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Congressional Record Weekly UpdateMay 13-17, 2002Return to the Congressional Report Weekly. 1A) Abolish Nuclear Arms If you read today's New York Times you see they say that ``the proposed treaty sets no pace for dismantling weapons over the next decade, as long as the total number of strategic weapons does not exceed 2,200 in 2012. It permits the United States to stockpile the dismantled weapons in a form that would allow them to be reinstalled on missiles or aboard nuclear armed submarines in case of an ugly turn of events with any major nuclear power. In short, it is an agreement filled with escape clauses.'' The only way that we can really protect the world against nuclear arms is to work for complete nuclear abolition. That is something that this administration has taken a path away from. It has taken a path towards deconstructing the nonproliferation treaty towards building new nuclear weapons and towards nuclear proliferation. This treaty that has been described does not do anything to bring the world one step away from the abyss.
1B) Defense Authorization and Nonproliferation Programs The Defense Authorization Act, as currently proposed, cuts by $30 million this critical national security work. If this $30 million is not restored in full, it would mean at least a one year delay in shutting down these plutonium production reactors, which translates into 1.5 additional tons of weapons grade plutonium that will be produced by Russia, which is equivalent to nearly 200 nuclear weapons. Mr. Chairman, the demise of the Soviet empire ushered in a new post-Cold War period with unclear and unidentifiable threats and a new and very real sense of urgency, instability and insecurity. During the Cold War, the enemy was clear and identifiable. Regrettably, that is not the case today. In addition to the traditional nuclear weapons proliferators such as North Korea, Pakistan, and China, countries such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and stateless terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, are out there and are actively in search of their next deal on nuclear weapons technology and components. It is this latter type of threat--the unclear, mobile, and not easily identifiable source of threat--that compels us to continue and increase our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. In the past 11 years, while much as been done to dismantle Russia's and the former Soviet Republics' nuclear weapons, the dangers persist, and in some cases have increased. In a January 2001 report to the DOE, former Senator Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler called the proliferation risks created by nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union the ``greatest unmet national security need'' for the United States.'' In a speech at the National Press Club on March 29, 2001, former Senator Sam Nunn addressed the need to continue to build upon existing programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, when he said, ``As we enter the second decade of the post-Cold War world.....the most significant, clear and present danger to the national security of the United States is the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Nothing else comes close. The public perception of the threat is low; the reality of the threat is high. There is a dangerous gap between the threat and our response. To close this gap, we must make a fundamental shift in the way we think about nuclear weapons, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and our national security. The world has changed, and with it so too have the threats. We cannot afford to cut back on such worthwhile programs. We cannot ignore or minimize these very real threats. Significant progress has been made thus far through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and various State Department and DOE programs. There is still much work to be done. Efforts to defund or reduce these vital programs are detrimental to our ability to protect Americans against the very real threat from weapons of mass destruction. The President's request and Congressman EDWARD's amendment to fund a critical program in Russia was a step in the right direction.
1C) Support for Yucca Mountain Repository Site In the 37 years that government and private industry has transported nuclear waste, there have been only 4 rail accidents and 4 highway accidents. That represents a 99.7 percent success rate. It also represents 2,700 shipments of 10,000 spent fuel assemblies over a distance of more than 1.6 million miles. It is important to remember also that the states will be actively involved in the rout selection process, there will be no shipments through down town Chicago. The containers, in which the spent fuel is stored, are quite capable of withstanding a broadside from a locomotive traveling 60 mph, tests have been conducted that prove this. The trucks and trains carrying this spent fuel are accompanied by at least one escort, which must report to the Department of Energy (DOE) every two hours and are continuously monitored and tracked by satellite. This is just the smallest part of the safety precautions being taken by the DOE, the NRC and state and local first responder's nation wide. After twenty years of spending $8 billion of the taxpayers money the Department of Energy has determined it is safe to store spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain. That being the case, it is high time the Federal Government keeps its long-standing commitment to citizens and utility companies by taking possession of these materials. Passage, by the House, of H.J. Res. 87 is a big step in that direction.
1D) Cleanup of Rocky Flats Cleanup at Rocky Flats is proceeding under a plan agreed to by DOE, EPA, and the State of Colorado. DOE's goal is to complete cleanup and close the site on or before December 15, 2006. Closure of Rocky Flats will mean increased greater safety for Coloradans. But it will also mean reduced demands for funds for security and maintenance of the site as well as for cleanup work. And that can make additional funds available to meet the needs of other nuclear -weapons sites, including sites in Washington, Texas, Ohio, Tennessee, South Carolina, Idaho, New Mexico, and other States. As a crucial part of the cleanup, DOE intends to relocate several tons of plutonium and other radioactive materials from Rocky Flats. The previous Administration planned to ship the plutonium to the Savannah River site, in South Carolina. There, some of it was to be used to create mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear reactors and some was to be immobilized for disposal elsewhere. This plan was developed to implement an international agreement under which both the United States and Russia agreed to reduce stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium, This is an important part of our efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, which of course is so vital an aspect of our foreign and defense policies. It is also important to our national security to consolidate this surplus plutonium in one location so that it can be effectively guarded and efficiently managed--and since Rocky Flats is slated for closure, it does not make sense to keep the plutonium there. However, the Bush Administration now has adopted a new plutonium-disposition strategy that does not include immobilization. In turn, that has prompted the Governor of South Carolina to raise objections to having plutonium shipped to that State. The Governor has gone into federal court to prevent that from happening--and as a result, shipments of plutonium from Rocky Flats have been delayed. Other legislation has been introduced that addresses issues raised in that lawsuit, and the bill I am introducing today does not focus on them--it focuses only on the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats. That is because while Coloradans may differ about some things, we all agree that a prompt and effective cleanup and closure of the Rocky Flats site is a matter of highest priority for our state--and we are all concerned that the shipments of plutonium, originally scheduled to begin last fall, are not yet underway. We are worried that unless those shipments begin soon the DOE will be unable to achieve its goal of completing the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006. That is why I was disappointed last week when the House's Republican leadership refused to even allow consideration of including in the defense authorization bill a simple statement of the importance of a timely cleanup. That is why I think it is now essential to act to protect Colorado's interests in case DOE does not soon overcome obstacles to removal of the Rocky Flats plutonium. And that is the purpose of the bill I am introducing today. The bill is intended to make it more likely that DOE will have the ability and the incentive to meet the 2006 cleanup goal. It provides that if shipments of the Rocky Flats plutonium under the current disposition plan have not begun by July 1 of this year, DOE will be required to examine alternative plans and to report on those alternatives within 6 months. And if shipments have not been completed by November 1 of next year, as called for in current cleanup plans, DOE would be required to compensate Colorado at the rate of $1 million per day--up to $100 million per year--until all the Rocky Flats plutonium has been removed. These deadlines were not selected arbitrarily. It is essential that the plutonium now stored at Rocky Flats be removed by the fall of next year so DOE can accomplish other essential cleanup work that must be done in order to achieve a 2006 closure. If the plutonium stays at Rocky Flats too long, DOE runs the risk of missing other cleanup and closure milestones and of failing to live up to its commitments to Colorado. That is also why there is an immediate need to explore other alternative locations to which the plutonium can be sent. DOE did look at other alternatives before selecting the South Carolina site, so I think a new examination of alternatives would not take very long, but it must be done soon for DOE to stay on schedule at Rocky Flats. Admittedly, this is strong medicine. But I think strong medicine is required in this case, because this is a matter of such great importance to the country and particularly to Colorado. In drafting this bill, I cannot claim great originality. The requirement for a consideration of alternatives is based on legislation that Senator WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado's junior Senator has proposed, and the idea of a $1 million-per-day incentive is based on legislation introduced by our colleague, Representative LINDSEY GRAHAM to protect the interests of South Carolina. My purpose in shaping this proposal was not to be innovative, but to develop legislation that would protect Colorado's interests and advance the national interest in reducing our stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. Mr. Speaker, I have supported DOE's efforts to achieve an effective cleanup of Rocky Flats, closure of the site, and its transformation into a National Wildlife Refuge before the end of 2006. I have done so because I have considered that to be in the national interest as well as the interests of all Coloradans--and of that I am still convinced. The bill I am introducing today reflects my continuing determination to do all I can to see that DOE will continue to press forward to achieve those goals.
2A) National Defense Authorization Ms. KILPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, while I support the highest standards of equipment and pay for our troops, and acknowledge that the most important function of our national government is to ensure the safety of our citizens, I could not support H.R. 4546, the FY 2003 Defense Authorization Act. The measure over militarizes American goals and policies at our economic and political expense. Our nation is great. There is no other that can compete with it--particularly on the battlefield. This is true today, it was true yesterday and I will work to ensure that it is true tomorrow and into the future. Yet, the $383.3 billion that we authorized for Defense (which I might add, does not include the $10 billion authorization the President has requested for a terrorism contingency fund) is more than the combined defense budgets of the next closest 25 nations. Surely, we can afford other national priorities. The bill includes $7.8 billion for a National Missile Defense System that may or may not materialize. After spending more than $100 billion since its inception during the Reagan Administration, National Missile Defense tests have had little success and system requirements continue to be downgraded. Even if successful, a National Missile Defense System would have done nothing to prevent the events of 9-11. Furthermore, the Bush Administration's insistence on this system continues our move away from strategic international laws that have helped maintain nuclear stability since the Second World War. The $7.8 billion spent on a National Missile Defense System, alone, would shore up our homeland security and provide 21st century classrooms to our nation's children. For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I opposed this measure and voted against it on final passage. 2B) National Defense Authorization Act Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003. This bill provides appropriations for an increase in pay for our armed services personnel, which I believe is very important for the security of our great nation. The authorization provides an across-the-board 4.1 percent pay increase for military personnel. The across-the-board and targeted raises would be the equivalent of a 4.7 percent across-the-board raise and will reduce the pay gap between the military and private sector from 7.5 percent to 6.4 percent. Our service men and women work very hard to protect this country and its way of life. Therefore, I believe that by raising their pay and giving more than a billion dollars more than the President requested, this will increase morale, which is very important. On the other hand, this Authorization provides funds for flawed defense items. First, the Air Force's controversial F-22 Raptor Fighter, the next-generation premier fighter, which is intended to replace the F-15 and F-16. It is designed to have both air-to-air and air-to-ground fighter capabilities. This aircraft is plagued by cost overruns, technical problems and questions over whether the Air Force should direct its resources to expensive manned aircraft when newer technologies and strategies are more effective and less costly. The bill authorizes $1 billion for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) procurement and research and development. UAV's have the ability to provide first-hand reconnaissance of opposition forces without placing lives at risk. Moreover, UAV's have proven particularly valuable in Afghanistan by identifying and tracking enemy targets, and conducting missions too dangerous for manned aircraft. By canceling the F-22, the Air Force can free up substantial funding that can be used to more aggressively pursue programs such as long range bombers. Yet, we fund this flawed and expensive jet fighter. Another flawed item is the controversial Crusader artillery system. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld signaled his intent to cancel the Crusader program, and to divert the $475 million in research and development funds earmarked for the program to another system. In addition, the President asked this Congress not to revive the $11 billion program, because he fully supported Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to scrap the artillery system and seek alternatives more in keeping with the current threat facing the United States. The Congress ignores the President's request and still proposes funds for this flawed and unwanted item. Along with these flawed programs, this Authorization will also relax environmental laws. Although, the bill authorizes the President's request for the Energy Department's environmental restoration and cleanup programs. The Defense Department environmental programs, relaxes some current requirements under our environmental laws which protects wildlife habitats on military installations. Here again, the Administration is trying to disrupt our delicate wildlife habitats to benefit its friends. However, the most problematic item within the authorization is the $7.8 billion ballistic missile defense . The reality with a ballistic missile defense system is that if a country is capable of building a long-range missile , and has the motivation to launch a missile against the United States, it has the capability and motivation to build effective countermeasures to any anti-ballistic missile defense system. Furthermore, the difficulty in developing a feasible ballistic missile defense system is not getting complex hardware to work as intended. It is that the defense system has to work against an enemy who is trying to thwart the system. Moreover, the attacking country can do so with technology much simpler than the technology needed for the defense system. This means that the attacker has the advantage, despite our technological edge. A year long study was conducted, that examined, in detail, what countermeasures an emerging missile state could take to defeat the missile defense system the United States is planning. The study showed that effective countermeasures required technology much less sophisticated than is needed to build a long-range ballistic missile . In addition, a high-level commission convened by Congress to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, noted that potential attackers could build such bomblets. I ask "how is it possible that this problem is being ignored?" The Pentagon is balking on how to proceed. It has divided the missile defense problem into two parts: (1) getting the system to work against missiles without realistic countermeasures and (2) getting the defense to work against countermeasures. Few doubt the first step could eventually be done. The Defense Department has tested and re-tested this ballistic missile defense system, and each time results have not achieved their desired intentions. But yet, the President wants to continue funding this flawed policy. In almost every case, post-test doubts have been raised. Critics have charged that test results over the past two decades have been exaggerated by false claims of success and promises of performance that later proved false. Many tests were proven to have had their targets significantly enhanced to ensure the likelihood of success. Furthermore, kinetic kill as a concept for destroying long-range ballistic missiles is even more problematic at this stage. There is no empirical evidence to support the contention that kinetic kill for ICBM defense will work. Despite the prowess of American technology, there are no quick, cheap or easy solutions in missile defense . Therefore, we should allocate funds for more pressing defense needs and spend our funds on systems that work and will enhance real security for all Americans. To assume otherwise is to base defense planning on wishful thinking. An effective defense is based on preparing for credible threats with workable systems. Not funding systems that have failed in tests as the Republicans have done in this bill.
WMD TERRORISM ***************************
CHEM/ BIO WEAPONS ***************************
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