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NUCLEAR/ NONPROLIFERATION
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1A) Global Nuclear Security Initiative Act of 2002

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, today I am proud to introduce the Global Nuclear Security Initiative Act of 2002 that was also recently offered in the Senate by Senator JEAN CARNAHAN.

The January 2001 report of the bipartisan task force chaired by former Senator HOWARD BAKER and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler has often been quoted but one of its conclusions bears restating today: ``the national security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing and/or neutralizing the equivalent of more than 80,000 nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons would constitute the highest return on investment in any current U.S. national security defense program.''

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our nonproliferation programs with Russia have improved America's national security greatly by dismantling Russia's nuclear facilities, finding jobs for their unemployed weapons scientists, and improving the security of Russian weapons and material. But as our relationship with Russia takes on a more cooperative definition, first with the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in Moscow and with the signing on May 28 in Rome of an agreement between NATO and Russia on a new working relationship, security threats arising from other nations with inadequately stored nuclear materials are increasing. Indeed, India and Pakistan's conflict over Kashmir has been escalating over the past several months and while tensions between the two countries are not new, unlike during the cold war, neither side has a clear idea of what actions would trigger a nuclear response from the other.

The challenges of translating some of our nonproliferation efforts to other countries of concern such as India, Pakistan, China or North Korea are significant but worth dealing with. While the nonproliferation programs of the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State are effective, they were not designed to meet the full range of terrorist threats now facing the United States. Expanding these programs to cover countries outside the former Soviet Union, to address the threat of radiological materials and to defend against the threat of terrorist sabotage of nuclear power plants abroad, is in the United States' national security interest.

The bill I am introducing today is an important first step in expanding America's defense against the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It calls on the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, to develop a comprehensive program of activities to encourage all countries to adhere to the highest security standards for their nuclear facilities and material.

Second, the bill requires the Department of Energy to establish a systematic approach for securing radiological materials other than uranium and plutonium outside of the United States.

Finally, the bill requires the Department of Energy to develop plans for preventing terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants outside the United States. These are simple but important steps and I encourage my colleagues to support this legislation.

1B) Yucca Mountain and Nuclear Waste Policy

 Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I want to speak about a need of this Senate to act and act soon. I am speaking about a provision within the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 that required a procedure by which this country would ultimately step forward in determining a permanent storage site for high-level nuclear waste. It is known here as Yucca Mountain in the State of Nevada. It has been a high-profile issue, one that has been given a great deal of debate over the last good number of years, but one that has come again to the floor of the Senate in which we must make a decision to make one step forward in a review and licensing process to determine whether the site of Yucca Mountain in the State of Nevada is capable of handling and effectively storing for 10,000 years the high-level nuclear waste of this country.

   In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, we established what is known as an expedited procedure for consideration of the resolution approving the President's selection of the nuclear waste site. Now the President has selected, because the NEPA process through the Department of Energy has determined that it is now time to go to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their review and their determination as to whether the site ought to be licensed. So the time is at hand, as was seen in 1982 under this act.

   The expedited procedure under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, specifically provides that once an approval resolution is on the calendar--and that means the authorizing committee has acted and sent it forward, as it has--the law says very specifically that any Senator may move to proceed to its consideration. And the motion to proceed is privileged and nondebatable.

   Under current practices, measures normally reach this floor through agreement to a unanimous consent request by the majority leader. It is critically important for the operation and the procedure of this Senate on a daily basis that the majority leader of the Senate set the agenda. But there is always the provision, because we are all equal in the Senate under the Constitution, that sometimes the majority leader may not set the agenda the way the majority of the Senate would want it set. And, of course, that can be objected to and a vote to proceed.

   But what we are talking about here is recognition of a special procedure--unprecedented, or at least certainly one that does not establish the precedent of the normal decorum of the Senate. If unanimous consent cannot be obtained, as we know now, the Senate has taken care of that procedure by simply allowing the rule or the decision to be tested.

   The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides special statutory authority to make exceptions to the contemporary practice to which I have just spoken.

   Let me say that again. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides a special statutory authority to make exception to contemporary practice. In other words, it is not to establish a precedent. It is not to override the majority leader, as some would like to have it thought today and are certainly arguing. It is in fact the law of the country and not the rules of the Senate to which we are speaking. It is one of four statutes adopted since the 100th Congress that expressly allow any Senator to offer a motion to proceed to an item of approval or disapproval. Those statutes are not redundant to Senate rules and do not upset contemporary practice regarding motions to proceed to other legislation on the Senate calendar.

   Exercising a Senator's right under the statutory authority in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act should be considered extraordinary, and not a general assault on the normal prerogatives of the majority leader.

   When the Senate passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, it envisioned a circumstance in which a leader might be unwilling to propound a motion to proceed. It appears that may be what is happening on the floor of the Senate. Thus, the law expressly permits someone else to act so Congress can work its will before a statutory deadline passes.

   Finally, let me say this: If a leader will not propound a motion to proceed, he cannot contend his leadership prerogatives will be violated if someone else moves the procedure. You can't contend that you have been violated if in fact that is the law of the land. And that is the law of the land.

   The very procedure I have outlined is expressly stated in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Agreement with such a position gives the leader absolute and unilateral authority to veto power over consideration of any legislation, if in fact that can be argued. But at times, when TRENT LOTT was majority leader of the Senate, that was challenged, and a majority of the Senate stayed with the leader when it dealt with contemporary legislation of the moment and the setting of the calendar outside the statutes of the Federal Government within the rules of the Senate.

   I wanted to speak about that briefly this morning because I know that is now being talked about amongst us Senators as we ultimately come to a time, prior to late July, when we must address this issue for the sake of the country, for the sake of ratepayers, certainly for the sake of the future of the energy sources of our country, and especially for nuclear - generated energy.

   It is important to understand, and I will be to the Chamber speaking out about this issue more as we develop it. I would hope that the majority leader or the authorizing committee chairman who brought the resolution forward would act as they should under the rules to establish a time and a date certain when this Senate can debate and act responsibly on this most critical national environmental issue.

1C) Yucca Mountain

Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I rise today to respond to remarks by the senior Senator from Idaho on the Senate floor procedures outlined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act regarding Yucca Mountain. And I come to the floor today out of great respect for the traditions of the U.S. Senate. I am a freshman Senator. I have only been here a year. But one of the first things I did when I arrived was to seek the advice of the senior Senator from West Virginia, Senator BYRD, our very own Senate historian. I asked him for a copy of his history of the Senate which I have turned to often. I haven't had the opportunity to speak to him directly on this matter, but I turned to his books for guidance.

   Madam President, when you have the chance, turn to Volume II page 191, and see what Senator BYRD says about the powers of the majority leader. He says the majority leader ..... ``determines what matters or measures will be scheduled for floor action and when.'' The Senator from Idaho is planning to change that by asserting that it would be alright for any member to determine when the Yucca Mountain resolution comes to floor. he said that, ``the Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides a special statutory authority to make exception to contemporary practice.'' That is not the case. I have the act right here.

   The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 does state that it shall be in order ``for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of such resolution.'' But the act also states that the procedures outlined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ``supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such other rules.''

   The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provision permitting any Member to move to proceed to the consideration of the Yucca Mountain resolution is consistent with Senate rules, therefore it does not supersede the rules of the Senate. In the modern history of the Senate, no Member, other than the majority leader (or a designee), has successfully made a motion to proceed to a matter or measure.

   Here are the facts:

   CRS indicates there are six statutory expedited procedures in current law which explicitly state that ``any Member of the Senate'' may offer the motion to proceed: Executive Reorganization Act; Atomic Energy Act; Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990; Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act; Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

   According to a March 28, 2002 CRS memorandum, the language in these six statutes which states that ``any Member of the Senate'' may offer the motion to proceed is ``consistent with the Standing Rules of the Senate, which permit any Senator to make a motion to proceed, but also with the general Senate practice under which Senators routinely concede to the majority leader the function of taking actions to determine the floor agenda.

   So the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is not, as the senior Senator from Idaho stated, ``a special procedure.''

   Next, a June 11 CRS memorandum indicates that since the 100th Congress, consideration of five measures was governed by some statutory procedure explicitly permitting any Senator to offer a motion to proceed to consider. In three of these cases, action to call up the measure for consideration was taken by the Senate majority leader. However, in two of those cases, no Senator took action to call up the other two measures. The majority leader secured their indefinite postponement. That means no Senators offered a motion to proceed, even when explicitly permitted to do so by statute. The majority leader kept control of the Senate.

   The Senate is a body which, quite rightly, reveres tradition. We must, as we have so few rules. As a new Member, I relied on the guidance from the Parliamentarian, the Congressional Research Service, and my senior colleagues. I am certain that if anyone, other than the majority leader, successfully offers a motion to proceed to the Yucca Mountain resolution, it will break with Senate tradition, undermine the goal of the majority leader, and allow other Senators to control the floor. I hope the Members of this body will think before they move forward on the resolution.
   In closing, I thank the majority leader. He is keeping his word that he gave to the people of the State of Nevada, and the people of the State of Nevada say thank you to the majority leader.


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MISSILE DEFENSE AND TECHNOLOGY
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2) ABM Treaty Has Ceased to Exist

Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise to acknowledge the fact that today, 6 months after President Bush announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the Treaty lapses. The 30-year old treaty, which most consider to be the cornerstone of arms control, now no longer exists.

   The significance of today has gone largely unnoticed. Press coverage has been minimal so most American will likely not realize what happens today. The objections of Russia and China to the withdrawal have been muted. Our European allies have reluctantly accepted the withdrawal. Some would say that this lack of fanfare proves that the ABM Treaty was a relic of the cold war and needed to be renounced. I would argue that while today's withdrawal seems insignificant at this moment, it has profound implications for the future.

   When President Bush announced his intention to withdraw from the treaty, he stated: ``I have conclude the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.'' I would argue that this statement is incorrect. First, the greatest threat from terrorists is not from a long range missile but from methods we have witnessed and watched for since September 11 conventional transportation like planes and cargo ships, used as weapons.

   Secondly, any testing of missile defenses that could be planned for the next several years would not violate the ABM Treaty. We simply do not have the technology yet to test a system in violation of the treaty. An article in today's New York Times states that on Saturday, ground will be broken for a missile test site in Fort Greely Alaska. The article states that this test site would violate the treaty. That is not correct. Under Article IV of the ABM treaty and paragraph 5 of a 1978 agreed statement, the U.S. simply has to notify Russia of U.S. intent to build another test range. As a matter fact, the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization act authorized the funding for the Alaska test bed prior to the President's announcement to withdraw from the treaty. As a supporter of the ABM Treaty and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I can assure you that Congress clearly had no intent to authorize an action that would violate the treaty. The technologies which would indeed violate the ABM Treaty, sea-based and space-based systems, are mere concepts that are years away from constituting an action that would violate the treaty. In sum, despite the claims of the President, there was no compelling reason to withdraw at this time.
   In addition, today, the United States becomes the first nation since World War II to withdraw from a major international security agreement. In the past 50 years only one other nation has attempted such an action. In 1993 North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which caused an international crisis until North Korea reconsidered. The U.S. withdrawal has not caused an international crisis, but it does send a subtle signal. If the U.S. can withdraw from a treaty at any time without compelling reasons, what is to stop Russia or China from withdrawing from an agreement? Furthermore, what basis would the U.S. have for objecting to such a withdrawal since our nation began the trend? This administration must keep in mind that other nations can also take unilateral actions, but we might not be as comfortable with those decisions. Indeed, as we seek to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction, this withdrawal sends the opposite signal.
   As I mentioned before, the ABM treaty was the cornerstone of arms control. With the cornerstone gone, there are worries about an increase in nuclear proliferation. As Joseph Cirincione said, ``No matter what some people may tell you, each side's nuclear force is based primarily on the calculation of the other side's force.'' If China believes its force could be defeated by a U.S. missile shield, China may decide it is in its best interest to increase the number of weapons in its arsenal to overwhelm the shield. If China increases its nuclear missile production, neighboring rival India may find it necessary to recalculate the size of its force. Of course, Pakistan would then increase its inventory to match India. So, while there seems to be little consequence to cessation of the ABM Treaty today, if we are not careful it could be the spark of a new arms race.
   As of today, the ABM Treaty no longer exists. But our work has just begun. Withdrawing from this treaty dictates that we redouble our efforts on other nonproliferation and arms control agreements. Since September 11, every American has become acutely aware of the need to eliminate and secure nuclear materials so that they do not become the weapon of a terrorist. The only way we will not regret today's action is to prove by future actions that the U.S. is truly committed to arms control and nonproliferation. The United States should robustly fund Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. The United States should pursue further negotiations with the Russians and agree to actually dismantle some weapons rather simply place them in storage. The United States should also ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
   In his withdrawal announcement last December 13, President Bush said, ``This is not a day for looking back, but a day for looking forward ..... '' I agree. We cannot look back to a treaty that no longer exists, but we must work diligently from this day forward to ensure that the United States is taking the steps necessary to maintain the peace and security once sustained by the ABM Treaty.

2B) Expressing Support for Withdrawal from ABM

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to introduce a resolution that would express support for President George W. Bush's withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Today marks the conclusion of the 6-month notification of the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by the United States.

My legislation reaffirms that the United States' national security has fundamentally changed since 1972. Not only do the Russians and Chinese have ballistic missile arsenals that are capable of reaching the United States, but so do a growing number of countries that are hostile to the United States' interests, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

This resolution simply says that the Congress supports the decision by the President to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with article 15 of the treaty. It also states that Congress supports efforts to provide for the establishment of a robust layered missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies.

Very frankly, the United States faces new and complex threats. September 11, 2001, showed the new threats to our national security and the potential threats we face by more than 32 countries that are working on ballistic missile development. The new threats involve states with considerably fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, reliability and range. However, emerging ballistic missile systems can potentially kill tens of thousands, or even millions, of Americans, depending on the warhead and intended target.

I believe we cannot allow these countries to use ballistic missiles as instruments of blackmail against the United States and its allies. The way we can and must defend our homeland is through the development of a layered missile defense system, a layered system that would violate the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Clearly, the day has come to withdraw from this dated and ineffective document that was created more than 30 years ago during a different time and under different conditions than those that face our national security today.

I would also like to submit the following sponsors: The gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Jeff Miller), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Aderholt), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones), the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), and the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. WATTS).



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WMD TERRORISM

3A) Syria Accountability Act of 2002

At the request of Mr. SANTORUM, the name of the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. INHOFE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2215, a bill to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of mass destruction , cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil, and by so doing hold Syria accountable for its role in the Middle East, and for other purposes.
   At the request of Mrs. BOXER, the name of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. JOHNSON) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2215, supra.

3B) Initial Rules for Joint Intelligence Committee Investigation
INITIAL SCOPE AND SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR THE JOINT INQUIRY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE -- (House of Representatives - June 12, 2002)

---

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask that the initial scope and the supplemental rules for the Joint Inquiry being conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence be published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Both the Joint Inquiry's initial scope and its supplemental procedural rules were adopted by the full membership of HPSCI and SSCI.
   Preamble
   To reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks; to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised; and to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of government:
   THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
   AND
   HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
   ADOPT THIS
   INITIAL SCOPE OF JOINT INQUIRY
   Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and all other authority vested in the Committees.
   The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is--
   (a) to conduct an investigation into, and study of, all matters that may have any tendency to reveal the full facts about--
   (1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States, the response of the United States Government including that of the Intelligence Community to international terrorism, from the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the present, and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks or attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States;
   (2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers or their associates, and what was done with that information;
   (3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of September 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to learn of, or prevent, those events;
   (4) whether any information developed before or after September 11 indicates systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks in advance, or that, if remedied, could help the Community identify and prevent such attacks in the future;
   (5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state, and local governments with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing, and coping with international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001).
   (6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community's responses to past intelligence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terrorism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and
   (7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Committees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such recommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and any administrative or structural changes, or other actions, as they determine to be necessary or desirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and
   (b) to fulfill the Constitutional oversight and informing functions of the Congress with regard to the matters examined in the Joint Inquiry.
   House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules
   In connection with the Joint Inquiry with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence into the events of September 11, 2001, authorized by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (``HPSCI'') pursuant to Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives and Rule 9 of HPSCI's Rules of Procedure, and pursuant to Rule XI(2)(a) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, HPSCI adopts the following Joint Inquiry Rules to supplement HPSCI's Rules for purposes of the Joint Inquiry only:
   JOINT INQUIRY RULE 1. JOINT PROCEEDINGS
   1.1. HPSCI may conduct hearings jointly with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All joint hearings shall be considered hearings of both Committees.
   1.2. The Rules of Procedure of HPSCI and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence shall apply in all hearings and other proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, except where superseded by these Joint Inquiry Rules, provided that, at any joint hearing, if any rules of the two Committees are inconsistent, the rules of that Committee whose Chairman or his designee is presiding shall apply.
   1.3. For the purposes of the proceedings of this Joint Inquiry, all employees on the staff of either Committee working on the Joint Inquiry shall be considered to be acting on behalf of both Committees.
   JOINT INQUIRY RULE 2. HEARINGS
   2.1. All testimony at hearings shall be taken under oath or affirmation.
   JOINT INQUIRY RULE 3. DEPOSITIONS
   3.1. All testimony taken, and all documents, records, or other materials produced, at a deposition of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence shall be considered part of the record of both Committees.

3C) Excepts from Discussion of Supplemental Appropriations

  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 9 minutes.

   Mr. Speaker, the motion to instruct conferees directs the House Members serving on the conference to convert what has been all too often merely a rhetorical assault on terrorism into a real war. It requires that we go to the higher dollar figure on any item directly related to the war on terrorism, and it also directs that we delete from the conference report funding for any item that is earmarked for a specific project or individual Member of Congress. That is to ensure that this supplemental remains focused on the job before us, fighting terrorism, and that those engaged in that war on behalf of the American people have the resources that they need to conduct that war.

   I find that ordinary people are somewhat amazed when they find that, despite all the rhetoric about a war on terrorism, we often continue to decline to provide the resources needed to actually conduct that effort. One example is the fact that the Pentagon called up 80,000 Guard and Reservists following September 11.

   We need those Reserves because our regular force is overwhelmed with all of the requirements being placed on them. If you do not believe me, Secretary Rumsfeld has made that statement. We do not have enough mechanics to keep all of our planes in the air, we do not have enough MPs to protect our bases and guard prisoners. But, remarkably, when the Pentagon told the White House budget office that it would cost $5.8 billion more than was contained in the regular fiscal 2003 appropriation bill to pay the cost of those Guards and Reservists called up to active duty, the White House budget office told them they could only have $4.1 billion. As a result, many of those reserves will have to be sent home early, unless we appropriate a considerable amount above the White House request. In my view, this is ludicrous. It is one of those situations that continues because it is so outrageous that nobody really believes it is going on.

   The truth is that some of the same people at the other end of the avenue who give lectures about the war on terrorism, particularly in the OMB, are particularly stingy when it comes to providing cash that is actually needed to conduct the effort. As a result, the resources needed by those who are actually engaged in that effort are not getting there and will not get there unless Congress acts to reverse the request.

   I would give the House another example. We have heard a lot of talk in the last several days about a dirty bomb. The President and Secretary of Energy, a former Republican Senator, a man named to that office by the President and confirmed by the Senate when it was still in Republican hands, a man respected on both sides of the aisle, Secretary Abraham, has asked that we spend some money in this bill to deny terrorists access to the radioactive materials that could be used to build a dirty bomb. He asked that we clean up sites where we used to make nuclear weapons and increase security at those sites. He asked that we relocate low level radioactive materials in a central depository. He asked that we provide more security for the movement of nuclear weapons.

   This the White House Budget Director did not say no to, they said ``hell,

[Page: H3460]

no.'' I would like to insert in the RECORD at this point a letter written by the Assistant Secretary of Energy for the Budget to OMB in order to demonstrate what I just said.
   THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
   Washington, DC, March 14, 2002.
Hon. MITCHELL DANIELS, Jr.,
Director, Office of Management and Budget, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington, DC.
   DEAR MR. DANIELS: This letter and accompanying enclosure transmit the Department of Energy's proposal to request supplemental funding to meet urgent and compelling requirements for safeguards and security, emergency response, and energy security and assurance activities.
   The Department of Energy is entrusted with the mission of designing, developing, manufacturing, assembling, stockpiling, refurbishing, decommissioning, and most importantly protecting the Nation's critical nuclear complex. To meet the Department's critical security mission, we are storing vast amounts of materials that remain highly volatile and subject to unthinkable consequences if placed in the wrong hands. These materials permeate the Departmental complex including sites under the programmatic jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Environmental Management, and the Office of Science.
   The events of September 11 resulted in heightened security throughout the complex. Our sites were directed to conduct vulnerability assessments based on an evaluation of potential consequences of the type of event that occurred on September 11. These security vulnerabilities were assessed on a site-by-site basis and immediate action was taken to mitigate many of the concerns. As a result, the Department issued Interim Implementing Guidance to the Design Basis Threat document that outlined the basis for initial physical security measures. In conjunction with this guidance, I directed the Departmental Elements to reassess their security requirements and associated costs with a view towards maintaining the highest level of security commensurate with the revised threat and response strategy. Although the initial supplemental and funds appropriated by Congress helped respond to the most urgent near term security needs, the Department now is unable to meet the next round of critical security mission requirements.
   The funding request of $379.7 million identified in the enclosure is a critical down payment to the safety and security of our Nation and its people. Failure to support these urgent security requirements is a risk that would be unwise.
   I appreciate the time your staff has spent with us in discussions about the Department's security concerns and needs. However, as you can see, we need your financial support to continue addressing the critical security requirements that face the Department and our Nation. Accordingly, if you and your senior staff need a more detailed classified briefing of our requirements, threats, and strategies, please have your staff contact Mr. Joseph Mahaley, the Department's Director of Security, at 202-586-3345.
   My point of contact on the specifics of this funding supplemental request is Dr. Bruce M. Carnes, the Director of the Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/Chief Financial Officer, who can be reached on 202-586-4171.
   Sincerely,
SPENCER ABRAHAM.

--

   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
   Washington, DC.
Ms. ROBIN CLEVELAND,
Program Associate Director, National Security Division, Office of Management and Budget, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington, DC.
   DEAR MS. CLEVELAND: The Department of Energy is now at a crucial juncture in executing our safeguards and security program. The Department's remaining safeguards and security budgets are not sufficient to implement the security posture requirements that appropriately respond to the September 11th attacks. On March 14, the Secretary transmitted to Director Daniels supplemental funding proposals fro safeguards and security, emergency response, and energy security. The Secretary's transmittal letter described the underlying need to increase our response capabilities for emergencies and improve the security posture of Department in order to adequately protect the public, our workers, and the environment. We appreciate your support for our $26.4 million supplemental request to increase emergency response efforts, however, we are very disappointed that we did not get your support for supplemental security funding.
   We are disconcerted that OMB refused our security supplemental request. I would have much preferred to have heard this from you personally, and been given an opportunity to discuss, not to mention, appeal your decision. We were told by Energy Branch staff that the Department's security supplemental proposals were not supported because the revised Design Basis Threat, the document that outlines the basis for physical security measures, has not been completed. This isn't a tenable position for you to take, in my view. We are not operating, and cannot operate under Interim Implementing Guidance, and you have not provided resources to enable us to do so.
   Given our current security funding and the physical security situation we face today, Mr. Joseph Mahaley, our Security Director, and I would like to meet with you to discuss our fiscal year 2002 and 2003 safeguards and security concerns. I can be contacted on (202) 586-4171 to arrange this discussion.
   Sincerely,
Bruce M. Carnes,
   Director, Office of Management,
Budget and Evaluation/CFO.


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CHEM/ BIO WEAPONS
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4A) America’s Commitment Against Bioterrorism

Mr. FRIST. Madam President, our vulnerability to a bioterrorist attack was highlighted by the events that unfolded last October, when anthrax took the lives of innocent Americans and put thousands more in jeopardy. How we address our vulnerabilities and respond to bioterrorism will be radically improved as a result of new legislation signed by President Bush. The greatest tool that terrorists have in their arsenal is to play on America's vulnerabilities and fears. This legislation makes great strides to significantly improve our ability to respond to bioterrorist threats. Yet it is critical that we provide the appropriate information so that families can prepare and protect themselves in the event of a potential attack. Information is power, and by better preparing ourselves, we can avoid being paralyzed by fear.

   Many news organizations have already begun to do their part by providing the necessary information for communities to feel safe. Good Housekeeping, which is read by thousands of readers each month, is a good example. In its April edition, Good Housekeeping answered the questions readers often have about bioterrorism , gave suggestions families could use to protect and prepare themselves, and provided information on what Congress is doing to lessen our vulnerability to bioterrorist attack. The magazine went a step further by providing a form readers could fill out urging Congress to act quickly to address bioterrorism . I was pleased that thousands of readers did respond with their views on this issue and the importance of passing legislation that would keep American families safe.

   Last fall's anthrax attacks changed the way America looked at bioterrorism . Overnight, the fear of bioterrorism moved from a remote possibility, to a reality for which we must be prepared. The bioterrorism bill, which will soon be signed into law, will greatly improve our ability to respond to a biological threat, equipping communities with the tools they need to strengthen our local health centers and educate those first responders, the doctors, nurses and emergency personnel on the front lines. But information for the general public is also key to improving our readiness. I commend the many news organizations that have recognized this fact and continue to get Americans the information they need to feel safe and secure. The unique nature of terrorism requires all of us to work together. While the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks have changed the world we live in, coming together to meet a common challenge remains the American way.

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