initiated action against Iran, from which the United States has not had any oil for many years. Basically, what we are talking about is a sanction. We have sanctions against Libya. We have sanctions against Iran. But I find it very frustrating that we have not gone forth and sanctioned Saddam Hussein and oil imports coming to the United States from Iraq.

   As I mentioned some time ago, when we had the unanimous consent agreement--and the RECORD will show that the leader allowed me an opportunity to bring this matter up at the appropriate time--I will again bring this matter up with the leader for his consideration. I think the time is right to initiate such action of a sanction against oil from Iraq.

   We find ourselves in a situation where not only are we enforcing a no-fly zone but we are taking out targets when he attempts to take us down, suggesting that it is certainly not in the national interest of our Nation to maintain this kind of relationship. I will be calling on the majority leader to honor his commitment to me to allow us to take up a sanction against Iraq. I suggest we do it as soon as possible.

   Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

1B) How Many Terrorist Opportunities Will Yucca Mountain Provide?

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, proponents of transporting 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain proclaim that terrorists will have a more difficult time committing an act of terrorism at one singular site as opposed to 131 commercial nuclear reactors around the country. Nonsense. What this view does not take into account is how many opportunities terrorists will now be provided if this nuclear waste is transported through 43 States, past the homes, hospitals, and schools of over 123 million Americans. Seventy-seven thousand tons of nuclear waste will require at least 96,000 truck shipments over 3 decades, giving terrorists over 96,000 opportunities to target these shipments as the next act of heinous terrorism. Mr. Speaker, I implore my colleagues to consider the safety and welfare of the 123 million Americans whose communities could be destroyed by transporting deadly nuclear waste throughout our entire country. Protect Americans from the next possible terrorist act. Stop Yucca Mountain.

1C) Yucca Mountain is a Moving Disaster

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, how much more simply can I say it, that shipping nuclear waste back and forth across this country 96,000 times is simply unsafe. Sure, proponents of the Yucca Mountain Project would say that some 3,000 shipments have already been made to destinations in America without any incidents. But let me say, I am sure that the elevators in the World Trade Center operated faultlessly until September 11. We cannot use the past to predict the future.

Mr. Speaker, terrorist threats against one of these many shipments is a real danger, and it would be foolish to disregard it. Moreover, the news program ``60 Minutes'' last year said that train accidents due to track failure are happening at a rate of nearly 1 every 24 hours. Just a few months ago the city of Baltimore was nearly shut down due to a chemical train accident.

Mr. Speaker, I am not willing to gamble on transporting the deadliest substance known to man back and forth through 43 States, especially when DOE has no strategy or plan for the possibility of disaster. We need to protect our communities and constituents, protect our Nation. I urge Members to vote ``no'' on Yucca Mountain.

2A) The Costs of a National Missile Defense
Mr. KYL. Madam President, on January 28, I addressed the reasons why I believe the President is correct to move this nation forward in the deployment of a national missile defense. I pointed out then that the threat is too great not to proceed when the technical means are at hand.

   Today, I wish to address the issue of the costs of defending America against the threat of ballistic missile attack. At the end of January, the Congressional Budget Office released yet another of its reports purporting to show the costs to the American taxpayer of a system to defend the United States against such an attack. Opponents of missile defense rushed to use the study to bolster their arguments. For reasons I will discuss, portions of the CBO report are seriously flawed, and opponents' cost arguments are fallacious. Today, I intend to set the record straight, and to demonstrate that we can afford missile defense.

   The first problem with the CBO report is that it was prepared at the request of national missile defense skeptics various Senators who carefully defined the options they wanted analyzed in their letter to the CBO. As a result,

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   Also, CBO's cost estimates vary widely, depending upon which of its scenarios and assumptions one wishes to use. For example, its April 2000 report includes cost estimates for one and two ground-based sites with varying numbers of interceptors and X-Band radars and associated space-based sensors, ranging from $29 billion to $60 billion. This wide variance in estimates--a factor of 100--renders its analysis virtually meaningless, except for the rhetorical use of opponents.

   The high range of the new study--$187 billion--is CBO's estimate of the cost of a 3-site national missile defense system and a full constellation of space-based lasers--an option not planned by the either the Clinton or Bush Administrations. This tactic of inflating the cost of national missile defense was similarly employed in the 2000 study.

   At least part of the reason for this methodology again can be laid at the feet of the report's sponsors. CBO has estimated the cost of a national missile defense employing the artificially derived assumptions required by the letter from the Senators. It was their letter, not any Department of Defense plan, that required the CBO study to include the cost of the nonexistent third site. The same letter also requested cost estimates for a stand-alone sea-based midcourse system, despite the fact that no such system is envisioned by the Administration. It should, therefore, be no surprise that CBO came up with a high estimate in the neighborhood of $187 billion to build the national missile defense system defined by its skeptics rather than the Defense Department.

   To CBO's credit, it denied the request of the sponsors' letter to include in its estimate Brilliant Pebbles--canceled in 1993--and appropriately treated as ``conceptual'' the sea-based boost-phase kinetic energy idea. CBO explained its reluctance to factor into its study cost estimates for Brilliant Pebbles by noting that:

   the most recent complete technical description of [Brilliant Pebbles] dates from 1992 [and] little additional work has been done on space-based interceptors since Brilliant Pebbles was terminated early in the Clinton Administration.

   With regard to a sea-based boost phase kinetic energy, it writes that:

   sea-based boost-phase defenses are . . . currently in the very early stages of conceptual development [and] there are substantial uncertainties regarding the needed capabilities, system architecture, technologies, and schedule for developing and deploying such defenses.

   I should note that I remain a strong supporter of Brilliant Pebbles and hope that it is seriously pursued at some point in the future. That the program's revival would entail financial costs is, of course, a given, if it were ever actually considered.

   CBO did include an estimated cost of $68 billion for a 24-satellite constellation of Space-Based Lasers, despite the Appropriations Committees having killed the long-range program, the Administration's budget request reflecting little emphasis on that program, and despite the fact that very little is known about the characteristics of any such satellites that may eventually be built. CBO also included in its estimate the construction of nine new AEGIS ships, each outfitted with 35 advanced interceptors, while omitting consideration of the possibility of converting existing AEGIS ships for the new mission.

   At the request of the Senators who requested the study, CBO also priced options as though they will all develop and deploy concurrently, and without regard for the relationships between programs. In other words, it estimated program costs in what we call a ``stovepipe'' fashion: programs exist parallel to and independent of each other. Deliberately ignored by the report's congressional sponsors is the common base from which these programs develop and from which they will operate, for example, feeding off of common sensor and processors. Once again, CBO warned against using such an approach. To quote again from its cover letter to Senators:

   (A)s you requested, CBO's assumptions about the architecture and components of the sea-based system reflect its use as a stand-alone system, not as an adjunct to a ground-based system.

   To summarize, then, CBO's high-end estimates are derived from the following questionable practices requested by Senators:

   No. 1, use of exaggerated scenarios, for example, the third ground-based site and the construction of new ships;

   No. 2, inclusion of drawing board programs that may or may not be included in some distant architecture, but certainly won't be developed concurrent with other covered programs; and

   No. 3, use of pricing and inventory requirement methodologies that may bear little or no relationship to a national missile defense system.

   The second problem with the analysis is the context.

   It assumes circumstances similar to other weapon acquisition programs. But the development of missile defenses, does not easily allow for such analysis. Unlike a new aircraft, for example, there is no existing national missile defense system from which to draw comparisons to programs under development. A decade of lost opportunity has left us with no alternatives but to field the systems currently under development.

   Yet, look at some of CBO's assumptions from its April 2000 report, which attempt to redefine a missile defense program to some hypothetical norm:

   Differing estimates for procurement arise for two reasons. First, CBO believes that in addition to the 100 deployed interceptors, the system would need 82 additional interceptors to use in testing and to replace ones lost in accidents or engagements. The Administration puts the number of additional interceptors at 47. However, CBO's larger figure is more consistent with the experience of previous missile programs. It includes 20 additional interceptors for operational testing and evaluation because CBO assumes that the system will need a total of 30 tests over its first five years of operations. (The Peacekeeper missile program conducted about 20 tests during its initial five years of operations, and the Navy's Trident missile program conducted about 40 tests in its first five years.) In addition, CBO projects that a greater number of spare interceptors (20 instead of five) will be necessary to replace ones that are destroyed during engagement or tests and to allow for unforeseen events such as damage during maintenance.

   The problem with this approach is that it estimates the cost of a make-believe program. It devises a program it thinks will be necessary and runs the numbers on that. With regard to the number of additional interceptors required for testing and spares, for example, CBO relies on the histories of ballistic missile programs that have no bearing on or relationship to the air defense interceptors being contemplated.

   To summarize, then, the CBO report includes a very wide variance of costs, depending upon a number of variables, many of which may bear no relationship to the eventual system architecture, and it derives assumptions based upon the experience of programs that have little or no relationship to the components of a missile defense system.

   The second point relates to the tactics of missile defense opponents.

   Missile defense opponents, such as the sponsors of the CBO report, invariably employ a series of misleading arguments to advance their case against missile defense. One is the misuse of total program life-cycle costs. Another involves the use of

   improperly derived cost estimates by adding together numbers that even CBO clearly states should not be added. A third argument used by missile defense opponents is that money spent on missile defense programs comes at the expense of other programs.

   With regard to argument number one, it is not fair to evaluate the cost of a program without spreading it out over the life of the program. But many

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   Estimating the cost of missile defenses over a 14-year period would have been akin to devising a similar cost estimate in 1958 for the cost of five generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles (the Titan I, the Titan II, the Minuteman I, II, and III) through 1972. If the procurement cost of these systems--likely more than $200 billion--had been debated prior to the decision to develop ballistic missiles, perhaps Congress would have been equally shocked by the ``sticker price'' of deploying a nuclear deterrent for the next 14 years.

   The second argument or tactic of missile defense opponents involves a misuse of data contained in the CBO report despite CBO warnings. For example, if one simply adds the various high-end estimates, ignoring the lower estimates and CBO's own caveats against taking such an approach, it could appear as though the cost of a National Missile Defense system would exceed $180 billion. And it turns out that is exactly the conclusion the report's congressional sponsors emphasize. In their prepared statement issued upon release of the report, the three senators wrote the following: ``The report . . . shows that developing, deploying, and maintaining a modest layered system that includes ground, sea and space-based elements could easily cost well over $150 billion.'' Yet, the CBO stated in its cover letter to the Senate sponsors, ``The cost estimates that CBO has prepared for individual systems should not be added together to yield an estimate of the total potential costs of national missile defense.'' But that is precisely what Senate opponents of missile defense are doing.

   Missile defense opponents use the high-end CBO estimate as a baseline from which the rhetoric escalates to even higher cost estimates. Some examples:

   One of our esteemed colleagues, in a floor statement on June 25, stated the following:

   The Congressional Budget Office in an April 2000 report concluded that the most limited national missile defense system would cost $30 billion . . . If we hope to defend against the accidental launch of numerous highly sophisticated missiles of the type that are now in Russia's arsenal, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost will almost double, to $60 billion . . . This is what the Congressional Budget Office had to say in March 2001: Those estimates from April 2000 may now be too low . . . Is it any wonder that some critics believe that a workable national missile defense system will cost more than $120 billion?

   From $30 billion to $120 billion.

   Another Senator was described in the New York Times on September 11 as saying that:

   ``The cheapest system proposed by the Bush Administration . . . would cost $60 billion over 20 years, but could rise to as much as $120 billion . . . A more complicated system that would combat decoys or munitions that carry biological weapons--known as a layered defense would cost between one-quarter trillion and half a trillion dollars,'' Mr. BIDEN said.

   This Senator is reported to have said, that quickly, the estimated cost to defend the American public from ballistic missile attack, in the eyes of those who oppose any such defenses, went from CBO's lowest number of $40 billion to ``one-quarter trillion.'' Exaggeration? Yes.

   Inevitably, cost estimates for missile defense are used out of context. The use of exaggerated lump-sum figures to portray national missile defense in the most negative light is intellectually dishonest. Even many critics of national missile defense claim to support the components to defend against shorter range missiles, like Iraqi Scuds.

   Taking such support for theater missile defense programs into account, the remaining portion of the overall missile defense budget allocated for defense of American cities usually represents less than two percent of the defense budget. That's right: less

   than two percent. The fiscal year defense appropriations bill included $331 billion. Of the $8.2 billion in that bill authorized for missile defense, only $3.8 billion is directed toward the so-called midcourse segment, which includes the ground and sea-based systems capable of intercepting intercontinental-range missiles. That amounts to one percent of the fiscal year 2002 defense budget for national missile defense. I will repeat that.

   That amounts to one percent of the fiscal year 2002 defense budget for national missile defense.

   For fiscal year 2003, the defense budget request is $379 billion. The amount requested for missile defenses is $7.8 billion. Of that amount, again, around $3 billion will go for systems designed to defend the United States. Again, that is only one percent for National Missile Defense programs. The Department of Defense's budget documents show that the annual expenditure for all missile defense programs will rise to $11 billion in 2007, a time when total defense spending is expected to be around $450 billion. So, in 2007, when national missile defense programs will be in or near the operational stage of development, and assuming they represent as much as half of all missile defense programs, they will still represent only one to two percent of defense spending, while all missile defense programs constitute two to three percent.

   A third argument is that missile defense will rob other needy programs of necessary funding.

   Some folks try to portray the missile defense programs as robbing from other more important things, more pressing national security requirements, and other needs more close to the heart of the American people.

   For example--and I will just quote one or two of these--the Senators, in their statement accompanying the release of the new CBO report, write:

   If the Administration decides to pursue such a costly program, it could draw resources away from programs to counter other, more likely and more immediate threats we know we face: terrorism, attacks with anthrax or other biological and chemical agents, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and delivery systems that are far more likely to be used than are ballistic missiles, such as trucks, ships, airplanes, and suitcases.

   One of the Senators involved here is the majority leader. It is my understanding that the distinguished majority leader has proposed to pay for the approximately $15 billion in energy subsidies in the energy bill that we are going to be taking up perhaps this week by offsetting that with the user fees that are collected by the Customs Agency.

   U.S. Customs has a responsibility in this war on terror, a very serious responsibility. As these Senators pointed out, one of the likely possibilities, anyway, of threat to the United States is the delivery of a weapon of mass destruction in the cargo hold of a ship. That, of course, is exactly the kind of thing for which Customs is supposed to check.

   So on the one hand the distinguished majority leader is at least recorded as having suggested that we take money away from the Customs Service, money which could be spent to check this kind of thing, and pay for subsidies in the energy bill with that funding. It is my belief that we should do both. We have to leave the Customs fees with the Customs Service which has a massive responsibility. They need more money, not less, to do what we want them to do with their regular job as well as fighting the war on terror.

   We also need to spend the kind of money that is required to ensure that we do not have a threat from ballistic missile attack. We can and should do both.

   Other Senators made similar comments, but I believe these arguments are demonstrably wrong. I will illustrate why with discussion on three brief points: First of all, spending to protect our Nation from another terrorist attack; secondly, costs of other weapons programs; and, third, what I would call porkbarrel spending.

   According to the Office of Management and Budget, the United States had budgeted $10.3 billion to combat terrorism for fiscal year 2002. That was before September 11. Back in August, once again, the Congressional Research Service had provided my office estimated federal expenditures for border security of $14 billion for the current fiscal year. Taking into account some degree of overlap, we can reasonably surmise that between $15 billion and $20 billion was budgeted by the Bush administration for what we now call ``homeland defense'' before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the

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   The budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes $38 billion for homeland security, double the amount for 2002. In addition, the amount budgeted for national defense will be $379 billion, almost all for conventional and special forces. Compare that with the $3 billion we are spending on national missile defense. Clearly, the opponents' claims that other defense and domestic security projects, especially our efforts to deal with terrorism, are suffering because of missile defense are just plain wrong.

   How about other weapons programs?

   The total costs of any major procurement program can appear daunting. Tactical fighter modernization--the development and acquisition of the F/A-18E/F, the F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter--is anticipated, if we accept CBO's numbers, to cost $350 billion through the year 2020.

   To date, we have spent over $10 billion on the V-22 Osprey program, which continues to prove a developmental headache and accidents of which have cost the lives of 30 Marines. The Department of Defense calculates that the V-22 program will cost a total of $38 billion.

   These are all high total costs. Taken out of context, they can be exploited by opponents of individual programs. The $350 billion figure for tactical fighter modernization, in particular, has been used to buttress arguments against these aircraft, given the absence of a serious threat to U.S. air superiority.

   Such arguments, however, would be misleading. They ignore the imponderables, such as the need to ensure air superiority throughout much of the 21st century, and the fact that procurement costs are spread out over many years. They ignore cost-benefit analyses that demonstrate fewer units required to accomplish missions that require far greater numbers of older, less capable models. They ignore missions assigned to platforms that may not be readily apparent because they do not fit into conventional images of how such platforms are used.

   So, it is not persuasive to argue against missile defense based on the seemingly large total cost spent over time.

   Finally, what about he argument that other needs go unmet because of what we would be spending on missile defenses? We rarely hear many of these same critics decrying the expenditure of considerable amounts of taxpayer money for porkbarrel projects that contribute neither to national security nor to our economic well-being. I direct my colleagues attention, for example, to the February 6 column by Robert Samuelson in the Washington Post. Samuelson notes that, ``since 1978, federal outlays to support farmers' incomes have exceeded $300 billion.'' Samuelson goes on to write: ``But wait: Congress is about to expand the subsidies. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that new farm legislation would increase costs by $65 billion over a 10-year period, on top of the $128.5 billion of existing programs.''

   These figures make what we are spending on national missile defense pale by comparison.

   Samuelson's column argues persuasively that the $300 billion in farm subsidies have had no--repeat, no--discernable impact on agricultural production in the United States, on farmer incomes, or on the contraction in the number of small family farms.

   My colleague Senator McCain regularly produces lists of items added to spending bills for purely parochial reasons. For example, he identified $3.6 billion worth of pure pork in the current year's defense appropriations bill--an amount exceeding our expenditure for national missile defense. And this is an annual phenomenon and represents just one of the 13 annual appropriations bills, all of which are loaded up with pork every year. Senator McCain estimated that the total spent on pork for fiscal year 2002 equals $15 billion three times the amount historically spent on missile defense programs per year.

   As a final thought, when discussing the cost of a national missile defense system, we should attempt to inject a little integrity into the process. The liberal public policy organization, The Center for Defense Information, recently published a report concluding that, since 1983, the United States has spent ``roughly $44 billion'' on national missile defense. The implication is intended to be that we have nothing to show for all that money, and should not spend more. The center further concludes that the cost of a three-site national missile defense system--the nonexistent third site that I mentioned earlier--would ``likely'' cost more than $60 billion.

   The $44 billion spent since 1983 on national missile defense amounts to $2.3 billion per year--less than 1 percent of defense spending. The suggestion that we have little or nothing to show for the money spent ignores two very important facts: No. 1, the research and development effort has given us a strong base of knowledge for what is technically feasible; has contributed to the development of the theater and short-range systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 that most of us agree are needed; and has generated a large number of technological spinoffs, for example, in the areas of cancer screening, computer chip production, and laser eye surgery; and, second, to the extent not all of the money was spent to produce a deployable system, we must recognize that, for 8 years, we had an administration vehemently opposed to actually developing and building a system to defend this country against missile attack.

   To the extent we did not make as much progress as could have been accomplished, the 8 years that were ``lost'' was because the Clinton administration was committed to the notion that we didn't need missile defenses, that arms control and deterrence would protect us against those who would do us harm. While money was spent on research, there was no commitment to actually deploy a national missile defense system. Adherence to the ABM Treaty, which was considered ``the cornerstone of strategic stability,'' was sacrosanct. As Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, in response to an inquiry regarding the eventual cost of the Bush administration's missile defense plans, said in his July 12 statement before the Armed Services Committee:

   ..... we have not yet chosen a systems architecture to deploy. We are not in a position to do so because so many promising technologies were not pursued in the past. The program we inherited was designed not for maximum effectiveness, but to remain within the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

   That is the real problem.

   So in conclusion, there is no question that the cost to build a national missile defense system will be high. Freedom is not free.

   We do not know the exact cost, both because we are struggling to make up for lost time and we were constrained by an outdated treaty from which President Bush is wisely extricating us. We do not know how many satellites we will need, because political decisions are still to be made regarding the scale of the threat against which a defensive system will be deployed. And we are only now getting a handle on questions that should have been answered years ago, for example, the feasibility of various technologies for interceptors and sensors.

   While we don't know precisely how much it will cost to build a national missile defense system, we do have some sense of what it could cost if we don't build one. A nuclear-armed missile targeted against New York City would do far more damage than did the aircraft that struck the World Trade Center. It would, in fact, destroy the city. The ramifications for the people, the whole country, and our national economy would, obviously, be enormous.

   Just to try to quantify the fiscal costs, the Congressional Research Service states that most credible projections of the cost to the insurance industry from the September 11 attacks range from $40 to $70 billion. And that's just the impact on the insurance industry. Arnaud de Borchgrave discussed the impact on the economy in a recent column in the Washington Times, stating, ``. . . the accumulated damage to the U.S. and world economies is now thought to be almost $700 billion.'' Obviously, the cost in human lives is incalculable.

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   The cost of a system to defend against that attack would be minuscule in comparison. In fact, as pointed out, the cost of defending against terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction, or even conventional weapons, far exceeds what we spend on missile defenses.

   The missile threat develops faster than does the means to counter it. We are neither spending extravagantly, nor inappropriately. We are seeking to deploy a layered defense that optimizes technologies that have been developed over the past two decades, and that are continuing to evolve.

   Opponents of national missile defense are free to continue to oppose the President's plan. That is their right. There is an old saying, though. Everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion; no one is entitled to his or her own facts. Missile defense programs should be discussed with the same respect for context and intellectual honesty that we afford the programs on which the other 98 percent of the defense budget is allocated. Only then, can we make the informed decisions we were sent here to make.

   That concludes my remarks on this matter of the cost of national ballistic missile defense. I spoke before on the need for national missile defense, and I will speak in the future on the question of the legal authority of the President to withdraw the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Ms. COLLINS. Are we in morning business?

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.

END

2B) Missile Defense of Nuclear Facilities

SA 2992. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 2917 proposed by Mr. DASCHLE (for himself and Mr. BINGAMAN) to the bill (S. 517) to authorize funding the Department of Energy to enhance its mission areas through technology transfer and partnerships for fiscal years 2002 through 2006, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

    On page 94, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:

   SEC. 5__. REPORT ON MISSILE DEFENSE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a study of the feasibility and desirability of establishing ground-based air defense missile systems, integrated with the national air defense system under the North American Aerospace Defense Command, at critical nuclear facilities to protect against threats from aircraft.

    (b) MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED.--The study shall include analyses of--

    (1) alternative organizations, structures, and equipment to be used in connection with the missile defense systems; and

    (2) the utility, suitability, feasibility, risks, and costs of establishing the missile defense systems.

    (c) REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report describing the results of the study.

3A) Establishing a WMD Responder Training Site
Mrs. CARNAHAN. Madam President, I rise today to introduce important legislation for homeland defense, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Responder Training Facility Act of 2002. America's war against international terrorism has increased the need to prepare against the threat of weapons of mass destruction , known as WMDs.

Currently the Army's frontline of defense against WMD threats, Fort Leonard Wood, does not have the ability to conduct full-scale, joint training year round. This preparation gap must be closed. Our national security depends on the ability to effectively respond to a WMD attack. That is why I have introduced legislation to create a permanent training facility at Fort Leonard Wood.

Fort Leonard Wood has no dedicated facility for training active duty and National Guard WMD responders. This prevents both joint training and the expansion of coordination among all WMD responders. Last October, we in this body learned first hand the importance of a coordinated response to WMD attacks. When letters, filled with anthrax, were mailed to members of Congress, 50 of our colleagues in the Senate and their staffs were evicted from the Hart office building for over three months. Experts from several agencies and departments, who never prepared together to respond to a WMD attack, worked to overcome setbacks and difficulties to make sure the Hart building was safe again. I thank them for all their hard work. But we now know that to prepare for future threats, those responsible for responding to WMD attacks must train together.

Constructing of a permanent facility will enable joint training and cooperation of WMD Civil Support Teams; Department of Defense Emergency Responders; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Instillation Support Teams; and Active and Reserve Component Chemical Units. The need to conduct joint operations and training year round is important and immediate. It is vital to national security. This is why the Army has placed the highest priority on building a permanent facility at Fort Leonard Wood.

This legislation will compliment S. 1909, which was introduced by my friend and colleague from Missouri. Senator BOND's legislation calls for the establishment of a unified command for homeland defense, a post both the President and the Secretary of Defense support.

S. 1909 will allow the Department of Defense to more effectively manage homeland defense resources by centrally locating the unified command within the United States, away from a major population center at an Armed Forces facility already in use for WMD training.

Fort Leonard Wood meets all of these requirements and seems like an ideal candidate to fulfill this new and important national security role. But Fort Leonard Wood is not yet ready. While it has taken the lead in preparing WMD responders, there is yet another step to take. We must ensure that the country is prepared for future attacks by establishing a permanent training facility now.

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, when the leader of the free world came to this Chamber in January to deliver his State of the Union address, he described the axis of evil governments. He mentioned them by name: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Since then, some people have criticized the speech. In fact, one of President Bush's predecessors said the speech was ``over simplistic'' and ``counterproductive.''

Mr. Speaker, the Government of Iran spends millions of dollars financing the murder of innocent civilians and violence in the Middle East. The Government of Iraq has used chemical weapons to kill its own citizens and has invaded its neighbors. North Korea is the only country I know of today that has concentration camps where people enter and never come home from. They literally starve their citizens.

If that is not evil, I do not know what is. Years ago another President referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire, and some of us remember the Soviet refusenik Natan Sharansky. He was in a gulag when President Reagan gave that speech. Mr. Sharansky told me, when I met him, that news of that speech spread like wildfire through the Soviet gulags. Not until then did they realize that a leader in the West understood the nature of communism.

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